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FOR MARCELLA 

If Chance will have me king, why, Chance may crown me, 
Without my stir. 
- Shakespeare, Macbeth, I, iv, 144-5 
Rendons au hasard ce qui est au hasard et à Dieu ce qui est à 
Dieu...Ce que nous admirons par-dessus tout dans une rencontre du 
genre de celle de Waterloo, c'est la prodigieuse habilité du hasard. 
- Victor Hugo, Les Misérables, Ile partie,Livre I, XVI 
Chance has an empire which reduces choice to a fool's illusion. 
- George Eliot, Middlemarch, Book 7, Ch.64 
One's happiness must in some measure be always at the mercy of 
chance. 
- Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility, Vol.11, Ch.36 
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INTRODUCTION 
- "A's theory of chance and its implications 
have a fascination of their own, which must 
be my excuse for allowing them what some 
may consider disproportionate space" 
- W.K.C. GUTHRIE, A History...V\, 233-4 
The topic of chance is one with which all human beings are 
confronted in day-to-day life. Everyone knows how it feels to have 
good luck and bad luck, and everyone attributes certain unexpected 
outcomes to chance. Chance is the spice of the plots of innumerable 
works of literature. At the level of techniques it is necessary to know 
about chance from a mathematical and statistical point of view, if one 
is in the business e.g. of gambling or insurance. Finally, scientists in 
many fields use the concepts of chance and probability, e.g. in 
physics, physiology, natural history, genetics and evolutionary biol-
ogy.1 Thus chance is a topic of concern to man at many levels, as a 
day-to-day phenomenon, as a technique and in science. It is also a 
topic that has far-reaching implications, the depths of which can be 
analyzed only by philosophy. 
The importance of the topic of chance to the philosopher, apart 
from the intrinsic interest in analysing this highly complex concept, 
lies in the fact that chance has been invoked by many distinguished 
thinkers to explain the order in the universe, the origin of life as well 
as human freedom and happiness. These topics are, of course, among 
those of foremost concern to any philosopher. Aristotle deals with 
chance in the Physics as part of his study of causality and was clearly 
strongly motivated to study the topic by his concern to refute the 
attribution of the order in the universe to chance by Democritus.2 In 
his ethical works he examines to what extent chance plays a role in 
1
 Cf. GiGERENZER, The Empire of Chance... 
2
 Cf. Aristotle's indignation in Phys. II, iv, 196 b 1-3 and the conclusion of Phys. 
II, vi. 
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happiness. In his biological works Aristotle also uses the concept of 
chance to explain the origin of some forms of life. In the conclusion 
to this study I shall suggest that the contemporary reference to chance 
requires to be completed by important elements from Aristotle's 
analysis. 
In the history of philosophy it would appear that four main views 
of chance have been held3 apart from that of Aristotle, which, as will 
be seen, goes further than any of them. The first of these views is 
referred to by Aristotle at the start of Phys. II, ¡v. It is that of those 
who say that nothing happens by chance, but that there is a definite 
cause of everything we say happens by chance, i.e. chance is a mis-
leading term conveying no content. This is the view held later by 
Francis Bacon, for whom chance is his prime example of the idols of 
the market-place (idolafori).4 
The second view is that of the preSocratic universal determinists, 
Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus,5 and later that 
of the Stoics, who attributed certain necessarily caused occurrences to 
chance. They saw no contradiction in holding that a necessary event 
occurred by chance. Thus for them chance appears to refer to the 
subjectively unexpected nature of certain necessary events. This 
viewpoint will be examined in detail in Ch. 4(b). 
The third view of chance stresses the unknown or unpredictable 
nature of the cause of a chance event. Thus in modern times Bertrand 
Russell defined a chance event as one, the cause of which is 
unknown,6 while J.S. Mill held a chance event to be the outcome of 
3
 SOONTIENS, Evolutie..АО lists 8 meanings of chance in contemporary biology, 
which can, however, be grouped under the four more general interpretations now to 
be dealt with in the text. 
* Novum Organon I, Ix. 
5
 For these preSocratics everything takes place necessarily. Cf. infra Ch.4(b) and 
Aët. 1.29.7 (DK 59A 66). 
6
 Cf. Bertrand RUSSELL, Reply to Criticisms...738: "What do I mean by a "chance" 
event? I mean one of which the causation is unknown." For a more detailed account 
of Russell's understanding of a chance event cf. Sidney HOOK, Bertrand Russell's 
Philosophy of History... 672-4. Cf. p. 674: "Nor does it [Russell's account of chance] 
breach the postulate of determinism. Chance events are not uncaused events but 
events relative to some determining strand or strands which they twist or snarl in ways 
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the concurrence of two independent causal chains. Such definitions 
do not claim for chance a distinct ontological status, but distinguish 
chance events from others merely on the basis of their objective 
unpredictability, not on the basis that they are uncaused. 
According to a fourth view, however, which was first put forward 
by Epicurus, chance events are entirely uncaused. Thus Epicurus, in 
his famous theory of the παρέγκλισι?, more commonly known by the 
Latin term clinamen (mentioned only in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 
II, 292) held that the origin of the universe and the source of human 
free will is chance, by which he means that they are entirely 
uncaused. Chance breaches the fundamental laws of cause and effect 
and is the assertion of a force for which no cause can be given and no 
explanation offered. 
CS. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, held universal de­
terminism to be a mere unnecessary postulate of science, which 
empirical evidence tended to disconfirm. The more precisely scien­
tific observations are made, the more numerous the irregular 
departures from scientific laws. Only by granting the occurrence of a 
chance element in every event can one account for the diversity of the 
universe.8 Tychism (the term he invented) or the doctrine of absolute 
that cannot be foretold by a consideration of the laws alone that describe earlier 
portions of the strands." 
7
 For Mill's account of chance cf. MILL, A System of Logic...Book III, Chapters 
xvii and xviii, pp. 525-547, esp. 526: "Chance is usually spoken of in direct antithesis 
to law; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to any law, is attributed to 
chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens is the result of some law; is an 
effect of causes, and could have been predicted from a knowledge of the existence of 
those causes, and from their laws....An event occurring by chance, may be better 
described as a coincidence from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity... It 
is incorrect, then, to say that any phenomenon is produced by chance; but we may say 
that two or more phenomena are conjoined by chance, that they coexist or succeed 
one another only by chance; meaning that they are in no way related through 
causation..." 
8
 Cf. PEIRCE, Collected Papers...6.59: "By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life 
as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within 
narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and 
great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the 
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chance means for Peirce indeterminism in reality and not just 
indeterminism due to our lack of knowledge. Thus the universe and its 
development and human free will are uncaused. Peirce was himself 
aware that his theory was related to that of Epicurus: "If I make the 
atoms swerve - as I do -1 make them swerve but very very little"9 
For William James only chance can explain free will. He holds 
chance to be the negation of necessity. For the determinist every 
human decision is the only possible one. However, James held that 
human choice was a real possibility. The fact that a certain event 
occurred provides no evidence that certain other events might not 
have occurred instead. A belief in the existence of such possible 
events was for James an instinctive feeling. James held that the 
conflict he saw between God's omniscience and a belief in chance 
could be solved by holding that God knows the ends he wishes to 
achieve, but not the exact means to these ends. There are various 
ambiguous possibilities in God's plan, and at these points man's free 
will comes into play, deciding on means to already determined ends. 
The way in which human beings choose is uncaused, i.e. occurs by 
chance, i.e. is not predetermined.10 
Thus the theses in regard to the functions of chance in these four 
main interpretations in the history of philosophy excluding Aristotle's 
interpretation may be subdivided as follows: 
(1) Chance is a misleading term with no content (the view of 
Francis Bacon); 
(2) Chance is the name given to a surprising event, which is 
nonetheless caused necessarily (view of preSocratic universal deter-
minists and the Stoa); 
(3) Chance is the name given to an event the cause of which is 
unknown to us (view of Russell); 
universe, in the only sense in which the really JIII generis and new can be said to be 
accounted for" 
9
 PEIRCE, Collected Papers...6.20\. On Peirce cf. further DEBROCK, Peirce, a 
Philosopher for the 21st century...14-16; OEHLER, Charles Sanders Peirce, 100-
105; COSCULLUELA, Peirce on Tychism and Determinism.... 
10
 For an account of the relationship of chance and free will in James cf. BIRD, 
William James... 147-160. 
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(4) Chance is the name given to an event that is the unexpected 
outcome of two independent causal chains (view of Mill); 
(5) Chance is a mere name given to the absence of a cause of the 
order in the universe and its development (view of Epicurus and 
Peirce); 
(6) Chance is a term used to explain human free choice (view of 
Epicurus, Peirce and James). 
Quantum mechanics has given rise to the question, based on 
Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty and von Neumann's theorem, as 
to whether certain subatomic events are not inherently unpredictable 
and whether the principle of universal determinism has not been 
proven false on the subatomic level. There exists no agreement on this 
topic. However, the question must be subdivided into two corre-
sponding to (5) and (3) above, namely the question whether (a) events 
on the subatomic level are entirely uncaused or (b) whether the causes 
of these events are simply too complex for men to grasp. Neither of 
these questions can ever be answered by using the method of physics. 
To the complex question of the meaning of chance may be added 
the complex question of the meaning of causality. A full treatment of 
the meaning of causality is, however, beyond the scope of this 
volume. 
Apart from the theories of chance in the history of philosophy 
listed above, there remains Aristotle's theory. In the present volume 
Aristotle's theory of chance will be examined exhaustively. In the 
Conclusion an attempt will then be made to show that the various 
other theories of chance listed above are deficient and that Aristotle's 
interpretation is most satisfactory. 
A discussion of chance in the works of Aristotle is also 
indispensable to an understanding of Aristotle's views on nature and 
ethics, which have had an overwhelming influence on the devel-
opment of philosophy over the centuries. The second aim of this 
volume is, then, to establish the precise function of chance in 
Aristotle's philosophy of nature and in his ethical works. 
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In a number of passages Aristotle attributes all generation 
(γένβσις) to nature (φύσις), art (τέχνη) and chance." For chance he 
has two terms, ταύτόματον and τύχη, and the distinction he estab­
lishes between them will be examined below. It is aimed to show in 
this volume that chance is a secondary, i.e. dependent kind of 
causality, and that ταύτόματον and τύχη are dependent on φύσις and 
νους. Once this dependence has been esthablished, it can be shown 
that φύσις and νους are the two ultimate (i.e. primary) causes of all 
generation (i.e. of everything that moves or changes in the universe). 
However, in order to show that φύσις and νους are the ultimate 
causes of generation, it is necessary to eliminate chance from a claim 
to this title. 
In the present volume, accordingly, chance will be investigated, 
and it is aimed to show that for Aristotle it is neither a substantial 
reality nor a purely subjective notion, but has the real and meaningful 
status of an accidental cause. It will be held that for the same reason 
chance should not be viewed as an ultimate cause or dismissed as 
absence of knowledge by the contemporary philosopher. In a 
discussion of ultimate causality chance seems to deserve a place, 
however, because, as Aristotle points out, all men say that some 
things are an outcome of luck,12 whereby they imply that luck 
possesses a degree of reality. Hence it is necessary to know exactly 
what is meant by this term and to what reality it corresponds. Aristotle 
makes it clear that he was the first philosopher to award chance its 
rightful place in such a discussion.13 
That chance is a highly fashionable, if not vitally important topic 
must be apparent from the astonishing number of contemporary 
Aristotelian scholars who have contributed to the discussion in one 
way or another. However, most of the partial accounts of chance in 
11
 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 12-13: τώΐ' 8è γιγνομέΐ'ων τα μέΐ' φύσει γίγνεται, τα 
δέ τέχι-χι, τα δέ από ταύτομάτου (text Ross). This is the fundamental passage in 
regard to this doctrine. Cf. also NE III, iii, 3-7, 1112 a 21-33. These passages will be 
discussed in Ch. 3(a) and Ch. 3(b)(iii). Cf. also the remainder oí Met. Z(VII), vii and 
ix. 
uPhys. II, iv, 196 a 15-16. 
nPhys. II, iv, 196 a 8-17. 
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Aristotle that have hitherto appeared contain fundamental errors and 
misunderstandings. Curiously, no volume has yet been written on the 
topic. The only book claiming to be about Aristotle's concept of 
chance that has appeared thus far is Helene WEISS, Kausalität und 
Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles (Basel, 1942). In this 
published doctorate, Weiss does not deal with Aristotle's fundamental 
discussion in Physics II, iv-vi at all. Her book is certainly useful as a 
kind of prolegomena to the study of chance. But she does not make 
any connection between her work and the topic of chance. Doubtless 
she originally intended to write about chance, but, having written a 
prolegomena to the topic, did not continue her task to its conclusion. 
Thus she complains (p.5) about the terrible misunderstanding of τύχη 
and ταύτόματον by Torstrik (in Hermes, 1875), but does not explain 
her criticism of Torstrik or attempt to refute him. The present volume 
accordingly aims to fill a lacuna in the exegesis of Aristotle. 
In the present study Aristotle's concept of chance will be 
examined in two parts, the first on chance in the Physics and the 
second on chance in the Ethics. The discussion of chance in the 
Physics is relevant to the question of the source of the order in the 
universe and of life and evolution, while the discussion of chance in 
the Ethics is relevant to that of the meaning of human free choice. 
In Part I the basic meaning of chance will be examined. It will be 
seen that chance is a concept which Aristotle explains in terms of his 
metaphysical theory. The fundamental text is Phys. II, iv-vi, which 
will be examined exhaustively in Chapter 1. These three chapters of 
the Physics, due to their structure, raise the question of the 
development of Aristotle's concept of chance (Chapter 2). In a 
thorough study of chance in Aristotle this question may not be 
neglected, and the discussion provides valuable information also for 
the comprehension of the terms used by Aristotle in discussing chance 
(τύχη and ταύτόματον). The development of Aristotle's notion of 
chance will then be followed throughout his works in the most 
important passages on the topic (Chapter 3). These passages are 
significant not merely because of their contribution to the under­
standing of Aristotle's concept of chance, but also in their own right, 
as many of them deal with the most fundamental problems in inter-
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preting Aristotle's metaphysical theory. Aristotle is the first thinker 
for whom chance is the opposite of necessity, as will be seen in 
Chapter 4, and an analysis of Aristotle's concept of necessity and a 
comparison of the concepts of necessity and chance will provide an 
answer to the complex question of the extent to which Aristotle was a 
determinist. Finally, chance, which is viewed by Aristotle as a cause 
(αίτια) will be examined in the light of Aristotle's well-known theory 
of four causes (Chapter 5). This discussion involves the analysis of 
Aristotle's theories of monsters and spontaneous generation and the 
question of the parallel between chance events and chance substances. 
In Part II the function of chance in the Ethics will be examined. 
Chance has a twofold role. Firstly, it is the source of external 
prosperity. In order to understand the Ethics, it is indispensable to 
grasp the relationship of external prosperity to happiness. Hence 
chance and external prosperity will be studied in relation to happiness 
(Chapter 6). Secondly, chance is related to happiness in a theory of 
intuition set out in ЕЕ and MM. The investigation of this theory can 
be held to be of particular relevance to the question of the meaning of 
human free choice (Chapter 7). 
The study of chance in the Ethics of Aristotle will then be 
completed by the investigation of the meaning of chance in the lists of 
the sources of happiness in NE and ЕЕ and by a comparison of the 
functions of chance in NE, ЕЕ and MM (Chapters 8 and 9). 
This exhaustive study of chance in Aristotle will then provide the 
basis for a number of conclusions. 
PART ONE 
CHANCE IN THE PHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE: 
THE METAPHYSICS OF CHANCE 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE DOCTRINE OF PHYS. II, iv-vi 
(i) Context and method 
Aristotle's main discussion of chance is that found in Book II of 
the Physics, which may be described as a discussion of causes, as is 
apparent from the first sentence of chapters 1,3,4,7 and 8.' Chance 
must be examined in a treatise on causality, since people speak of 
things happening 'by chance', as if chance were a cause. The atomists 
attributed the order in the universe to chance. Other people denied any 
reality to chance, and yet others held chance to be something divine 
and a mysterious power ( еіо τι ούσα και οαιμονιώτερον).2 
Aristotle therefore felt called upon to examine these claims in a 
treatise on causes. 
Chapters iv-vi of Phys. II contain Aristotle's main discussion of 
τύχη and ταύτόματον. It will be argued in the next chapter that 
Aristotle originally wrote an account of τύχη which comprised Phys. 
II, iv-v and only at a later stage wrote the more specialised doctrine of 
Phys. II, vi. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to set out 
Aristotle's final doctrine of chance, i.e. the doctrine of the three 
chapters. The inconsistencies that remain due to imperfect revision of 
II, iv-v will not be dealt with here, but will be reserved for the next 
chapter. 
The method adopted in this chapter is that of systematically 
elucidating Aristotle's own highly cryptic notes on chance in Phys. II, 
'Cf. alsoPAys.il, vi, 198 a 2. 
2
 Phys. II, iv, 196 b 6-7. 
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v-vi. This chapter thus constitutes a commentary on the doctrine of 
Phys. H, v-vi. A commentary on the doctrine of Phys. II, iv will be 
given in chapter II, where it will be used at the same time to elucidate 
the structure of Phys. II, iv-vi. 
(ii) Terminology 
In the following account Aristotle's two terms τύχη and 
ταύτόματον will be retained in their Greek form for the sake of 
clarity. However, it is worthwhile discussing briefly the most 
appropriate English equivalents for these terms. In Phys. II, vi the best 
equivalent for τύχη is doubtless 'luck' (the term used by Apostle and 
Charlton), since Aristotle restricts τύχη to human beings (cf. infra 
§xv) and in English 'luck' is also only usable when referring to 
human beings or anthropomorphized animals. For ταΰτόματον the 
best equivalent is undoubtedly 'chance' (Apostle's term), since 
ταύτόματον includes τύχη. The translations 'spontaneity' (Ross) and 
'the automatic' (Charlton) are not used to refer to chance events in 
English, and it does not appear necessary to use an invented term 
remote from English usage to translate a term in common Greek 
usage. As will be seen, however, τύχη is frequently used in Phys. II, 
iv-v and in other works to refer to chance as a whole (the domain of 
ταύτόματοι; in Phys. II, vi) and hence cannot always be translated by 
'luck'.3 It would accordingly appear most appropriate to translate 
τύχη by 'chance' when it is used to cover all of chance and by 'luck', 
when it is restricted to chance in the domain of human action (as laid 
down in Phys. II, vi). Some further nuances of meaning between these 
Greek and English terms will be discussed infra §xv. 
The translation of αυτόματος and the terms referring to spon­
taneous generation will be discussed in §xv of this chapter and 
3
 It is a mistake to translate τύχη by 'luck' throughout Phys. II, iv-vi, as do 
Charlton and Apostle. However, it is equally incorrect to translate τύχη by 'chance' 
in Phys. II, vi, as does LACEY, Philoponus, On Aristotle's Physics 2. The reasons will 
be given in this chapter. 
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Ch.5(c)(i). The expression από τύχη? και του αυτομάτου and related 
expressions will be examined in Ch.3 (b)(i) 
(¡ii) Only unusual occurrences come about by chance 
Aristotle starts out in his argument about chance in Phys. Π, ν from 
his distinction between usual and unusual occurrences. Some things 
occur always in the same way and necessarily (e.g. day always 
follows night) and some things occur for the most part (e.g for the 
most part it is hot in summer and cold in winter, but there are 
exceptions). Aristotle notes, then, on the basis of linguistic usage, that 
we do not say that something that occurs always or for the most part 
in the same way occurs 'by chance'.4 But there are unusual 
occurrences. Aristotle declares then, against those who claim that 
there is no such thing as chance (τύχη),5 that because everyone uses 
the term it must have some real status or meaning.6 This is a 
fundamental aspect of his dialectical method.7 Since people use the 
term 'chance' to refer to certain unusual occurrences, the term must 
have some content relating to reality and be applicable to these 
unusual occurrences for some reason. 
4
 Phys II, v, 196 b 10-13, 196 b 20, 197 a 19-20, 32, De Cael I, xn, 283 a 32 -
283 b 1 (this passage is examined infra Ch 3), Gen et Corr II, vi, 333 b 3-7 (this 
passage is also examined infra Ch 3), APo I, xxx, 87 b 19-27 (passage also examined 
infra Ch 3), ЕЕ Vili, n, 1247 a 31-3 (passage examined infra Ch 7(a)), Rhet I, x, 
1369 a 32 - b 5 (passage examined infra Ch 3) Cf FREELAND, Accidental causes 56 
"The key feature of the accidental is that it is not regular or predictable " 
5
 Phys II, lv, 195 b 36-196 a 11 
6
 Phys II, v, 196 b 13-15 έστι τι (196 b 15), II, îv, 196 a 11-17, ЕЕ VIII, и, 9, 
1247 b 3 αλλ' ανάγκη και ειΐ'αι και αίτιαν εΐναι Cf infra Ch 7 (а) ρ 210 and n 11 
In 196 b 13-15 it is to be noted that Aristotle argues that because everyone (παντε?) 
says that certain things occur due to τύχη, therefore there must be such a thing as 
τύχη and ταυτοματοί' Thus the distinction between τύχη and ταυτόματον is 
carefully slipped in It will be seen infra Ch2 ρ 66 that it appears likely that 
ταυτοματοί' was inserted here during a revision of the chapter 
7 Cf Top I,i, I00a29-30, 100 b 21-23,1, n, 101 a 3 4 - 101 b 4 and my book Gott 
und θεωρία 15-19, also Phys II, ν, 197 a 11-12 πάιτα γαρ ταύτα ορθώ? λέγεται, 
ευλόγως 
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(iv) Chance refers to events 
Having established that chance is a term used to refer only to 
unusual occurrences, Aristotle, in his argument in Phys. II, ν then 
turns to another aspect of chance, namely its relationship to purpose 
or finality. Firstly, however, it is necessary to establish that Aristotle 
is referring at this point to events, not substances, as the outcome of 
chance. If he were not referring to events, he would be contradicting 
his metaphysical theory, as will be seen. 
The apparent problem arises when Aristotle writes in 196 b 17-18: 
των δ€ γιγνομένων τα μεν ё ека του γίγνβται, τα δ'ού, literally "of 
things that come to be some come to be for a purpose and others do 
not." In 197 a 35 Aristotle again refers to "those things which occur 
for a purpose", implying that some things do not occur for a purpose. 
It is not immediately clear what 'things' do not come to be for a 
purpose. Normally speaking one would expect Aristotle to be re­
ferring to substances. But it is known that for Aristotle no substance 
comes to be without a purpose. Hence one is confronted with a 
difficulty. However, the solution appears to lie in the fact that 
Aristotle is referring to events, which may be viewed as coincidences, 
as the context indicates. Hence Ross' regular translation in this 
passage of the neuter plural by 'events' seems justified.8 Thus, if 
Aristotle is understood to mean that "of events that come to be, some 
come to be for a purpose and others do not", there is no longer any 
difficulty of interpretation. 
(v) Some events are meaningful and others are not 
It was seen in the last section that Aristotle writes: "of events that 
come to be, some come to be for a purpose and others do not" (196 b 
17-18). This statement requires further explicitation. By this statement 
Aristotle means that some events are meaningful to man, whereas 
8
 ROSS, Aristotle's Physics...353, 517-8. THEM1ST1US, In Phys. 179, 15, 
PHILOTONUS, In Phys. and SIMPLICIUS, In Phys. totally misunderstood the passage. It 
may be noted that the term τύχη is also found in the plural in the meaning of 
accidental events. Cf. Pol. V, iii, 1303 a 3; NE I, x, 11, 1100 b 20. 
CHAPTER ONE 25 
others are not. Implicit in his observation is the fact that human beings 
are at all times attempting to understand events and discover their 
meaning for their own purposes. Because human beings are constantly 
on the lookout for events (occurrences, associations) that are 
meaningful, they develop a trained "eye" for the meaningful and pay 
no attention to what is not meaningful. One might compare the 
situation of the chess-player who only ever examines a very limited 
number of possible moves in a game of chess, because he knows from 
experience that there is no point in examining the vast majority of 
possible moves, as these will not help him win the game. 
Thus Aristotle points out in Met. E(VI), ii that the number of 
accidents pertaining to any substance is infinite.9 Most purposeless 
events or coincidences are never even observed by man, since they are 
irrelevant, i.e. lacking in meaning, precisely because they have no 
connection with purpose.10 As examples of this kind Aristotle gives 
the coincidence of someone regaining his health and having his hair 
cut, or again the coincidence of someone washing himself when a 
solar eclipse is taking place." One cannot say that there is any 
connection between these events, as one cannot lead or have any 
9
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 7; Phys. II, v, 196 b 28-29. 
10
 Cf. CHARLTON, Phys. /-//...106-7: "We ascribe a thing to chance only if we think 
it remarkable, and it is doubtful whether we should think a thing remarkable, doubtful 
whether we should even notice it or be able to pick it out from the rest of our 
environment, if it did not seem to us, at least in a weak sense, such as to be for 
something" 
" Phys. II, v, 197 a 21-25; II, vi, 197 b 27-29. CHARLTON, Phys. /-//...108-9 misses 
the point of these examples. Likewise in APr I, xiii, 32 b 10-13 Aristotle gives the 
example of the coincidence that an animal is walking when an earthquake takes place. 
In her account of chance CRAEMER-RUEGENBERG, Die Naturphilosophie...53 thinks 
incorrectly that Aristotle did not recognize that chance events are caused by per se 
causes. She also thinks (consciously or unconsciously under the influence of Mill) 
that chance events are due to ignorance of future meetings of causal chains, which, if 
they were known, would enable us to predict the event (and eliminate 'chance'), and 
that Aristotle failed to see this point. But Aristotle does not accept this view and is 
making a more profound point, namely that chance events are essentially 
unpredictable, because the number of accidents of every per se cause is unlimited and 
hence their interaction with other per se causes, which leads occasionally to a 
meaningful and unusual, i.e. a chance event, could never be calculated. 
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relevance to the other. For this reason also it will be seen that one 
cannot say that they are due to chance. 
One of Aristotle's most profound observations is that intelligibility 
and purpose go together. He states e.g. that "if someone said that he 
had washed himself in vain (μάτην) because the sun did not go into 
eclipse, he would be ridiculous. Solar eclipses are not what washing is 
for (ё ека)"(197 b 27-29). If there is no potential connection of 
purpose between two occurrences, it is absurd, i.e. meaningless to 
connect them. Indeed, one would declare the individual who said that 
he had washed himself in vain because the sun did not go into eclipse 
to be not merely ridiculous, but mad, because he was not obeying or 
was indeed endangering a fundamental trait of human nature, which is 
to seek to understand events, i.e. to interpret them in such a way as to 
make it possible to promote the achievement of one's goal in life. 
Closely related to this observation is Aristotle's statement of 
principle: "Of events that come to be, some come to be for a purpose 
and others do not. Of the former some are the kind ofthing one would 
choose [i.e. an outcome of διάνοια] and some are not [events that 
occur due to nature], but both are among events that are for a purpose 
[i.e. meaningful]...Those things that are for a purpose are either what 
might have been done due to thought or have been the outcome of 
nature"12 For Aristotle all natural substances have a purpose.13 It is 
12
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 17-22. For LENNOX, Aristotle on chance... 52-3 there is a 
problem in Aristotle's statement that "those things that are for a purpose are either 
what might have been done due to thought or have been the outcome of nature", since 
he holds that Aristotle's doctrine of teleology is represented by "what is done by 
thought or nature." However, the problem is only apparent, since (i) whatever 
occurred in such a way that it might have been done due to thought or have been the 
outcome of nature has as a per se cause that which was done due to thought or nature 
(this view is that of Porphyry ap. Simplic. In Phys. 336, 27-29), and (ii) that which 
was due to thought or nature results not in the end aimed at, but in another end which 
might have been due to thought or nature, because of a meaningful coincidence. Thus 
Lennox ibid. 60 concludes incorrectly that "chance processes [a confusing expression 
meaning per se causes of chance events] are for the sake of their results [chance 
outcomes] only in the causal sense." The truth is the reverse. They are not for the sake 
of their results, but are per se causes thereof coincidentally. It will be seen infra 
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not just that they give the impression of having a purpose, as has been 
claimed.14 For Aristotle intellect is not a prerequisite of purpose, but 
subsequent to it. The outcome of thought is not merely parallel to the 
working of Nature, but posterior to it. Art imitates Nature.15 This 
observation is of capital importance. All thought is orientated towards 
man's purpose in life, and whatever occurrences cannot be interpreted 
as relevant to this purpose are meaningless. 
(vi) Chance events are both unusual and meaningful 
Aristotle writes in Phys. II, v: "Of events that come to be, some 
come to be for a purpose and others do not...so that it is clear that 
among events which are neither necessary nor usual there are also 
some to which purpose can be attributed" (196 b 17-20). This 
statement is, of course, a non sequitur, since logically it could be that 
purpose could only be seen in those events that occur always or 
usually and that unusual events were meaningless. Nonetheless, 
Aristotle is, of course, right that "among events which are neither 
necessary nor usual there are also some to which purpose can be 
attributed." Hence he should have simply referred to linguistic usage 
or empirical observation his statement that there are events which are 
neither necessary nor usual, but which nonetheless appear meaning-
§(viii) that chance is not for a purpose, but pertains to the area of that which is for a 
purpose, i.e. is that which might have been done for a purpose, but was not. 
13
 This point will be seen to be important in regard to spontaneously (i.e. 
unnaturally) generated natural substances (infra Ch.5). 
14
 Ross, Aristotle's Physics...518: "Aristotle's whole conception of the general 
course of nature as being ei'erá του, though not κατά προαίρεσιν or διάΐΌίαν (see 
the contrast in 196 b 18-22), is the conception of merely 'defacto teleology', that in 
which results that were not aimed at yet present the appearance of having been aimed 
at." Likewise, WIELAND, Die aristotelische Physik...271-2: "Man wird enttäuscht 
werden, wenn man in der aristotelischen Analyse mehr als den Nachweis sucht, daß 
wir die Begrifflichkeit von Zweck und Worumwillen, die wir schon immer in der 
gewöhnlichen Redeweise anwenden...auch auf das natürliche Geschehen anwenden 
dürfen...Für Aristoteles ist die Zweckkategorie ein äußerst nützliches Hilfsmittel der 
Forschung. Verborgene zielstrebig wirkende oder unbewußt schaffende Kräfte haben 
für ihn dagegen bestenfalls metaphorische Bedeutung..." 
15
 Phys II, ii, 194 a21-22; II, viii, 199 a 15-17; Protrep. В 13 DURING. 
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ful. It is a simple fact that some members of the set of events that 
occur unusually also appear meaningful. It is these which we call 
chance events. Whenever something which might have occurred or 
been done for a purpose comes about unusually, i.e. by coincidence 
(κατά συμβεβηκός), it is said to occur by chance.16 
(vìi) Chance is a cause 
One of the most striking and difficult aspects of Aristotle's 
analysis of chance is that he holds that chance (τύχη) is a cause.17 The 
reason why he does so is no doubt because of his dialectical method, 
according to which there must be at least an element of truth in the 
views of the many and the wise. In Phys. II, iv he had noted that the 
many as well as both Empedocles and the atomists (among the wise) 
attributed certain events to chance. His immediate reason for holding 
that chance is a cause (as shown by γαρ in 196 b 24) is the phrase από 
τύχη? (196 b 23-24) "by chance", which implies that chance is a kind 
of agent. Aristotle accordingly holds that chance is a cause. However, 
16
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 21-24; 196 b 29-33; 197 a 12-13; Cf. Met. Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 
14-19; Met. E(VI), ii, 1027 a 7-8; Phys. II, v, 197 a 5-8. In the last-mentioned 
passage, however, Aristotle has restricted the meaning of chance (τύχη) to his own 
interpretation thereof, namely luck, i.e. chance in the area of human free action only, 
i.e. to those actions which could have resulted from choice (προαίρεσις). MATTHEN, 
The Four Causes...178 writes: "Finally, it is the central point of Aristotle's analysis of 
the concept of chance, in Physics II, 5...that a process may be comparable to that 
which is end-directed inasmuch as it serves the same good, but may still come about 
by undirected causes. A fortuitous sequence of events is not end-directed..., but it may 
serve some good. It follows that a fortuitous process is not directed towards good 
even if it serves it." Matthen falls into a different kind of error to Lennox (n.12 
supra). The causes which cause chance events are end-directed, but are directed at an 
end other than the chance outcome. The expression "a fortuitous sequence of events" 
should properly be reserved for a series of chance outcomes that lead to a further 
chance outcome, e.g. a man got a job, because one person died, another resigned due 
to a scandal, and a third got a job elsewhere. The expression "a fortuitous process" is 
misleading, since there is nothing fortuitous in the action oîper se causes until they 
coincide with the unusual category that produces the chance outcome. Cf. infra §(ix). 
"Phys. II, v, 196b 12. 
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he then proceeds to explain it as a cause of a kind that neither the 
many nor the wise had understood properly. 
In order to explain chance as a cause Aristotle reverts to a 
distinction he had already made in Phys. II, iii between a substantial 
or per se (καθ' αυτό, 196 b 26) cause and a so-called 'accidental 
cause'. A per se cause acts as an efficient cause (one of the four 
causes), whereas an accidental cause is not one of the four causes.18 
Aristotle explains what he means by an accidental cause with the 
aid of examples. The substantial or fundamental - literally per se -
cause of a house is the builder (literally τα οικοδομικοί', "that which 
can build", which means 'the builder', not 'that which can build in the 
builder') and of the statue the sculptor. The accidental cause of the 
house or of the statue (κατά συμβεβηκός, 196 b 26-27, 195 b 4) is the 
fact that the builder or the sculptor is fair-skinned or a musician.19 
Instead of saying that the builder built the house, one could say that a 
fair-skinned man or a musician built the house. But the proper (καθ' 
αυτό) efficient or determinate cause (αίτιον ώρισμένον, 196 b 28) of 
the house is a builder. All of the unlimited number of substitutes for 
the term 'builder' (such as a fair-skinned man or a musician) are 
accidental (or coincidental) causes, since they are merely accidents 
(or coincidental properties) of the per se cause.20 
It is to be noted that Aristotle maintains that such accidental causes 
can be spoken of as able to cause or as actually causing.21 In reality, 
however, no accident is ever a real (substantial) or per se cause, and 
hence Ross rightly holds Aristotle's view to be a façon de parler.12 In 
18
 Phys. II, iii, 195 a 26 - 195 b 6; II, v, 196 b 24-29. 
19
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 24-27; 197 a 14-15; II, iii, 195 a 32 - b 6. 
20
 It is to be noted that the per se cause could also be replaced by its genus or a 
proprium, e.g. a living being built the house (cf. Phys. II, iii, 195 b 1). But this kind 
of accidental cause is not relevant to the discussion of chance. However, it should be 
noted that an 'accidental' cause might more accurately be called a 'coinciding cause', 
since for Aristotle every property that coincides with a per se cause is a so-called 
'accidental' cause. 
21
 Phys. II, iii, 195 b 3-6. 
22
 Ross, Aristotle's Physics...5\9. In De An. II, vi, 418 a 7-25 Aristotle 
distinguishes in a parallel way between the proper (κα(Γ αυτά) objects of a sense and 
accidental (κατά συμβ€βηκός·) objects of sense. Proper objects of a sense are e.g. 
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contemporary terms, the only way in which an accident may be 
associated with anything causal (which for Aristotle must be a 
substance or that which is assimilated to a substance) is in a 'derived' 
way. 
For Aristotle, accordingly, it is possible to retain the notion that 
chance is a cause, provided that one understands it as an accidental 
cause under the terms of his own metaphysics. His application of 
accidental causality to the notion of chance will be examined in the 
following sections. 
(viii) Chance is an accidental cause that is meaningful 
In Met. Д( ), xxx Aristotle defines the term συμβεβηκός· firstly as 
an attribute (δ υπάρχει τινι) that is predicated neither always nor 
usually, e.g. the fact that a musician is fair-skinned, where most 
musicians are not fair-skinned.23 Similarly, he defines το συμβεβηκός 
in Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 31-37 and Met. K(XI), viii, 1064 b 32 - 1065 
a 6 as occurring neither always nor usually.2'' Aristotle is speaking, 
therefore, of an unusual accident in these passages, and not just of an 
accident in general, as the translators presume.25 In this chapter on то 
συμβεβηκό? {Met. Δ xxx) Aristotle does not treat of the usual 
colour for sight, sound for hearing, whereas an accidental object of a sense is e g 
Diares' son as the object of sight (the proper object being whiteness) It should be 
noted, however, that Aristotle is analysing objects of sense qua objects of sense Of 
course the essence of the object seen is Diares' son and not just whiteness, once one 
shifts attention away from the object of sense qua object of sense. 
2 3
 Met Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 19-21. "Fair-skinned" rather than "pale' (CHARLTON, 
Phys ML. 30) or "white" (TREDENNICK, Met ) appears to be the correct translation of 
λευκό? - WEISS, Kausalität und Zufall 159 translates by "eine helle Hautfarbe" 
24
 On Met E(VI), il cf. infra Ch 4 (χι) 
2 5
 An accident in general is whatever attribute is not part of the essence of a 
substance, τούτω γαρ διωρισται ουσία και το συμβεβηκό?· το γαρ λευκοί' τω 
άνθρώττω συμβεβηκει·, οτι εστί μει· λευκός· αλλ' ούχ όπερ λευκοί' (Met Г(І ), ìv, 
1007 a 31-33). Likewise Top. I, v, 102 b 4-26; I, viii, 103 b 17-19, IV, ι, 120 b 34-35 
In Top a συμβεβηκός includes both usual and unusual accidents, but excludes a 
proprium (ίδιοι') But in Met Д( ), xxx a συμβεβηκός is either an unusual accident 
or a proprium An examination of the implications of these differences is beyond the 
scope of this volume 
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accident that is not a proprium, e.g. the blue-eyed musician, where 
most musicians have blue eyes. 
When he deals with accidental causes in Phys. II, iii Aristotle does 
not restrict them to those that neither always nor usually inhere in a 
per se cause. All concurrent or coincidental causes are accidental 
causes. Thus if one says that a house was built by a fair-skinned man 
or a musician, the fair-skinned man or the musician is an example of 
an accidental cause. But if one says that the statue was sculpted by a 
man or by a living being, that is also an example of an accidental or 
rather a concurrent cause,26 as it is the sculptor qua sculptor who is 
the cause. 
An accidental cause is a concurrent cause, but not necessarily a 
chance cause. Thus it makes no sense to say that the builder was a 
musician by chance, where there is no connection between building a 
house and playing music (cf. §(v) supra). For an accidental cause to 
be a chance cause, it must not only be unusual, but also be 
meaningful, i.e. belong to the area of that which is for a purpose.27 
This is the second criterion of a chance event examined supra §(vi). 
Thus all chance occurrences are due to a coincidence (con-
currence), but not all concurrences (accidents coinciding with per se 
causes) can be called chance occurrences, since there are an indefinite 
number of concurrences that are not contrary to expectation, i.e. that 
are not meaningful to man and therefore do not qualify as chance 
occurrences. It so happens that Aristotle in giving examples of the 
meaning of an unusual accident in MetAÇV), xxx chooses mainly 
chance occurrences (not, however, in the case of the musician who is 
fair-skinned).28 The definition of an unusual accident (συμβεβηκό?) 
given by Aristotle in Met.à(V), xxx is the same as that of a chance 
event except that it is not limited by the requirement of unexpected 
26
 Phys II, iii, 195 a 32- 195 b 12. 
27
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 29-30. 
28
 Cf. WIELAND, Die aristotelische Physik...259. 
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meaningfulness, which is the additional characteristic that makes 
chance a subset of the coincidental29 
It is of fundamental importance to recognize that for Aristotle only 
substances and human decisions have a purpose.30 Substances and 
human decisions are efficient causes and Aristotle considers human 
decisions therefore to be parallel to substances.31 
Accidents, therefore, do not have a purpose. Hence Aristotle states 
that chance, i.e. chance events, does not occur for a purpose. This 
tenet is stated very clearly in a series of texts outside the Physics32 
However, careful examination shows that it is also the doctrine of 
Phys II. Aristotle states that chance (τύχη) is των е ека του, i.e. 
pertains to the area of that which is for a purpose, i.e. the meaning­
ful.33 But chance itself is not for a purpose, since it is not a per se 
(substantial), but an accidental or concomitant cause.34 This Aristotle 
expresses by stating that chance is not a cause of anything simply 
(απλώς), i.e. in its own right.35 To give an example: the man who 
Met Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 14-15 Συμβεβηκος· λέγεται b υπάρχει μεν τινι και 
άληθε? ειπείν, ou μειτοι ουτ* έξ ανάγκη? ούτε <ώ?> επί το πολύ For chance as a 
subset of the coincidental cf also infra Ch 4 (x) In Δ, xxx Anstotle also gives a 
definition of a second meaning of the term "accident" which is not relevant to the 
discussion of chance, namely that of so-called eternal accidents, ι e propria. 
3 0
 Phys II, v, 196 b 21-22 
3 1
 Phys II, in, 194 b 30-32, 195 a 21-23 
3 2
 Rhet I, x, 12-13, 1369 a 32 - b 5, APo II, xi, 94 b 27 - 95 a 9, esp 95 a 8-9 απο 
τύχη? δ' ούδεί' ένεκα του γίνεται (these texts are dealt with more fully infra Ch 
3(a)), Protrep В 12 DURING των μεν ουν άπο τύχη? γιγνομένων ουδέν ένεκα του 
γιγνεται, οΰδ' εστί τι τέλος αυτοί? συμβαίη μεν γαρ αν και άπο τύχη? TL 
αγαθόν, ού μην άλλα γε κατά την τυχην και καθόσον από τύχη? ούκ αγαθόν 
αόριστον δ' άει το γιγνομενον έστι κατ' αυτήν (for the meaning of αόριστον cf 
infra §x) Cf also Rhet I, ix, 1367 b 25-6 and GRIMALDI, Rhet I. 212, Part An I, v, 
645 a 23-25 
3 3
 Phys II, v, 197 a 6, 196 b 29-30, Met K(XI), vin, 1065 a 30-31 Cf GUTHRIE, 
Notes on some passages 75 and A History VI, 235-6 
3 4
 Phys II, v, 197 a 5-6 ή τύχη αίτια κατά συμβεβηκο? A MANSION, 
Introduction 296, who certainly realises that chance is an accident, not a substance, 
nonetheless falls into the trap of describing chance as an efficient cause The same 
error is made by VERBEKE, Happiness and Chance 248 
3 5
 Phys II, v, 197 a 13-14 εστίν αίτιον ως συμβεβηκο? ή τύχη ως δ'άπλώ? 
ούδενο? Cf Phys II, ш, 199 b 23 Chance is not a. per se or substantial cause, ι e a 
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recovered his debt by chance did not set out to recover his debt, i.e. it 
was not a chance event that caused his decision to set out for the 
market-place. But, on the other hand, the chance event pertained to 
the area of the meaningful, because the man would certainly have set 
out for the market-place with the purpose of recovering his debt, had 
he known in advance that he would recover his debt by doing so. 
Charlton claims that Aristotle is careless in saying that chance is a 
concurrent cause, rather than restricting himself to holding that a 
thing due to chance is a concurrent outcome.36 But chance (τύχη) for 
Aristotle is a cause and is not the same as a chance outcome or piece 
of luck (τύχημα). By his accusation Charlton apparently misses the 
point of what Aristotle is saying. Aristotle shows that coincidences 
(chance concurrences) are due to nothing in the substance or per se 
cause which chances to concur with the unexpected accident. There 
is, therefore, some cause of significant concurrence other than the per 
se cause that concurs. Aristotle holds that this cause is what people 
call chance, which in fact is nothing other than the imposition of a 
meaningful interpretation by man on particular kinds of concurrence, 
which is what makes them unexpected. Without the expectation of 
intellect there is no cause of (the experience of) coincidences, which 
occur randomly without being observed.37 But there is a cause that 
causes certain concurrences to be said to be "by chance", and this 
cause is the human pursuit of goals, which explains why some 
concurrences are unexpected. 
Thus it is possible for Aristotle in his revised definition of chance 
(197 a 5-6) to replace his original observation that a chance event is 
necessarily unusual (196 b 10-13) by the conclusion that it is an 
accidental cause (αιτία κατά συμβεβηκός). But since accidents in 
themselves have no purpose, a chance occurrence must be further 
cause qua substance, as is clear from 196 b 26 and 198 a 9, where Aristotle contrasts 
chance with a cause κα(Γ αυτό. Cf. Phys. II, vi, 197 b 19 and Met. K(XI), viii, 1065 a 
32-1065 b 4. 
3 6
 CHARLTON, Phys. /-//...108. 
37
 Met. Д( ), ххх, 1025 a 24-25: ουδέ δη α'ίτιοί' ώρισμέΐΌΐ' oùSèi' του 
συμβεβηκότο? άλλα το τυχόν τούτο δ'αόριστοί'. 
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defined as pertaining to the area of purpose, i.e. of being the kind of 
event that is meaningful or choiceworthy. 
(ix) Chance as an accidental cause can pertain to any category 
It has been seen that Aristotle defines chance as an accidental 
cause (αιτία κατά συμβ€βηκός, 197 a 5-6, 33). It has also been seen 
that an accidental cause is always accidental to a substantial or per se 
cause (§vii supra). 
Aristotle illustrates his analysis of chance by means of examples. 
His favourite example in Phys. II is that of a man who collected a debt 
from his debtor by chancing to meet him in the market-place.38 The 
per se or fundamental cause - assimilated by Aristotle to a substantial 
cause - of collecting the debt is then seen as the cause in the mind of 
the man39 which made him go to the market-place,40 while the 
accidental cause of collecting the debt is the coincidental meeting 
with his debtor.41 In Phys. II, viii Aristotle also gives the case of the 
3 8
 Cf. Phys. II, v, 196 b 33 -197 a 5; 197 a 15-18; Phys. II, iv, 196 a 3-5. 
3 9
 The cause of human actions is in the soul. Cf. Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 32 - 1032 
b 30, esp. 1032 b 21-23. Cf. also FREELAND, Accidental causer...54: Aristotle "is 
perfectly 'willing to describe even the moving cause...as a substance (i.e. when it is 
potential, rather than actual)." 
4 0
 Thus those who claim that the cause of collecting the debt was the man's going 
to the market-place (Phys. II, iv, 195 b 36 -196 a 5) are right as regards the per se or 
substantial cause, but not as regards luck, which is an accident, not a substance. 
4 1
 CHARLTON, Phys. /-//...107 argues that it is not the recovery of the debt which 
Aristotle regards as the outcome of luck, but A's going to where В is. But Aristotle 
states very clearly that the recovery of the debt (ή κομιδή) is the end which would 
have been willed (would have been the cause in the creditor) had he known (197 a 1-
2). The creditor is said to have come by chance (196 b 33-34, 197 a 3, 196 a 3)(rather 
than to have recovered his debt by chance) because Aristotle assumes that if you come 
to where your debtor is, you get back your debt when your debtor has the money to 
repay you (cf. Phys. II, viii, 199 b 18-20). The outcome of luck is obviously not just 
meeting your debtor, but actually getting back your money, which is the end (то 
τέλος, ή κομιδή, 197 а 1). There would be no luck involved in meeting your debtor 
unexpectedly if you failed to get your money back from him. The same remark applies 
to Charlton's interpretation (ibid.) of Phys. II, viii, 199 b 20-25 and Met. Д( ), xxx, 
1025 a 25-30. In explaining why Aristotle states (196 b 36) that the creditor did not 
go to the market-place regularly - since one would think that the coincidence of 
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visitor who came by chance at the right time and paid the ransom 
before departing.42 Here again the per se or substantial cause is the 
decision of the visitor to come. He did not come to pay the ransom, 
but would have come with this purpose, if he had known about the 
kidnapping. The accidental cause of paying the ransom and freeing 
the imprisoned is the coincidence of this coming at the same time as 
the kidnapping. Again, in Met. A(V), xxx Aristotle gives the example 
of a man who found a treasure while digging a hole for a plant.43 The 
per se or substantial cause of finding the treasure is then the decision 
to dig a hole for a plant. The accidental cause of finding the treasure 
was the coincidence of the digging with the place where the treasure 
was hidden. 
From the examples given so far it is to be noted accordingly that a 
chance event occurs where there is a coincidence of the fundamental, 
per se or substantial cause of the chance event with a category which 
is unusual (i.e. not essential to its substantial basis). This Aristotle 
states in his account of the term συμβεβηκός· in Met. Д( ), xxx. There 
he writes: 
Therefore, since there is something which inheres [sc. the accidental] and 
something in which it inheres [sc. the substance]44 and some of these [sc. 
things which inhere] inhere in a particular place and at a particular time, 
whatever inheres [sc. in a substance], but not because it is this [sc. Sub­
stance], or at this time or in this place, will be coincidental.45 
Thus the fact that the builder or sculptor is fair-skinned or a 
musician is an accident based on the coincidence of a quality with a 
meeting his debtor would be enough on its own to be called lucky - one should 
doubtless conclude with Ross, Aristotle's Physics...520 ad loc. that the unusualness 
of the creditor's visit to the market-place merely heightens the coincidence of meeting 
with his debtor. The coincidence is ftirther heightened by the fact that the debtor is 
himself collecting a debt at the very moment when the creditor chances to meet him. 
nPhys. II, viii, 199 b 20-25. 
4 3
 Met. Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 15-19. 
4 4
 For the assimilation of decisions to the status of substances cf. supra n.30-31, 
39. 
4 5
 Met. Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 21-24: ώστ' έπει έστιν υπάρχον τι καί τινί, και èita 
τούτων καί πού καί ποτέ, ö τι αν ύπάρχτ) μέν, άλλα μη διότι τοδί ην ή νυν ή 
ενταύθα, συμβ€βηκΟ£ έσται. 
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substance. If this were meaningful, in the sense of contrary to 
expectation, it would be a chance event. The fact that the creditor 
happened to meet his debtor in the market-place is an accident based 
on the coincidence of the right place with a substantial basis (namely, 
the decision to go46 - which was taken for a different purpose). 
Likewise the fact that the man happened to find a treasure is an 
accident based on the coincidence of the right place with a substantial 
basis (namely the decision to dig a hole for a plant). Again, the fact 
that the visitor happened to pay the ransom is an accident based on the 
coincidence of the right time with a substantial basis (namely the 
decision of the visitor to come). Finally, the fact that someone went to 
Aegina is an accident based on the coincidence of an affection (a 
storm or being captured by pirates) with the substantial basis which is 
his decision to sail elsewhere.47 Outside the realm of human action, 
the fact that a horse was saved is an accident based on the coincidence 
of the right time with its coming.48 The fact that a stone hit someone 
is an accident based on the coincidence of the right time or the right 
place with its falling.49 The fact that a tripod fell in such a way that 
someone could sit on it is an accident based on the coincidence of the 
right posture (or relation) with its falling.50 Thus from Aristotle's 
examples it would appear that the accident that goes to make up each 
chance event may pertain to any of his categories. 
(x) Chance events are inherently unpredictable 
Having set out his account of chance in Phys. II, v, 196 b 10 - 197 
a 8 Aristotle's next concern is to show that it takes into account as far 
as possible the opinions of the many and the wise.51 This is a 
requirement of his dialectical method. A widespread belief among the 
many is that chance is a cause unclear to the human mind, being 
4 6
 Cf. supra n.39. 
4 7
 Met. Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 25-30. 
^ Phys. II, vi, 197 b 15-16. 
49/»Ays. II, vi, 197 b 30-32. 
50
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 16-18. 
"Phys. II, v, 197 a 11-12. 
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something divine and a mysterious power. " Hence Aristotle sets out 
in the second part of Phys. II, ν to show in what sense this opinion of 
the many is correct, namely why chance events are unpredictable. 
A given chance event may result from any one of an indeterminate 
number of per se causes.5 The man who came and recovered the 
money, but did not come for that purpose, might have been e.g. 
hoping to see someone, or litigating as plaintiff or défendent or going 
to the theatre.5'1 These and an indeterminate number of other possible 
motivations in the mind of the man who came are causes of the luck 
involved in recovering the money (which was unexpected). 
Thus one of the causes of the unpredictability of a chance event is 
the freedom of choice of the per se cause, where it is an outcome of 
thought. 
The second reason why the occurrence of chance events is 
unpredictable is that chance events do not occur always or for the 
most part. If one divides events into the usual and the unusual, only 
unusual occurrences are said to come about by chance (§3 supra). 
Hence the occurrence of chance events cannot be reduced to a 
science,55 since science is only of that which occurs always or for the 
most part.56 Implicit in the assertion that the occurrence of chance 
events cannot be reduced to a science is the notion that science is an 
instrument for predicting the future.57 Prediction of the future, 
inasmuch as the future will involve the unusual, would imply the 
reduction of the unusual to a science, which is a contradiction in 
terms. Since not all meaningful occurrences can be subsumed under 
what usually happens, the future cannot be predicted. 
>2Phys. II, iv, 196 b 6-7. 
53
 Phys. II, v, 197 a 8 αόριστα, 197 a 16-17 άπειρα το πλήθο?, 197 a 20 αόριστα; 
Mir. K(XI), viii, 1065 a 32-33. 
^Phys. II, ν, 197 a 17-18. 
55
 APo I, xxx, 87 b 19-27. For an analysis of this passage cf. infra Ch. 3(a) and 
Ch.4 § (xi). 
5 6
 Phys. II, v, 197 a 19: ö γαρ λόγος ή των dei όντων ή των ώς έπί το πολύ. 
5 7
 The notion that science is an instrument for predicting the future is implicit also 
e.g. in the search for the times at which honey-water is useful as a médecine (Met. 
E(VI), ii, 1027 a 20-26, Ch. 4 §xi p. 124 and Ch. 5(d)(i) p. 164). 
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Since the occurrence of chance events cannot be reduced to a 
science, chance events must necessarily occur unexpectedly.5 The 
unusual is by definition unexpected. That which occurs by chance 
(άπο τύχη?) occurs randomly59 and not in a fixed order,60 since it 
cannot be foreseen. Reason attempts to reduce the usual to general 
principles (scientific laws, in modern terms). Hence the occurrence of 
chance events is irrational, i.e. counter to reason (παράλογον, 197 a 
18), since the occurrence of chance events is inherently unpredictable 
and irreducible to a science.61 
(χι) The contingent as the starting-point of a chain of necessary 
causes 
It was seen in the last section that one of the reasons for the 
unpredictability of a chance event is the freedom of choice of the per 
se cause, where it is an outcome of thought. 
In Met. E(VI), iii Aristotle investigates further the unpredictability 
of the future by pointing out that it depends on contingent events or 
free choices. His aim is to set out the role of the contingent or more 
precisely of ή τοίι отготер' Ιτνχζν αρχή as the start of a chain of 
necessary causes. This topic, although it is dealt with in Met. E(VI), 
iii, will be examined here, as it follows logically on the discussion in 
the last section. 
It is well known that for Aristotle there is a substantial cause of 
every substance,62 i.e. that which comes into being by a process 
5 8
 Phys II, v, 197 a 18-19: και το φάνει eîvai τι παράλογον την τύχην όρθώ?; 
Rhet Ι, ν, 1362 а 6-7 έστιν δε καΐ τών παρά λόγοι' αγαθών αιτία τύχη This 
passage is analysed infra Ch.3(a) Cf also ЕЕ VIII, и, 10, 1247 b 7 την τύχην 
τιθέασιν αΐτίαν αλογον άι^ρωπίνω λογισμω 
5 9
 Phys II, ν, 197 a 31 ή γαρ τύχη αβέβαιος. Cf. NE Ι, vi, 12, 1096 b 26-27. 
6 0
 Part An l, i,641b 18-23. 
61
 Cf. GUTHRIE, A History. VI, 234 n.3: "A saw reason to believe in events the 
causes of which were by their very nature undiscoverable." 
6 2
 Phys II, iv, 196 a 13, Met E(VI), in, 1027 a 31-32, Met Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 13-
14, Met Z(VII), vui, 1033 a 24, Met Θ(ΙΧ), vin, 1049 b 27-29 KlRWAN, 
Metaphysics...197-8 incorrectly denies that Anstotle holds this principle. Cf. Ross, 
CHAPTER ONE 39 
(caused by a substance) must have a non-accidental (i.e. substantial) 
cause. However, events (except where the contingent can be ex­
cluded) are not necessary (in the sense of foreseeable), since not all 
causes are substantial (i.e. which would imply that they are generated 
or come into being by a process).63 The absence of necessity (fore-
seeability) of events is clearest if one attempts to look into the future. 
The future cannot be predicted because the chain of causes involves 
not only necessary or substantial causes, but also unforeseeable 
coincidences and human choices. Thus X will die by violence or 
Aristotle's Metaphysics...], Ixxxi and 362 ad 1027 a 29; JOACHIM, Gen. et Corr. 
...xxviii. 
6 3
 KIRWAN, Metaphysics...196 claims that Aristotle is wrong to hold that there is 
no γένεσις and φθορά of events that occur by accident (Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 22-24). 
But Aristotle does not appear to be wrong. A man went to the market-place to go to 
the theatre and recovered his money because he met his debtor there by chance. 
Clearly the coincidence does not come to be, i.e. is not a physical process (γέΐ'εσις), 
but is the instantaneous outcome of the understanding of the additional 
meaningfulness of meeting the debtor and recovering the money that makes the man 
speak of the event as chance or good luck. Kirwan takes the case of a man who 
happens to be pale (his translation of Хеикос - cf. supra η.23), which Aristotle calls a 
coincidence because this is unusual (Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 35-6). Kirwan thinks that 
Aristotle is wrong in not recognizing that it takes time (i.e. a process) for a man to 
become pale. But that is not what Aristotle is talking about. Aristotle is saying that it 
is a coincidence if e.g. the builder of a house is fair-skinned. If someone is struck by 
the coincidence that the builder is fair-skinned (because it is unusual and strikes him 
as meaningful in some context) the recognition of the coincidence is instantaneous 
and not subject to a process of becoming in nature (γέΐ'€σι$). 
KIRWAN, Metaphysics...198 also criticizes Aristotle for writing at 1027 b 5-6: "of 
necessity he will die or not die." He claims that Aristotle is illogical in claiming that a 
man will not die from violence if he does not eat the pungent food, although it is true 
that he will necessarily die from violence if he does eat the pungent food. But 
Aristotle is not denying that the man will necessarily not die from violence under 
different circumstances. He is simply stating that the present necessary chain of 
causes leading from the pungent food to death by violence will necessarily not take 
place if the man decides not to eat the pungent food. 
SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame...52 claims that Aristotle holds unequivo­
cally in only one passage that every effect is necessitated, namely in Met. E(VI), iii. 
But in this passage Aristotle's point is precisely the opposite, namely that not every 
effect (event) is necessitated. 
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disease if he goes out, and he will go out if he gets thirsty, and he 
will get thirsty if he eats pungent food. But there is a last term in the 
series of necessary causes (Aristotle is taking them to be such) that is 
contingent, e.g. whether the man eats pungent food or not, which 
depends either on his choice or on coincidence.65 With hindsight one 
can explain that the cause of the man's death was his eating of 
pungent food (if one admits with Aristotle that every further step 
towards the man's death was logical and therefore necessary). But no-
one can say in advance that a man will be killed by robbers or disease 
given that he is now eating pungent food, because deliberate choices 
and coincidences may occur at any stage. The free choices and 
coincidences (accidents) involved at the start make the series of 
logically following causes non-necessary (unforeseeable), i.e. 
accidental. Sorabji claims that for Aristotle there is no cause at all of 
the man's meeting with ruffians, i.e. that there is no cause of 
coincidences.66 He is undoubtedly right that there is no cause of 
coincidences qua coincidences. However, he does not see that 
Aristotle is not speaking of coincidences qua coincidences, but of 
coincidences qua events, for which there most certainly do exist 
causes. In the example taken by Aristotle, the cause (of the man's 
death) assimilated to a substance was the choice to drink at the well 
which coincided with the category of the right place (meeting with the 
ruffians or catching a disease), as explained above. Given that the 
chain of causes is viewed by Aristotle as necessary,7 doubtless 
because in the order of expectation, the decision to eat pungent food 
6 4
 Ross, followed by JAEGER, unnecessarily bracketed iwiji ή at 1027 b 2. Cf. 
FINE, Aristotle on determinism...567 n.5. 
6 5
 Cf. ROSS, Aristotle...80. 
6 6
 SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame...9, 10-11, 19, 25. Similarly A. MANSION, 
Introduction...328 writes: "Les produits du hasard n'ont pas de cause déterminée 
assignable..." 
67
 The man's death is not viewed by Aristotle as accidental, as FREELAND, 
Accidental causes...dl holds, but as necessary once the chain of causes has been set in 
motion: ώστ' έξ ανάγκης άποθαί'είται ή ούκ άποθαί'εΐται (1027 b 5-6). Freeland, 
ibid., likewise writes that eating spicy food was the accidental cause of the man being 
murdered. But, on the contrary, the man's decision to eat spicy food was the per se, 
i.e. substantial cause of his being murdered, as explained. 
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can take the place of the decision to go to the well. Sorabji 
incorrectly claims that the cause of the man's death was his accidental 
meeting with ruffians who happened to be passing by the well.69 This 
is the kind of loose language that we use in common parlance, but is 
inaccurate. A meeting is an accident, not a per se cause, and therefore 
cannot be the profound cause of the man's death. For Aristotle 
ruffians are people who kill and he is not interested in this example in 
their free choice to kill the thirsty man (nor does he consider the 
theoretical possibility that the man might have gone to another well 
than the one nearest his home). Disease can take the place of the 
ruffians in the example. What he is concerned with here is the 
accidental or contingent origin of a series of causes that is viewed as 
necessary from a given point onwards, i.e. Aristotle is interested in 
working backwards from the man's death and asking the question if 
the man was foredoomed to die by violence. He finds that the man 
was not foredoomed to die by violence until he freely chose to eat 
spicy food. The pungency of the food, the necessity to assuage thirst 
and the choice to go to the well are then a chain of necessary (because 
logical) efficient causes (βία) that lead to the man's death, which is 
viewed with hindsight as inevitable from the moment he ate the food 
by free/contingent decision.70 
6 8
 FINE, Aristotle on determinism...568 has seen that the cause of the man's death 
(indirectly) is his consumption of pungent food, but holds that this consumption is a 
coincidence. While the consumption may be a coincidence, it may, however, also be 
due to a free choice. 
69
 SORARJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame. ..9. 
7 0
 On βία and a chain of efficient causes cf. infra Ch. 4 (a) (vii). FREDE, The limits 
ofdeterminism...222 holds that it is "much more plausible that Aristotle regarded all 
the intermediate steps which lead up to the murder, the eating, getting thirsty, and so 
on, as complete actions which involve all four kinds of causes, not just efficient 
causes." While it is true that Aristotle would not deny the operation of all four causes 
in the events leading to the man's death, if he were asked for a full analysis, Frede 
cannot be right in holding that he would consider them all relevant to the question 
with which he is concerned, as his interest is focused on the role of ή του ототер' 
έτυχεν αρχή as the start of a chain of (with hindsight necessary) efficient causes. 
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Ross rightly comes to the conclusion that such contingency is not 
confined to human action (i.e. the outcome of human choice).71 The 
first term in the necessary nexus is said to be caused by ή τοΰ отготер' 
βτυχζν [sc. αιτία], which should not be translated as the 'starting-
point of the fortuitous', but as the 'point of departure [reason, cause] 
ofthat which can result in an unpredictable outcome', e.g. the reason 
why the man eats pungent food. As Aristotle points out,72 this reason 
may under given circumstances be a material cause (the man likes to 
drink water with his meals), a final cause (he prefers water to wine) or 
an efficient cause (the pungent food, as in the example envisaged). 
Once the man has eaten the pungent food the chain of efficient 
causes starts to work. If it is asked why the man should necessarily go 
through the various stages leading to his death,73 the answer is 
because the chain of efficient causes is subject to the final cause that 
imposes rational decisions. The reason why the man necessarily had 
to act as he did is because he is human and therefore supposed to act 
rationally, i.e. to act as the final cause (his good) requires of him. The 
final cause requires him to drink at the well. In theory he could have 
chosen not to go out to the well (had there been a higher good in 
staying at home, e.g. if he had known the ruffians were at the well). 
But it would be irrational to suffer from thirst at home (i.e. one would 
act against the good or final cause) unless there were some higher 
good/final cause to be served by doing so. Thus there is a teleological 
framework presupposed, within which the chain of efficient causes 
acts. 
It may be concluded, accordingly, that for Aristotle a chain of 
necessary causes cannot be traced further back than a free choice or 
an unforeseeable coincidence. Similarly the future cannot be predic-
ROSS, Aristotle's Metaphysics...l, 363. 
7 2
 Met E(VI), in, 1027 b 12-16. Cf. FREDE, The limits ofdeterminism...22\. 
7 3
 FREDE, The limits of determimsm...223 writes "...one cannot help wondering 
why he should necessarily go through the several stages which lead up to his 
death...some scholars came to the conclusion that Aristotle in E3 simply presupposes 
a much more rigid determinism than he does elsewhere." However, the rigid 
determinism is not that of the chain of efficient causes, but the benevolent dictatorship 
of the final cause, which nothing living can escape. 
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ted except in those cases where - or to the extent that - free choices 
and unforeseeable coincidences can be eliminated. Aristotle's rejec­
tion of determinism will be dealt with further in the Conclusion. 
(xii) The relationship of τύχη to τέχνη: their outcomes are 
contingent 
The inherent unpredictability of chance events is a topic of major 
importance for Aristotle, since it sets limits to science and is opposed 
to determinism. In this section another aspect of the opposition 
between chance and determinism will be examined, namely Aris­
totle's association of τύχη and τέχνη, both of which have contingent 
outcomes. 
Chance (τύχη) and art (τέχνη) are opposites: that which a human 
being brings about by art usually does not occur of its own accord, i.e. 
by chance.74 
However, in ЕЕ V (=NE VI), iv Aristotle relates chance (τύχη) to 
art (τέχνη): "In a way art deals with the same objects as chance"75 
From the context it is very clear that the major connection between 
τύχη and τέχνη is that both deal with contingent matters (то 
ένδεχόμενον άλλως έχειν),76 i.e. unlike that which occurs by 
necessity or by nature: 
For art (τέχνη) does not deal with things that exist or come into existence 
of necessity or according to nature.77 
Furthermore, luck (τύχη) deals with that which is contingent in the 
area ofthat which would be chosen, and τέχνη deals with that which 
is contingent because the object of free choice, as appears from the 
following two passages in Phys. II, ν and ЕЕ V(= NE VI), iv 
respectively: 
7 4
 Cf. Plat. Gorg. 448c (with Arist. Met. A(I), i, 981 a 3-5; Poet, xiv, 1454 a ΙΟ­
Ι 2). For other passages cf. JOUANNA, De l'Art ...187n. 
7 5
 ЕЕ V (=NE VI), iv, 1140 a 18: τρόποι' τινά περί τα αυτά έστιν ή τύχη και ή 
τέχνη. 
7 6
 Cf. ЕЕ V (=ΝΕ VI), iv, 1140 a 12-13, 22-23. 
7 7
 ЕЕ V(=NE VI), iv, 1140 a 14-15: ούτε γαρ των έξ ανάγκη? όντων ή γινομένων 
ή τέχνη έστίΐ', ούτε των κατά φύσιν. 
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Clearly, then, luck (τύχη) is an accidental cause of the kind ofthing one 
would choose among events that are for a purpose. Hence thought and 
luck deal with the same objects, for choice involves thought.78 
The class of things that admit of variation includes both things made 
(ποιητόν) and actions done (πρακτόν).79 
In the latter passage τέχνη comes under the heading of ττοίησις· 
and hence it belongs to the area of the contingent. 
While the application of art implies freedom of choice, free 
consent is not withheld if the art is practised and leads in a 
considerable proportion of its applications to the achievement of the 
purpose for which it is applied (since otherwise it would not be an 
art). There is, then, a further accidental connection between τύχη and 
τέχνη, namely that exceptionally chance can produce the same as that 
which art produces regularly.80 Art requires experience (to produce its 
result regularly), whereas a man lacking experience (and hence art) or 
coincidental circumstances81 may produce the same result by 
chance.82 The most frequent example given by Aristotle is health, e.g. 
where someone is cured by luck, although they usually would have to 
Phys. II, v, 197 a 5-8: δήλοι' dpa ότι ή τύχη αιτία κατά συμβεβηκός έν τοις 
κατά προαίρεσιΐ' τώΐ' ενεκά του. διό περί το αυτό διάνοια καί τύχη· ή γαρ 
προαίρεσις ούκ άνευ διανοίας. This passage will be dealt with further infra §xiv. 
79
 ЕЕ V (=NE VI), iv, 1140 a 1-2: той δ' ενδεχομένου άλλως εχειν εστί τι και 
ποιητον καί πρακτόν. 
8 0
 Rhet. Ι, ν, 1362 a 2. This passage is dealt with fully infra ch. 3(a). 
8 1
 Cf. Met. Z(VI1), vii, 1032 b 21-26. This passage is dealt with fully infra ch. 
3(b)(ii). 
8 2
 Met. A(I), i, 981 a 3-12. In Poet. XIV, 20, 1454 a 10-12 Aristotle gives the 
example of playwrights who discovered how to produce given emotional effects in 
their plays by luck (από τύχης) rather than through application of art (άπα τέχνης). 
Cf. also Poet. XIII, 7-8, 1453 a 17-23. Art is thus developed to a considerable extent 
from results that are the outcome of luck, and lucky results (i.e. results which can lead 
to the improvement of an art) are frequently the outcome of the practice of the art in 
question. This is the meaning of Aristotle's quotation from Agathon in ЕЁ V(=NE 
VI), iv, 1140 a 19-20: τέχνη τύχην έοτερξε καί τύχη τέχνην. Cf. also Pseudo-
Arist-, Rhet. ad Alex, xxix, 1436 a 12-13. 
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be cured by the art of the doctor. In the case of art, art is the form 
without the matter, and the form precedes the matter, just as in natural 
objects the form precedes the substance. In the case of the products of 
ταύτόματοί', the form also precedes the results and is of such a nature 
that it could reasonably be chosen, but was not, since it occurred by 
accident.84 
Outcomes of τέχνη are accordingly contingent because freely 
chosen. Outcomes of τύχη are contingent because they are inherently 
unpredictable, as seen supra §(x), and hence irreducible to a science. 
They are also contingent because they depend on their meaning-
fulness to a free agent (indeed their choiceworthiness in the case of 
luck). 
(xiii) Both good luck and bad luck are meaningful 
Bad luck has proven problematic to a number of exegetes. It has 
been claimed, firstly, that Aristotle did not deal with bad luck at all.85 
This, however, is not true. Aristotle deals with bad luck in 197 a 25-
30. 
Secondly, a number of misunderstandings have occurred due to a 
failure to see that bad luck is meaningful, i.e. belongs to the area of 
that which is for a purpose, as will be seen in what follows. 
A. Mansion claims that an evolution took place in Aristotle's 
definition of chance. He claims that in a first period Aristotle 
identified chance with any exceptional occurrence, i.e. including both 
good and bad luck.86 This he calls the broad meaning of chance.87 He 
then claims that at a later period Aristotle limited this broad meaning 
of chance to exceptional occurrences within the area of purpose, 
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which he held to exclude bad luck. This A. Mansion calls the narrow 
meaning of chance.89 He claims there is an obvious contradiction here 
between two different meanings of chance. He then wishes to see in 
this supposed contradiction evidence of an incomplete revision of 
Phys. II, v. by Aristotle. The latter view will in fact be supported in 
Chapter 2, but for other reasons than those proposed by A. Mansion. 
It is necessary, however, to refute A. Mansion's view that there is a 
contradiction between 196 b 10-17 and 196 b 17-24. The latter 
passage is simply a second specification of the meaning of chance and 
part of one single definition. The fact that a second specification is to 
be expected is already clear from 196 b 10, where πρώτον μέν ουν 
implies there will be a following reason. The trap which A. Mansion 
and likewise Ross fell into was that of believing that bad luck could 
not correctly be part of chance, if chance is for a purpose (as they 
believed) and he who has bad luck would never have bad luck as a 
purpose.90 However, their criticism of Aristotle is unjustified, since 
the inclusion of purpose or meaningfulness in the definition of chance 
has nothing to do with the choice of the outcome by the person who 
undergoes bad luck (or indeed good luck), but rather with the fact that 
the outcome strikes the human mind because it is the kind of thing 
that recalls purpose (i.e. it belongs to the area of purpose), regardless 
of whether it is lucky or unlucky.91 For example, Oedipus met his 
father Laïus by chance. This was bad luck for Oedipus. But if 
Oedipus had met and killed just anyone, Sophocles' play would be 
uninteresting. It is precisely because the meeting between Oedipus 
and his father pertains to the area of that which appears to have a 
meaning, i.e. a purpose, that the event strikes the human mind. 
Innumerable other accidents on the journey undertaken by Oedipus 
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were insignificant, i.e. lacking in meaning, and hence passed 
unnoticed. The same remark applies to the case of the man who set 
sail for a destination, but was carried by a storm or by robbers to 
Aegina92 Again, it is untrue that A. Mansion's "broad" meaning of 
chance is found in Phys. II, v, 197 a 25-30, as he claims.93 A. Mansion 
thinks that his "narrow" meaning is excluded in this passage, as he 
does not see that bad fortune belongs to the area ofthat which is for a 
purpose, without in any way implying that the subject of bad fortune 
chooses the end (i.e. the bad fortune). The same remark holds for ЕЕ 
VIII, ii, 1247 b 2-4, where Aristotle states that chance (τύχη) is the 
cause of both goods and evils. It follows, therefore, that it is incorrect 
to maintain that there is a broad and a narrow meaning of chance.94 
Aristotle makes a distinction between good and bad luck and 
between good and bad fortune: 
Luck (or спапсеХтОхп) is called good when something good occurs and 
bad when something bad occurs, and it is called good fortune (ευτυχία) or 
bad fortune (δυστυχία) when the events are considerable.95 
The essence of luck does not consist in the fact that it would be 
chosen, had it been foreseen, since this is untrue of bad luck. Bad 
luck, like good, is the unexpected and coincidental outcome of a 
purposeful action. In this sense bad luck and good pertain to the realm 
of purpose or meaning. The fact e.g. that a man who went to chop 
wood in a forest was by chance killed by robbers (Torstrik's example) 
- an accident based on the coincidence of the right place with a per se 
cause (substantial basis), namely the decision to go, which was taken 
for a different purpose - is viewed as bad luck, as there is nothing 
absurd in connecting going to the forest with (the unlikely and 
unforeseen event of) meeting robbers. The event would have a 
purpose if it had been chosen, i.e. someone who wanted to be robbed 
or killed could choose to go to the forest in the hope that he would be 
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robbed or killed, and hence the event pertains to the realm of purpose. 
The fact that no-one would choose to be killed by robbers (or to have 
any kind of bad luck) is irrelevant.96 The man's purpose in life, to the 
fulfilment of which chopping wood was to contribute, was frustrated 
by an unforeseen unusual event which belongs to the area of that 
which is viewed as rationally associated with the action undertaken, 
i.e. as belonging to the realm of purpose, and this is why we say he 
had bad luck. Thus both good luck and bad luck pertain to the realm 
of purpose, i.e. the area of the rational or meaningful. 
A comparison of an example of good and of bad luck may clarify 
the situation. Good luck: A man is digging in his garden to plant a 
tree, i.e. he is doing something with an aim, namely that of securing 
his happiness. Unexpectedly he finds hidden treasure (something 
unusual). This is good luck, because he recognizes in the treasure a 
short-cut to his aim of achieving happiness. The event also meets the 
further criterion for good luck which is that of non-absurdity, i.e. of 
belonging to the realm of purpose, because there is nothing absurd 
about connecting the discovery of treasure with digging in one's 
garden to plant a tree. Bad luck: A man goes into the forest to chop 
wood, i.e. he is doing something with an aim, namely that of securing 
his happiness. Unexpectedly robbers attack and kill him (something 
unusual). This is bad luck because he recognizes (or others recognize) 
in the attack something that will prevent his aim of achieving 
happiness. The event also meets the further criterion of bad luck 
which is that of non-absurdity, i.e. of belonging to the realm of 
purpose, because there is nothing absurd about connecting being 
attacked by robbers with going into the forest to chop wood. Thus the 
only difference between good luck and bad is whether the event is 
recognized as a short-cut or a hindrance to happiness. 
96
 TORSTRIK, IJepi Τύχης...446 misses the point. 
CHAPTER ONE 49 
(xiv) Good luck 
It is important to note that Aristotle is speaking at the start of Phys. 
II, ν (196 b 10-33) about chance (τύχη) and not only about luck.97 
This is proven by the passage quoted in section (v) supra: "Of events 
that come to be, some come to be for a purpose and others do not. Of 
the former, some are the kind of thing one would choose [i.e. an 
outcome of διάροια] and some are not [events that occur due to 
nature], but both are among events that are for a purpose [i.e. 
meaningful] (èv TOLÇ ё ека του)..." (196 b 17-19). 
As from 196 b 33 Aristotle is speaking about luck (good or bad). 
There is no indication of a change of subject, and hence exegetes have 
been misled.98 If the phrase in brackets at 196 b 31-33 is an 
interpolation, as I shall attempt to show in the next chapter, it may 
have taken the place of a phrase indicating that the next passage deals 
only with luck. However, that Aristotle is speaking of luck (good or 
bad) and not of chance in general (which includes chance in the area 
of nature) is clear from his definition in 197 a 5-6: "τύχη is an 
accidental cause of the kind ofthing one would choose (èv TOLÇ κατά 
προαίρεση) among events that are for a purpose (των ё ека του)." 
There is no reference in this definition to chance in the area of nature, 
which proves that Aristotle is referring to luck (good or bad). In this 
definition Aristotle also does not mention the condition of 
unusualness. However, this is explained by the fact that he referred to 
it in the previous sentence. 
From 197 a 8 to 197 a 25 Aristotle is again speaking of chance and 
not merely of luck, as is clear from the examples in 197 a 21 -25 and 
from 197 a 8-12, where he is proving that his theory of chance 
(clearly in general) corresponds to the views of the many and the 
wise. At the end of Phys. II, ν Aristotle then gives a definitive 
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definition of chance which includes the condition of unusualness and 
of meaningfulness, but not of choiceworthiness, since choice-
worthiness applies only to luck (good or bad)" and does not cover 
chance in the area of nature.100 
To tum to Aristotle's example of luck in Phys. II, v: In the case of 
the man who would have come for the purpose of getting back the 
money when his debtor was collecting contributions, if he had known, 
Aristotle states that the end (το τέλος), namely the recovery of the 
money (ή κομιδή), is not one of the causes in the man (ού των ëv 
αΰτώ αιτίων), but is an object of choice (των προαιρετών) and an 
outcome of thought (άπο διανοία$τ)(197 a 1-2). This sentence is to be 
understood as follows: in the particular case in question101 the 
recovery of the money was not one of the causes that made the man 
go to the market-place (where he accidentally recovered the money), 
since the cause in the man that made him go to the market-place was 
something quite different. Nonetheless, the man would have come for 
the purpose of recovering the money, had he known, i.e. the recovery 
of the money pertains to the area ofthat which would be chosen (των 
προαιρετών). The recovery of the money is also an outcome of 
thought (άττο διανοίας), since it is logical to go to the market to 
recover money from a debtor, if one knows that he is there. 
Thus luck also belongs to the area of thought (197 a 2, 7-8), since 
the area of choice is also the area of thought,102 and that which is 
thought is a logical option and possible object of choice. It may be 
noted that this remark is applicable to bad luck as well as good. 
On the choiceworthiness (i.e. meaningfulness) of bad luck cf. the last section. 
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Aristotle states that it is rightly held that good fortune is something 
inconstant.103 Torstrik objects that this is incorrect, as there are some 
people who are held to be always lucky or always having bad luck.104 
However, Torstrik's criticism is clearly unfounded. Aristotle is 
referring in this passage to pure good luck, not good luck based on 
ορμή (the theory developed in ЕЕ VIII, ii and MM II, viii). Those rare 
people who always have pure good or bad luck are the exception. 
Even the good luck of those people whose good luck is based on a 
good ορμή only have "more constant" (συνεχής ευτυχία μάλλον, 
1248 b 6-7), not permanent good luck. Most people know and hold 
that good fortune is something inconstant, i.e. which cannot be relied 
upon to continue. Torstrik also objects that the fact that one has 
gained e.g. some property by good luck does not mean that one will 
lose it through bad luck. But Aristotle never asserts this. He merely 
states that one cannot expect to continue to have good or bad luck 
permanently, since luck is inconstant. 
(xv) The distinction between τύχη and ταύτόματον 
In Phys. II, vi Aristotle deals with his distinction between τύχη 
and ταύτόματον. The term τύχη is restricted in meaning here in a 
way that strictly contradicts the use of the term in Phys. II, iv-v. This 
contradiction will be examined in Ch. II. Aristotle writes that the area 
of ταύτόματον is greater than that of τύχη.1 0 5 Everything that occurs 
due to τύχη can be said to occur due to ταύτόματον as well, but not 
vice versa.106 The area of τύχη is limited to beings who can have good 
fortune (το εύτυχήσαι) and who can act rationally (i.e. who are 
capable of πραξι.?)107 and have choice (τοΐ? εχουσι προαίρεσίν).108 
Phys. II, ν, 197 a 30-31. This passage clearly was written before the 
development of the doctrine of ЕЕ VIII, ii. Cf. infra Ch.2 section 2 and n. 5 and Ch.7 
(a) end. 
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Thus only human beings can have τύχη. Happiness ευδαιμονία) is 
also limited to rational beings. It is frequently thought that happiness 
consists in having very substantial good luck (ευτυχία).109 Hence 
ευδαιμονία and ευτυχία are closely related in meaning.110 Happiness, 
like τύχη, is reserved to rational beings, since ευδαιμονία is a kind of 
rational action (πραξις), namely good rational action (εύπραξία)."1 
Whatever beings cannot act rationally (πραξαι) can do nothing by 
τύχη.
1 1 2
 Hence no inanimate being, beast or child can do anything by 
τύχη, as they do not possess choice (ττροαίρεσι?)."3 Only an adult 
human possesses (free) choice (προαίρεσις·), the outcome of mind 
(διάνοια), and only a chance event which occurs as a by-product of a 
free act is said to be performed by τύχη. Thus no inanimate being, 
beast or child has good fortune (ευτυχία) or bad fortune (ατυχία), 
except in an analogous sense."4 Aristotle's doctrine here corresponds 
with his view in the ethical works, where he holds that no animal or 
child can be happy115 because they do not possess choice (προ­
αίρεση). 1 1 6 There is an intrinsic relation between τύχη (in the form 
of ευτυχία) and happiness (also called ευτυχία), because both are 
based on free choice. 
It is true that ταύτόματον is also used in relation to human beings. 
For example, Aristotle writes that some people get things right in 
rhetoric άττο ταΰτομάτου "of themselves", "by chance"."7 It is to be 
noted that the meaning here is not "by luck", but "by chance" On the 
other hand, ταύτόματον also applies to the other living beings 
i09Phys. II, v, 197 a 26-27. 
"°Phys. II, vi, 197 b 3-4. 
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(besides man) and to numerous inanimate beings. For example, a 
horse "came" by chance (αύτόμα-roçXas we say) because it was 
saved by coming, although it obviously did not come in order to be 
saved. A tripod fell by chance (αυτόματο?), because its position after 
its fall was such that someone could sit on it, but it did not fall in 
order to be sat upon. A stone fell by chance (άττο του αυτομάτου), 
because it did not fall in order to hit someone, but in such a way that 
it could have been thrown for the purpose of hitting someone119. On 
the basis of his examples Aristotle then writes: "Thus it is clear that 
among things which come to be in their own right (άττλώς) for a 
purpose, whenever things, of which the cause is external to them, 
come to be not for the sake of what actually occurs, we say then that it 
occurred due to ταυτόματον"120 
Thus in its restricted sense (as laid down in Phys. II, vi) τύχη 
corresponds in meaning more or less to the English term 'luck', since 
in general only human beings have 'luck'. However, Aristotle's τύχη 
is slightly more restricted in meaning than the term 'luck'. For 
Aristotle only adult human beings can have τύχη in the restricted 
sense. In English, however, we readily admit that children and even 
animals (to the extent that we assimilate their feelings to those of 
human beings) can have 'luck'. For the translation of the term 
ταυτόματον the English term 'chance' seems adequate. In English 
'chance' is a broader term than 'luck', since all 'luck' takes place 'by 
chance'. Thus Aristotle's ταυτόματον corresponds well with 
'chance' in English. 
It may be noted that τύχη (luck) cannot even be predicated of all 
chance occurrences that involve adult human beings, but only those 
Phys. II, vi, 197 b 14-15: τοΐ? άλλοις ζώοις και πολλοί? των αψύχων. 
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that involve the coincidence of an unexpected category with a 
substance (or a free choice that is assimilated to a substance). Thus if 
I bump my head against the wall while I am sleepwalking, Aristotle 
would doubtless conclude that that was a case of ταύτόματον and not 
of τύχη (δυστυχία). 
It is also apparent that Aristotle's limitation of luck to adult human 
beings is based on his theory that children and animals cannot 
choose.121 Likewise children and animals cannot be happy because 
they cannot choose.122 The capacity to choose (possessed by all 
adults) is sufficient for τύχη, but is not alone sufficient for happiness, 
of course, since for happiness perfect virtue is required during a βίο? 
теХеюс.
123
 It is apparent that Aristotle in the application of his 
dialectic here rather strains the view of the many (the linguistic usage 
of his time).124 However, he holds rightly that luck depends on having 
choice and on having happiness as an end in life, which is due to the 
fact that when we say that something is lucky or occurred by luck we 
mean that something occurred accidentally (contrary to expectation) 
and appeared to constitute a choiceworthy shortcut to the happiness 
we were already seeking by our freely chosen action.125 
(xvi) The relationship of ταύτόματον to μάτην 
Aristotle seeks to clarify further the meaning of the term 
ταύτόματον by contrasting it with the term μάτην. His purpose is to 
Cf. n.107 and n.UO. A choice is a voluntary action preceded by deliberation 
(NE III, ii, 16-17, 1112 a 14-15), and children cannot deliberate. 
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présence aux choses qui n'est pas liée à un domaine déterminé, mais "ouverte" Cette 
présence suppose que les choses qui ne sont pas thématisées par un projet à un 
moment donné restent dans le monde de l'homme, à titre de composantes de son 
monde environnant, et que leur mode d'être est l'être par accident. La capacité d'avoir 
rapport à l'accidentel est le signe d'une présence qui n'est pas celle d'une chose parmi 
d'autres, mais celle d'une âme "dans" le monde qu'elle ouvre à lui-même." 
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show firstly the teleological context implied by the use of the term 
ταΰτόματον and secondly that the purpose in the case of ταΰτόματον 
comes from the exterior.126 Nothing can be said to have been done in 
vain unless there was a planned purpose (which then failed to come 
about). Likewise, nothing happens άττο του αυτομάτου unless it 
appears to have a purpose or to be meaningful, i.e. to be the kind of 
thing that would have been done to achieve a purpose. 
In his commentary on 197 a 22-32 Torstrik again declares 
Aristotle's theory to be nonsense.127 He holds that one cannot say that 
a stone that fell by chance fell in vain, since it achieves its aim of 
falling to its natural place! In saying this Torstrik entirely misses the 
point of what Aristotle is saying. Aristotle states that a stone which 
fell and accidentally hit someone did so by chance (από του 
αυτομάτου, 197 b 31), since (a) it did not actually fall for the purpose 
of hitting someone, and (b) hitting someone pertains to the area of 
purpose (since it is quite logical to throw a stone if one wishes to hit 
someone, 197 b 32). If, then, one takes a chance occurrence, e.g. the 
coincidence of a stone falling at the moment when someone was 
walking underneath it, this chance occurrence pertains to the area of 
purpose, as stated. 
Aristotle explains the relationship of the terms ταΰτόματον and 
μάτην (on the basis of a false etymology) as follows: An action is 
normally said to be in vain when it does not achieve the end for which 
it is logically performed. Aristotle then writes: "This is what то 
αύτόματον is like when it comes to be in vain, as the term suggests. 
For the stone did not fall in order to hit someone. Therefore the stone 
fell by το αύτόματον, because it could have fallen through someone's 
agency and for the sake of hitting" (197 b 29-31). This passage is 
difficult. However, the key to the interpretation seems to be: (i) 
Aristotle's aim is to draw a parallel, not a contrast, between 
ταΰτόματον and μάτην; (ii) the γαρ in 197 b 30 is significant. Hence 
Aristotle is saying that just as a stone did not fall in order to hit 
someone, that which occurs due to ταύτόματον is in itself vain 
This is clear from Phys. II, vi, 197 b 18-23. 
TORSTRIK, IJepi Τύχης:.Α63-4. 
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(μάτην-), since it does not have a purpose. The purpose is conferred 
by the human interpreter of the event.129 
(xvii) Substances generated counter to nature fall under 
ταύτόματον 
Before concluding his account of chance Aristotle adds a brief 
section on the unusual in nature. That which occurs in accordance 
with nature occurs always or for the most part in the same way.130 
That which occurs exceptionally contrary to nature is referred rather 
to ταύτόματον than to τύχη, as Aristotle informs us. Hence it is clear 
that that which occurs in accordance with nature is furthest from 
τύχη.
1 3 1 
Aristotle runs into difficulties when he wishes to categorize natural 
products, i.e. substances, which are generated counter to nature, i.e. 
monsters and spontaneous generation.132 He has no doubt that they 
The source of Torstrik's mistake in thinking that a stone has a purpose in falling 
is SIMPLICIUS, In Phys. 348, 32. GUTHRIE, A History...\l, 239 fell into the same trap. 
1 2 9
 This is essentially the explanation given by Ross, Aristotle's Physics...524. The 
alternative interpretations proposed by CHARLTON, Phys. /-//...110 have less in their 
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expected effect occasionally fails." This interpretation cannot be correct, since 
Aristotle is not speaking of chance as an explanation for human failures. 
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Phys. II, viii, 198 b 35-36. Cf. Pol. I, i, 1253 а 1-4; Part. An. I, i, 641 b 20-23. 
Some natural things occur of necessity (ανάγκη,), i.e. always, others only usually. 
That which occurs due to compulsion (βία) occurs of necessity. That which occurs by 
chance (τύχη) is different, since it occurs neither always nor for the most part. Thus 
chance (τύχη) or that which occurs randomly (оттотер' έτυχεν) is radically opposed 
to necessity (ανάγκη). Free human actions are also contingent. Cf. Rhet. I, x, 1368 b 
32 - 1369 a 2; De Int. 18 b 5 - 19 b 4. Cf. infra Ch.5 and Conclusion (cXii)(a). 
131
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-35. Cf. Prob. XV, iii, 910 b 29-31 : ού γαρ δη άπο τύχη? 
ye αυτό тгоіой тес φαίνονται και dei- то бе del καί έπί πάντων ούκ από τύχη?, 
άλλα φυσικόν. 
1 3 2
 Some commentators have wished to exclude monsters from the phrase όταν 
γαρ γένηταί τι παρά φύσιν (197 b 34) and others have wished to exclude 
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cannot come under τύχη, since τύχη simulates the action of human 
choice. However, they also do not fit well under ταύτόματοί' 
(exclusive of τύχη), since their cause is internal, whereas the cause of 
everything due to ταύτόματον (exclusive of τύχη) is external. 
Aristotle contents himself with saying that they are to be classified 
under ταύτόματον, although in fact they are different.134 He concedes 
in reality that he is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation. 5 
Chapter 5 section (d) infra will be devoted to examining the 
difficulties raised by Aristotle's attempt to establish a parallel 
between chance substances (chance in the area of nature) and chance 
events (chance in the field of thought). 
(xviii) Chance, νους and φύσις 
In the final passage of II, vi Aristotle writes: "What chance 
(ταύτόματον) and luck (τύχη) are, then, and how they differ from 
one another has been stated. As for the ways in which they are causes, 
each of them is a source which begins motion; for each is always one 
of the causes that operate by nature (φύσει) or from mind (ÒTTO 
διανοίας)"1 3 6 It is presumed by Ross and A. Mansion137 that Aristotle 
is here distinguishing the sources of ταύτόματον and τύχη and 
saying that the source of ταύτόματον is φύσις and that of τύχη is 
διάνοια. Hence they see a contradiction with what Aristotle stated at 
the start of Phys. II, vi, namely that ταύτόματον covers all of chance 
including the area of τύχη. 1 3 8 As a result of this supposed 
contradiction they introduce the notion of a "generic" usage of 
spontaneous generation. It will be seen infra Ch.5 (b) and (c)(ii) with n.87 that both 
groups are wrong. 
m
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-35. 
1 3 4
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 35-6: ёаті δε και τούτο ётеро . 
135
 Cf. also infra Ch.3 on Rhet. 1, χ, 12,1369 a 32 - b 5, where Aristotle mentions 
the same problem. Ross, Aristotle...1'6 claims that monsters show best the difference 
between τύχη and ταύτόματον. In fact they do not correspond properly either to 
τύχη or to ταύτόματοί' (exclusive of τύχη). Cf. also Ch.5 (d). 
u6Phys. II, vi, 198 a 1-4. 
1 3 7
 Ross, Aristotle's Physics..M; A. MANSION, Introduction ... 293-4. 
1 3 8
 Phys. II, vi, 197 a 36 - 197 b 1. 
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ταύτόματον whereby it includes τύχη and a "specific" usage 
whereby it excludes it. It is unnecessary, however, to make Aristotle 
contradict himself even within a single chapter. In fact Ross and A. 
Mansion missed the point of what Aristotle was saying. His point in 
saying that "each [sc. ταύτόματον and τύχη] is always one of the 
causes that operate by nature (φύσει) or from mind (άττο διάνοια?)" 
was that each operates coincidentally for a purpose. Nature and mind 
are the two sources of all purpose, and Aristotle lays great emphasis 
on the fact that all events attributable to chance occur coincidentally 
with these for a purpose.139 Apart from the fact that it is most 
unsatisfactory to make Aristotle contradict himself within one chapter 
there are two further points of evidence to show that Aristotle did not 
intend to set up a one-to-one correspondence in 198 a 1-5 between 
τύχη and διάνοια and ταύτόματον and φύσις· respectively. Firstly, 
Aristotle reverses the order of φύσις and διάνοια (in 198 a 4) when 
he writes νους ή φύσις in 198 a 6. He would not have reversed this 
order had there been a one-to-one correspondence with ταύτόματον 
and τύχη. Secondly, in 198 a 4-5 Aristotle concludes that there is an 
indeterminate multitude (πλήθος αόριστον) of things that can occur 
by chance. This is precisely the same conclusion as that of II, v, 196 b 
17-29 (cf. 196 b 28: то oè κατά συμβεβηκος αόριστον) and 197 a 14-
18. It is clear, accordingly, that Aristotle is referring in 198 a 1-4 to 
the passage 196 b 17-29, the purpose of which is to show that chance 
only occurs in the domain ofthat which has purpose. The point of his 
reference is thus to show that chance is restricted to the domain of 
that which has purpose and not to set up a one-to-one correspondence 
between τύχη, διάνοια and ταύτόματον, φύσις respectively. Accor­
dingly, it must be concluded that there is no "specific" usage of 
ταύτόματον whereby it does not include that which occurs due to 
τύχη. Another important conclusion arising from the establishment of 
only one meaning of ταύτόματον is that Phys. II, vi is a doctrinally 
unified chapter. 
Finally, Aristotle concludes his account of chance as follows: 
"since ταύτόματον and τύχη are causes of those things for which 
Phys. II, v, 196 b 17-29. 
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νους or φύσις might be responsible, when one of these [sc. νους or 
φύσις] has become a cause incidentally,140 and since nothing which is 
by accident is prior to that which is in itself (καθ' αυτό), it is clear 
that the cause by accident is also not prior to that which is by itself 
(καθ' αυτό). Therefore, το αύτόματον and τύχη are posterior to νους 
and φύσις. Hence no matter how much το αυτόματοι» is cause of the 
heavens (του ουρανού), νους and φύσις are necessarily prior causes 
both of many other things and of the universe (τούδε той παντός)"1 4 1 
There are a number of noteworthy features in this passage. Firstly, 
Aristotle substitutes νους for διάνοια which he used throughout the 
preceding passage.142 The νους which is cause of the universe is cause 
of the order in the universe, as is that of Anaxagoras or Plato's 
Demiurge, since for Aristotle there is no cause of the existence of the 
universe. The νους which causes the order of the universe can clearly 
only be the Unmoved Mover. But whereas διάνοια is applicable to 
man, it is not applicable to God. Hence it was necessary for Aristotle 
to use νους here instead of διάνοια. On the other hand, Aristotle 
could have used νους instead of διάνοια in the whole account of 
chance, but doubtless preferred διάνοια because it is the more general 
term.143 
Secondly, νους and φύσις are said to be the causes of the universe. 
There are strong reasons for arguing that νους and φύσις are not 
identical, but rather that there is a fundamental distinction between 
them. Elsewhere in Aristotle's works there are also a number of 
passages in which God (ό θεός) and nature (φύσις) occur together. 
These terms are not, however, to be taken as identical, but rather as 
parallel to νους and φύσις in this passage. This topic will not, 
however, be dealt with here, as the present work is restricted to the 
topic of chance. In regard to chance, then, it is to be noted that 
ταύτόματον, as was seen, is applicable to the areas of both νους and 
For the translation cf. Ross, Aristotle's Physics...524. 
141
 Phys. II, vi, 198 a 5-13; cf. Met. K(XI), viii, 1065 b 2-4. 
1 4 2
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 22, 197 a 2, 197 a 7, 197 a 8, 197 a 29; Phys. II, vi, 198 a 4. 
1 4 3
 For the equivalence of IOÛÇ and διάνοια in human terms cf. also ЕЕ V (=NE 
VI), ii, 4, 1139 a 33. 
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φύσις, according to the doctrine of Phys II, vi, whereas the term τύχη 
is limited to the area of νους. 
Lastly, Aristotle concludes his account of chance by pointing out 
that neither τύχη nor ταύτόματον are ultimate causes, since they 
depend on νους and φύσις. They are only accidental causes, and it is 
clear that an accidental cause is not prior to a cause in itself (καθ' 
αυτό), i.e. a per se or substantial cause.144 Thus τύχη and 
ταύτόματον have no substantial existence and hence cannot be 
ultimate causes. No matter how much το αύτόματον is cause of the 
order in the heavens (του ουρανού), as Democritus held, νους and 
φύσις are necessarily prior causes of the universe (τούδε του παντός) 
and much else. 
In this chapter, accordingly, the meaning of chance in Phys. II, iv-
vi was examined, and the many aspects of the concept dealt with. The 
controversies in the literature on the topic were investigated and 
solutions proposed. The chapter took the form of a commentary on the 
doctrine of Phys. II, v-vi. The internal contradictions of the chapters 
were not treated, however, as this topic is complex and has 
accordingly been reserved for the next chapter on the structure of 
Phys. II, iv-vi. 
144
 A cause καθ' αυτό (198 a 9) should be taken as the same as a cause άπλώ? (197 
a 14). Cf. supra n.35 and n.120. CHARLTON, Phys. 1-11 ...108 speaks of 'proper 
causes', by which he doubtless means per se or 'substantial' causes. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE STRUCTURE OF PHYS. II, iv-vi 
In this chapter the structure of Phys. II, iv - vi will be examined. It 
is hoped to show firstly that this structure presupposes a development 
in Aristotle's concept of chance. Secondly, it is aimed to show that 
the doctrine of τύχη and ταύτόματον in passages of other treatises, 
where it is also of considerable importance, can only be properly 
understood from the structure (including the revision) oí Phys. II, iv -
vi. These passages will be investigated in Chapter 3. 
In this chapter it will be argued that Aristotle originally wrote 
Phys. II, iv - ν about τύχη alone, that he wrote Phys. II, vi which 
contains his distinction between τύχη and ταύτόματον at a later date, 
and that Phys. II, iv-v was then revised to accommodate the doctrine 
of Phys. II, vi.1 The evidence in favour of this thesis derives from both 
the doctrine and the structure of these chapters. 
The first evidence that Phys. II, iv - vi was not written as a unit 
arises from several contradictions in doctrine between Phys. II, ν and 
Phys. II, vi. 
1. In Phys. II, vi Aristotle writes that "when dealing with things 
that occur by nature (φύσει) one is furthest from luck (τύχη)"2 Here 
he contradicts what he wrote in Phys. II, v: "Anything that might 
occur due to mind (διάνοια) or due to nature (φύσις) is for a purpose. 
When such occurrences take place by accident we say that they are 
due to chance (τύχη)"3 Thus in Phys. II, ν accidental occurrences due 
to nature (φύσις) are attributed to τύχη. But in Phys. II, vi accidental 
' TORSTRIK, Περί Τύχης.,.ΑΜ is also of the view that Aristotle's account of 
chance was revised. 
2
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-33: μάλιστα δ'έστι χωριζόμεΐΌΐ' του από τύχης έν TOÎÇ 
φύσει γιγνομέΐ'θΐ<Γ. 
3
 Phys. II, ν, 196 b 21-24: εστί δ' е ека του δσα те από διανοίας di' πραχθείη 
και οσα από φύσεως, τα δε τοιαύτα όταν κατά συμβεβηκος γενηται, άπο 
τύχης φαμεν είναι. 
62 THE STRUCTURE OF PHYS. II, IV-VI 
occurrences due to nature (or rather, in the field of nature) - the only 
examples of which are in fact occurrences contrary to nature4 - are 
explicitly said to be furthest from τύχη. It will be seen that the only 
reasonable explanation is that the passage from Π, ν quoted was 
written in an earlier draft before the distinction between τύχη and 
ταύτόματον had been introduced by Aristotle. 
2. In Phys. II, ν Aristotle states: "Again, the view that good fortune 
(ευτυχία) is something unstable, is correct; for chance (τύχη) is 
unstable"5 But in Phys. II, vi he writes: "Hence also luck (τύχη) must 
necessarily have to do with actions (τα ττρακτά) (an indication of this 
is that it seems that good fortune (ευτυχία) is either the same as 
happiness (ευδαιμονία) or nearly the same, and happiness 
(ευδαιμονία) is a particular kind of action (πραξις): it is doing well 
(εύπραξία)"6 It will be seen (infra Ch. 6 and 7) that the ευτυχία 
referred to in Phys. Π, ν is external prosperity, an unstable condition 
(not source) of happiness in both NE and ЕЕ, referred to as the pure 
good luck of the dice-thrower in ЕЕ VIII, ii, 1247 b 9-18. On the other 
4
 In Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-37 Aristotle proves that one is furthest from τύχη when 
in the realm of фіхтіс from the fact that when something occurs contrary t o nature we 
do not say that it occurred by τύχη, but by ταύτόματοί'. At first sight it seems strange 
that Aristotle shows that one is furthest from τύχη when in the realm of φύσι? on the 
basis of that which occurs contrary to nature. However, the reason why he does so 
soon becomes clear. It is because no substance that comes into existence in 
accordance with nature occurs by chance. Hence the only example of a chance 
substantial occurrence in the realm of nature is that which occurs contrary to nature. 
Ross, Aristotle's Physics...524 claims that Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 28-32 shows that 
the reference to that which occurs by chance contrary to nature must be a reference to 
spontaneous generation. It will be seen infra Ch.5 (b) that monsters are also chance 
substances. It may be noted that outside the category of substance chance events may 
occur in the area of nature without being contrary to nature. Cf. Rhet. I, v, 1362 a 7-8 
where Aristotle gives the example of a man's brothers all being ugly, while he himself 
is handsome. This is an example of the coincidence of a quality with a substance. Cf. 
also infra Ch.3 (a), where this passage is dealt with in detail. 
5
 Phys. II, v, 197 a 30-31: ετι αβέβαιοι' ή ευτυχία εύλόγω?· ή γαρ τύχη 
αβέβαιος- Cf. also infra Ch.7 (a) and n. 37. 
6
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 2-5: διό και ανάγκη περί τα πρακτά είναι την τύχην 
(σημείον δ' οτι δοκει ήτοι ταΰτοΐ' είναι τη ευδαιμονία ή ευτυχία ή έγγύ?, ή δ' 
ευδαιμονία πραξί? TIC· εύπραξία γαρ)... 
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hand, the ευτυχία referred to in Phys. II, vi, which is considered to be 
nearly the same thing as happiness, is the ευτυχία based on ορμή, 
which Aristotle first discusses in ЕЕ VIII, ii and then in MM II, viii 
and calls 'more continuous' (συνεχή? μάλλοί', 1248 b 6-7). Aristotle 
refers in NE to the fact that some people consider ευτυχία to be the 
same as ευδαιμονία, but does not agree with them, as he had at that 
stage not yet developed the theory of ευτυχία based on όρμη.7 Now it 
is well known that Aristotle rejects any notion that ευδαιμονία could 
be transitory - if it is to be real happiness it must last in his view for a 
complete lifetime (βίο? τέλειο?).8 There is accordingly a contra­
diction between Aristotle's statement in Phys. II, ν that ευτυχία is 
something unstable like τύχη and his statement in Phys. II, vi that 
ευτυχία is the same or nearly the same as ευδαιμονία, which is 
essentially something permanent. 
3. Another indication that Phys. II, vi was added on to Phys. II, iv-
v at a later stage is to be found in Phys. II, v, 197 a 22-25, where 
Aristotle raises the question if just anything could be a cause of 
chance. He leaves the matter an open question in Phys. II, v. 
However, he provides a very clear answer in Phys. II, vi, 197 b 22-32. 
The vagueness and uncertainty of the passage in Phys. Π, ν show that 
it was written before Aristotle came to the clear view expressed in 
Phys. II, vi. 
4. Besides these discrepancies between the doctrine of Phys. II, ν 
and II, vi, which must arouse considerable suspicions to the effect that 
Phys. II, iv-vi were not written as a unit, there also exists evidence 
that Phys. II, iv-v form a unit on their own. This evidence arises from 
7
 NE I, viii, 17, 1099 b 7-8· οθεν ει? ταύτο τάττουσιΐ' êiaoi την εύτυχίαν τη 
ευδαιμονία. For ευτυχία as a condition (not a source) of happiness cf. NE I, viii, 2, 
1098 b 14-16; I, viii, 3, 1098 b 18-20; NE I, viii, 15, 1099 a 31-32; ЕЕ 1, ii, 5, 1214 b 
24-27; ЕЕ VI(= NE VII), xiii, 2, 1153 b 17-19. For the instability of this ευτυχία cf. 
NE Ι, χ, 12, 1100 b 25-30; ЕЕ Vili, ii, 24, 1248 b 7: αϋτη δε ou συνεχή?. 
8
 Cf. NE I, vii, 16, 1098 a 18-20: έτι δ' έν βίψ τελείω· μία γαρ χελιδών εαρ ού 
ποιεί, οΰδε μία ήμερα- οϋτω δε ούδε μακάριοι» και εύδαίμονα μία ήμερα ουδ' 
ολίγος χρόνο?. A complete lifetime (βίο? τέλειο?) may be taken to mean a life 
lasting at least until the age of 50. On the meaning of βίο? τέλειο? cf. my article El 
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the structure of Phys II, iv - v, which is that of a complete 
Aristotelian dialectical argument.9 
In Phys II, iv Aristotle sets out the views of the many and the wise 
about chance. In what may be taken to be the first part of Phys Π, ν 
(196 b 10 - 197 a 8) he sets out his own opinion about chance. Then in 
the second part of II, ν (197 a 8 - 25) he proves his own view by 
showing that it is in harmony with the views of the many and the 
wise. In this way the two chapters form a complete dialectical 
argument. 
It can be shown easily that the second part of Phys II, ν (197 a 8 -
25) corresponds to Phys. II, iv. Thus Aristotle accepts the view of 
those who hold that τύχη is unclear to man (άδηλος άΐ'θρώπω), a view 
which had been listed in II, iv.10 Likewise he accepts the view that 
nothing comes into being from chance, provided that chance is rightly 
understood." He accepts the view that the causes from which that 
which occurs by chance occurs12 are indeterminately many, whereas 
each thing that comes to be (in the strong sense) has a determinate 
cause.
13
 Finally, he accepts that the view that τύχη is something 
paradoxical or counter to reason (παράλογον) is right, a view which is 
expressed also in II, iv.14 
sentido de la felicidad de la vida perfecta (bios teleios) en la Etica de 
Aristóteles and infra Ch 6 (b)(iv) 
9
 Cf LENNOX, Teleology 229 
10
 Phys II, iv, 196 b 6 ή τύχη, άδηλο? 8e ανθρωπινή διάνοια, Phys II, ν, 197 a 9-
10 η τύχη άδηλο? αι<θρωπω 
11
 Phys II, ιν, 196 a 1 ουδέν γαρ δη γίγνεσθαι απο τύχης· φασιν, Phys II, ν, 197 
a 10-11 εστίν ώς ουδέν απο τύχης δοξειεν αν γίγνεσθαι 
12
 Since luck is not a substance, that which occurs by luck occurs primarily due to 
something else (namely, a per se cause or substance) 
13
 Phys II, iv, 196 a 1-2 πάντων είναι τι αίτιον ώρισμενον, Phys II, ν, 197 a 8-
9 αόριστα μεν ουν τα αίτια ανάγκη είναι αφ' ων αν γένοιτο το απο τύχη?. 
14
 Phys II, ν, 197 a 18-19 και το φάνει ειναί τι παράλογοι· την τυχην ορθώς 
Aristotle is doubtless referring here to the fact that it is absurd to say that there is such 
a thing as luck Phys II, iv, 196 a 7 επει ει γε τι ην ή τύχη, άτοπον αν φανειη, 196 
α 19-20 άτοπον ουν είτε μη ύπελαμβανον είναι είτε οιομενοι παρελειπον He is 
also referring to the fact that there can be no science of chance events (cf supra Ch 1 
§(x)) 
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Thus the second part of Phys. Π, ν (197 a 8-25) corresponds 
expressly to Phys. II, iv. Accordingly, it appears that Phys. II, iv - ν 
form a complete dialectical argument. Their structure corresponds to 
the structure of numerous similar dialectical arguments, e.g. NE I, iv -
viii. In NE I, iv - vi Aristotle sets out the views of the many and the 
wise about happiness. In NE I, vii he sets out his own view about 
happiness. Finally, in NE I, viii he proves the correctness of his own 
views by showing that they concur with the views of the many and the 
wise.15 It appears, accordingly, from the structure of Phys. II, iv - ν 
that these two chapters constitute a complete account of chance on 
their own. 
At the conclusion of his account of chance Aristotle then adds on a 
note on the meaning of ευτυχία and δυστυχία (197 a 25-32). In this 
note we read: ετι άβέβαιον ή ευτυχία ευλόγως... "Again, the view 
that good fortune is something unstable is correct..." The existing 
translations do not bring out the fact that Aristotle appears to be 
referring to a popular view which he is drawing upon to confirm his 
own view. (We likewise find the expression ευλόγως in 197 a 12 
where he was proving his own views with the aid of the views of the 
many and the wise). However, this point cannot be proved, as there is 
no reference in Phys. II, iv to a popular view of τύχη as an άβέβαιον. 
Nonetheless, the last sentence of Phys. II, iv is at least partly the work 
of an editor, as is clear from the addition of the reference to 
ταϋτόματον. It may be suspected, then, that there was a reference at 
this point in the original version of Phys. II, iv to the instability of 
τύχη. 
5. The argument so far has shown that there are two contradictions 
between the doctrine of Phys. II, ν and II, vi and that from the 
structural point of view Phys. II, iv and II, ν form a unitary argument 
on their own. It will now be seen that Phys. II, iv - ν shows every 
indication of having originally dealt only with τύχη and of having 
been revised to include ταΰτόματον. 
15
 Cf. especially NE I, viii, 1, 1098 b 9-11 where Aristotle explicitly states his 
method. For an account of dialectical method in Aristotle cf. my article Dialectic, 
Language and Reality in Aristotle... and my book Gott und θεωρία... 15-19. 
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At the start of Phys. II, vi Aristotle states that all chance may be 
classified under ταύτόματον and that τύχη is a specialised part of 
ταύτόματον which is restricted to the area of human choice (197 a 36 
- 197 b 13). Since ταύτόματον includes τύχη and all of chance one 
would expect Aristotle to speak of ταύτόματον from the start of his 
treatment of chance and to speak of τύχη only when he came to speak 
of luck, i.e. the more specialised sense of ταύτόματον. Instead, 
however, it is precisely the contrary that is found. Aristotle speaks 
mainly of τύχη in Phys. II, iv and v, i.e. in the two chapters before he 
introduces his distinction between τύχη and ταύτόματον. And not 
only does he speak mainly of τύχη in Phys. II, iv and v, but it has 
been seen above (point 1.) that in Phys. II, ν τύχη is used to cover 
ταύτόματον as well. Accordingly, it appears that in Phys. II, iv - ν 
Aristotle was concerned mainly with τύχη and that he wrote these 
two chapters without making use of the meaning of ταύτόματον 
found in Phys. II, vi. Hence it is worthwhile inquiring whether there is 
evidence that the references to ταύτόματον in Phys. II, iv - ν were 
introduced during a revision of these two chapters. In order to show 
that this is so, it is easiest to take II, ν first. 
A. In Phys. Π, ν Aristotle proves firstly that chance does not refer 
to that which always occurs in the same way or for the most part, but 
to that which occurs besides these (παρά ταύτα).1 6 In this passage he 
refers to τύχη six times and to ταύτόματον once. The sentence 
containing ταύτόματον runs as follows: "But since there are some 
things that occur besides these [sc. that which occurs always or for the 
most part] and all people say that these things come from τύχη, it is 
clear that there is such a thing as τύχη and ταύτόματον"17 It is 
illogical to conclude that because all people say that things occur due 
to τύχη, therefore there is such a thing as ταύτόματον. It is all the 
more illogical, as Aristotle then continues to speak of τύχη and to 
ignore ταύτόματον. This passage is thus a first indication that 
ταύτόματον was inserted into II, ν in an incomplete revision of the 
chapter. 
1 6
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 10-17. 
"Phys. II, v, 196 b 13-15. 
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In the next argument in Phys. II, ν Aristotle proves that some 
events which occur for a purpose occur by choice, others by nature, 
and he holds that all chance events pertain to the area of that which 
occurs for a purpose.18 In this passage Aristotle does not refer to 
ταύτόματον at all, and it has been seen that he uses τύχη to refer to 
accidental occurrences due to nature (φύσις), whereby he contradicts 
what he writes in Phys. II, vi.19 In this passage there is accordingly not 
only no mention of ταύτόματον, but Aristotle could not even have 
arrived at the meaning of ταύτόματον in II, vi due to the fact that 
τύχη is used in a sense which includes the area of ταύτόματον in II, 
vi. 
Having set out the two major aspects of chance in Phys. II, v, 196 
b 10-29, Aristotle gives a summary of 196 b 17 - 29 in which he uses 
both τύχη and ταύτόματον and then says he will state the difference 
between the two later on.20 There are two reasons which indicate 
strongly that this passage must have been added during a revision of 
Phys. II, v. Firstly, when Aristotle says he will explain the difference 
between τύχη and ταύτόματον later on, he must be referring to Phys. 
II, vi. But it has been seen that the use of τύχη in 196 b 17-29, of 
which Aristotle gives a summary using ταύτόματον in 196 b 29-31, 
contradicts the use of τύχη in Phys. II, vi. Secondly, having stated 
that he will explain the difference between τύχη and ταύτόματον 
later on, Aristotle then proceeds to use τύχη in the next part of II, ν in 
a specialised sense without having explained the difference between 
τύχη and ταύτόματον. It would accordingly appear that the reference 
to ταύτόματον and the fact that an explanation would be given of the 
difference between τύχη and ταύτόματον was inserted in a revision 
of Π, ν to make it fit in with II, vi. 
In the following passage of II, ν (196 b 33 - 197 a 8) Aristotle 
again makes no mention of ταύτόματον. Furthermore, as stated 
above, he uses τύχη in the specialised meaning given in II, vi, despite 
the fact that he has not yet explained the difference between τύχη and 
"Phys. II, v, 196b 17-29. 
19
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-37. Cf. supra point 1. 
20
 Phys. II, v, 196 b 29-33. 
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ταύτόματον, which he said he would do (196 b 31-33), and which he 
clearly ought to have done before using τύχη in a specialised sense. It 
is difficult to say with certainty, however, when the passage 196 b 33 
- 197 a 8 was written. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the 
passage is the remainder of an original passage in II, ν in which 
Aristotle introduced his specialised meaning of τύχη (different from 
the meaning found in 196 b 17-29 whereby τύχη also refers to 
accidental occurrences due to nature). In this case the transition to this 
specialised meaning has been replaced by 196 b 31-33 in which 
Aristotle says he will explain the difference between τύχη and 
ταΰτόματοί later. Clearly, when Aristotle had arrived at his doctrine 
of ταύτόματον he would no longer have wished to use τύχη in the 
sense ofταύτόματον and would have wished to reserve τύχη for the 
specialised meaning in the area of human choice. The best evidence 
that this is what actually took place is the fact that 196 b 33 οίον 
ё ека... begins abruptly and does not follow from the preceding lines. 
It seems not unlikely that the introductory lines to the passage 196 b 
33 - 197 a 8 were suppressed and replaced by the present II. 196 b 29-
33 (which, as has been seen, are illogical and do not fit at this point). 
Finally, the last part of the argument of Phys. II, v21 refers 
exclusively to τύχη. The term τύχη occurs nine times and 
ταύτόματον does not occur. It has also been seen that this passage is 
dialectical in nature.22 Its purpose is to show that Aristotle's own 
doctrine of τύχη given in the first part of Π, ν is in harmony with the 
arguments of the many and the wise set out in II, iv. Hereby the 
argument on τύχη is rounded off. 
At the end of Η, ν a note on the meaning of good and bad luck is 
appended.23 Here too only τύχη is dealt with, and there is no 
reference to ταύτόματον. 
From the evidence of Phys. Π, ν it appears, accordingly, that the 
chapter in its original version dealt only with τύχη and that the 
21
 Phys. II, v, 197 a 8-25. 
22
 supra argument 4. 
23
 Phys. II, v, 197 a 25-32. 
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references to ταύτόματον were inserted later in the course of a 
revision which was far from thorough. 
B. The evidence that Phys. II, iv originally also dealt only with 
τύχη and was revised to include ταύτόματον will now be set out. 
Firstly, the purpose of II, iv is to give an account of the opinions of 
the many and the wise on chance. This technique, as is well-known, is 
regularly adopted by Aristotle before he sets out his own opinion. 
Hence there can be no doubt that Phys. II, iv is an introduction to II, v. 
Secondly, it has been seen in part A. of this section that there is 
overwhelming evidence that II, ν originally dealt only with τύχη and 
was revised to include ταύτόματον. Hence one would be already 
virtually obliged to accept that II, iv originally dealt only with τύχη, 
unless there were strong evidence to the contrary. This, however, is 
not the case. In fact, there is considerable evidence that II, iv was also 
revised in a manner which leaves its original content visible to some 
extent. 
The start of II, iv refers to both τύχη and ταύτόματον. In the first 
six lines of the chapter both terms are used five times. In the next 
passage (195 b 36 - 196 a 11), however, where Aristotle deals with 
the fact that some people (ëvioi) and also the ancients thought there 
was no such thing as τύχη, τύχη alone is used seven times and in 
conjunction with ταύτόματον once. This fact alone contradicts the 
usage of II, vi, since ταύτόματον, being the broader term (including 
τύχη), would have been the appropriate term to use for both if one 
wanted to use only one term. It cannot be argued either that all of 
these seven occurrences of τύχη on its own refer to the opinions of 
others, since in 196 a 10-11 Aristotle is clearly giving his own view 
and nonetheless refers only to τύχη. 
In the next passage, where Aristotle argues that the Ancients ought 
to have discussed τύχη (196 a 11-24), one again finds that 
ταύτόματον is mentioned once at the start of the passage together 
with τύχη, and thereafter τύχη occurs a further five times on its own. 
It is again clear that the passage is about τύχη, and that had Aristotle 
written the whole passage at a time when he had reduced τύχη to the 
status of a subordinate part of ταύτόματον he could not have been 
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satisfied with merely throwing in a reference to ταύτόματον (196 a 
12) and then continuing to speak only of τύχη. 
Up to this point, accordingly, there is fair evidence that II, iv 
originally dealt only with τύχη and that in the course of revision 
ταύτόματον was included at the start of the chapter and was thrown 
in once at the start of the passage 195 b 36 - 196 a 11 and 196 a 11-
24. The authors Aristotle explicitly criticised are Empedocles (φιλίαν 
ή еікос, 196 a 18), Anaxagoras (νουν, 196 a 18) and Heraclitus (πύρ, 
196 a 18) and others (άλλο yé TL των τοιούτων, 198 a 18-19).24 
The next passage (196 a 24 - 196 b 6) is somewhat complicated by 
the fact that Aristotle is dealing with predecessors of his who 
undoubtedly used the term ταύτόματον.25 From the reference to all 
worlds (κόσμων πάντων, 196 a 25) and to the Swirl (δίνην, 196 a 26) 
it is clear that Aristotle is referring to Democritus.26 However, it is not 
at all clear, as shown by the next sentence, that he is referring only to 
Democritus.27 In this sentence Aristotle, while still referring to 
2 4
 Aristotle also criticises Empedocles and Anaxagoras in Phys. II, viii, 198 b 14-
16 for making events follow necessarily from what precedes without making adequate 
use of the efficient and final cause. Cf. also Met. A(I), iv, 985 a 10-23 and A(I), vii, 
988 b 6-16. 
" GUTHRIE, A History...\l, 418-9 and Ross, Aristotle's Physics...514 hold that the 
view expressed in 195 b 36 - 196 a 11 may also be attributed to Democritus. While 
this may be true, Aristotle is doubtless referring to a view that was more widely held, 
as evidenced by the term èiioi (195 b 36). The final view on τύχη referred to by 
Aristotle in this chapter (196 b 5-9) was also defended by Democritus, but again not 
only by him. Cf. infra n.34. 
2 6
 Ross, Aristotle's Physics...5\5; BAILEY, The Greek Atomists.A39-\43. GUTHRIE, 
A History...II, 414 states that it is not certain that ταύτόματοί' was a technical term of 
atomism, as it occurs only once in a fragment of Democritus, as an adjective and in an 
ethical context (fr. 182). Guthrie's caution is not justifiable, given that the surviving 
fragments of Democritus are in no way representative of his works, and above all 
given the use of ταύτόματοί' in Phys. II, iv, when we see that Aristotle's own term for 
chance at the time of writing Phys. II, iv-v was τύχη. That ταύτόματοί' was used as a 
technical term by at least one of Aristotle's predecessors is proven by Part. An. I, i, 
640 b 8. The reference can hardly be to anyone except Democritus. For ταύτόματοί' 
in a non-technical sense in Plato cf. Tht 180 с and Ch. I §(xv) n. 117 supra. 
2 7
 The plural TU'CÇ (196 a 24) also furnishes some evidence that Aristotle is re-
ferring to others besides Democritus. This point has also been noted by GUTHRIE, A 
History...Vl, 237. 
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"those" who attribute the order in the universe to ταύτόματον, writes 
that these same people attribute [sc. the order found in] animals and 
plants to "φύσις or νους or something else of this kind" (196 a 30-
31). It would appear that he is referring here not merely to 
Democritus, but also to Anaxagoras.28 A confirmation of the evidence 
that the passage refers to several thinkers may also be seen in the fact 
that it is expressed largely in Aristotle's own terms, e.g. τον 
δ'ουρανόν και τα θειότατα των φανερών (196 а 33-34),29 έκ δε του 
τουδί άνθρωπος (196 a 32-33),30 μήτε είναι μήτε γίγνεσθαι (196 a 
29-30), εις ταύτην την τάξιν το παν (196 a 27-28), and other 
phrases.31 
It would appear, accordingly, that Aristotle is referring in this 
passage in a general way to all of his predecessors who attributed the 
order in the universe to chance (ταύτόματον). The sentence 196 a 28-
31 shows, however, that the thinkers in question saw no contradiction 
between attributing the order in the heavens to chance (ταύτόματον) 
and attributing the order within the universe (sc. of animals and 
plants) to φύσις or νους. It appears, accordingly, that ταύτόματον, 
φύσις and νους all represent necessity for these thinkers, and that 
what they deny is that anything occurs at random, i.e. without a 
necessary cause. The compatibility of chance and necessity for these 
thinkers will be examined in Ch.4 (b). There it will also be seen that 
Aristotle agreed with them that the general order in the universe is 
necessary, but was unwilling to attribute it at the same time to chance, 
because he held that chance events are unusual, whereas the general 
order in the universe is regular. On the other hand, Aristotle allowed 
for the occurrence of chance events in filling in the detail of the 
sublunar world-order and hence criticised these preSocratics for 
supposing that everything within the universe occurred necessarily. 
2 8
 Cf. infra Phys. II, viii, 198 b 10-16. 
2 9
 Cf. ЕЕ V (=NE VI), vii, 1141 a 34 - 1141 b 2: και γαρ άιΌρώπου άλλα πολύ 
еіотера την φύσιν, οίον φανερώτατά γε έξ ων ό κόσμο? συνέστηκεν. 
3 0
 This phrase echoes Aristotle's recurring expression: άνθρωπο? άιΌρωπον γεννά 
- cf. infra Ch. 5 п. 72, also Part An. I, i, 641 b 26-28. 
31
 A close parallel is to be noted between the passages Phys II, iv, 196 a 28-34 and 
Part An I, ¡, 641 b 20-28. Cf. infra Ch. 3. p.92 and n. 55. 
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His standpoint is thus the reverse ofthat of the preSocratics in regard 
to the detail of the world-order and the same as theirs in regard to the 
world-order in general, but for different reasons.32 
Aristotle also condemns these preSocratics for denying that there 
are among animals and plants events due to τύχη, seeing that in this 
area many things do in fact occur due to τύχη (196 a 28-30, 196 b 2-
4). Here it is again apparent that Aristotle is using τύχη in a sense 
different to that found in Phys. II, vi where it is restricted to luck in 
the area of human choice. Thus, once again the evidence shows that 
Phys. II, iv was written prior to the development of the specialised 
doctrine of τύχη found in II, vi. 
Finally, the last passage of II, iv displays the same inconsistent 
reasoning found in II, v, 196 b 15.33 Aristotle writes: "There are some 
who think that τύχη is a cause, on the one hand, but is unclear to the 
human mind as if it were something divine and a mysterious power. 
Hence it is necessary to examine what each [sc. both τύχη and 
ταύτόματον] is and whether το αύτόματον and τύχη are the same or 
different..."34 It is, of course, illogical to state that one must examine 
the meaning of both τύχη as well as ταύτόματον because some 
people think that τύχη is a mysterious supernatural power. At the 
least the concluding sentence of II, iv must be held to be excessively 
abrupt. The view that τύχη is something supernatural is not explained 
or discussed, unlike the other views of the many and the wise, and one 
3 2
 In regard to the passage Phys. II, iv, 196 a 24 - 196 b 5 it is to be noted that the 
more accurate translation is that by HARDIE and GAYE, not those of Charlton and 
Apostle. 
3 3
 Cf. supra p. 66 and n. 17. 
3 4
 Phys. II, iv, 196 b 5-8. Those who referred to τύχη as άδηλο? шЮрыті^ 
διαί'οία (аіЮрштічі) λογισμώ, Met. K(XI), viii, 1065 a 33-34) included Anaxagoras 
and Democritus (and later the Stoics). Cf. THEODORET, Έλληΐ'ΐκώΐ' ерапеитиаі..У\, 
15. Democritus, however, would not have referred to τύχη as θείον τι ούσα και 
δαιμοιαώτεροί'. Hence GUTHRIE, A History...\\, 238 and II, 419 thinks that Aristotle 
is referring to a different, possibly a common or popular view of τύχη (cf. SIMPLICIUS, 
In Phys. I, 333). But it seems more likely that the phrase Oeíói' τι ούσα και 
δαιμοιαώτεροί' is Aristotle's own commentary on the view of Anaxagoras and 
Democritus (and others), to be construed as meaning "as if it were something divine 
and a mysterious power..." 
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may suspect that a passage was cut off here when the final sentence of 
II, iv was added on to make allowance for II, vi. 
A complicating circumstance arises from the fact that in the 
conclusion of II, vi Aristotle emphatically rejects the attribution -
notably by Democritus - of [sc. the order in] the universe to 
ταύτόματον.35 This passage clearly refers to the paragraph in II, iv 
where Aristotle deals with the view of Democritus (and others) that 
[sc. the order in] the universe is attributable to ταϋτόματον. It may be 
speculated that the reasons why Aristotle concludes his treatment of 
chance in this way are twofold. Firstly, Aristotle concludes his 
treatment of many topics with references to God. So frequently does 
he do so, as was observed by Philoponus, that one may attribute this 
characteristic to his method and desire for the highest θεωρία.36 
Secondly, it may well be that Aristotle felt that a passage reinforcing 
his refutation of Democritus in II, iv would be a suitable conclusion 
for II, vi, particularly as the refutation of Democritus is of vital 
importance to Aristotle's defence of the purposefulness of νους and 
фшіс. The presence of this passage refuting Democritus at the end of 
II, vi cannot be used, however, as counterevidence to the thesis that II, 
iv was written at an earlier stage than II, vi (i.e. prior to the 
development of the doctrine of τύχη in II, vi), as it has been shown 
that the broader meaning of τύχη in II, i ν is incompatible with the 
specialized meaning found in II, vi. 
In this chapter, accordingly, an attempt has been made to show that 
Phys. II, iv-v constituted an original treatment by Aristotle of the topic 
of τύχη only, that τύχη originally referred to all chance occurrences 
and that at a later stage Aristotle wrote Phys. II, vi, in which he 
introduced his own theory of ταύτόματον and retained only a 
specialised sense of τύχη. Phys. II, iv-v and Phys. II, vi were then 
conflated and Phys. II, iv-v revised. The revision of II, iv-v appears, 
however, to have been carried out in such a summary manner that the 
35
 Phys. II, vi, 198 a 10-13. 
3 6
 Philoponus, In de An. p.20, 1.31 - p. 21,1.7. Cf. my article in Bulletin de Philo­
sophie Médiévale 16-17 (1974-5), p.85. For other passages where Aristotle applies 
this method cf. my book Gott und θεωρία...120. 
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original meaning of τύχη and the original structure of Π, iv-v remain 
largely intact. It seems hard to attribute such an inferior conflation of 
Phys. II, iv-v and Phys. II, vi to Aristotle himself, unless it is claimed 
that he did not have time to fully harmonize the two passages. 
Otherwise, the revision should be attributed to an editor who wished 
to conflate Phys. II, iv-v and Phys. II, vi, but was scrupulous about not 
changing too much of the Master's text. The latter solution is by far 
the more satisfactory and yields evidence regarding the origin of a 
number of Aristotle's works, e.g. the Metaphysics, where the inter­
vention of an editor must also be supposed. 
The consequences of the development of doctrine found in Phys. 
II, vi, which are of considerable significance from a doctrinal as well 
as from a chronological point of view, will now be examined. 
CHAPTER THREE 
DATING PHYS. II, vi 
In the last chapter an attempt was made to show that Phys. II, iv-v 
was written at a different stage of the development of Aristotle's 
thought to Phys. II, vi. In Phys. II, iv-v, in its original form, the term 
τύχη appears to have been used to cover all of chance, whereas in 
Phys. II, vi ταϋτόματοί' is the term which covers all of chance and 
τύχη is reduced to luck, i.e. to chance in the area of human choice. 
The first aim of this chapter is to examine the possibility of dating 
Phys. II, vi. In part (a) a series of texts will be examined in which 
Aristotle uses τύχη in a sense that covers all of chance and therefore 
strictly contradicts the restricted meaning of τύχη in Phys. II, vi. In 
part (b) a series of texts will be examined, where the use of τύχη no 
longer contradicts that found in Phys. II, vi. The question will be 
raised as to whether this evidence makes it possible to date Phys. II, 
vi. 
The second aim of this chapter is to provide a commentary on all 
of the major texts dealing with chance outside Phys. II, iv-vi, ЕЕ VIII, 
ii and MM II, viii, since the aim of this volume is to deal with 
Aristotle's concept of chance exhaustively. The texts in section (a) 
will be examined in the following order: Rhet., NE, APo, Protrep., De 
Cael., Gen et Corr., Phys. II, viii, Part.An., Met. A iii, Met. Θ. Rhet. is 
held by During1 to be an early work. I have placed the text from NE 
early, as I take the view that NE is an early work and that the common 
books (NE V-VII = ЕЕ IV-VI) in fact belong to ЕЕ, which is a later 
work.2 I take APo to be an early work with During, as Aristotle has 
not yet developed the theory of hypothetical necessity (cf. infra Ch.4 
§(viii)).3 Protrep., De Cael., Gen.et Corr. and Phys. II, viii are 
1
 DURÍNG, Aristoteles... 48-52. 
2
 For a justification cf. infra Ch.7 n.l. 
3
 It may be noted that APo is held to belong to the transitional period by Ross, 
Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics...6-23 and NUYENS, Ontwikkelings-
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generally held to be early works and Part.An. to belong to the 
transitional period. It has been argued convincingly by Dumoulin that 
Met. A iii-x and Met. Θ are among Aristotle's later metaphysical 
writings.4 
(a) Texts in which τύχη covers all of chance 
In Rhet. I, ν Aristotle gives an account of good fortune (ευτυχία) 
as part of his discussion of the external goods necessary for 
happiness. The passage runs as follows: 
Good fortune (ευτυχία) is the acquisition or possession of either all or 
most or the most important of those goods of which chance (τύχη) is the 
cause. Now chance (τύχη) is the cause of some things of which the arts 
(τέχναι) are also causes, but also of many which have nothing to do with 
art (ατέχνωι/), e.g. of those due to nature (ef>uo4ç)(though it is possible for 
the results of chance (τύχη) to be contrary to nature (φύσις)). For art 
(τέχνη) is a cause of health, but nature (φύσι?) of beauty and stature. In 
general those goods come from chance (τύχη) which excite jealousy. 
Chance (τύχη) is also a cause of those goods contrary to calculation, e.g. 
when all of a man's brothers are ugly, while he is handsome, or when the 
others did not see the treasure, while he found it, or when the arrow hit 
one who stood by and not the person aimed at, or when one who 
frequented [sc. a particular place] did not go there on a certain occasion, 
while those who went there then for the first time met their death. All such 
cases appear to be instances of good luck (ευτυχήματα).5 
In this passage τύχη is said to be the cause of some things of 
which the arts (τέχνοα) are also causes,6 i.e. τύχη covers the area of 
human choice, since τέχνη is the outcome of choice.7 But τύχη is 
momenten...305. However, BALME, De Partibus Animalium...S0 (by implication) and 
SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Вlame...159 hold correctly thztAPo is an earlier work 
than Part.An. Cf. also BARNES, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics... 221. 
4
 DUMOULIN, Anafyse..A0\, 404. 
5
 Rhet. I, v, 1361 b 39 - 1362 a 12. On this passage cf. WORNER, Das Ethische in 
der Rhetorik...3\4. 
6
 An example of τύχη in this sense is where someone is cured by luck, although 
they usually would have been cured by the doctor. Cf. Met. Z(VI1), vii, 1032 b 22-28. 
Cf. also p.45 and n.83, p.82 and n. 28, p.98 and n.75 and Ch.5 (cXii). 
7
 Cf. supra Ch. 1 §(xii) and infra Conclusion (c)(ii)(a). 
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also said to be the cause of many things which have nothing to do 
with art, e.g. which are due to nature.8 Here τύχη is used in a sense 
which contradicts the doctrine of Phys. II, vi whereby τύχη is 
restricted to the area of human choice. But it corresponds well with 
Phys. II, v, 196 b 17-29 where Aristotle uses τύχη to refer to 
accidental occurrences due to nature (φύσις).9 Aristotle then adds that 
"it is possible for the results of chance (τύχη) to be contrary to nature 
(φύσις)" This qualification is undoubtedly added because in fact no 
substance in accordance with nature occurs accidentally. Hence the 
only role of chance in the area of natural substances is where 
something comes to be contrary to nature.10 Aristotle then writes: 
"For art (τέχντ\) is a cause of health, but nature (φύσις) of beauty and 
stature." Here it is to be understood that chance (τύχη) can also be the 
cause - exceptionally - of both health and beauty, i.e. chance can 
operate as the cause of unusual events in the areas of both human 
choice and nature. Then, when he writes: "in general those goods 
come from chance (τύχη) which excite jealousy", Aristotle is 
practically repeating the first sentence of the passage. The goods 
which excite jealousy are doubtless those which arise from good 
fortune (ευτυχία), and he has already stated that chance (τύχη) is the 
cause of these goods. In the next sentence he writes: "chance (τύχη) 
is also a cause of those goods contrary to calculation." Here τύχη is 
understood in the sense of ευτυχία, as is shown by the reference to 
ευτυχήματα in the last sentence in the passage. The fact that 
Aristotle states here that "τύχη is also a cause...contrary to 
calculation", a phrase which is the very essence of the definition of 
chance, might lead one to suspect that this passage antedates the 
original version of Phys. II, iv-v. 
From this passage, accordingly, it is clear that τύχη is used in a 
sense which includes all kinds of chance, i.e. chance in the area both 
8
 Aristotle writes "for example" (οίον) which are due to nature, as if he envisaged 
yet other chance events which were due neither to τέχνη nor φύσις·. 
9
 Cf. Ch. 2 n. 4 and n. 18. 
1 0
 Cf. Ch. 2 n.4 and p.78 on Rhet. I, x, 12-13, 1369 a 32 - b 5, where Aristotle 
makes this point clear. GRIMALDI, Rhet.I...\\9 ad 1362 a 3 missed the point that 
chance is a cause in the area of nature ofthat which occurs contrary to nature. 
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of human choice and of nature. Hence the meanings of τύχη in this 
passage exclude the limitation in meaning of τύχη found in Phys. II, 
vi. This passage accordingly appears to go back at least to the stage of 
thought of the original writing οι Phys. II, iv-v, where τύχη includes 
all of chance. 
Again, in his discussion of the motives of wrongdoers {Rhet. I, x-
xi) Aristotle deals briefly with τύχη as part of the subordinate 
discussion of sources of involuntary human action: 
Those events are due to chance (τύχη), the cause (αιτία) of which is 
indefinite and which do not occur for a purpose and which occur neither 
always nor usually nor regularly (τεταγμένω?); it is clear from the 
definition of chance (τύχη) what these are. Those things are due to nature 
(φύσει), on the other hand, the cause (αιτία) of which is in themselves 
and is regular; for they turn out always or usually in the same way. For in 
regard to those things [sc. which occur] contrary to nature (παρά φύσιν) 
there is no need to investigate minutely whether they occur in accordance 
with a certain nature or some other cause; but it would appear that chance 
(τύχη) is also the cause of things of this kind." 
In this passage Aristotle states that those events are due to τύχη, 
the cause of which is indefinite (αόριστος)12 and which do not occur 
for a purpose (μη 'е ека του). He then states in accordance with Phys. 
II, iv-vi that events due to τύχη occur neither always nor usually nor 
regularly (the term τεταγμένως, which occurs twice here, is not 
found in Phys. II, iv-vi). He refers to the definition of τύχη. Here 
Grimaldi thinks that Aristotle may be referring to Phys. II, iv-vi.13 
However, it seems more likely, due to the emphasis of the sentence, 
that Aristotle is not referring to some other book. He has just given 
the definition of τύχη. Hence it seems likely that all he wishes to say 
is: what these chance events are is now clear from the definition (just 
given). Hence he passes on without further ado to his next point. 
Natural beings are then said to be those whose "cause" (αιτία) is in 
themselves and is regular (τεταγμένη). As for things which occur 
11
 Rhet. I, x, 12-13, 1369 a 32 - b 5. On this passage cf. WÖRNER, Das Ethische in 
der Rhetorik...%\. 
12
 Cf. Phys. II, v, 196 b 28, 197 a 8-10, Ch. l(v) with n. 9 and Ch. l(xviii), p.58. 
13
 GRIMALDI, Rhet.l...236 ad 1369 a 35. 
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contrary to nature (παρά φύσιν), there is no need to investigate 
minutely14 whether they occur in accordance with a certain nature or 
some other cause, i.e. Aristotle thinks there might be some "nature" or 
some other cause which causes things which occur contrary to nature. 
Nonetheless, he concludes that such cases are "also" due to τύχη. 
Like the last passage of Rhet. dealt with above, it would appear 
that this passage is also of early date. Firstly, τύχη is held to be the 
likely cause of natural beings which come to be contrary to nature.' 
This view strictly contradicts Phys. II, vi, where Aristotle states that 
such events are furthest from τύχη and closer to ταύτόματον. 1 6 
Hence this statement goes to show that this passage of Rhet. belongs 
to an earlier period than the revised version of Phys. II, iv - vi. 
Another possible indication of early thought is the statement that 
natural things have their "cause" (αίτια) in themselves. The term 
αίτια is more vague than the αρχή κινήσ€ως which one might expect 
if the passage were written after Phys. II. 
In NE III, iii, in his discussion of deliberation, Aristotle writes: 
No-one deliberates about things eternal, such as the order of the universe, 
or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. Nor 
yet about things that change, but always do so in the same way, whether 
from necessity (έξ ανάγκης) or by nature (φύσει) or through some other 
cause, for example solstices and the sunrise. Nor about irregular 
occurrences, such as droughts and rains. Nor about chance events (περί 
των από τύχης), such as finding a treasure. Nor yet do we deliberate 
about all human affairs, for example, no Lacedaemonian deliberates about 
the best form of government for Scythia17 The reason why we do not 
deliberate about these things is that none of them can be brought about by 
14
 Cf. GRIMALDI, Rhet.I...lil: "To attempt to determine precisely their causality as 
belonging either to some nature of which one knows nothing or to some other 
causality is not necessary ¡n the use of such topic material in deliberative rhetoric, 
insofar as everyone would accept such a reality as the result of chance." 
" Cf. supra pp.76-7 and n.5. 
16
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-37. Cf. also supra p.57 and n.133. 
17
 The substitution of India for Scythia in ЕЕ II, χ, 1226 a 29 and MM I, xvii, 1189 
a 20 has been frequently observed and held to refer to the interest in India awakened 
by Alexander's conquest, thereby reflecting a later date for ЕЕ and MM than that of 
NE. Cf. BURNET, The Ethics...\21; STEWART, ΝΕ..Λ, 261 etc.. 
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us. We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by 
action; and these are in fact what is left. For the causes are generally 
considered to be nature (φύσι?), necessity (ανάγκη) and chance (τύχη), 
furthermore intellect (vous) and human agency generally.18 
In this passage τύχη is found twice. It is used the first time to 
cover chance in the area of human action1 9 - the example of a man 
digging and accidentally finding a treasure is also given by Aristotle 
in Rhet. I, v.20 - In its second occurrence in the passage, however, 
τύχη covers every area of chance (1112 a 32).2 ' If Aristotle had 
already written Phys. II, vi he would have had to use the term 
ταύτόματον here. It may be concluded, accordingly, that NE (or at 
least this passage of NE) antedates Phys. II, vi. 
In APo Aristotle devotes a brief chapter to pointing out that there 
can be no science (επιστήμη) of that which proceeds from chance 
(τύχη). He writes: 
There can be no science (επιστήμη) by means of demonstration 
(άπόδειξι?) of that which proceeds from chance (τύχη). For that which 
proceeds from chance (τύχη) is something neither necessary nor usual, 
but something which occurs contrary to these. But demonstration is of one 
or other of these. For every syllogism proceeds through premisses which 
are either necessary or usual. If the premisses are necessary, then the 
conclusion is necessary too; and if the premisses are usual, so too is the 
conclusion. Hence if that which proceeds from chance (το άπο τύχης) is 
neither usual nor necessary, there can be no demonstration of it.22 
In this chapter Aristotle has divided all events into three: those 
which occur necessarily, those which occur usually and those which 
occur contrary to these, i.e. which occur neither necessarily nor 
usually. Events which occur neither necessarily nor usually are 
attributed to chance (τύχη), and vice versa that which proceeds from 
chance occurs neither necessarily nor usually. The fact that there can 
nNEl\\, iii, 3-7, li 12 a21-33. 
1 9
 Elsewhere in NE τύχη is also found covering chance in the area of human 
action: cf. NE I, ix, 5, 1099 b 20. 
2 0
 Cf. supra p.76 and n.5. 
21
 Cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque...ll, 198. 
22
 APo I, xxx, 87 Ы 9-27. 
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be no science (επιστήμη) of that which proceeds from chance is a 
doctrine emphasised elsewhere also.23 The term chosen by Aristotle to 
cover the area of chance, i.e. ofthat which occurs neither necessarily 
nor usually, is τύχη. The choice of this term, of course, contradicts 
the doctrine of Phys. II, vi, which states that ταύτόματον is the term 
to cover all of chance.2 4 However, the use of τύχη is easily explicable 
if APo is to be attributed to Aristotle's early period, as it usually is, 
and if Phys. II, iv-v was revised and Phys. II, vi added on at a later 
period. 
In APo II, xi, in his discussion of the different kinds of cause and 
how each can play its part in a definition, Aristotle writes the 
following passage, which is of importance for the discussion of 
chance: 
The same effect may obtain both for a purpose (ё ека τίνος) and due to 
necessity (έξ ανάγκη?)... If then an effect can exist (eivai) [due to two 
causes], can it also come to be (γίγνεσθαι) [due to two causes]?...There 
are numerous such examples, especially among things that are being or 
have been constituted by nature (κατά φύσιν); for nature (φύσις) in one 
aspect acts with a purpose (ё ега του) and in another due to necessity (έξ 
ανάγκης). Now necessity (ανάγκη) is of two kinds: one acts in 
accordance with nature (κατά φύσιν) and impulse, the other by force (βία) 
and against impulse (thus a stone is borne both upwards and downwards 
due to necessity (έξ ανάγκης), but not due to the same necessity (δια την 
αυτήν ανάγκην)). Among the products of thought (ev oe τοίς άπο 
διανοίας) some, such as a house or a statue, never owe their existence to 
chance (άπο του αυτομάτου) or necessity (èÇ ανάγκης), but always to 
some purpose (ё ека του); others, such as health and safety, may also be 
due to luck (άπο τύχης). It is most of all those things which may be both 
thus and otherwise that come into being for some purpose, when their 
23
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 26-7, 1027 a 26-28. Parallel to these statements is the 
statement that there is no θεωρία of accidents: 1026 b 3-4. Cf. also Met. K(XI), viii, 
1064 b 30-32, 1065 a 4-6 and Phys. II, v, 197 a 9-10. 
24
 This contradiction is noted by DETEL, APO II, 481: "In dieser Terminologie der 
Physik ist das. was in An. post. I 30 diskutiert wird, zweifellos das Spontane, oder 
anders formuliert, der Begriff des Zufälligen wird in An. post. I 30 allgemeiner 
verwendet als in Phys. II 4 - И 6." [II 6 only would have been more accurate]. Cf. id., 
482: "το άπο τύχη? (im Sinne von το άπο ταύτομάτου) in I 30." 
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coming into being is not due to chance (από τύχης·), so that the end is a 
good; and they may come into being either due to nature (φύσει) or to art 
(τέχνη). Nothing which comes into being for a purpose occurs due to 
chance (από τύχη?).25 
Before dealing with chance in this passage it is necessary to 
examine the meaning of the passage as a whole. However, the inter­
pretation presents considerable difficulties. Indeed, it is has been 
claimed that the chapter is one of the most difficult in Aristotle.26 
At the start of the passage Aristotle states that the same effect may 
exist both for a purpose (ё е ш τίνος) and due to necessity (έξ 
ανάγκης). Having given an example, he then states that if an effect 
can exist due to these two causes, it can also come to be due to these 
two causes. He gives an example and then states that this dual 
causality by purpose and necessity is found mainly in the area of 
nature (φύσις), since nature in one aspect acts with a purpose and in 
another due to necessity. In a parenthesis Aristotle then explains 
which kind of necessity is found in nature: namely, necessity in 
accordance with nature. Having dealt with dual causality in nature 
Aristotle then turns to the area of human thought. He states that some 
products of thought, e.g. a house27 or a statue, are never due to chance 
or to necessity, but are due to some purpose. From Aristotle's division 
of the universe into the products of φύσις and διάνοια it is known 
that the distinction between these two causes is that the products of 
διάνοια are not due to necessity. The products of both φύσις and 
διάνοια are for a purpose. The reason for Aristotle's introduction of 
chance here is not immediately clear, however, but appears to be 
explained by the next phrase. Here Aristotle writes that other products 
of thought, e.g. health and safety,28 can be due to chance at times. 
2 5
 APo II, xi, 94 b 27 -95 a 9. 
2 6
 ROSS, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics...638. 
2 7
 For the example of a house cf. also Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 a 9-10; Protrep. В 11 
DURING infra p.84 and n. 34. 
2 8
 Here Aristotle is thinking of the possibility of a man accidentally curing himself 
by keeping warm, whereas the normal manner of cure is through the art of the doctor. 
Cf. Met. A(I), i, 981 a 3-12; Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 b 21-26 and p.45 with n.83, p.98 
with n.75 and Ch.5(c)(ii). Likewise a man may achieve safety by chance (i.e. 
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Thus in the area of human thought the contrast for Aristotle appears to 
be between those products which are never due to chance and those 
which can be due to chance. 
In the conclusion of the passage, "thus and otherwise" must be 
applicable to the areas of both φύσις and τέχνη (95 a 8 ή φύσει ή 
τέχνη). Furthermore, the emphasis of the sentence must be on ένεκα 
του, since the next sentence denies purpose (ένεκα του) to chance. 
Hence the sentence must mean that purpose (ένεκα του), whether in 
the area of φύσις or of τέχνη, is found most of all in those things 
which can be both thus and otherwise, i.e. which are contingent -
when they do not occur due to chance.29 Again, in an attempt at 
explaining "most of all" Apostle concludes that there must be some 
cases when necessary beings come into being for some purpose. He 
then suggests that the motions of the heavenly bodies and motion in 
general by the prime mover are examples of things which of necessity 
come to be for the sake of something.30 However, he cannot be right, 
firstly, because motion is not substantial, secondly, because it does 
not come to be. Thirdly, the sentence is about the areas of both φύσις 
and διάνοια. Another difficulty arises earlier in the passage from 
Aristotle's statement that examples of dual causality by purpose and 
necessity are found "especially" (μάλιστα, 94 b 35) among things 
constituted by nature. It is not clear, however, in what other area 
causality by purpose and necessity might be at work. There appears to 
be no easy solution to these problems.31 
From the conclusion of this passage it appears clearly that τύχη 
refers to chance in the areas of both φύσις and τέχνη and that its 
meaning is therefore incompatible with the restricted meaning 
accidentally and contrary to expectation). Cf. Rhet. I, v, 1361 b 39 - 1362 a 12 and 
supra p.76 with n.5. 
2 9
 This is substantially the version of ROSS, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior 
Analytics...638; TREDENNICK, Anal. Post. 217. 
3 0
 APOSTLE, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics...250. 
3 1
 Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics...638 concludes that the form of 
the chapter "betrays clearly that it has not been carefully worked over by A. but is a 
series of jottings for further consideration." DETEL, APo II, 714 comments: "Die 
Schlußbemerkungen von II 11 (95 a 3-9) sind teilweise nachlässig formuliert und 
daher im Detail nicht leicht verständlich." 
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attributed to it in Phys II, vi In 95 a 4-5 it is noteworthy that Aristotle 
appears to use ταύτόματον and τύχη arbitrarily. There would not 
appear to be a distinction in meaning between them at this point.3 2 
This passage accordingly appears to be prior to the revision of Phys 
II, iv-vi, a conclusion which is in keeping with the early date usually 
attributed to Apo13 
In Protrep. Aristotle writes a passage in which he states that there 
are three sources of generation: 
Of things generated some are generated from some kind of thought or art 
(άπο τίνος διάνοια? και τέχνης), for example a house or a ship (for the 
cause of both of these is some kind of art or thought (τ€χνη τι? έστι καΐ 
διάνοια), while others are generated through no art, but by nature; nature 
is the cause of animals and plants, and all things of this kind are generated 
according to nature. But indeed there are also some things that are 
generated by chance (δια τυχην), for of most things which are generated 
neither by art (6LU τεχνην) nor by nature (δια φύσιν) nor of necessity (έξ 
ανάγκη?) we say that they are generated by chance (δια τύχην).34 
In this passage, accordingly, Aristotle attributes all generation to 
τέχνη, φύσις and τ ύ χ η . 3 5 He does not mention ταύτόματον, and 
32
 Cf DETEL, APo II, 715, who comments as follows "In An post I 30 scheint 
Aristoteles allerdings den Ausdruck "durch Zufall" synonym mit dem Begriff des 
Spontanen zu verwenden und auch im letzten Abschnitt von An post II 11 fallt es 
schwer, einen Unterschied zu entdecken Denn nach der Terminologie von Phys II 5 -
II 6 wäre der Begriff "spontan" in 95 a 4 unangemessen, weil die vom Verstand 
zustandegebrachten Dinge den Bereich von Handlungen betreffen - entsprechend wird 
in 95 a 5 auch der Ausdruck "durch Zufall" gebraucht, in 95 a 7 dagegen wäre nach 
der Terminologie der Physik der Ausdruck "durch Zufall" nicht ganz korrekt, weil 
Aristoteles hier ausdrücklich auch von Ereignissen spricht, die nichts mit mensch-
lichen Handlungen zu tun haben " 
33
 Cf ROSS, Aristotle 's Prior and Posterior Analytics 22-3 WAGNER, Physik-
vorlesung 466 ad 195 b 31-33 is in no doubt that APo II, χι, 94 b 27 - 95 a 9 is 
earlier than Phys II, iv-vi 
34
 Protrep. В 11 DORING 
35
 The threefold division of causality into art (τ€χνη), nature (φυσι?) and chance 
(τυχη) clearly seems to have been taken over from Plat Leg X, 888 e, 889 a, 889 с 
To this list Aristotle then adds necessity (ανάγκη), which m fact comes under both art 
(in the form of βια) and nature (material or natural necessity and the absolute 
necessity of the existence and movement of the heavenly bodies, cf infra next 
chapter) Cf also APo Π, xi, 94 b 27 - 95 a 9, discussed supra pp 81-2 and n 25, 
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hence it is clear that τύχη is taken to include all of chance. This use 
of τύχη to include all of chance, however, strictly contradicts the 
meaning of τύχη given in Phys. II, vi, where ταύτόματον is said to 
cover all of chance and where τύχη is restricted to chance in the field 
of human action. Again, Aristotle's attribution here of all generation 
to τέχνη, φύσις- and τύχη contrasts strikingly with his attribution in 
Met. Z(VII), vii of all generation to φύσις·, τέχνη and ταύτόματον. 3 6 
Whereas τύχη is the term used in Protrep. to cover all of chance, in 
Met. Z(VII), vii the term used is ταύτόματον, in accordance with 
Phys. II, vi. It would appear, accordingly, that the passage oí Protrep. 
given above was written before the revised version of Phys. II, iv-vi, a 
conclusion which is in keeping with the usual attribution of an early 
date to Protrep. 
In De Cael. I, xii, in his discussion of the eternity of the world, 
Aristotle writes: 
It is also possible to observe as follows that it is impossible either for 
anything which has once been generated to remain indestructible, or for 
anything which is ungenerated and has always been in existence to be 
destroyed. For nothing can be either indestructible or ungenerated by 
chance (άπο του αυτομάτου). For chance (το αύτόματον και το άπο 
τύχη?) is contrary to that which always or usually is or occurs, whereas 
that which exists for an infinite time, whether absolutely or from a certain 
point in time, belongs to the category ofthat which exists either always or 
usually. That which is by chance (τα τοιαύτα), then, is by nature such as 
to exist at one time and not at another.37 
The argument is against Democritus, who holds that the universe 
came into being by chance. Aristotle refutes Democritus with a 
linguistic argument: something is said to occur by chance when it 
does not occur always or usually. If the universe is held to be infinite 
in time, then it pertains to the category of that which always or 
Rhet. I, x, 1368 b 32-37 discussed in Ch.4(a)(xii); NE III, iii, 3-7, 1112 a 21-33, 
discussed supra pp.79-80 and n. 18. 
3 6
 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 12-13. Cf. infra this chapter (b)(iii). 
3 7
 De Cael. 1, xii, 283 a 29 - 283 b 3. For the translation of the phrase το αυτόμα­
τοι και το από τύχη? cf. infra this chapter (b)(i). The Oxford translation of J.L. 
STOCKS (revised ed. by J. BARNES) grasps the meaning correctly. A number of other 
translations yield nonsense. On the interpretation cf. ELDERS, De Cael., 170. 
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usually occurs and hence cannot be by chance. It should be noted, 
however, that Aristotle does not refute the possibility that the universe 
could have come into being and could be destroyed one day. He states 
correctly that the universe, on the assumption that it has been in 
existence "for an infinite time, whether absolutely or from a certain 
point in time" must be indestructible by chance on the basis of its 
permanence or usualness. Likewise, if it had come into being by 
chance, it would have been destroyed by chance before attaining 
infinite age. 
The two terms το αυτόματοι' and το άττό τύχης appear to be used 
together in this passage to indicate the single idea of "chance" 
Aristotle uses the term ταύτόματον on its own the first time in the 
passage and in combination with τύχη the second time. This usage 
does not reflect any evolution in meaning, however, as appears from 
the fact that Aristotle uses τύχη to refer to chance in the area of 
nature in another passage of De Cael., now to be examined. 
In De Cael. II, viii Aristotle is attempting to explain the movement 
of the stars. He inquires into the possibility that the stars and their 
circles move independently and rejects this theory on the basis of the 
improbabilities involved: 
If it occurred by chance (άττό ταύτομάτου)^. that the stars in the spheres 
move at the same speed as the spheres], the coincidence in every case of a 
greater circle with a swifter movement of the star contained in it is 
unreasonable. There would be nothing strange in this happening in one or 
two cases, but that it should in all cases be exactly the same [se. due to 
chance] is a mere fiction. Besides, the haphazard (το ώς έτνχεν) is not 
found in the domain of nature (èv TOÎS φύσει), and whatever applies 
everywhere and to all cases is not the outcome of chance (άπο τύχης).38 
In this passage it is clear that το αύτόματον and τύχη are used as 
synonyms and that Aristotle has no difficulty in using τύχη to refer to 
the area of nature. This usage accordingly contradicts the restricted 
meaning of τύχη found in Phys. II, vi. The statement that there is 
nothing haphazard (το ώς ετνχεν) in nature also appears to show the 
absence of the theory of monsters (found earliest in Phys. II, viii, later 
De Cael. II, vü¡, 289 b 21-27. 
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also referred to in II, vi) and spontaneous generation (referred to in 
Phys. II, vi), since monsters and spontaneously generated organisms 
are chance substances that arise haphazardly and contrary to nature 
(cf.infra Ch.5). 
In Gen. et Corr. II, vi, where he is criticising Empedocles, 
Aristotle writes: 
It is much more difficult [sc. for him] to give an account of coming-to-be 
by nature. For the things that come to be by nature all come to be either 
always or generally in the same way and exceptions to the invariable or 
general rule by chance (άπο ταϋτομάτου και dirò τύχης).39 
Here Aristotle states that that which comes to be contrary to nature 
occurs as a result of ταύτόματοι/ and τύχη. In this passage it would 
appear that ταύτόματον and τύχη are synonymous and together mean 
'chance'.40 Thus τύχη is used to refer to the area of φύσις and hence 
is used in a sense that is incompatible with the restricted meaning 
attributed to it in Phys. II, vi. 
Further in the same chapter Aristotle criticises Empedocles' view 
that proportion (λόγος), not chance (όπως έτυχε), is the cause of 
things being what they are.41 He states that neither Fire nor Earth, nor 
Love nor Strife is the cause of things being in a certain proportion 
(which is what Empedocles claims is what makes things be what they 
are), i.e. in Aristotle's view none of Empedocles' causes is a valid 
cause of the proportion of the mixing which always produces the 
same result in the area of nature. Aristotle states that it is rather the 
essence (ουσία) of each thing that is the cause of its being what it is. 
3 9
 Gen. et Corr. II, vi, 333 b 3-7. 
4 0
 Cf. JOACHIM, Gen. et Corr....234: "The distinction [sc. between ταΰτόματοί' and 
τύχη] is irrelevant here, and Aristotle mentions both [in 333 b 6-7] only in order to 
cover all possible cases. Thus at 34 a 2 he employs the term τύχη. though (according 
to the distinction as drawn in the Physics) he ought to have spoken of το αυτόματοι'" 
Joachim is doubtless right that the distinction is irrelevant here. But it appears most 
likely that Aristotle mentioned both terms not in order to cover all possible cases 
(which is virtually to say that a distinction between the terms does exist here), but 
rather precisely because at this point in his thought there was no distinction between 
the terms, as is shown by the use of τύχη in the area of nature. 
"Genet Corr. II, vi, 333 b 9-16. 
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It is not "a mingling and separation of things mingled", even 
according to a certain proportion, since a mere mixing and proportion 
of the mixing are the outcome of chance (τύχη, ώς ετυχεν). In this 
passage, accordingly, Aristotle again uses τύχη to refer to the area of 
nature, a usage which is incompatible with the meaning of τύχη in 
Phys. II, vi. 
Finally, later in the same chapter, Aristotle accuses Empedocles of 
inconsistency in speaking on one occasion as if αίθήρ were borne 
upwards as if due to chance (ώσπ€ρ άττο τύχης·), and on another 
occasion in stating that αίθήρ 'sank with long roots into the ground'.42 
Here, again, Aristotle uses τύχη to refer to the area of nature.43 
From Gen. et Corr. II, vi it appears, accordingly, that Aristotle 
uses τύχη to refer to 'chance' in the area of nature, a usage which is 
incompatible with his view of τύχη in Phys. II, vi. As Gen. et Corr. is 
generally held to be an early work, it is not difficult, however, to view 
the application of τύχη to the area of nature as a reflection of the fact 
that the restricted meaning of τύχη in Phys. II, vi was established at a 
later date. The appearance of ταύτόματον as synonymous with τύχη 
in 333 b 3-7 seems to be paralleled by the synonymous use of both in 
APo II, xi and De Cael. I, xii and II, viii discussed above in this 
chapter and occurs also in Phys. II, viii. 
In Phys. II, viii Aristotle argues that nature is teleological 
essentially and not merely by chance. He mentions the counter­
argument, whereby the growth of natural substances is as coincidental 
as rain making com grow. According to this argument all natural 
substances that had by chance (άπο του αυτομάτου) the capacity to 
survive survived and those that did not did not, as Empedocles says of 
man-headed calves.44 It might appear that the term αύτόματον used 
here was that of the proponents of the argument Aristotle now refutes. 
Aristotle states that things cannot be thus, because all things due to 
nature come to be as they do always or for the most part, whereas 
4 2
 Gen et Corr. II, vi, 334 a 1-5. 
4 3
 Cf. JOACHIM, Gen. et Corr. 234 quoted supra n. 40. 
M
 Phys. II, viii, 198 b 30-32. 
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nothing that is άπο τύχης και του αυτομάτου does so. Here 
Aristotle appears to have introduced his own term and placed it 
alongside ταύτόματον, the term mentioned in the counter-argument. 
The two terms thus appear synonymous. As an example Aristotle 
states the fact that we do not consider it to be άπο τύχη? ούδ' από 
συμπτώματος when it rains a lot in winter.46 Here he has reduced the 
terms denoting chance to the single term τύχη. This reduction 
contradicts the doctrine of Phys. II, vi and shows that τύχη was the 
single term for chance used by Aristotle at this point. 
Aristotle concludes that if things seem to be either coincidental or 
for a purpose (άπο συμπτώματος... ή е ека του), and the things 
under discussion cannot be either άπο συμπτώματος μήτ' άπο 
ταύτομάτου, they must be for a purpose.47 Here the term ταύτόματον 
has returned to supplant τύχη. Possibly Aristotle reintroduced the 
term ταύτόματον to refute more effectively the original argument 
which appears to have contained this term (198 b 30). Aristotle at 
least shows here that the terms, when applied in the realm of nature, 
are synonyms for him and hence that the passage ignores and 
therefore antedates the distinction introduced by the doctrine of Phys. 
II, vi. 
Towards the end of Phys. II, viii Aristotle argues that not merely 
the area of animal life, but also that of plant life operates according to 
nature, not chance. Otherwise generation among seeds would have 
been haphazard (όπως €τυχ€ν).48 But each principle brings forth, not 
the same thing in each case, nor just anything (το τυχόν), but always 
something proceeding towards the same thing, if nothing prevents it.49 
He then gives an example of chance from the area of human free 
choice: 
What something is for, and what is for that, can also come to be due to 
τύχη, as when we say that the family friend came due to τύχη and paid 
45
 Phys. II, viii, 198 b 34-36. 
4 6
 Phys. II, viii, 198 b 36 - 199 a 2. 
47
 Phys. II, viii, 199 a 3-5. 
4 8
 Phys. II, viii, 199 b 14. 
49
 Phys. II, viii, 199 b 17-18. 
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the ransom before departing, if he acted as if he had come for that 
purpose, but had not in fact come for that purpose. This occurred 
coincidentally (κατά συμβ€βηκό?)(ίθΓ τύχη is a cause coincidentally, as 
we stated above), but when a certain thing comes to be always or for the 
most part, it is not a coincidental occurrence nor is it due to τύχη. Now 
among natural beings things always happen the same way, unless 
something prevents this.50 
In this passage Aristotle uses the term τύχη exclusively, although 
he is referring to the area of nature (namely the plant world), except 
for the example he gives. Thus this usage of τύχη shows that the 
chapter antedates the distinction between τύχη and ταύτόματον 
introduced in Phys. II, vi. The example is taken from the area of 
human free choice (the area to which τύχη is restricted in Phys. II, 
vi), doubtless to avoid entering into the area of chance natural 
substances, namely monsters and the products of spontaneous 
generation.51 At the period when Aristotle had not yet introduced the 
distinction between τύχη and ταύτόματον found in Phys. II, vi there 
was nothing illogical in taking an example from chance in the area of 
human free choice, since the same term - τύχη - covered chance both 
in this area and in the area of nature. It is, of course, most striking to 
find that the distinction introduced in Phys. II, vi between τύχη and 
ταύτόματον is not respected in Phys. II, viii. 
From this analysis it follows, accordingly, that Phys. II, viii is to be 
dated prior to Phys. II, vi and the revision of Phys. II, iv-v. 
In Part.An. I, i Aristotle argues that in regard to animals the formal 
and efficient cause (the fully-grown animal) is prior to the offspring: 
Similarly too with those things that appear to come into being 
spontaneously (αύτομάτω?) just as with those produced by the arts (ètri 
των τεχναστών); for some that come into being spontaneously (άπο 
ταύτομάτου) are identical with those produced by art (από τέχνη?), such 
as health. In the case of those things where the producing agent (то 
ποιητικόν) is pre-existent, such as the art of statuary, nothing spontaneous 
(αυτόματον) occurs. Art (ή τέχνη) is the form (λόγος) of the product 
without the matter (äveu ττ\ς ϋ\τ\ς). And similarly with the products of 
50
 Phys. II, viii, 199 Ы 8-26. 
51
 Cf. infra chapter 5 (b) and (c). 
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chance (TOLS από τύχη?): they come into being by the same process that 
τέχνη would employ.52 
The last sentence in this passage appears to mean exactly the same 
as the first.53 The passage was bracketed by Peck with the remark: "ex 
Met 1032-1034 exorta, olim ut vid. in marg. 640 b 4 adscripta; inepta 
seclusi." Balme, however, does not object to the passage.54 The 
content certainly has a close affinity with Met. Z(VII), vii and ix. 
Whether it was added to the text of Part.An. at a later date is unclear. 
If the passage is provisionally taken as authentic, Aristotle refers 
to health coming into being αύτομάτω? or άπο ταύτομάτου. It is 
unfortunately unclear whether he has in mind health caused by heat 
produced by a person not versed in the art of médecine or caused by 
the heat of warm weather. In the former case the appropriate term is 
τύχη, but not in the latter, according to Phys. II, vi, where, however, 
ταύτόματον covers τύχη. Significantly, however, τύχη replaces 
ταύτόματοί' later in the passage (in the repetition of the first 
sentence), so that it would appear to be a matter of indifference which 
term is used. 
In Part. An. I, i, in his introduction to the study of the parts of 
animals, Aristotle insists on the reality of Nature, given the definite 
ordering of animals, and he holds that there is even less room for 
attributing the movements of the heavenly bodies to chance than there 
is for attributing animal life to chance, given the greater order in the 
heavens. He continues: 
Nevertheless, there are those who hold that each of the animals exists and 
comes into being by nature, and yet that the heavens in all their glory were 
constructed by chance (από τύχη? και τοίι αυτομάτου), although there is 
not the slightest sign of anything being by chance (άπο τύχη?) or 
disordered in the heavens. And everywhere we say that one thing is for the 
sake of another, when there appears an end towards which a movement 
proceeds, unless it is prevented. Hence it is clear that there exists such a 
5 2
 Part.An. I, i, 640 a 27-33. 
5 3
 OGLE, Part.An..Λ44 maintains that τύχη and ταύτόματοί' are not synonymous 
in this passage. LE BLOND, Part.An.... 144 rightly points out that they are synonymous. 
5 4
 BALME, De Partibus Animalium /...86. He is followed by LENNOX, 
Teleology...226. 
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thing, which we call Nature. For not just anything (ö TL έτυχαν) grows 
from any seed, but each specific living creature from its own specific seed, 
nor does just any seed (σπέρμα το τυχόν) come from just any body (ек 
του τυχόντος σώματο?)... For these things are so arranged by Nature.55 
This passage is closely related to Phys. II, iv, 196 a 28-34, and it 
would appear certain that Aristotle had the passage of the Physics in 
mind when he wrote the passage in Part. An. It is clear in this passage 
of Part. An. that the term then in use by Aristotle to cover the whole 
area of chance was τ ύ χ η , as appears from Aristotle's comment: 
"although there is not the slightest sign of anything being by chance 
(άττο τύχη?) or disordered in the heavens" Thus the passage antedates 
the specialised meaning of τύχη found in Phys. II, vi, with which it is 
incompatible. In the first part of the same sentence Aristotle is 
relating the view of Democritus. It is possible that this is the reason 
why he uses the term ταύτόματον in addition to his own term τύχη. 
This he does also in Met. A(I), iii, 984 b 14, likewise where he is 
rejecting the standpoint of Democritus. There would not, however, 
appear to be a distinction between τύχη and ταΰτόματον at this point 
in Aristotle's thought,5 6 although τύχη is the predominating term and 
doubtless that most in common usage at the time. 
In his discussion of causes in Met. A iii Aristotle writes the 
following: 
When the men and the principles of this kind had had their day, since they 
were insufficient to account for the generation of things as they are, men 
were again compelled by truth itself, as we have said, to investigate the 
next kind of first principle. For surely it is not likely either that fire or 
earth or any such element should be the reason why things manifest 
goodness and beauty both in their being and in their coming to be, or that 
those thinkers should have supposed it was; nor again could it be right to 
ascribe so great a matter to chance (τω αύτομάτω και τη τύχη).57 
Part. An. I, i, 641 b 20-30. For the translation of the phrase άπο τύχης και του 
αυτομάτου cf. infra this chapter (bX¡). 
56
 Cf. supra this chapter pp. 87-8 on Gen.et Corr. and esp. n.40. 
57
 Met. A(l), iii, 984 b 8-15. For the translation of το αυτόματοι' και ή τύχη cf. 
infra this chapter (b)(i). 
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In this passage the terms ταύτόματον and τύχη again appear to be 
synonyms The term τύχη refers to chance in the area of nature. This 
usage contradicts the restricted meaning of τύχη in Phys li, vi 
In Met Θ(ΙΧ), vu, at the outset of a discussion of potentiality, 
Aristotle writes: 
It is necessary to distinguish when a given thing exists potentially and 
when not, for it is not at any and every time E g is earth potentially a 
man
9
 No, but rather when it has already become semen, and perhaps not 
even then· just as not everything can be healed by médecine or even by 
chance (άπο τύχης), but there is a definite kind of thing which is capable 
of it, namely the potentially healthy58 
Here Aristotle chooses "the potentially healthy" as an example of 
that which can be healed by médecine or by τύχη It is theoretically 
unclear whether Aristotle has in mind a cure by heat applied by a non­
medical practitioner or heat from the sun. In the former case τύχη 
would be the appropriate term, according to Phys. II, vi, in the latter 
not Ross presumes that Aristotle has the distinction in Phys II, vi in 
mind and translates τύχη by 'luck'.39 However, the context is against 
him, and τύχη should rather be translated by 'chance',60 thereby 
contradicting the definition of chance in Phys. II, vi. 
In this section, accordingly, a number of texts have been examined 
in which τύχη is used in a sense that contradicts the definition of 
τύχη in Phys II, vi This discrepancy has not gone unnoticed. But the 
general conclusion drawn by numerous commentators is that Aristotle 
was simply inconsistent.61 They notice that Aristotle carefully re-
5 8
 Met Θ(ΙΧ), vu, 1048 b 37 - 1049 a 5 
5 9
 Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics ad toe 
6 0
 Cf TREDENNICK, Met ad loc and BARNES, The Complete Works ad loc 
6 1
 ROSS, Aristotle s Metaphysics II, 355 "Sometimes, however, τύχη and 
ταύτόματον are used without distinction in the general sense", JOACHIM, Gen et 
Corr 234 (cf supra n 40), DETEL, A Po II, 715 (cf supra η 32), TRICOT, Met .35, 
LOUIS, La génération spontanee 293 n 9 A MANSION, Introduction 292-3 notes 
that τύχη is a subordinate part ofταύτόματον (ι e the doctrine of Phys II, vi) and 
notes likewise that Aristotle frequently uses τύχη as equivalent to ταυτοματοι But 
the conclusion he draws is that this contradictory usage is a "négligence de style" 
Ross, Aristotle 77 notes that "Aristotle sometimes uses τύχη (luck) in the generic 
sense" [in which case Ross would have done better to translate τύχη by 'chance'], but 
94 DATING PHYS. II, IV-vi 
stricted and defined the meaning of τύχη in Phys. II, vi and then hold 
that he completely ignored his definition in all or most of his other 
works. It has been seen that Aristotle even uses τύχη in Phys. II, iv-v 
and II, viii in a sense that contradicts the definition in II, vi. Now 
obviously one possible conclusion is that previous commentators are 
right and that Aristotle was simply inconsequent. However, it was 
seen in the last chapter that Phys. II, iv-v shows every sign of having 
been revised in such a way as to accomodate Phys. II, vi. This fact had 
never yet been observed. Under these circumstances it is therefore 
vastly more satisfactory to conclude that Aristotle's restriction of the 
meaning of τύχη in Phys. II, vi dates from the latter part of his career, 
especially as all of the texts examined above in which τύχη is used in 
a sense incompatible with Phys. II, vi are generally admitted to belong 
to the earlier part of Aristotle's career. It now remains to be seen, 
however, whether it is possible to date Phys. II, vi more precisely. 
(b) Τύχη in Aristotle's latest metaphysical writings 
It is assumed by Ross in his commentary on Aristotle's latest 
metaphysical writings (Z vii-ix and Λ i-vii) that Aristotle in these 
writings took cognizance of his definition of τύχη in Phys. II, vi.62 
The evidence in favour of this standpoint will be examined in this 
section. This evidence was not examined by Ross and has not been 
examined by other exegetes because they simply assumed that 
Aristotle was inconsistent in his use of τύχη. It is necessary to 
examine firstly the meaning of the recurrent phrase ταύτόματον και 
τύχη, as this phrase occurs in Met. Z(VII), vii. 
claims incorrectly that Aristotle also sometimes uses το αυτόματοι« "in the sense of 
species." 
62
 Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics...II, 182-3, 355. On the dating of Ζ vii-ix and Λ i-
vii cf. DUMOULIN, Analyse..A0\-5. 
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(i) The meaning of ταύτόματοί'και τύχη 
The phrase ταύτόματον και τύχη is found in various forms in a 
series of Aristotle's early works. Its meaning can be seen most clearly 
from a passage from Aristotle's account of plots of plays in Poet.: 
Since the imitation is not only of a complete action (πράξεως), but also of 
incidents arousing pity and fear, these occur most effectively when they 
arc contrary to expectation (παρά την δόξαν), yet in consequence of one 
another (δι' άλληλα). For in this way they will have more of the 
marvellous about them than if they proceeded άπο του αυτομάτου και 
τη? τύχης (since of events which proceed from τύχη those are most 
marvellous which appear to have occurred as if intentionally...).63 
In this passage there is a strong contrast between events that occur 
in consequence of one another (8L' άλληλα) and events that proceed 
from ταύτόματον and τύχη. The latter two terms seem therefore to 
mean "αί random" (i.e. without rhyme or reason). This is confirmed 
by the next sentence where Aristotle says that of events that occur at 
random those are most marvellous where the appearance of 
intentional occurrence is present. Thus it is clear from this passage 
that ταύτόματον and τύχη are understood in a sense different from 
that of Phys. II, v, 196 b 17-24 and II, vi, 197 b 18-20 where they are 
held to include the appearance of purpose. 
There is a simple explanation for the different meaning of chance 
in the two passages. In Phys. II, v, 196 b 17-24 and II, vi, 197 b 18-20 
Aristotle is speaking ofthat which we say (φαμέν, 196 b 24; λέγομεν, 
197 b 20) is due to chance, namely unusual events which appear to 
have a purpose. But it has been seen above that the number of 
accidents of any substance at any time are infinite.64 Among these, 
man is struck by certain concurrences of accidents which appear to 
have a purpose and calls these "chance" In the passage of Poet, above 
Aristotle is using ταύτόματοί/ and τύχη to refer to all accidental 
occurrences of a kind where it is not possible to trace any purpose in 
the chance occurrences. Thus chance can be used to refer to any 
6 3
 Poet, ix, 1452 a 1-7. 
M
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 7 and Ch. l(v), p.25 with n.9. 
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concurrent accidents. But in practice man only observes those 
concurrent accidents which are of interest to him, i.e. which appear to 
have a purpose. Hence we speak of chance usually only in reference 
to concurrences which appear to have a purpose. But of course we can 
be struck in a badly written play by concurrences which do not fulfil 
the sense of purpose we usually expect in an event we attribute to 
chance, and hence which is disappointing. 
In this passage of Poet, it would appear that ταύτόματον and τύχη 
are synonyms.65 The repetition of the term τύχη would appear to 
show that this is the dominant or more important term for Aristotle at 
this period of his thought. Of importance is the fact that τύχη both 
alone and in the phrase άπο του αυτομάτου και της· τύχη? has been 
seen not to have the restricted meaning defined in Phys. II, vi. Poet, is 
generally held to be an early work. It will now be seen that the phrase 
ταύτόματον και τύχη meaning 'chance', 'randomness' recurs 
frequently in other early works of Aristotle. 
It was seen above that the phrase το αυτόματοι' και το άπο τύχη? 
occurs in De Cae!. I, xii, 283 a 32-33 in a context where τύχη cannot 
possibly mean "luck"66 The expression means "chance" or '4he 
random", as in Poet, ix, 1452 a 1-7. Likewise the phrase από 
ταύτομάτου και άπο τύχης in Gen.et Corr. II, vi, 333 b 6-7 means 
"by chance"67 The reverse phrase άπο τύχης καΐ τοΰ αυτομάτου 
meaning "by chance" occurs in Phys. II, viii, 198 b 36 and Part.An. I, 
i, 641 b 22.68 The expression το αύτόματον και ή τύχη also occurs 
in Met. A(I), iii, 984 b 14 meaning "chance"69 The phrase μηδέν ώς 
€τυχ€ μηδ' άπο ταύτομάτου meaning "nothing random" or "nothing 
by chance" is found in De Cael. II, v, 287 b 24-25. 
It must be concluded, therefore, that the term τύχη occurs in this 
more or less standard phrase without any reference to its restricted 
6 5
 This is also the view of BYWATER, Aristotle on the art of poetry...197 and 
GUDEMAN. Aristoteles, ΠΕΡΙΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ...1\%. 
6 6
 supra pp. 85-6. 
6 7
 Cf. supra p.87. 
6 8
 supra pp. 88-9 and 91-2. 
6 9
 supra p.92. 
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meaning in Phys. II, vi. This fact will now be seen to be of value for 
the interpretation of a passage of Pol. VII and Met. Z(VII), vii. 
In his discussion of the sources of happiness in Pol. VII, i Aristotle 
writes the following: 
Let us then take it as agreed between us that to each man there falls just so 
large a measure of happiness as he achieves of virtue and wisdom and of 
virtuous and wise action: in evidence of this we have the case of God, who 
is happy and blessed, but is so on account of no external goods, but on 
account of himself and by being of a certain quality in his nature; since it 
is also for this reason that ευτυχία is necessarily different from 
ευδαιμονία - for the cause of goods external to the soul is chance 
(ταύτόματον και ή τύχη), but nobody is just or temperate by chance (άπο 
τύχης ουδέ δια την τύχην).70 
Once again the phrase ταύτόματον και ή τύχη is found here in an 
admittedly early work. It is presumed by a number of commentators 
that τύχη in this context is different from ταύτόματον and is used in 
the restricted sense found in Phys. II, vi.71 That this is not the case is 
shown, however, by the numerous occurrences of the phrase in other 
early works meaning simply "chance" 
Again, in Met. Z(VII), vii Aristotle examines the sources of 
generation. Having examined natural generation Aristotle states that 
the other kinds of generation are called ποιήσεις. 7 2 He then writes: 
Of these some are generated άπο ταύτομάτου και άπο τύχη? in much the 
same way as things generated in nature. For sometimes there too the same 
things come into being both from seed and without seed.73 
In his commentary on this passage Ross assumes that ταύτόματον 
here is the generic term and τύχη restricted as in Phys. II, vi. He does 
10
 Pol. VII, ¡,5,1323 b 21-29. 
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 Cf. SuSEMiHLand HICKS, Pol. ad loc; RACKHAM, Pol. ad loc. 
72
 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 26-27. 
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 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 28-32. When Aristotle writes παραπλήσιων ώσπερ, "in 
much the same way" (1032 a 29-30) he is not emphasizing the "way" chance occurs, 
but its unexpectedness. In the field of nature monsters and spontaneous generation 
occur by chance. Cf. infra Ch. 5 nn. 11 and 87. Cf. Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 b 4-6; Phys. 
II, vi, 197 b 32-37. Cf. supra Ch.l §(xvii) and supra pp.78-9. Cf. further on 
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not attempt to explain why Aristotle uses both terms when one would 
be sufficient. Presumably he would have to say that τύχη was added 
by Aristotle to render more precise the kind of chance meant here, 
namely chance in the area of ποιήσοις. 
However, it is clear that Ross' assumption is incorrect, i.e. that the 
definition of τύχη in Phys. II, vi is not reflected in this passage. The 
expression από ταύτομάτου και από τύχη? is no more than a general 
expression meaning "by chance", "randomly", as seen from the long 
series of earlier writings, in which it is also found. 
In the next section a number of other inconclusive passages in the 
later metaphysical works will be examined. 
(ii) Inconclusive passages in the later metaphysical writings 
In Met. Z(VII), vii, having dealt with artificial generation, e.g. the 
restoration of a patient's health by a doctor, Aristotle then briefly 
mentions chance generation. He writes as follows: 
That which produces (το ποιούν) and from which the process (κίνησι?) of 
becoming healthy begins is the form (то eîoos) in the soul, if it occurs due 
to art (άπο τέχνης), but if due to chance (από ταύτομάτου), it is from 
that which is the starting-point74 of producing for the producer from art 
(άπο τέχνη?), as in healing perhaps the starting-point is from heating [sc. 
the patient].75 
Here the efficient cause which brings about the chance outcome is 
the same means as the means which the doctor (the producer from art) 
would have used, e.g. heating the patient. The difference is that the 
doctor started off with the idea of health in his soul, which is the 
formal cause, and converted this formal cause into the efficient cause 
of the result, e.g. heating the patient. But where the patient is cured by 
chance, the formal cause of the result is absent, and the efficient cause 
(heating) brings about a result, as if it had proceeded from a formal 
cause. 
Read άρχει with Ross, TREDENNICK, FREDE and PATZIG. 
Met. Z(VH), vii, 1032 b 21-26. 
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The question in the case of the passage under discussion is 
whether Aristotle presupposed that the patient who was cured by 
chance was cured (a) by keeping himself warm (or by a kind 
neighbour telling him to keep warm) or (b) by the fact that the 
weather turned warm at the right time and cured him. In the first case 
the patient would be cured by τύχη and in the second case by 
ταύτόματον, but not by τύχη, if we adhere to the definition in Phys. 
II, vi. Aristotle refers to the first possibility in Met. A(I), i, 981 a 3-12, 
and spontaneous generation bears a certain resemblance to the second 
possibility. 
Unfortunately Aristotle does not specify which of the two 
possibilities he has in mind. We may note that he chooses to use the 
term ταύτόματον. 
Again, in Met. Z(VII), ix Aristotle inquires why some things can 
be generated both by art (τέχνη) and by chance (άπο ταύτομάτου), 
e.g. health, while others cannot, e.g. a house.76 Once again, however, 
he does not make it clear whether he is thinking of health as being 
accidentally caused by heat recommended by a person without the art 
of médecine or by heat from the sun. We are not in a position to 
determine whether the chance in question falls under τύχη or under 
ταύτόματον exclusive of τύχη (according to Phys. II, vi).77 We can 
note only that Aristotle uses the term ταύτόματον for the kind of 
chance he has in mind. 
It must be concluded that the two passages examined in this 
section from Met. Z(VII), vii and ix provide no decisive evidence as 
to whether Aristotle was taking account of the definition of τύχη in 
Phys. II, vi or not. 
7 6
 Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 a 9-10. In Rhet. I, v, 1362 a 2 Aristotle used τύχη in the 
same context: τύχη is the cause of some things of which the arts (τέχναι) are also 
causes. 
7 7
 The explanation given by Aristotle also does not answer the question. In some 
cases the matter can initiate its own motion and in others it cannot. Aristotle views 
heat as the matter of health and stones as the matter of a house. For further analysis of 
this passage cf. infra ch.5 (cXii) pp. 151-4. 
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(Hi) The sources of generation 
In Met. Z(VII), vii Aristotle enumerates the three sources of 
generation, which he then proceeds to discuss. These are φύσις·, 
τέχνη and ταϋτόματον.78 
This passage contrasts with Aristotle's attribution of all generation 
in Protrep. to τέχνη, φύσις- and τύχη.7 9 It seems likely that 
ταϋτόματον in the passage from Met. Z(VII) is intended to include 
τύχη in the restricted sense found in Phys. II, vi. 
In Met. A(XII), iii, 1070 a 4-9 Aristotle also lists the sources of all 
generation. These are said to be τέχνη, φύσις· and ταϋτόματον. 
In this passage from Met. A it would appear that there is a 
correspondence between τέχνη and τύχη, on the one hand, and φύσις-
and ταϋτόματον, on the other. There is a close parallel with the 
concluding paragraph of Phys. II, vi: Έπεί δ' εστί το αύτόματον και 
ή τύχη αϊτια ων αν ή νους· γένοιτο αίτιος ή φύσις... (198 а 5-6). 
In the passage from Met. A the term τύχη is included on the list, 
unlike the list in Met. Z(VII), vii. The passage is of such a summary 
nature as to give the impression that it is simply a reminder of a 
previous longer discussion of generation, which in this case would 
most probably be the discussion in Met. Z(VII), vii and ix. The 
explanation of τύχη and ταϋτόματον as mere privations in this 
passage is undoubtedly much simpler than the doctrine of chance in 
Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 b 23-25 and possibly represents an advance on 
(iv) Note on Met. К 
In Met. K(XI), viii, 1065 a 26 - 1065 b 4 an account of chance is to 
be found that consists in a series of excerpts from Phys. II, v-vi. Some 
7 8
 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 12-13. 
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 Cf. supra p.84 and n.35. 
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 Cf. BONITZ, Aristotelis Metaphysica..ATb ad 1070 a 4-9: "Idem uberius explicat 
Ζ 7.9. Nee solum nimia brevitate et obscuritate hie locus ab illa disputatione 
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sentences are literal quotations taken from the account in Phys., 
whereas in others the vocabulary or word-order has been modified 
slightly. The excerptor clearly picked out from Phys. II, v-vi those 
aspects of chance that seemed most important to him. The sudden 
introduction of ταύτόματον in the last sentence of the passage 
without any context shows clearly that the short account in Met. 
K(XI), viii is an excerpt from Phys. II, v-vi and not preparatory notes 
for the latter.81 The conclusions drawn in regard to the chronology of 
Phys. II, v-vi accordingly apply to Met. K(XI), viii, and it follows also 
that Met. K(XI), viii must be dated after Phys. II, vi. 
(ν) Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to see if it was possible to date Phys. 
II, vi, since it was seen in the last chapter that Phys. II, vi was written 
at a different stage of Aristotle's thought on chance than Phys. II, iv-v. 
In section (a) a series of texts was examined in which Aristotle uses 
τύχη in a sense that covers all of chance and therefore strictly 
contradicts the restricted meaning of τύχη in Phys. II, vi. It was noted 
at the end of section (a) that the commentators obviously could be 
right in supposing that Aristotle was simply inconsequent in his use of 
the term τύχη. However, given that all of the texts examined in 
section (a) are generally thought to date from the earlier part of 
Aristotle's career, it is more probable that Phys. II, vi dates from the 
latter part thereof.82 In section (b) an examination was carried out into 
the presumption by Ross that Aristotle took account of Phys. II, vi in 
81
 Cf. ROSS, Aristotle's Metaphysics...II, 324. Cf. BONITZ, Aristotelis Meta­
physial. ..22-23 on 1065 a 26 - 1069 a 14: "Aristotelem autem non esse huius 
epitomae auctorem, equi dem non dubitaverim contendere. Fieri quidem potuit, ut 
nescio quo Consilio Aristoteles opus illud physicum in brevius contraheret, sed 
profecto non potuit earn sui ipse operi s faceré epitomen, qua temere frusta quaedam 
evellerentur, sententiarum autem contextus prorsus obscuraretur. Sed quis fecerit hanc 
epitomen et qui factum sit ut metaphysicis libris insereretur, id ne divinando quidem 
videmur assequi posse." 
82
 Aristotle's use of τύχη to cover all of chance is accepted as a characteristic of 
his earlier works by A. MANSION, Introduction ...324 n.15. 
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his latest metaphysical writings. It was seen in subsection (i) that the 
expression το αύτόματον και τύχη means no more than "chance" 
and is found in a series of texts in Aristotle's earlier works. It must be 
concluded that τύχη in this phrase, when it occurs in Pol. VII and 
Met. Z(VII), vii, does not have the restricted meaning found in Phys. 
II, vi. In subsection (ii) it was seen that the term ταύτόματον found 
elsewhere in Met. Z(VII), vii and ix does not provide any clear 
indication as to whether it includes the term τύχη, as it does in Phys. 
II, vi. This is possible, but not certain. In subsection (iii), finally, it 
was seen that the lists of the sources of generation in Met. Z(VII), vii 
and Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), iii provide a degree of evidence that Aristotle wrote 
them at a point where his thought on chance corresponded with that in 
Phys. II, vi. It may be concluded that it is most unlikely that Aristotle 
had written Phys. II, vi before any of the texts examined in section (a) 
and that there is some likelihood that Phys. II, vi is to be dated to the 
same period as Met. Z(VII), vii-ix and Met. Л(ХП), iii, i.e. (as widely 
held) towards the end of Aristotle's career, but before De An. and De 
Gen. An. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
NECESSITY AND CHANCE 
(aJAristotle 's concept of necessity 
(i) Introduction 
In this chapter Aristotle's concept of necessity will be investigated 
and the important question will be treated of the extent to which 
Aristotle was a determinist' and the extent to which he made room for 
contingency. In part (a) of this chapter Aristotle's concept of 
necessity will be examined together with the areas which Aristotle 
held to be necessary. In part (b) of the chapter Aristotle's concept of 
chance will be contrasted with that of his predecessors for whom 
chance and necessity are not incompatible. An attempt will be made 
to determine Aristotle's precise criticism of these predecessors. For 
Aristotle chance and necessity are opposites and chance is defined to 
some extent by its opposite. It will be seen that Aristotle's concept of 
chance is essential to one of the types of contingency he believed in. 
(it) Absolute necessity 
Aristotle defines the necessary as that which cannot not be.2 This 
is the primary meaning of 'the necessary'. The various subdivisions of 
necessity will now be examined. 
In discussing necessity Aristotle, inspired by a number of Platonic 
texts3 distinguishes between absolute necessity (το απλώς 
1
 Necessity is held by SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame... HA to be the 'main 
problem' in Aristotle's philosophy of nature. 
2
 Met Г(І ), iv, 1006 b 32; Met Д( ), ν, 1015 аЗЗ-36. 
3
 For the hypothetical necessity of matter cf. Phaedo 99 a-b, also implicitly Tim. 
42 a, 75 a-b, 77 a. For the opposition of matter (Plato's Necessity and Aristotle's 
absolute necessity) to reason (the Demiurge) cf. Tim. 46 c-e, 47 e - 48 a, 56 c, 68 e -
69 a, Leg. X. 889 b-c quoted infra part (b) of this chapter. 
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αναγκαΐον) and hypothetical or conditional necessity (τα δ' έξ 
υποθέσεως αναγκαίοι').4 Absolute necessity is found in the following 
areas. Absolute necessity is the necessity belonging to eternal things 
(τοις GLLSLOLC).5 Thus the necessity in mathematics is absolute 
necessity, e.g. since a straight line is what it is, it is necessary that the 
angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles.6 More 
generally, in regard to that which is knowable absolutely, attributes 
that are called per se as implying or implied by their subjects, belong 
to those subjects in virtue of their own nature and of necessity.7 The 
necessity of science is absolute necessity, since science is invariable.8 
The necessity of the existence of the heavenly bodies and of their 
movement is also absolute necessity,9 also referred to by Aristotle as 
'continuous necessity' (συνεχές αναγκαΐον).10 
In Gen.et Corr. II, xi Aristotle raises the question as to whether 
absolute necessity (το έξ ανάγκης απλώς) also occurs in the world of 
becoming, i.e. in the sublunar world. He replies that absolute 
necessity is also found in the area of becoming, because becoming is 
eternal and the consequent follows necessarily from the antecedent. 
The eternity of becoming in the sublunar world is circular.11 Its 
necessity does not apply to the individual, but only to the species.12 It 
is caused by the efficient causality (of the heat of) the sun and of the 
* Pari.An. I, i, 639 b 21 - 640 a 9; 642 a 1-13, 642 a 31 - 642 b 4. Cf. Met. E(V1), 
ii, 1026 b 27-33; Phys. II, ix; De Int. xiii, 23 a 21-26; Met. Θ(ΙΧ), viii, 1050 b 16-18; 
Gen. et Corr. II, xi, 337 a 34 - 338 b 19. 
5
 Gen. et Corr. II, xi, 337 b 34 - 338 a 2 esp. 338 a 1-2: ει έστιι> έξ ανάγκη?, 
άίδιον έστι, και ei άΐδιον, έξ ανάγκης·. 
6
 Cf. Phys. II, ix, 200 a 15-18; Part.An. I, i, 640 a 3. 
1
 APo\, iv, 73 Ы6-18, 23-28. 
8
 ЕЕ V (=NE VI), iii, 1139 b 19-24; ЕЕ V(=W£ VI), vi, 1140 b 31-32. Cf. APo I, 
iv, 73 a 21-3. On the science of the unusual, but regular, cf. infra p. 124 and p. 164 on 
honey-water. 
9
 Cf. De Gen.An. II, i, 731 b 24; De Gen An. IV, iv, 770 b 11 ; ЕЕ V (=NE VI), iv, 
1140 a 14: των έξ ανάγκης όντων ή γινομένων; Gen. et Corr. II, xi, 338 a 17 - b 3; 
Part.An. I, i, 639 b 23-24; Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 27-28. 
i0APr. I, xiii, 32 b 8. 
" Gen. et Corr. II, xi, 338 a 14-15: èv τη κύκλω άρα κινήσει καΐ γενέσει εστί το 
έξ ανάγκης απλώς. 
ì2Gen. et Corr. II, xi, 338 b 11-19. 
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moon, the movements of which in turn are caused by the efficient 
causality of the other heavenly bodies starting from the outside with 
the πρώτος ουρανός, all of which move by absolute necessity.13 The 
compatibility of hypothetical with absolute necessity will be 
examined infra §ix. 
Material necessity or necessity in accordance with nature (ανάγκη 
κατά φύσιν), by which a thing moves in accordance with its material 
nature, is - logically - also absolute necessity. The necessity in 
accordance with nature with which e.g. a stone falls (unless it is 
prevented by force) is the absolute necessity of the material cause, i e. 
it is an analytical necessity.14 This necessity is related to the absolute 
necessity by which the elements change into one another, e.g. air 
becomes water and water air However, there is a difference between 
them, because when water comes to be from air and air from water, 
the water or the air is the same specifically, but not numerically.15 
Thus the absolute necessity of the cyclical change of water into air 
and air into water is only an imitation of the absolute necessity 
regulating the movement of the eternal heavenly bodies, whereas the 
absolute necessity by which a stone falls is identical qua absolute 
necessity with that regulating the movement of the heavenly bodies. 
Aristotle distinguishes those things which exist by absolute 
necessity, i.e. always in the same way, from both those that exist not 
13
 Gen et Corr II, x, 336 a 31 - 336 b 24 (336 b 2-3 on the movement of the sun 
by the other heavenly bodies), Gen et Corr Π, xi, 338 a 17 - 338 b 5, Meteor I, n, 
339 a 21-32, Meteor I, ix, 346 b 20-23, De Gen An IV, x, 777 b 16 - 778 a 9 (esp 
important for the moon) Cf HAPP, Hyle 506-7 
14
 APo II, χι, 94 b 37 - 95 a 3 ή δ' ανάγκη διττή ή μεν γαρ κατά φυσιΐ' και την 
όρμην, η δε βια ή πάρα την όρμην, ώσπερ λίθο? εξ ανάγκη? και άνω και κάτω 
φέρεται, αλλ' ού δια την αυτήν ανάγκην Cf Phys II, ix, 199 b 35 - 200 a 5 It is to 
be noted that φύσις in these passages (πεφυκε, 200 a 2) refers to the material nature 
of stones and not their form Cf also Part An Ι, ι, 642 a 31 - b 4 Cf CHARLTON, 
Phys I-II 115 and HAPP, Hyle 760 n401 On the compatibility of absolute and 
hypothetical necessity cf infra §(ix) 
15
 Gen et Corr II, χι, 338 b 17-18 Aristotle seems to envisage air as 'this 
particular parcel of air' and water as 'this particular shower of rain' etc Cf HAPP, 
Hyle 511 n 202 " streng genommen gibt es auch bei den Stoffen (das sieht 
Aristoteles klar, gen corr 338 b 170 nur unwiederholbare Individualität " 
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always but usually, and from those that exist neither always nor 
usually.16 
At the conclusion of his dictionary account of necessity in Met. 
Д( ), ν Aristotle makes a distinction within absolute necessity 
between unqualified absolute necessity and derived absolute 
necessity. Those things that are necessary by derived absolute 
necessity have a cause of their necessity, whereas those that are 
necessary by unqualified absolute necessity are the cause of the 
necessity of those that are necessary by derived absolute necessity. 
That which is necessary by primary and unqualified absolute 
necessity (το πρώτον και κυρίως αναγκαίοι') is the simple (то 
απλούν), i.e. the eternal and invariable.17 
(Hi) Final causes are not derived by absolute necessity 
At this point it is important to refute the view that final causes 
exist by absolute necessity, as held by S. Mansion.18 She defines such 
a necessary final cause as an end that is necessarily laid down due to 
the fact that the nature that tends towards it exists. She admits that 
there is no necessary link between anything in sublunar nature and its 
end, as is shown by the fact that monsters come about. Likewise, in 
the field of human intention, doctors intend to cure, but may not 
achieve their end, because they give the wrong médecine, as Aristotle 
points out. However, she blames Aristotle for not retaining the 
absolute necessity of the final cause in theory.19 But Aristotle can 
hardly be blamed for not being interested in a logical relation that 
does not apply to the real world. Aristotle is interested in the term 
16
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 27-30; Phys. II, v, 196 b 10-13. 
17
 Me/. Д( ), v, 1015 b 9-15. 
18
 S. MANSION, Le jugement d'existence...S2-S4; following A. MANSION, 
lntroduction..2W-%. 
19
 S. MANSION, Le jugement d'existence...84: "...il néglige d'insister sur la 
nécessité qui lie chaque être à sa fin naturelle, même si celle-ci, pouvant être entravée 
de l'extérieur, n'est pas toujours atteinte." Id. 318: *'...il est toujours et nécessairement 
vrai que l'être vivant est constitué de telle sorte que son devenir naturel le conduise 
dans la plupart des cas (!) à l'obtention de sa fin." 
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necessity, but not in necessity with certain exceptions. A necessity of 
the usual is not really necessity. 
S Mansion then proceeds to take the so-called logical necessity of 
the final cause (which is a necessity of relations)20 as given, in order 
to criticise Aristotle further. Thus for her there is a logical absolute 
necessity between the foundations of a house and the completed 
house. For Aristotle, however, this is not the case.21 Mansion then 
accuses Aristotle of confusing real eternity with what she calls the 
logical eternity of necessary propositions.22 She accuses him of 
confusing the eternity of a phenomenon in time with the eternity of its 
relationship to its cause.23 However, she misinterprets the three texts 
which she uses to support her view.24 There is no such confusion in 
S MANSION, Le jugement d'existence 90 
2 1
 Cf SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame 144 
2 2
 S MANSION, Le jugement d'existence 85 
2 3
 S MANSION, Le jugement d'existence 87, cf 91 
2 4
 S MANSION, Le jugement d existence 86-7 In APr I, xin, 32 b 4-10 Aristotle 
does not class among events occurring frequently and 'lacking in continuous 
necessity' what occurs necessarily to a subject, where the subject does not always 
exist In fact Anstotle states that a man is not one of the things that exist always (ι e 
is not like the heavenly bodies, which have what Aristotle calls 'continuous 
necessity') Therefore, one of the meanings of the term 'to be possible' is what either 
necessarily or usually (Mansion omits 'or usually'1) happens to him naturally, such as 
going grey (TRICOT, Premiers Analytiques 62 incorrectly holds that Anstotle means 
by the statement that 'there is not always a man' that a man may die young and hence 
not go grey He is misled by ALEXANDER, ¡n APr 162, 13-30 and PHILOPONUS, In 
APr 152, 22 - 153, 5 In fact Aristotle holds that some men do not go grey regardless 
of their age, APr 32 b 16-17) 
In APo I, vin Anstotle does not claim, as S Mansion holds, that there is something 
lacking to the perfection and to the universality of a scientific demonstration from the 
mere fact that its object does not exist eternally, even though its object, e g an eclipse 
of the moon, is a constant phenomenon In fact Aristotle states that a science, if it 
bears on that which is eternal, will be eternal, but if it bears on the intermittent will 
only be a science if reducible to a law (to a species, ή μεν τοιουδ' εισιι·, 75 b 34) Cf 
SEIDL, Zweite Analytiken 67, 222 
In Met Z(VII), xv, 1039 b 27 - 1040 a 2 Anstotle states that there cannot be 
demonstration or definition of individual sensible substances because they are 
contingent and corruptible S Mansion denies that it is because they are contingent 
and corruptible that there can be no science of the individual (and holds that it is due 
to the conceptual and abstract character of our thought) But in fact Anstotle is stating 
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Aristotle. Mansion claims that Aristotle is under the influence of 
Plato, who reduces science to the area of the Ideas25 (thus 'the logical' 
of later thinkers). But Aristotle does the opposite, by reducing science 
to the really eternal (the superlunary world) and to that in the 
transitory or in the intermittently existing or occurring which can be 
reduced to a law (i.e. to the eternal). This is unquestionably a realist 
(as opposed to an idealist) standpoint. 
(iv) The necessity of the Unmoved Mover 
It was seen in (ii) that Aristotle distinguishes at the end of Met. 
Д( ), ν between necessary things which have a cause of their 
necessity and those which have not. There he holds also that 'the 
necessary' in the primary and strict sense is 'the simple' (το απλούν), 
as 'the simple' is 'the invariable'.26 He concludes: "Therefore, if there 
are certain things which are eternal and immutable, nothing forces 
them or is contrary to their nature"27 It has been held that Aristotle is 
referring here to the separate substances in Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), 6-8.28 
However, the plural (αττα) does not necessarily imply that Aristotle 
is referring to a plurality of substances.29 It has also been held that the 
term απλώς refers only to immutability of substance, but not 
necessarily to accidents and for this reason that he can be referring to 
a plurality of substances.30 However, Aristotle himself specifies that 
he intends to rule out even mutability of accidents (i.e. to rule out the 
heavenly bodies) from the proper (κυρίως) meaning of absolute 
necessity when he writes: "For it cannot be in a number of conditions, 
thus not in one state now and then in another; for that would be to be 
that there is only science of the eternal (and, as seen above, ofthat in the contingent 
which can be reduced to an eternal law), which is a perfectly correct standpoint Cf 
SEIDL, Metaphysik ..II, 436, FREDE and PATZIG, Metaphys Ζ.. 285 
2 5
 S MANSION, Le jugement d'existence.. 88, 90. 
2 6
 Met Д( ), v, І 0 І 5 Ы Ы 4 
2 7
 Met Д( ), v, 1015 b 14-15 
2 8
 REALE, La Metafisica...], 423, APOSTLE, Aristotle's Metaphysics. .300. 
2 9
 For Aristotle's use elsewhere of a plural to refer to the Unmoved Mover (in the 
kind of indirect way which is so typical of him) cf my book Gott und ешріа. 18 
'
G
 S MANSION, Le jugement d'existence.. 73 
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in a number of conditions." The reference here at the end of the 
chapter to the absolutely necessary in the primary and proper sense, 
which has no external cause of its necessity, which is simple, eternal 
and invariable (without any succession of states), is unmistakeably a 
reference to the Unmoved Mover.32 
In Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), vii, in his discussion of the attributes of the 
Unmoved Mover, Aristotle writes: 
Therefore it exists necessarily; and qua necessary it is good, and is in this 
sense a first principle. For the necessary (то а аукаіо ) has all these 
meanings, that which is by compulsion (βία) because it is contrary to 
impulse (παρά την όρμήν), that without which the good (то efi) is 
impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise (το δέ μη ένδεχόμ^νον 
άλλως), but is absolutely necessary (άλλ' απλώς).3"" 
That which is necessary by compulsion (βία) is contrary to nature, 
while that, without which the good is impossible, would appear to be 
formal or hypothetical necessity. Finally, Aristotle refers to absolute 
necessity. The absolute necessity of the Unmoved Mover is due to his 
simplicity, i.e. absence of potency, eternity and immutability.3'1 
It may be noted that Aristotle's absolute necessity is not the 
necessity ofthat which cannot not be, but ofthat which is eternal and 
(when interpreted strictly) not potential, since for Aristotle the 
universe is uncaused in its being and he felt no need to explain the 
being of the universe by a Necessary Being, efficient cause of the 
being of contingent beings. 
n
 Met. A(V),v, 1015 b 12-14. 
3 2
 Cf. S. MANSION, Le jugement d'existence...!1-2; VERBERE, Nécessité de la 
génération...204. FREDE, The limits of determinism ...208 also wishes to include under 
πρώτω? καί κυρίωΐ' [άΐ'αγκαιοί'] "what belongs per se in the way required for the first 
premises of the scientific syllogism." But the final sentence of Met. A(V), ν ούδέΐ' 
έκείνοις εστί βίαιοι' ουδέ παρά φύσιΐ' (text Ross) rules out this interpretation. Ross, 
Aristotle's Metaphysics...I, 299 claims that "it is only τα πρώτα, the ultimate premises 
of demonstration, that are necessary in their own right." However, the references to 
the attributes of the Unmoved Mover, coming here at the end of the chapter, rule out 
Ross' claim. For Aristotle's custom of speaking of the Unmoved Mover at the end of 
his treatment of a topic cf. my book Gott und θεωρία. ..119-121. 
3 3
 Met. Λ(ΧΠ), vii, 1072 b 10-13. 
ì4Met.A(V),\, 1015 b 11-15. 
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(ν) Hypothetical necessity 
Hypothetical or conditional necessity is the necessity of the means 
once the end (final or formal cause) is given. It applies to all 
substances in nature that are in a process of becoming as well as to the 
products of art.35 The means envisaged by Aristotle both in regard to 
natural substances and to the products of art are the matter or 
materials required to attain the end.36 Hence Aristotle, speaking of 
hypothetical necessity, states that the necessity is to be found in the 
matter,37 i.e. it is the matter that is under necessity to be of a certain 
sort. 
Hypothetical necessity also applies in logic: given certain 
premisses the conclusion is necessarily true, not absolutely (άττλώ?), 
but only on the basis that the premisses are true (= the hypothesis).38 
Hypothetical necessity and the necessity of a conclusion if the 
premisses are true may be referred to as relative or qualified 
necessity. Relative or qualified necessity must be distinguished from 
derived absolute necessity, which is e.g. the necessity by which the 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. 
(vi) Degrees of hypothetical necessity 
Kullmann claims that Aristotle introduces a distinction between 
strict hypothetical necessity and less strict hypothetical necessity, 
which he calls "accidental necessity".39 He derives the term 
"accidental necessity" from PartAn. Ill, vii, 670 a 30, where Aristotle 
3 5
 Part. An. 1, i, 639 b 23-26; De Somn. 455 b 26-28; De Gen.An. V, in, 782 a 22-
24; Part. An. IV, ii, 677 a 15-19; De Gen. An. IV, viii, 776 b 31-33. 
3 6
 Cf. APo II, xii, 95 b 32-34; Phys. II, ix, 199 b 35 - 200 a 14; Part. An. I, i, 639 b 
26-27; 642 a 7-13. 
3 7
 Phys. II, ix, 200 a 14: èv γαρ τη ϋλτ) το αναγκαίοι/. 
3 8
 APo II, vii, 92 a 36: άΐ'άγκη ¿κείνων όιτων ётерог TL eïwu; APr Ι, χ, 30 b 31-
40; cf. APo II, ν, 91 b 14-17; APo II, xi, 94 a 21-2; De Cael. I, xii, 281 b 3-25. For a 
detailed account of the vocabulary used by Aristotle to express necessity in his logical 
works cf. PATZIG, Die aristotelische SyUogistik....25 ff. 
3 9
 KULLMANN, Wissenschaft und Methode...295-6. 
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states that the spleen is "necessary incidentally" (κατά συμβεβηκος 
έξ ανάγκης) in those animals that have one. 
The term 'accidental necessity' is, however, highly misleading, 
and I shall argue that it must be rejected. If we proceed to examine 
several other passages in the same chapter, it becomes clear what 
Aristotle meant. Firstly, he states that some animals have a spleen of 
necessity (έξ ανάγκης), while others have a spleen not of necessity, 
i.e. a very small one, as it were by way of a token (μη έξ ανάγκης 
έχουσιν, άλλα πάμμικρον ώσπερ σημείου χάριν), i.e., where the 
spleen is very small, it gives the impression of not being necessary 
(i.e. of not belonging to the logos by hypothetical necessity).40 
Secondly, he states that the spleen is necessary in a way (άναγκάίον 
μέν πως), though not particularly necessary (μη λίαν) in all animals.41 
Aristotle then proceeds to categorize (a) the heart and the liver as 
being "necessary" to all animals, (b) the spleen (in those animals that 
have one) and the residues in the stomach and the bladder as being 
"necessary incidentally" (κατά συμβεβηκος έξ ανάγκης) and the 
kidneys (in those animals that have them) as being "not necessary", 
but present for a good purpose (то eú και καλώς ё еке ) to help the 
bladder perform its function better.42 
The meaning of κατά συμβεβηκος έξ ανάγκης thus must mean 
that a spleen, where present in a particular type of animal, is present 
by hypothetical necessity (like the heart and the liver), but is not 
particularly important (μη λίαν), since it is sometimes very small (a 
mere token presence). The words κατά συμβεβηκος here are therefore 
not to be taken in a metaphysical sense, but as synonymous with "in a 
way, but not too much" (πως, μη λίαν). It is therefore incorrect to 
speak of "accidental necessity" as being a subsidiary type of 
necessity.43 It would be more appropriate to refer to degrees of 
hypothetical necessity. 
40
 PartAn. Ill, vii, 669 b 27-30. 
41
 Part. An. Ill, vii, 669 b 36 - 670 a 2. 
42
 Part.An. Ill, vii, 670 a 23 - 670 b 32. 
43
 FREDE, The limits of determinism...214-5 also tries to get away from Aristotle's 
'hypothetical necessity' and would prefer to rename it 'functional necessity' in the 
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(vii) Force 
Force (βία, το βίαιον) is a necessity contrary to the necessity 
found in nature.44 Thus a stone is thrown into the air by force, but 
falls to the earth by the necessity of its nature.45 In the context of 
human beings, force is that which hinders and prevents in opposition 
to impulse (ορμή) and choice (προαίρεσις).46 Force cannot, of course, 
be exercised in the area of the eternal and ofthat which is absolutely 
necessary,47 since that which is eternal cannot be forced. Force is an 
external cause48 and an efficient cause and causes by absolute ne­
cessity (although it can be hindered by a counter-force). It has been 
referred to also as "efficient necessity".49 
Aristotle admits the existence of such a thing as a chain of 
efficient causes that operate by βία and compares them to automatic 
puppets.50 In the example given in Ch.l §xi the pungent food acted as 
an efficient cause of the man's thirst and the necessity to assuage his 
thirst (pain) as the efficient cause of his decision to go to the well. 
Pungent food, the necessity to assuage thirst and the decision to go to 
the well are per se causes assimilated by Aristotle to substances (cf. 
supra ch.l p.32 and n.31). 
It is important to realize that βία is an external efficient cause. 
Nature either always or usually attains its end. Whenever it does not 
achieve its end, this is because it has been prevented.51 However, that 
biological works. But 'functional necessity' does not appear to be an improvement, as 
it does not convey Aristotle's teleologica! thought as well. 
4 4
 Met. Д( ), ν, 1015 a 26-33; Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 27-29; Met. K(XI), viii, 1064 
b 32-34. 
4 5
 ЕЕ II, viii, 4, 1224 a 16-20; APo II, xi, 94 b 37 - 95 a 3. The latter passage has 
been dealt with supra pp. 81-2 with n.25 and p. 105 with n.14. 
4 6
 Mei. Д( ), v, 1015 a 26-27. 
4 7
 De Cael. II, i, 284 a 15; II, iii, 286 a 17-18; Met. Д( ), ν, 1015 b 14-15. 
4 8
 NE III, i, 12, 1110 b 15-17; Phys. VIII, iv, 255 b 32-33. 
4 9
 D É T E L A / O II, 714. 
50
 De Gen.An. II, i, 734 b 9-10; II, v, 741 b 7-9; Met. A(I), ii, 983 a 14. Cf. also 
infra Ch.5 n.56. 
"Phys. II, viii, 199 b 25-26; 199 a 8-11; 199 b 17-18. 
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which prevents it is rarely attributable to βία, because it is usually 
passive (matter or the mere presence of a passive obstacle).52 
(via) The correspondence of the four causes to absolute and 
hypothetical necessity 
The method proper to the student of nature is to study all four 
causes.
53
 But the four causes belong to two groups, (i) the material 
and efficient causes, which cause by absolute necessity, and (n) the 
formal and final causes, which cause by hypothetical necessity.54 
Thus absolute necessity covers both the material cause and force 
(efficient necessity). In APo II, xi Aristotle states that there are two 
kinds of ανάγκη.55 Upon examination these tum out to be (i) the 
material cause (necessity in accordance with nature, ανάγκη κατά 
φύσΐ-v, nature being understood here as the material nature), which 
explains why a stone falls, and (ii) force (βία), the efficient cause that 
makes a stone go up in the air. In this passage Aristotle does not 
mention hypothetical necessity. He even denies that that which comes 
about for a purpose comes about by necessity, i.e. he has not yet 
developed the concept of hypothetical necessity at the time of 
dictating this passage. The passage must be dated early. This is also 
shown by his use of the phrase ανάγκη κατά φικπν, where he later 
uses the phrase το άναγκαΐον άττλως (Part An. I, i, 639 b 24, Phys. II, 
ix, 199 b35).5 6 
Aristotle refers to necessity in accordance with (material) nature 
and force as the two known types of necessity in Part. An. I, i and 
5 2
 Cf NE III, ι, 12, 1110 b 15-17, Phys VIII, ív, 255 b 5-24 and infra p. 141 n 35 
Cf HAPP, Hyle 767, who concludes "Die Hyle ist also Ursache der Kontingenz alles 
Sublimaren " 
53
 Phys II, vu, 198 a 22-24, Met H(VIII), ¡v, 1044 a 32 - 1044 b 1 
M
 De Gen An II, i, 731 b 20-24. FREDE, The limits of determinism 218 has not 
noticed that βια falls under absolute necessity 
5 5
 APo II, xi, 94 b 27 - 95 a 9 This passage is examined supra pp 81-2 with n 25, 
ρ 105 with n 14 and this chapter nn 14 and 45 
5 6
 BARNES, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 221-2 also remarks that APo II, xi 
contains one of the earliest notes on the problem of the compatibility of different 
types of explanation 
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then introduces hypothetical necessity as a third (new) type of 
necessity, which he proceeds to describe.57 
(ix) The coincidence of hypothetical and absolute necessity 
It has been held that absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity 
are incompatible and that Aristotle subsumes absolute necessity under 
hypothetical necessity in nature.58 This is not, however, an accurate 
statement of Aristotle's view, since for him there is no incompatibility 
between the two approaches, which he views as complementary, as 
will be seen. 
In APo II, xi Aristotle states the principle that "the same effect 
may obtain both for a purpose and due to necessity."59 Late in his 
career we read similarly how he criticises Democritus for reducing the 
cause of everything used by Nature exclusively to absolute necessity 
(the material and efficient causes) and states that such things, while 
they are necessary by absolute necessity, are also for some purpose, 
i.e. are determined by hypothetical necessity.60 He also gives many 
examples in the area of nature where hypothetical necessity coincides 
in effect with material necessity. Thus in his discussion of horns in 
Part.An. Aristotle states that deer lose their horns by hypothetical 
necessity, where the aim of extra lightness necessitates the means of 
losing the horns. But they also lose their horns by material necessity 
because they are too heavy (i.e. deer lose their horns for the same 
57
 Part.An. 1, i, 642 a 1-13. BALME, De Partibus Animalium /...80 (also p.100, 
which COOPER, Hypothetical necessity...,259 n.19 incorrectly contests) and id. 
Teleology...285 has noted that Aristotle appears to correct APo 94 b 37 at Part.An. 
642 a 5. 
58
 BALME, De Partibus Animalium /...76-84; followed by BARNES, Aristotle's 
Posterior Analytics...222; PREUS, Aristotle's biological works...chA; cf. WEISS, 
Kausalität und Zufall...75-93. 
59
 APo II, xi, 94 b 27-28. This passage is examined supra pp. 81-2 with n.25. 
60
 De Gen An. V, viii, 789 b 2-8. He refers to absolute necessity as άΐ'άγκη (789 b 
3), as is clear from the contrast with hypothetical necessity, and he refers to the two 
subdivisions of absolute necessity, the efficient and material causes, in 789 b 7-8: 
ταύτα δ' ώς κινουιτα και ώς όργανα και ώς ϋλη αϊτια. The efficient cause for 
Democritus corresponds to Aristotle's βία. 
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reason as a stone falls to the ground, namely because it follows from 
their material nature that they must act in this way).61 Aristotle 
explicitly undertakes to explain horns both from the standpoint of 
hypothetical necessity and from that of absolute necessity. Having 
dealt with hypothetical necessity he writes the following: 
This completes our statement of the purpose for which homs exist and the 
reason why some animals have them and others do not. Let us now state 
how nature according to the logos made use for a purpose of the necessary 
nature pertaining to things necessarily62 
From this passage it appears that horns are necessary both by 
hypothetical necessity and by absolute or material necessity. The 
matter (necessity in accordance with (material) nature or material 
necessity) is used by the form (nature according to the logos).63 
A similar example is that of breathing: breathing is necessary by 
hypothetical necessity given the aim of living, but the process of 
admission and discharge of air is necessary by absolute necessity 
given the nature of breathing.64 Again, in the superlunary area, the 
absolute necessity by which the heavenly bodies move does not 
exclude the attribution of their movement at the same time to final 
causality. The absolute necessity by which the heavenly bodies move 
is due to the fact that aether is naturally in movement and naturally 
moves in circles65 and encounters no opposition in its movement. 
However, the Unmoved Mover also moves the heavenly bodies ώς 
ерыце о
 6 6
, i.e. by final causality.67 Given the goodness of the 
61
 Part An III, n,663bl2-14. 
62
 Part An III, и, 663 b 20-24 
63
 On necessity m accordance with nature in the sense of the absolute necessity 
following from the material nature cf supra §n and n.14 
6 4
 Part An I, i, 642 a 31 - b 4, for similar passages cf Part An II, xiv, 658 b 2-10; 
Part An IV, xi, 692 a 3-5, IV, xn, 694 a 22 - 694 b 9; De Gen An II, lv, 738 a 33 -
738 b 3, 739 b 26 - 30; De Gen An II, vi, 743 a 36 - 743 b 5, De Gen An III, iv, 755 
a 21 - 25, De Gen An IV, vi», 776 a 23-26, De Gen An V, in, 782 a 20-24, De 
Gen An V, vin, 789 a 9-12, cf De Resp xin, 477 a 25-26. 
6 5
 De Cael I, n, 269 a 5-7 
6 6
 Met Λ(ΧΙΙ), vu, 1072 b 3 BALME, Teleology 277 is doubtful whether there is 
teleology in the movement of the heavens and claims that, if there is, it has no 
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Unmoved Mover, they necessarily strive for it and move in a circle, 
i.e. by hypothetical necessity. 
The absolute necessity of the cyclical change of the elements into 
one another, e.g. of water into air and of air into water (cf. supra §ii) 
is also an imitation of the absolute necessity regulating the movement 
of the eternal heavenly bodies and is caused by final causality.68 
"Nature always strives for the better"69 The cycle of generation and 
decay is an imitation of the eternal.70 
Aristotle even goes so far as to interpret the absolute necessity 
(necessity arising from the material nature) by which inanimate 
beings move to their natural place, e.g. by which a stone falls, as at 
the same time due to final causality, since he interprets motion in a 
straight line as being an imitation of cyclical movement and holds that 
the simple bodies in this way imitate the cyclical movement of the 
heavenly bodies.71 No doubt Aristotle has in mind Plato's view that 
time is an imitation of eternity.72 
connection with natural teleology on earth. However, the passage from Met. Λ re­
ferred to shows that this view is incorrect. 
6 7
 The ethereal bodies of the spheres to which the heavenly bodies are fixed are 
inhabited by souls. From Aristotle's text it is unclear whether the stars have souls 
separate from those of the spheres to which they are attached. Cf. HAPP, //y/e...495-6, 
499. However, if the stars did not have separate souls, their movement by final 
causality, which causes that of the spheres to which they are attached, would be 
unexplained. Cf. HAPP, Hyle...50Q: "Es besteht mithin zwischen der Natur des Äthers 
und dem Wollen der Sphärenseelen eine Art von prästabilierter Harmonie." 
68
 Gen.et Corr. II, x, 337 a 3-4: μιμείται την κύκλω φοράν; Meteor. Ι, ix, 346 b 
35-36: γίγνεται δέ κύκλο? оитос μιμούμενος τον του ηλίου κύκλοι'; Met. Θ(ΙΧ), 
viii, 1050 b 28-29: μιμείται δε τα άφθαρτα καί τα έν μεταβολή όντα, οίον γη και 
πυρ. Cf. De Gen.An. II, i, 731 b 31 - 732 a Ι; De Gen.An. IV, χ, 777 b 16 - 778 a 9. 
Cf. HAPP, tfy/e...510-l. SOLMSEN, Aristotle's system..3SS interprets the term 
μιμείται as meaning the mere reflection (by efficient causality) of the absolute 
necessity of the movement of the heavenly bodies, i.e. he denies the action of final 
causality on becoming as a whole. But Aristotle's language and his method show 
Solmsen to be incorrect. 
6 9
 Gen. et Corr. II, x, 336 b 27-28. Cf. JOACHIM, Gen. et Corr. ...xxxviii. 
7 0
 Gen. et Corr. II, x, 336 b 31-34. 
7 1
 Gen. et Corr. II, x, 337 a 1-7. HAPP, Hyle...765 writes: "Die anorganischen 
Stoffe wirken ja mit ateleologischem Automatismus und Mechanismus ('absolute 
Notwendigkeit') und können deshalb als 'zielfreie Kräfte' (δυνάμεις άλογοι) 
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The student, according to Aristotle, must state both the material 
cause (absolute necessity) and the end (that which necessitates by 
hypothetical necessity).73 This is a fundamental aspect of Aristotle's 
method requiring careful attention. 
(x) Accidents occur by absolute and not by hypothetical necessity 
In De Gen. An. V, i, in his discussion of παθήματα, Aristotle states 
that whatever does not belong to the logos of a natural being or is not 
a proprium (ίδιον) does not have a purpose. For example, an animal 
has an eye by hypothetical necessity (given the aim of forming an 
animal, it will have to have an eye because it belongs to the logos or 
definition of an animal to have an eye). But the fact that the eye in 
question is blue or another colour is not for a purpose, i.e. Aristotle 
holds that a variable accident of purposeful development (natural 
substance) does not itself have a purpose. But the eye necessarily 
must be of some colour. He then states that this necessity is that of the 
material and efficient causes, i.e. is absolute necessity.74 
schlechthin bezeichnet werden." He has not observed the compatibility of absolute 
necessity and final causality in this context. 
7 2
 Cf. S. MANSION, Le jugement d'existence. ..318. 
7 3
 Phys. II, ix, 200 a 32-33. Cf. also last section (§viii) and nn. 53 and 54. 
7 4
 De Gen An. V, i, 778 a 16 - 778 b 19; V, viii, 789 b 18-20. Cf. HAPP, 
Hyle...757-8. Individuation, i.e. that which makes the individual an individual, is 
caused by the material cause. KULLMANN, Wissenschaft und Methode...294-6 holds 
incorrectly that the colour of the human eye is determined by a kind of second-rate 
hypothetical necessity, which he calls "accidental necessity" COOPER, Hypothetical 
necessity...253-4 has misunderstood the meaning of hypothetical necessity. He claims 
that only conditions sine qua non which are not part of the nature of the end to be 
attained are necessary by hypothetical necessity. Thus he claims that human beings do 
not require eyes by hypothetical necessity because having eyes is part of human 
nature, whereas he holds that human beings require eyelids by hypothetical necessity, 
because he claims that eyelids are not part of human nature. But Aristotle does not 
introduce a limitation of this kind on hypothetical necessity and specifically states that 
an animal has an eye by hypothetical necessity. Cooper, ibid., also does not give 
adequate evidence for his claim that "the hypothetical necessity of certain animal parts 
is thus to be sharply distinguished from the necessity of those other parts, the having 
of which is directly implied in the statement of the animal's essential nature." 
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Thus those aspects of the material cause (the matter) or of the 
operation of the efficient cause on the matter, where they do not 
contribute to the accomplishment of the form or final cause, are 
accidental to it. This, however, is not to say that they are a product of 
chance, as Piatt and Balme hold,75 since a chance event requires an 
unusual outcome and the appearance of purpose. But there is nothing 
unusual about blue eyes and Aristotle states explicitly that an accident 
of this kind has no purpose. 
Everything that occurs in the area of nature occurs for a purpose or 
is an accident ofthat which occurs for a purpose.76 In De Gen. An. IV, 
iii, in his discussion of the resemblance of offspring to parents and 
ancestors, Aristotle states that monstrosities are examples of an 
accident ofthat which occurs for a purpose: 
As for monstrosities, they are not necessary so far as the purposive or 
final cause is concerned [i.e. are not necessary by hypothetical 
necessity], yet per accidens they are necessary, since we must take it 
that their origin at any rate is located here [sc. in the final cause].77 
Here Aristotle states that the accidents of that which occurs for a 
purpose are necessary. Clearly this necessity is the same as that of the 
colour of a man's eyes, i.e. they are necessary by the material or 
efficient cause, i.e. by absolute necessity.78 
Monsters are not merely accidents, but are chance substances (cf. 
infra, Ch. 5(b)). Thus it is correct to say in the case of monsters that 
that which occurs by chance (given its unusualness and the 
appearance of purpose) is nonetheless necessary by absolute necessity 
if one examines merely the material and efficient causes. In the case 
7 5
 PLATT, De Gen.An....n.2 ad 778 b 14; BALME, Greek Science... 137. Cf. JUDSON, 
Chance...73 n.l. 
7 6
 De An. Ill, xii, 434 a 31-32. 
7 7
 De Gen.An. IV, iii, 767 b 13-15. 
7 8
 Aristotle makes it perfectly clear in Met. Д( ), ν and Part.An. I, i that there are 
no other kinds of necessity besides absolute necessity, hypothetical necessity and 
force (βία). 
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of monsters the efficient cause (the semen) necessarily fails to master 
the matter (the female cause) and this causes a monster.79 
Aristotle explicitly states that accidents ofthat which occurs for a 
purpose do not themselves have a purpose, even if Nature 
occasionally turns them to advantage.80 Thus he states that bile around 
the liver and the sediment produced in the stomach and the intestines 
serve no purpose (just as the colour of a man's eyes serves no 
purpose). The fact that Nature occasionally turns even residues to use 
and advantage is not a reason for trying to discover a purpose in all of 
them. Rather, he says, some things being for a purpose, numerous 
other things necessarily occur accidentally.81 
It is noteworthy that Aristotle places the colour of a man's eyes, 
bile around the liver and monstrosities all in the category of accidents 
of that which has a purpose, i.e. accidents arising from the 
development of natural substances. It is not difficult to see that the 
colour of a man's eyes is accidental in the metaphysical sense. 
However, the extension of the status of an accident to that which is a 
substance in its own right requires some explanation. Bile and 
monstrosities are to be viewed as accidents of the development of 
natural substances in the same way as falling into the hands of robbers 
or recovering a debt are accidents of a decision to go to the market-
place (this decision is viewed as a per se cause and as equivalent to a 
substance, as seen in chapter 1). 
It has been argued by Balme that material necessity falls under 
hypothetical necessity.82 Undoubtedly the material cause does fall 
19
 De Gen.An. IV, ¡ii, 767 b 22-23; Phys. II, viii, 199 b 6-7. For a detailed account 
of the causes of monsters cf. infra Ch.5 (b). 
80
 Thus KULLMANN, Wissenschaft und Methode..295 incorrectly seeks to reduce 
even accidents to a limited kind of hypothetical necessity. 
81
 Part.An. IV, ii, 677 a 11-19. For another passage where Nature makes use of a 
necessary outcome to serve a purpose cf. Part.An. IV, v, 679 a 25-30. 
82
 BALME, De Partibus Animalium /...pp.76-84, followed by STRIKER, 
Notwendigkeit met Lücken...161. Cf. pp. 81-2 where he writes: "Aristotle probably 
likes to distinguish properties necessary for the end from properties necessary because 
of the matter, because he wishes to distinguish proper characteristics from accidental 
characteristics. But this line is notoriously difficult, perhaps impossible, to draw. He 
often uses the expression 'necessary concomitants', which aptly describes them and 
120 NECESSITY AND CHANCE 
under the requirements of the hypothetical cause, as Aristotle himself 
says.83 However, those accidents that do not belong to the logos of a 
natural being or are not propria are not necessary by hypothetical, but 
merely by absolute necessity. Thus Balme claims incorrectly that all 
movements are due to the ultimate hypothetical necessity of the 
Unmoved Mover.84 While all natural substances are attracted by the 
goodness of the Unmoved Mover, nonetheless the movement of a 
stone, for example, where it is an accident caused by the movement of 
an animal, is not the outcome of hypothetical necessity. 
Balme argues that matter is not mere chaos (necessity), as it is for 
Plato, but is teleologically orientated towards the Prime Mover and 
hence that material necessity falls under absolute necessity. That is 
does not deny their ultimate hypothetical necessity The hypothesis which 
necessitates them is that natural ends are to come to be at all, this necessitates the very 
existence and properties of the elements Aristotle does not suggest (as Plato seems to 
in the Timaeus) that the elements are there first as a given, and that a teleological 
force then comes along and makes the best of them finality is present even in the 
elements (Meteor IV, 390 a 4, cf Met Λ 1075 a 19-22) " 
Balme had already expressed this standpoint in Greek Science 136 There he 
claims that even that which does not have a purpose in itself does have a purpose as a 
concomitant of that which has a purpose But that is not what Anstotle is saying 
Aristotle says that the colour of the eyes has no point in itself, not that the colour of 
the eyes serves a purpose because the eyes must have a colour and therefore the 
colour serves the purpose of making an eye The colour of the eye cannot be made 
equivalent to the matter from which the eye is made The matter of the eye does serve 
a purpose, but its colour does not The colour of the eye is an accident of the process 
towards the fulfilment of the goal of Nature, which is not the same as matter. 
BALME, Teleology 285 η 33 withdrew his view that all 'necessity' in living bodies 
could be subsumed under hypothetical necessity 
8 3
 Phys II, ix, 200 a 32-33, 200 b 7-8 εστί. γαρ και ci' τω λόγω êita μόρια ώ? 
ύλη του λογού COOPER, Hypothetical necessity 254 claims that the matter of the 
handle of a saw (which he considers to be non-essential) is not part of the definition, 
whereas the matter in the teeth of the saw (which he considers to be essential) is part 
of the definition However, Anstotle in 200 b 4-8 is certainly not distinguishing 
between certain kinds of matter which are part of the essence of an object and other 
kinds of matter which are not 
8 4
 Cf WIELAND, Die aristotelische Physik 263 "Auch daraus, daß das Telos der 
anderen Ursachen immer schon bedarf, läßt sich noch nicht ableiten, daß es selbst 
auch in einem höheren Sinn Ursache ist " The Thomist standpoint that the final cause 
is the cause of the other causes (In Phys II, 5, 11) is unaristotehan 
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undoubtedly true of matter qua matter, but not of matter qua the 
accidental characteristics of the matter used by a given form (final 
cause) in its ideological movement towards its end. Thus the given 
matter which a human being uses to develop into a human being leads 
to an eye turning out to be blue (or another colour) by absolute 
(material) necessity, because nothing in the matter's 'desire' 
(έφίεσθαι) for form (i.e. hypothetical necessity applying to matter 
qua matter)85 has any relation to the blue colour of an eye that 
develops from it due to its absorption by a human being. 
Again, while it may be necessary by absolute necessity that an eye 
will turn out to be blue if one knows that the matter that went to 
making that eye could only produce a blue eye, that is not what 
Aristotle is saying. Aristotle is saying that the blueness of an eye, 
because it is not related to the logos of a human being and is not a 
proprium, is therefore an accident from the point of view of the final 
cause (the logos). Aristotle is therefore making the metaphysical and 
logical statement that an accident cannot serve a purpose and can 
therefore only be necessary by absolute necessity. 
It follows, therefore, that the material cause, while it is subordinate 
to the final cause (200 a 32-34) qua achievement of ends, is not 
subordinate to it qua accidental outcomes resultant from the 
movement towards ends. This fact will be seen to be of fundamental 
importance in the Conclusion, as it is one of the foundations upon 
which Aristotle bases his rejection of determinism. 
(xi) There is no science of the unusual accident 
In Met. E(VI), ii Aristotle examines the nature of the unusual 
accident (το κατά συμβεβηκός) and the reason for its existence and 
explains why there is no science of it. He also gives a briefer account 
of the topic in Met. K(XI), viii, 1064 b 32 - 1065 a 6 and Met. Д( ), 
xxx (cf. supra Ch. 1 §viii). 
On the desire of matter for form (Phys. I, ix, 192 a 16-23) cf. Conclusion pp. 
255-6 and p. 154 with n. 86. 
122 NECESSITY AND CHANCE 
It is clear from 1026 b 27-33 that Aristotle is not writing in this 
chapter about 'the accidental' in general, as Ross and Tredennick 
presume, but about 'the unusual accident'.86 Aristotle distinguishes 
the unusual accident (το κατά συμβεβηκος·) and the accidental in 
general (which falls under τα σχήματα ττ\ς κατηγορία?) at the start 
of the chapter. It is clear that there are numerous accidents which are 
by no means unusual, e.g. the fact that someone has blue eyes. But 
Aristotle restricts the topic of the chapter (το συμβοβηκό?) to that 
which occurs neither always nor usually, i.e. the unusual accident. 
In this chapter Aristotle is concerned with the unusual accident 
qua unusual accident. In a dialectical introduction to the topic he 
rightly states that there can be no science of unusual accidents qua 
unusual accidents, since the number of accidents that coincide with 
any substance or action are infinite in number. Thus the relation of a 
house to every other substance in the universe is an accident and is 
not considered by a builder, nor is the subjective effect on everyone 
who enters the house (agreeable, injurious, beneficial etc.) a matter 
which the builder can consider.87 
Having listed the various other indications as to why there can be 
no science of the unusual accident, Aristotle states that it is his 
intention to explain the nature of the unusual accident (του 
συμβεβηκότος·) and for what reason (δια τίν ' αί,τί,αν) it exists.88 This, 
he says, will no doubt provide the (profound) reason why there is no 
science of it. 
KtRWAN, Metaphysics, is closer to the truth in holding that the chapter is about 
the 'coincidental' - but this is also not accurate, since coincidences are chance events, 
and Aristotle's unusual accidents are not all coincidences, since they are not all 
meaningful, e g the pale musician (Δ xxx 102S a 19-20) or the musical pale man (E u 
1027 a 11) 
8 7
 Met E(VI), ii, 1026 b 6-10 KlRWAN, Metaphysics.. 190 accuses Aristotle of 
"entirely" failing to show that no study deals with what is coincidental to a house. In 
fact Kirwan does not see that Aristotle is speaking of the coincidental qua 
coincidental and would never deny that there was a study of any aspect of a house as 
such Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 358 provides the correct solution to the 
apparent equivalence of 'triangle' and 'triangle with angles equal to two right angles' 
8 8
 Met E(VI), и, 1026 b 24-26 The term αίτια can best be translated here by 
'reason' and not by 'cause' 
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Among existing things there are some that are invariable and of 
necessity and others that are neither invariable nor of necessity, but 
usual, and this is the source of (αρχή) and reason for (αίτια) the 
existence of the unusual accident (του εΐναι το συμβεβηκός). If 
there were no unusual occurrences (accidents), everything would be 
of necessity.90 Among other examples of unusual accidents he cites 
the rare occurrence of stormy and cold weather in the dog-days.91 
Of things that are or occur by accident the cause is also 
accidental.92 This is an abbreviated way of stating what was seen 
above in Ch. 1, §viii-ix: the cause of the accident by which a man e.g. 
recovered his debt was his decision to go to the market-place, which 
coincided with the category of the right place (the place where his 
debtor was). 
Aristotle states that the cause of the unusual accident is the matter 
(ϋλη), which admits of variation from the usual.93 Thus the matter of a 
dog-day94 is said to vary and occasionally to permit the coincidence of 
stormy and cold weather. Likewise the matter of a man would permit 
him to be fair-skinned exceptionally, or the matter of a builder would 
enable him exceptionally to be a doctor as well. This is an extended 
use of matter analogous to the matter that is the partial cause of 
monsters ,95 
8 9
 Mei E(VI),ii, 1026 b 27-31. 
9 0
 Met E(VI), ii, 1027 a 12-13. 
9 1
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1026 b 33-34. He gives a similar example in Phys. II, viii, 199 a 
1-2. 
9 2
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1027 a 7-8. 
9 3
 Met E(VI), ii, 1027 a 13-15. HAPP, Hyle...759 uses this passage to support the 
following statement: "Von der Art-Form aus gesehen ist eben alles Individuelle 
genauso 'akzidentell' (συμβεβηκό?) wie jede beliebige 'unwesentliche' Eigenschaft" 
This interpretation of all individuals as accidental to essences is Platonic and 
unAristotelian. For Aristotle it is clear that it cannot be the form that is cause of the 
unusual accident and therefore that it must be the matter. But this does not make all 
individuals accidents of Platonic Forms. 
9 4
 Cf. K.IRWAN, Metaphysics...\94, who states that the "matter" of a state of affairs 
is the kind of thing it is, by which he presumably means that in the nature which 
enables it to change and have accidents. 
9 5
 On monsters cf. infra Ch. 5(b). For Aristotle's gradual extension of his 
metaphysical theory cf. infra Ch.7(b) p.226 on MM II, viii and Conclusion (a), p.239. 
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Aristotle then gives the reason why there is no science of the 
unusual accident, namely because all science is of the unchangeable 
or the usual. There is no other way that knowledge can be acquired or 
taught. If it is objected that one can say that honey-water is beneficial 
as a remedy for fever except at the new moon, the objection does not 
hold, because the exception also obeys the rule of 'always or usually 
at the new moon'.96 The unusual (as such) obeys no rule and therefore 
cannot be studied scientifically.97 
It was seen in the last section that a variable accident of a 
purposeful development (natural substance) does not itself have a 
purpose, e.g. blue (or brown) eyes. It was recalled in this section that 
there is only a science of that which is invariable or at least usual. It 
may be added that science is always for a purpose and hence that 
there is a second reason why there is no science of variable accidents, 
namely because the accidental qua accidental does not serve a 
purpose. 
Needless to say, the material and efficient necessity of the 
accidental (e.g. the fact that an eye must have a colour) must not be 
confused with the unusual nature (i.e. the absence of necessity) of the 
coincidental. 
(xii) Necessity in relation to man 
In this section a very brief account will be given of the meaning of 
necessity in relation to man, from which it will be apparent that 
chance does not fall under ανάγκη. 
In his discussion of the motives of wrongdoers (Rhet. I, x-xi) 
Aristotle deals with the sources of all human action: 
JUDSON, Chance...89 misses this point. Cf. also infra Ch.5(d) on the parallel 
between chance events and chance substances. 
9 7
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1027 a 20-26; cf. ЕЕ IV (= NE V), xi, 8, 1138 a 35 - 1138 b 5. 
Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics..λ, 361 claims incorrectly that Aristotle in this passage 
of Met. admits that coincidences are merely beyond our present knowledge. Aristotle 
does precisely the opposite by stating that coincidences by definition can never be the 
object of scientific knowledge. 
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Now all human actions are either the result of man's efforts or not. Of the 
latter some are due to chance (δια τύχην), others to necessity (έξ 
ανάγκη?). Ofthose due to necessity (των δ' έξ ανάγκη?), some are to be 
attributed to compulsion (τα μεν βία), others to nature (та бе φύσει), so 
that the things that men do not do of themselves are all the result of 
chance (από τύχη?), nature (τα δε φύσει), or compulsion (τα δε βία).98 
The doctrine of this passage may be schematized as follows: 
human action 
у man's efforts 
(δι ' αυτούς) 
(=VOÜC) 
by chance 
(δια τύχην) 
not by man's 
efforts 
(μη δι ' αυτού?) 
by necessity 
(έξ ανάγκης) 
by by nature 
compulsion (φύσει) 
(βί<?) 
Thus in this passage Aristotle states that the source of human 
actions that are necessary is to be subdivided into nature and 
compulsion. Compulsion means when a man acts contrary to his 
desire or calculation." 
In De Philos. Fr.21 W (= Cic. DNDII, xvi, 44) we read: 
Nee vero Aristoteles non laudandus est in eo quod omnia quae moventur 
aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut volúntate. 
Here "natura" is the translation of φύσει. By "vi" we should 
understand βία, which is counter-natural ανάγκη. Finally, "volúntate" 
refers to the area of human free choice. The list of agents given here 
98
 Rhet. I, x, 1368 b 32-37. On this passage cf. WöRNER, Das Ethische in der 
Rhetorik...**, 244-5. 
99
 Rhet. I, x, 1369 b 5 παρ' έπιθυμίαν ή TOÙÇ λογισμούς; ЕЕ II, viii, 7, 1224 а 33-
36 and ЕЕ II, viii passim; Met. Д( ), ν, 1015 a 27: παρά την όρμήν και την προ-
αίρεσιν. 
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is limited to substances and hence does not include chance, which is a 
non-substantial cause. 
In NE III, iii, in his discussion of deliberation, Aristotle writes: 
We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by 
action; and these are in fact what is left. For the causes are generally 
considered to be nature (φύσις), necessity (ανάγκη) and chance (τύχη), 
furthermore intellect (νους) and human agency generally.100 
From this passage and from other similar passages (cf. the schema 
above) it would appear that necessity (ανάγκη) in relation to human 
action is to be taken as referring both to nature (φύσις) itself as well 
as to compulsion (βία).101 
The aim of this section was merely to show that ανάγκη in relation 
to man does not include chance. The topic will not be investigated 
further here.102 In part (a) of this chapter Aristotle's doctrine of 
necessity was examined with a view to clarifying the concept. This 
examination was conducted at some length due to the importance and 
complexity of the topic, as well as with a view to preparing the way 
for a comparison of the term ανάγκη with chance, a task which will 
be undertaken in part (b). The importance of the topic of necessity 
will be seen further in the Conclusion, where it will appear that 
Aristotle rejects determinism on the basis of his metaphysical analysis 
of necessity. 
(b) Necessity and chance 
In Chapter 1 it was seen that for Aristotle chance and necessity are 
mutually exclusive concepts, since that which occurs by chance 
occurs unusually, whereas that which occurs of necessity occurs 
always. In part (a) of this chapter his theory of necessity was 
examined. In part (b) of this chapter the aim will be to contrast 
1 0 0
 NE III, iii, 7, 1112 a 30-33, passage dealt with supra Ch.3(a). 
101
 Cf. APo II, xi, 94 b 27 - 95 a 9, passage dealt with supra Ch. 3(a), also this 
chapter n.14; Protrep. В 11 During, passage dealt with supra Ch. 3(a). Cf. STEWART, 
NE...I, 256-9. 
1 0 2
 For a detailed study of this topic cf. SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame... and 
MEYER, Aristotle on moral responsibility, Ch.4. 
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Aristotle's concept of chance with that of his predecessors, for whom 
chance and necessity are not incompatible. An attempt will be made 
to determine Aristotle's precise criticism of these predecessors. 
All ancient Greek philosophers saw the universe as necessary in 
the sense that it had always existed and had no origin.'03 But the 
major point on which Aristotle differed from his predecessors was the 
extent to which he admitted necessity in occurrences within the 
universe. 
For Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus and doubt­
less other preSocratics everything in the universe - certainly in the 
area of physics104 - takes place necessarily.105 It is untrue, however, 
that they gave no other explanation. Indeed Aristotle states in Phys. II, 
iv that they adduced nature (φύσι?)106 or intellect (voûç) or some 
There exists, however, the incongruency of Epicurus' view (which differs from 
that of Democritus, cf. BAILEY, The Greek Atomists...3\\) that "originally" atoms 
rained down in straight lines through the void (cf. esp. Lucr. DRN II, 216-224). The 
notion of a beginning of the genesis, though not of the being of the universe is 
implicit in this atomist theory. Likewise, Anaxagoras held that all things were together 
for an infinite time before l'oûç set them in motion and divided them (Phys. VIH, i, 
250 b 24-26; De Gael. Ill, ii. 301 a 11-13). Disordered nature also existed for an 
indefinite time before Plato's Demiurge reduced it to order (Tim. 29 d - 30 b, 37 с -
38 b and ARCHER-HrND, The Timaeus ... 118-122; cf. De Cael. Ill, ii, 300 Ы6-18. 
104
 Heraclitus has an ethics and seems to believe in the immortality of the soul. 
Likewise Empedocles believed in asceticism to secure the immortality of the soul. 
Such theories do not square with a determinist position in regard to human beings. 
Anaxagoras, however, seems not to have believed in the immortality of the soul. It is 
of course questionable whether or to what extent any preSocratic explicitly considered 
human actions to be necessary. Cf. HAMELIN, Sur le De Fato...36. The incompatibility 
of an ethics with a determinist position, such as that of Democritus and the Stoa, is a 
well-known anomaly in the determinist position. 
105
 Phys. II, viii, 198 b 10-16; Phys. VIII, i, 252 a 5-11; Met. B(III), iv, 1000 b 15-
17 and REALE, La Metafìsica...1, 280 n.28; Cicero, De Fato 17, 39. The inclusion of 
Aristotle on a list of determinists in this passage of Cicero is anomalous (cf. DK 68 
A66 and HAMELIN, Sur le De Fato...l6). 
106
 The listing of nature beside intellect in 196 a 30 seems incongruous, as the 
necessity meant by the preSocratics is a necessity inherent in nature (Aristotle's 
simple necessity), i.e. inherent in the constituent elements of the universe. Cf. 
GUTHRIE, A History...11, 165 and 417. Intellect (Anaxagoras' Intellect), however, is to 
be viewed as an efficient cause (in Aristotle's terms). Cf. Met. A(I), iii, 984 b 15-22; 
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similar cause for [sc. the order in] animals and plants. However, 
they only touched on other efficient causes, such as intellect or love 
and hate108 and did not deal with them adequately. The ancient 
philosophers of nature were only aware of the material and efficient 
causes and did not consider formal and final causes.109 In particular, 
they failed to account for final causes, which are required to explain 
that which occurs necessarily. Aristotle also states that none of the 
philosophers of the past believed that anything occurred due to 
chance"0 in the sense of chance as an efficient cause. He says that the 
philosophers of the past did not equate chance with any of the causes 
they recognized, love or strife (Empedocles), or mind (Anaxagoras) or 
fire (Heraclitus) or the like.1" These causes are to be equated with 
necessity, not chance. 
Chance, when understood in a given - non-Aristotelian - sense, is 
not, however, incompatible with necessity. The tragedians, for 
example, referred to 'necessary chance', meaning that which was 
fated to occur, i.e. must necessarily occur, but yet was unforeseen or 
unpredictible.112 A similar expression is found in a well-known 
passage of Leg. X, where Plato argues against unspecified thinkers 
who wish to reduce all causality to φύσις, τύχη and τέχνη" 3 : 
Fire and water and earth and air all exist by nature (фиаеі) and by chance 
(τύχη), they say, and none of them by art (τέχι/η). And in regard to the 
A(I), iv, 985 a 18-20; Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), χ, 1075 b 8. Heraclitus' fire is listed in 196 a 18 
beside Empedocles' Love and Strife and Anaxagoras' Intellect. Here fire is not merely 
a material cause, but the logos of the universe, comparable to Empedocles' Love and 
Strife, which were both material and efficient causes (Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), χ, 1075 b 1-4), but 
unlike Anaxagoras' Intellect, which is an efficient cause distinct from the material 
cause. 
m
 Phys. II, iv, 196 a 28-33. 
1 0 8
 Phys. II, viii. 198 b 14-16. Cf. COULOUBARITSIS, Sur la Nature...\37. Aristotle 
holds that none of his predecessors, including Socrates and Plato, dealt adequately 
with the efficient cause: Gen.et Corr. II. ix, 335 b 7-10. 
1 0 9
 De Gen.An. V, i, 778 b 7-10; Part.An. I, i, 640 b 4-11. 
U0Phys. II, iv, 196 a 8-11. 
niPhys. II, iv, 196 a 17-19. 
1 1 2
 Soph. EI. 48 αναγκαία τύχη; Aj. 485; Eur. I.A. 511; Aesch. Ag. 1042. 
m
 This theory is attributed by Bury to Archelaus, by Dies to Prodicus and by 
SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame..ЛИ to Empedocles. 
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bodies that come after these, the earth, the sun, the moon and the stars, 
they hold that they come into existence through the former, although these 
are entirely inanimate. It is by chance (τύχη) all these elements move, 
according to their respective tendencies, and according as they meet 
together and combine fittingly, - hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with 
hard, and all such necessary (έξ ανάγκη?) mixtures as result from the 
chance (κατά τύχην) combination of these opposites - in this way and by 
these means engendered the whole heaven and all that is in the heaven, 
and all animals and plants as well, all seasons then being engendered from 
these elements; and all this, as they assert, not due to intellect (δια νουν) 
nor to any god or art (ουδέ δια τίνα ео ουδέ δια τέχνην), but, as we 
have said, by nature (φύσει) and chance (τύχη)."4 
In this passage Plato refers to necessary (έξ ανάγκη?) mixtures 
resulting from the chance (κατά τύχην) combination of opposites, 
thereby showing that for the thinkers in question - if not also in his 
own eyes - a necessary occurrence could also be regarded as a chance 
occurrence, in the sense of a random (i.e. unforeseen or unpredict­
able) occurrence. 
It would appear that Anaxagoras held a similar view, namely that 
"nothing comes about by fate [the Stoic term ειμαρμένη here 
hopefully refers to Anaxagoras' term, which would have been 
ανάγκη], but that the term is empty of meaning", i.e. everything 
occurs by necessity. At the same time "Anaxagoras said that there is 
no providence whatever of the gods for humans, but that all human 
events [i.e. events concerning man] come about by chance (τύχη)." 1 1 5 
Here too chance and necessity are perfectly compatible, because that 
which comes about necessarily is unforeseen and unpredictable.116 
In the Timaeus necessity and chance are also inherent in the 
material cause (matter or chaos) with which the Demiurge has to 
work. Reason (the Demiurge) has to prevail over Necessity (the 
resistance to order in matter).1 1 7 Reason cannot, however, fully prevail 
114
 ¿eg. X, 889 b-c. 
115
 DK 59 A 66. 
116
 Anaxagoras' Nous was responsible only for the initial start of movement in the 
cosmos. Cf. Simpl. In Phys. 177.9; Plat. Phaedo 97 с - 99 a. 
117
 Tim. 47 e -48 a. 
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over Necessity, and the outcome is chance results, without order, 
which just happen ш Matter is necessarily opposed to Reason and the 
outcome is frequently a chance occurrence."9 
Thus chance in current Greek usage, i.e. in a prephilosophical 
sense, refers, as Aristotle points out, to that which is unforeseen or 
unpredictable, and it may be applied, as seen above, to occurrences 
that are also viewed as necessary. 
Aristotle attests that none of the philosophers of the past believed 
that anything occurred due to chance in the sense of an efficient 
cause,
120
 and none of them discussed chance as a fundamental cause 
of generation and corruption Aristotle criticises them for either 
thinking there was no such thing as chance (in Aristotle's own sense, 
i.e a statement of a particular kind of causal relation) or for not 
analysing it and for leaving it aside, if they did realise there was such 
a concept.121 He then attacks Empedocles and Democntus in 
particular for using the concept of chance without clarifying its 
meaning and for applying it to the movement of air and the origins of 
the parts of animals (in Empedocles' case) and for using it to explain 
the heavens (in Democntus' case).122 
In the case of Empedocles there is no reason to suppose that 
chance had any further implication than the prephilosophical sense 
1 1 8
 Tim 46 e Хектеа μεν αμφότερα τα τώΐ' αιτιών γένη, χωρίς δε οσαι μετά νου 
καλών και αγαθών δημιουργοί και οσαι μονωθεισαι φρονήσεω? το τυχοι ατακτον 
εκάστοτε εξεργα£οιται 
1 1 9
 It may be noted that Plato's material chaos moved by a mindless inner necessity 
closely resembles Democntus' world-view 
1 2 0
 The personification of 'Ανάγκη in Empedocles is not to be taken as implying 
that Empedocles believed in necessity as a personal force or efficient cause Cf 
GUTHRIE, A History 11,163 For 'Ανάγκη in Parmenides cf GUTHRIE, A History II, 
34-7 
1 2 1
 Phys II, iv, 196 a 19-20 Clearly Aristotle cannot be criticising the preSocratics 
for thinking that chance was not an efficient cause, since he himself also does not 
believe that chance is an efficient cause 
1 2 2
 Phys II, iv, 196 a 19-28, Cicero, De Natura Deorum 2 37 93-95 Cf Gen et 
Corr II, vi, 334 a 1-2 For further criticism of Empedocles cf Part An Ι, ι, 640 a 10 -
640 b 4, where Aristotle criticises him for failure to use the final cause 
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referred to above.123 The use of chance by Democritus, however, 
seems to have further implications of a philosophical nature. 
It is well-known that Democritus explicitly held that everything in 
the universe occurs necessarily.124 At the same time Aristotle attests 
indisputably that Democritus (and others) held the cause of the 
heavens to be chance.125 Bailey and Guthrie argue that for Democritus 
all events are attributable to necessary causes, and that his 
simultaneous attribution of events to chance meant only that the 
origin of such events was due to a nexus of necessary causes so 
complex that it was beyond human powers to comprehend it.126 
However, it is attested by Simplicius that Democritus did not apply 
the term chance to any occurrences except the formation of worlds, 
and there is no other evidence that he did so. It is possible that the use 
of chance by Democritus in regard to the formation of worlds may 
refer to the unforeseen or unpredictable character of the matter that 
goes to make up a given world or to the unforeseen or unpredictable 
time or place of occurrence of a world. By using the term 'chance' he 
certainly did not intend to take from the necessity with which 
everything occurs in the heavens.127 But it also seems likely that he 
intended to deny a non-physical or final cause of the order in the 
heavens, i.e. to deny a cause exterior to the necessary nexus of 
occurrences.
128
 According to Aristotle he denied that there is the same 
kind of causality in the heavens as there is in animals and plants.129 
1 2 3
 On chance in Empedocles cf. GUTHRIE, A History...\\, 159-164. 
124
 De Gen.An. V, viii, 789 b 2-5; Diog. Laert. ix, 45; SIMPLICIUS, In Phys. 330, 
14-20: το δε καθάπερ ό παλαιός λόγο? ό άναιρών την τύχην προς Δημόκριτοί' 
έοικεν είρήσθαι· εκείνος γαρ καν ér τη κοσμοποιία е&жеі. τη τύχη κεχρήσθαι, 
αλλ' év τόίς μερικωτέροις ούδενός φησιν είναι την τύχην αίτίαν αναφερών εις 
άλλα? αιτίας, οίον του θησαυροί' εΰρειν το σκάπτειν ή την φυτείαν της· έλαίας, 
τοίι δε καταγήναι του φαλακρού το κρανίον τον άετόν ρίψαντα την χελώιτιν, όπως 
το χελώνιον ραγή· οϋτω? γαρ ό Εύδημος 'ιστορεί. 
125
 Phys. II, iv, 196 a 24 - 196 b 5; Part.An. I, i, 641 b 20-23. 
1 2 6
 BAILEY, The Greek /í/omútó... 138-143, GUTHRIE, A History... II, 417-9. 
127
 Cf. Diog. Laert. ix, 45. 
128
 ROSS, Aristotle's Physics...5\5. BAILEY, The Greek Atomists ...138-143 also 
puts forward this view. 
129
 Phys. II, iv, 196 a 33-35. 
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The denial of a non-physical or final cause or of any cause of the 
formation of worlds must in the final analysis be a reaction to the 
psychological unexpectedness of the order in the heavens.130 
Aristotle opposes in particular the attribution by Democritus of the 
formation of the heavens to chance, because there is regularity in the 
heavens.131 Aristotle maintains the principle that that which occurs 
always in the same way occurs by necessity.132 But that which occurs 
always and by necessity (έξ ανάγκης) or usually in the same way 
does not occur by chance, since this would be contrary to the use of 
the term 'chance' in day-to-day language.133 Chance refers to the 
psychological unexpectedness of an unusual and yet meaningful 
event. Democritus attributed the order in the universe to chance 
because it is so remarkable and unexpected that it requires an 
explanation, but he has no other explanation to offer.134 Aristotle is 
also of the view that the order in the universe is astonishing,133 but 
believes he has found a much more worthy, substantial and solid 
explanation in the form of final causality by the Unmoved Mover.136 
Aristotle criticised his predecessors, Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras137 and doubtless the other preSocratics, who explained 
nature by means of "absolute necessity" (το δ' έξ ανάγκη? άττλώ?) as 
opposed to "hypothetical necessity" (το δ' έξ ανάγκη? έξ υπο­
θέσεως).138 Under the heading of absolute necessity comes the 
material cause, e.g. the stones, earth and posts which are necessary to 
13
 Cf. Aët. 1.29.7 (DK 59 A66) ΆΐΌξαγόρας και Δημόκριτος και οι Στωικοί 
άδηλοι' αϊτίαν άνθρωπίνω λογισμω. 
131
 Phys. II, iv, 196 b 2-3: ορώντας· έι> μεν τφ ούραΐ'ώ ουδέν από ταύτομάτου 
γιγνόμενον. 
132
 Phys. II, ν, 196 b 20, 197 a l . 
1 3 3
 Phys. II, ν, 196 b 10-13; II, viii, 199 b 24-5; De Gael. II, ν, 287 b 24-25. 
1 3 4
 Cf. my article De invloed van het begrip toeval bij Aristoteles op het 
godsbewijs vanuit de orde in het heelal...99-\02. 
1 3 5
 This is clear e.g. from the fact that he admits with Democritus: ώστ' ei οτι 
μάλιστα του ούραΐ'οΟ αίτιοι1 το αυτόματοι' (Phys. II, vi, 198 a 10-11). 
1 3 6
 Phys. II, vi, 198 a 11-13: ανάγκη πρότεροι- voûv α'ίτιον και φύσιν είναι και 
άλλων πολλών και τούδε του παιτός. Cf. supra Ch.l §xviii. 
1 3 7
 ROSS, Aristotle's Physics...53l. 
1 3 8
 Phys. II, ¡χ, 199 b 34-5. 
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make a city wall or the iron necessary to make a saw.139 While the 
material cause is necessary, in the sense that one cannot build a city-
wall without stones, earth and posts, or make a saw without iron, the 
material cause does not explain a natural object or artefact adequately, 
since one can have stones, earth, posts and iron without having a city-
wall or a saw. In explaining nature Aristotle, on the contrary, gave 
priority to "hypothetical necessity", the term he invented to refer to 
necessity in function of an end: given the end, the means follow 
necessarily. Given that a house is to be built, bricks and stones are 
required.140 
Aristotle disagrees fundamentally with Empedocles, Anaxagoras 
and the other preSocratics on the kind of necessity found in nature. 
The latter held "simple necessity", i.e. the necessity of the material 
cause, to be an adequate explanation, whereas Aristotle held simple 
necessity to be inadequate and considered "hypothetical necessity", 
namely the necessity of the aim or end, to be indispensable and prior 
to simple necessity. 
Just as Democritus held that the order in the heavens came about 
by chance (necessarily, but without a purpose, and with a degree of 
order contrary to expectation), so too Empedocles held that 
everything in nature came about by chance, i.e. by coincidence 
(necessarily,1'" but without a purpose, and with a degree of order 
contrary to expectation). Empedocles held that that which was well 
adapted in nature survived. Aristotle argues against Empedocles in the 
same way that he argued against Democritus' view of the order in the 
heavens. For Aristotle order is the partly necessary and partly usual 
state of the universe, and hence he denied that the order in the 
universe occurred by chance and attributed it to nature. 
Thus in Aristotle's view, which is contrary to that of Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato and common Greek usage, the 
necessary or usual and chance are incompatible opposites. For 
Aristotle the necessary or usual implies an order which is 
mPhys. II, ix, 199 b 35-200 a 15. 
140
 Phys. II, ix, 200 a 15 - 200 b 4. 
141
 Phys. II, viii, 198 b 16-32. 
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irreconcileable with chance, since chance presupposes that which 
occurs contrary to a given order (i.e. the unusual and unexpected), 
which must also be meaningful to man (relevant to man's aim in life). 
For Aristotle the necessary or usual requires a substantial and 
worthy explanation not given in the term 'chance', which amounts to 
unexpected material necessity for his predecessors. The necessary or 
usual requires an explanation because it is unexpected. The order in 
the universe is unexpected because nature acts as if it were intelligent, 
although it is not intelligent. Just as human intellect sets itself goals 
which are envisaged as good and aims at achieving such goals, so too 
nature appears to set itself goals and to act in function of them, 
although it is unintelligent. It is for this reason that the order in the 
universe is surprising and requires an explanation. This is the account 
taken over by Thomas Aquinas in his quinta via. If one examines a 
watch one must conclude that it is attributable only to human 
intelligence. Hence Paley concluded from the apparently intelligent 
behaviour of unintelligent nature that there must be a universal 
Watchmaker. Aristotle concludes that the necessary or usual 
movement in Nature is explicable only by the final causality of the 
Unmoved Mover, i.e. that everything in the universe strives for the 
eternity, εντελέχεια and ενέργεια of the Unmoved Mover. Nature 
moves, therefore, fundamentally by hypothetical necessity: given the 
end of everything in the Universe, namely the Unmoved Mover, its 
movement follows necessarily. In the Conclusion §(cXii) the causes 
of the limitations of the action of hypothetical necessity on the 
sublunar world will be examined. 
In this section Aristotle's concept of chance was contrasted with 
his view of necessity. It was seen that Aristotle diverged radically 
from his predecessors by viewing chance and necessity as 
irreconcilable. Unlike his predecessors Aristotle attributed necessity 
or the usual in nature to hypothetical necessity rather than to a chance 
formation occurring by material necessity. The argument he put 
forward for associating chance with final causality rather than 
material necessity will be held in the Conclusion to be a lasting 
contribution to philosophical and scientific thought. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CAUSES OF THAT WHICH OCCURS BY CHANCE 
In this chapter the aim will be to examine the kinds of cause at 
work in chance events and chance substances. Chance events will be 
dealt with in section (a). The two kinds of chance substance are 
monsters and spontaneously generated organisms. These will be 
examined in sections (b) and (c) respectively. An attempt will then be 
made in section (d) to see whether the causes at work in chance events 
and in chance substances can be viewed as parallel and compatible. 
(a) Chance events 
In his Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne A. Mansion 
speaks of "la réalité causale du hasard"1 This expression is deceptive 
in that it gives the impression that chance itself is something (some 
substance) and that it is an efficient cause. In fact chance itself is non-
substantial, and one can only speak of a substantial or per se cause 
that causes that thing (event) which occurs by chance. 
It has been seen that chance is not a per se, but an accidental cause 
(αιτία κατά συμβεβηκός, 197 a 5-6, 33) in the area ofthat which is 
for a purpose.2 In the area of τύχη (as expressed in Phys. II, vi) 
chance means an unexpected event (i.e. one which appears to be for a 
purpose), which occurs as a by-product of a free act.3 As chance itself 
is not a substance it cannot be classified under any of Aristotle's four 
causes. The per se cause of the chance event is, then, the decision by 
the person to perform the free act which led to the chance event.4 A 
1
 A. MANSION, Introduction..!^. Mansion states (ib. 296) that chance is an 
efficient cause. This is not true of chance qua chance. 
2 Ch.l §vi-viii. 
3 Ch.l §xv. 
4
 It is recalled that the cause of human actions is in the soul. Cf. Met. Z(VII), vii, 
1032 a 32 - 1032 b 30, esp. 1032 b 21-23. 
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decision by a free agent is viewed by Aristotle as an efficient cause. 
Thus the per se or substantial cause which leads to a chance event in 
the area of τύχη (as understood in Phys. II, vi) is always an efficient 
cause.
5
 But one cannot say that the chance event was caused by the 
efficient cause qua chance (i.e. coincidence), precisely because it is 
dependent upon an accident contrary to expectation. 
In regard to ταύτόματον as defined in Phys. II, vi, but outside the 
area of τύχη as defined in Phys. II, vi, a distinction has to be made 
between events and substances which arise by chance. Events will be 
dealt with first. In regard to the event e.g. of a stone hitting someone, 
it has been seen that this is an accident based on the coincidence of 
the right time or the right place with its falling.6 This kind of event is 
parallel to an event based on τύχη as described above, the only 
difference being that the stone did not decide freely to fall. Thus the 
per se or substantial cause of the chance event is the stone. The stone 
is, needless to say, an efficient cause. But, again, it cannot be said that 
the chance event was caused qua chance (i.e. coincidence), precisely 
because it is dependent on an accident contrary to expectation. 
An accident contrary to expectation is not viewed by Aristotle as 
classifiable under one of the four causes, because it is in itself cause 
of nothing (ως δ' απλώς oûSevoç, 197 a 14). When Aristotle comes to 
decide under which of the four causes chance (τύχη and ταύτόματον) 
is to be classified, he immediately turns to speak of the substantial or 
per se cause in which the coincidental (unexpected) category inheres. 
Thus he writes: "As for the ways in which they (τύχη and 
ταΰτόματον) are causes, both belong to the mode of causation 
'source of change' (αρχή της κινήσεως)."7 But already here Aristotle 
is speaking of a per se or substantial cause, as is clear from the next 
sentence: "for they always pertain to the causes by nature or from 
thought, but of these the number is unlimited." The reference to an 
unlimited (αόριστον) number of causes refers to the passage above 
5
 One should not forget that such an efficient cause cannot properly be dissociated 
from its final cause or purpose - cf. Phys. II, v, 196 b 17-29. 
6
 Ch. 1 §ix and §xv. 
''Phys. Il, vi, 198 a2-3. 
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where Aristotle points out that the man who recovered his debt by 
chance in the market-place might have been hoping to see someone 
there, or litigating as plaintiff or defendant or going to the theatre etc 
ad infinitum} Thus there is no limit to the number of per se or sub­
stantial causes of a chance event.9 
In conclusion, therefore, Aristotle, in identifying the cause of a 
chance event, turns immediately to the per se or substantial (efficient) 
cause. He does not classify an accident contrary to expectation under 
one of the four causes, but views it as a separate kind of cause, an 
"accidental cause" (αιτία κατά συμβεβηκός, 197 a 5-6, 33). Similarly 
in Met. Aristotle states that the cause of an accidental or coincidental 
or chance event is an accidental cause (αίτιον κατά συμβεβηκό?).10 
(b) Monsters 
After chance events it is necessary to deal with the classification of 
the causality of chance substances. These are natural substances 
which are generated counter to nature," which means they occur 
neither always nor for the most part and unexpectedly. Two kinds of 
substances generated counter to nature must be examined. Monsters 
will be dealt with first. Aristotle's detailed treatment of this topic is to 
be found in De Gen. An. IV, iii-iv. Monsters include cases where 
offspring do not resemble their parents (767 b 5-6), twins in animals 
that usually produce only one offspring (772 a 36-7), animals lacking 
parts (770 b 8-9) or with extra parts or irregular formations (772 b 13 
- 773 a 29, cf. Hist.An. I, xvii, 496 b 17-18, Hist.An. V, xiv, 544 b 21), 
and tumours (772 b 29-31, 724 b 25). Ross argues12 that monsters do 
not occur by chance, since in that which occurs by chance "an end-
like result is always produced", whereas monsters are instances of 
8
 Phys II, v, 197 a 16-17, 196 b 28; Met Д( ), xxx, 1025 a 25. 
9
 Cf Ch 1, §viii for the assimilation by Aristotle of a decision to an efficient and 
per se or substantial cause. 
wMet E(VI), ii, 1027 a 7-8. 
11
 Phys II, vi, 197 b 34; De Gen An. IV, iv, 770 b 9-10. Cf also Rhet. I, v, 1362 a 
3-4 (passage discussed Ch 3(a)). 
12
 ROSS, Aristotle's Physics...524. Cf. also WAGNER, Physifoorlesung..A12. 
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failure in the purposive activity of nature (αμαρτήματα εκείνου του 
ενεκά του).13 However, Ross appears to be overhasty in deciding that 
monsters do not occur by chance, since everything that fails implies 
an initial purpose and Aristotle does not insist on the production of 
the purported outcome of a purpose, but rather on the presence of 
purpose.14 When nature is seeking to attain a goal by fulfilling 
conditions (i.e. by hypothetical necessity), monsters are a necessary 
although unusual by-product, i.e. an inevitable, although unusual 
accident of the process,15 due to the coincidence of nature's aim (the 
per se or substantial base) with an unusual category. This unusual 
category may be classified as the category of the right place. More 
will be said of this below. Thus monsters should be considered to 
occur by chance.16 The causes of monsters qua substances are, then, 
the four causes at work in any natural substance. 
The cause of monsters qua monsters is to be explained as follows. 
Seed is the male principle, and the correct course for nature to take is 
for the male or formal cause (also referred to as το δημιουργούν.17 the 
fashioning agent) to master the female or material cause. A female 
offspring or even a monster arises when the formal nature (ή κατά то 
εΐδος φύσις) does not gain sufficient control over the material nature 
(ή κατά την ϋλην φύσις).18 It is to be noted here, firstly, that Aristotle 
speaks of the formal cause as an efficient cause. This is undoubtedly 
an abbreviation of his complete thought on the functioning of animal 
generation. In Met. Η Aristotle states that the matter of a future 
animal is the menses, the efficient cause the seed, the formal cause the 
form and the final cause the end.19 The formal and final causes are the 
nPhys. II, vüi, 199b4. 
14
 Cf. Phys. II, v, 196 b 21-22: ecrn δ' ё ека του όσα те dirò διάνοια? αν 
πραχθείη και οσα άττο φύσεως. Phys. II, vüi, 199 b 1-4. 
15
 De Gen. An. IV, iii, 767 b 13-15. HAPP, Hyle..J5\ has misunderstood this 
passage. He writes: "Im Gegensatz dazu [to females] sind die wirklichen τέρατα nicht 
mehr teleologisch bedingt, sondern nur Ergebnis eines mechanistischen Prozesses." 
16
 This is also the view of A. MANSION, introduction...!^. 
17
 De Gen.Ân. IV, i, 766 a 15; IV, iii, 768 a 16: IV, iv, 771 b 21-22, 772 b 31. 
18
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 770 b 16-17; De Gen.An. IV, iii, 767 b 15-23, 769 b 10-13. 
19
 Met. H(VHI), iv, 1044 a 34 - 1044 b 1. 
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same. In Met. Ζ he states that the seed contains the form potentially. 
In Met. A he states that the male seed (γοΐ'ή) is like carpentry,21 i.e. 
the carpenter contains the formal cause of the table in his soul in 
potency and transforms the wood into the table as an efficient cause.22 
A similar theory is found in De Gen. An. except that the semen is said 
to be the tool of nature. The male provides the είδος and the αρχή 
της κινήσεως and the female the ϋλη.23 The male contributes γονή, 
the female καταμήνια, the male is κινούν και ποιούν, the female 
παθητικόν.
24
 Aristotle draws an exact parallel between nature and art. 
The form in the soul of the carpenter causes his hands and then his 
tools to move in a particular way, i.e. the formal or final cause causes 
the efficient cause to act. Similarly, semen is the tool of nature (ή 
φύσις...χρήται τω σπέρματι ώς όργάνω, 730 b 19-20). The potential 
formal cause in the semen causes the semen to act as an efficient 
cause and imprint the form on the matter.25 The material nature means 
the matter which the male principle uses to form the offspring. This 
matter corresponds to prime matter, just as the male principle 
corresponds to the formal cause.26 
The question is, then, why the male principle does not always 
master the female principle. In Phys. II, viii Aristotle states in passing 
that the cause of monsters (or possibly one of the causes) is defective 
seed. 7 In De Gen.An. he discusses the question expressly and in detail 
2 0
 Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 a 33 - 1034 b 1. 
21
 Cf. De Gen An I, xxii, 730 b 8 οίκοδόμησι?: house-building is in the houses 
being built. 
2 2
 Met Л(ХП), і, 1071 b 29-31. 
2 3
 De Gen.An 1, xx, 729 a 9-11. 
2 4
 De GenAn I, xx, 729 a 20-33. 
2 5
 De GenAn. I, xxii, 730 b 5-32; II, i, 734 b 20-735 a 29. LENNOX, Teleology... 
221-3 claims that the semen merely transmits warmth or a pattern of warmth - but it 
transmits the form (in the form of the specific soul) in the first place as well as 
warmth. 
2 6
 De GenAn II, i, 732 a 3-9. On prime matter cf. PECK, De GenAn. ...110 n. ad 
729 a 34. 
2 7
 Phys. II, viii, 199 b 6-7. HAPP, Hyle...741 n.302 interprets σπέρμα in this 
passage incorrectly as referring to matter. WAGNER, Physikvorlesung...481 claims 
incorrectly that the σπέρμα in question is female οττέρμα. 
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and mentions two possibilities. We read: "The principle that is acted 
upon [i.e. the female principle] departs from type and does not get 
mastered either due to deficient potency in the concocting and motive 
agent [i.e. a defective male principle] or due to the quantity and 
coldness ofthat which is being concocted and articulated [i.e. due to 
an unsuitable female principle]"28 Thus, in this passage Aristotle 
leaves open the possibility of either inadequacy on the part of the 
male principle or unsuitability on the part of the female principle. 
Elsewhere he states that the failure to produce male offspring is due to 
the inadequacy of the male principle, e.g. the male may be too young 
or too old and hence not have sufficient heat to concoct .29 In another 
passage he admits that Democritus may be right in attributing the 
cause of monstrosities to the joint action of more than one semen, but 
states that it is preferable to regard the cause as being "in the matter 
and the fetations as they take shape" (iv TTJ ϋλτ] και TOÎÇ συν-
ισταμένοι^ κυήμασιν).30 Later in the same passage he holds that it is 
clear that the cause of monstrosities is in the matter.31 In this passage 
as a whole Aristotle is willing to admit that it is possible that 
monstrosities may be due to the male principle, but much prefers to 
find the cause in the female principle. However, he does not express a 
decisive opinion on the topic, but prefers to leave the question partly 
open in a manner that prepares the way for Theophrastus and 
Epicurus. This procedure occurs often in De GenAn.ï1 Somewhat 
further on in the discussion he writes that the cause of such 
monstrosities as an extra large finger, hand or foot etc. is to be found 
"in the fetations, whenever more material gets set than is required for 
the nature of the part in question"33. 
If one takes all of the evidence together, one may conclude that it 
is certainly inaccurate to hold that the reason why the male or formal 
28
 De Gen.An. IV, iii, 768 b 25-27; cf. De Gen.An. IV, i, 766 a 18-20. 
29
 De Gen.An. IV, ii, 766 b 29-31. 
30
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 769 b 30 - 770 a 7. 
31
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 770 a 30-31. 
32
 Cf. e.g. De GenAn. IV, iv, 771 b 18-23. On Theophrastus cf. REALE, Storia 
della fìlosofia...m, 138. 
33
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 772 b 14-15, cf. 772 b 24. 
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principle does not always master the female or material principle is 
"defective matter"34 or is due to "the recalcitrance of the matter"35, as 
has been claimed Aristotle nowhere speaks of defective matter. He 
undoubtedly leaves open the possibility that Democntus is right about 
the joint action of more than one semen and also allows for the fact 
that the male principle may be lacking in the necessary heat for 
concoction due to youth or old age. Although Aristotle inclines in the 
case of most monstrosities to find the cause in the material36, he 
attributes the cause to the quantity of material in the first place and to 
its coldness in the second place.37 Matter is passive38, thus not 
recalcitrant It is true that Aristotle speaks of the male principle being 
defeated in its attempt to master the female: "When the principle does 
not gain the mastery and is unable to concoct through lack of heat or 
bring it into its proper form, but is defeated (ήττηθη) in this respect, 
34
 ROSS, Aristotle 80 
3 5
 PREUS, Aristotle's biological works 102, GUTHRIE, A History VI, 235, HAPP, 
Hyle 753-5 A MANSION, Introduction 116 admits that matter is passive, but 
nonetheless attributes an active role to it [La matière] "ne s'est point laissée adapter 
complètement a la forme"' At a later stage he speaks openly of the resistance of matter 
"Rappelons tout d'abord que la resistance de la matière, dont il est question ici, se 
rapproche bien plus de l'activité positive d'un agent que de la causalité passive, 
propre a la matière entendue au sens strict" (ibid 298) This reading of Aristotle, 
whereby passive matter is active, is incorrect Finally, A Mansion (ibid 298) puts 
forward another unfounded theory He states that the cause of monsters is the 
defective seed [ι e the male principle] referred to in Phys II, vin, but claims that the 
defect in the seed is a defect in the matter of which the seed is made This is an 
explanation nowhere put forward by Aristotle S MANSION, Le jugement d'exis­
tence 81 claims that the reason why the male principle sometimes does not master 
the female is a "positive obstacle", an "external efficient cause" (as in the case of βια), 
a "mechanical cause" This interpretation arises from the fact that she took Phys II, 
vin, 199 b 18 αν μη τι εμπόδιση to imply an efficient cause, which it does not, since 
the hindrance in question is unsuitability For the passivity of the hindrance that 
prevents Nature always attaining its goals cf further supra Ch 4 §vii (on force) 
3 6
 This statement does not hold for those cases where offspring do not resemble 
their parents, since the discussion of this topic precedes the passage 769 b 30 - 770 a 
7 
3 7
 De Gen An IV, in, 768 b 25-28 This passage appears to give the most accurate 
account of the cause of females and monsters 
3 8
 Cf De GenAn IV, iv, 771 b 21-22 
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then the material must change over into its opposite condition"39 
However, the male principle is not defeated by any action on the part 
of the female, but through its own deficiency or the female's coldness. 
Aristotle appears to apportion the blame for lack of heat both to the 
male who lacks in heat (766 b 30) and to the coldness of the female 
(768 b 27).40 
Finally, it may be noted that the statement in Phys. II, viii that 
monsters are caused by defective seed seems out of line with the 
causes expressed in De Gen.An. The difference in the cause of 
monsters in the two treatises may reflect a difference in embryology 
in them. In De Gen.An. the seed becomes the embryo in the case of 
plants and certain animals in which male and female are not 
separate, i.e. contains the principles derived from both parents.41 
Balme has pointed out that Aristotle in Phys. A and В and in Met. θ 
and I speaks in a manner that gives the impression that the seed not 
just of plants, but also of animals is that which becomes the embryo.42 
This view corresponds to that of Plato (and others).43 In De Gen.An., 
however, Aristotle holds that in the case of animals in which male and 
female are separate the semen transmits soul and form and heat and 
motion (αρχή κινήσ€ως) and power (δύναμι?)44, but does not itself 
become part of the embryo.45 The physical part of the semen 
3 9
 De Gen.An. IV, i, 766 a 18-21. Cf. also κρατάσθαι (768 a 22), κρατηθέιτοί 
(768 a 34). 
4 0
 DURING, Aristoteles...548 has not seen this point and attributes the defeat of the 
male only to its own lack of heat. 
4 1
 De GenAn. I, xviii, 724 b 14-19. It may be noted that Peck has bracketed the 
passage as an interpolation. However, Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics...II, 370 ad 1071 
b 30 refers to it without comment. 
4 2
 Phys. I, vii, 190 b 4; II, iv, 196 a 31; II, viii, 199 b 7; Met. ( ІІІ), vii, 1049 a 1 
(this passage has been examined supra Ch.3(a)); I(X), ix, 1058 b 23-24. Cf. BALME, 
Development of biology...95. 
4 3
 Tim. 50 D. 
4 4
 The term δύναμι? can also refer to the form - cf. e.g. Part.An. I, i, 640 b 23 and 
PECK, Part.An....30-32. 
4 5
 De Gen.An. I, xxii, 729 a 34 - 730 b 32. 730 b 9-11: ουδέ γαρ то äppei- ¿brav 
προίεται σπέρμα, όσα те προίεται τώι» άρρέΐ'ωΐ', ούθεν μόριον TOUT' εστί του 
γιγί'ομέΐΌυ κυήματος...; De Gen.An. II, iii, 736 а 24-26. [Semens and fetations not 
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disappears.4 The seed is merely the tool of nature like the tools of the 
carpenter that transmit form to matter.47 This view is not expressed in 
Met. and is incompatible with the view that the seed becomes the 
embryo. Ross attempts to explain the discrepancy between the 
embryology of Met. Θ and De Gen.An. by stating that Aristotle in 
Met. θ "is merely illustrating a general principle; and in such cases he 
often writes from the point of view of a common theory not his 
own"
48
 Given Aristotle's known departure from Platonic standpoints, 
this explanation is unsatisfactory.49 That of Balme is more con­
vincing. It seems likely, then, that not only is there a development in 
embryology between Phys. and De Gen.An., but that this change 
explains the different account of monsters in the two treatises. It does 
not seem possible that even in a passing reference to the cause of 
monsters (as in Phys. II, viii) Aristotle could have stated on the basis 
of the doctrine of De Gen.An. (the seed is a tool of Nature) that the 
cause was defective seed, given that he explicitly states that the cause 
is in the matter or due to an inadequate male principle that is merely 
transmitted by the seed. The statement in Phys. II, vi that the cause of 
that which occurs by chance in nature is internal also seems to refer 
to defective seed and to be incompatible with the theories of De Gen. 
An. 
In this section it was seen, firstly, which phenomena Aristotle 
considers to be monstrous. It was also seen that monsters are 
undoubtedly viewed by Aristotle as chance substances. The causes at 
work in the formation of monsters were then examined, and it was 
seen that the accounts thereof provided hitherto were seriously 
deficient. Finally, it was seen that it is likely, as Balme held, that not 
separate from the parent possess nutritive soul potentially, and in actuality when they 
feed themselves De Gen.An. II, iii, 736 b 8-12; 737 a 16-18.] 
4 6
 De Gen.An. II, iii, 737 a 7-15. 
4 7
 De Gen.An. I, xxii, 730 b 12-23. 
4 8
 Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics...U, 255 ad 1049 a 2. It is highly unlikely that 
Aristotle was using a theory not his own. It is just possible, however, that he was 
using loose or imprecise language in a non-biological context. 
4 9
 It also seems well-established that the latest strata of Aristotle's metaphysical 
thought in Met. show that De An. and De Gen.An. are later works. Cf. DUMOULIN, 
Analyse...esp. 401-417. 
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only did Aristotle develop his embryology between the time of 
writing Phys. and De Gen.An., but that this development in thought 
explains the different account of monsters in the two treatises. 
(c) Spontaneous generation 
Apart from monsters, the remaining kind of chance substances to 
be dealt with are those generated by spontaneous generation. The 
notion of spontaneous generation is that of generation without seeds.50 
It does not mean the origin of life from non-life, as will be seen. 
Aristotle is the first thinker to have written about the theory of 
spontaneous generation systematically. However, spontaneous gene-
ration was a popular belief, and the notion of spontaneous generation 
is found in Greek philosophy from the start, in Anaximander, if not 
already in Thaïes, and is not confined to philosophy.51 Plato relates 
that Socrates investigated the early theories of spontaneous generation 
and found them lacking.52 The notion of spontaneous generation was 
known to Aristotle both from popular beliefs ("mother earth") and 
from his numerous predecessors, including Plato.53 It is a theory that 
was never contested in Antiquity54 and is the theory of the origin of 
50
 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 31-32; De Gen.An. I, i, 715 b 26-27. 
51
 Cf. QuiNN, Theory of spontaneous generation., .who traces the theory in Thaïes, 
Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Pindar, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, 
Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, Theophrastus, Epicurus, Lucretius. Cf. the formulation of the theory in 
Lucr. DRN V, 797-8. On the historical background to Aristotle's theory cf. also BYL, 
Recherches....269-277'. 
S2Phaedo 96 b\-3. 
53
 De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 762 b 29; Plat. Menex. 237 d - 238 a; Resp. Ill, 414 d - e; 
Polit. 269 b, 271 a - e. In the passage of De Gen.An. Aristotle appears to allow for the 
possibility that human beings and quadrupeds at one time did not exist on the earth 
and then emerged. Cf. HULL, The conflict...246. This, however, is not a theory that 
Aristotle followed up or used as a working hypothesis. He continues, even in De 
Gen.An., to consider spontaneous generation to be something exceptional. 
54
 Cf. BYL, Recherches. ..277. Other authors who refer to the theory are e.g. Ovid, 
Met. I, 422-437; Diodorus I, 10, 6-7; Sextus Empiricus Pyrrh. Hyp. I, 41; St. 
Augustine, Contra Faustum VI, 8. CAPELLE, Die Urzeugung...175-7 claims to have 
found a text in the Corpus Hippocraticum (TJepi Τέχνης· VI, 3-4) denying the 
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life on earth most widely accepted - in a more modern form - by non-
religious scientists at the present time. This point will be dealt with in 
the Conclusion. In the following three subsections the vocabulary of 
spontaneous generation, its causes and the evolution of the theory in 
Aristotle's writings will be examined. 
(i) The vocabulary of spontaneous generation 
The notion of spontaneous generation is expressed by Aristotle by 
means of the term αυτόματος or some derivative. It should be noted, 
existence of spontaneous generation. However, in this text the author does not 
mention spontaneous generation. He criticizes the attribution of the cure of a patient 
to το αυτόματοι', because he holds that το αυτόματοι' is nothing (ούδεν έόν). 
Everything that happens is found to have happened for a reason (δια τι), and as an 
explanation το αυτόματοι' does not appear to have any essence, but its name (έν τω 
διό τι το αυτόματοι' ού φαίνεται ούσίην έχον ούδεμίαν αλλ' ή όνομα). But 
médecine both appears and will continue to appear to have an essence (ουσία) both in 
the area of that which is for a reason (έν τοΐσι δια τι) and in the area of 
prognostication. Thus the author's criticism of το αυτόματοι' is that it is nothing 
(ουδέν eòi') and has no ουσία apart from its name, whereas médecine has an ουσία in 
the area of that which is for a reason. Thus he is claiming that το αύτόματον is a 
word devoid of content or meaning (ουσία) and that there is always a meaningful 
explanation for everything that happens. This evidence is certainly insufficient for the 
claim that the author would have rejected spontaneous generation (if he had discussed 
it). Aristotle is no doubt referring to the author's viewpoint on chance in Phys. II, iv, 
196 a 1-2 when he mentions those who held that there is a definite cause of 
everything which we say comes to be due to το αυτόματοι'. This is a viewpoint he 
agrees with himself (196 a 7-8: eï γέ τι ην ή τύχη, άτοποι' αν φα vein ώς αληθώς). 
Aristotle himself in De Gen.An. held, however, that spontaneous generation is both a 
chance occurrence and explicable by the usual four causes (cf. infra Ch.5(c)(ii)). The 
author of ITepi Τέχιιρ, on the other hand, is unwilling to accept that an occurrence 
can be due to το αύτόματον and to other causes. It is possible that the author is a 
follower of Leucippus and Democritus (as held by CAPELLE, Die Urzeugung...176; 
cf. also JOUANNA, De I' Art..253 n.6). But it must be pointed out that although 
Democritus rejected ταύτόματον entirely as an explanation of terrestrial events (cf. 
supra Ch.4(b)), he still believed in spontaneous generation (i.e. generation without 
seeds, which he viewed as necessary). It may be noted that το αύτόματον and τύχη 
are synonyms for the author, as is clear from ITepi ΤέχΐΊ)ς VI, 3-4 and VII, 1. The 
treatise is dated by most exegetes to the end of the 5th century, by some (including 
CAPELLE, Die Urzeugung...\76) to the fourth century. Cf. JOUANNA, Del'Art...\90-\. 
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however, that the adjective αυτόματο? properly means "of its own 
accord", "without intervention"55, e.g. eggs hatch out of their own 
accord (αυτόματα, Hist.An. VI, ii, 559 a 30 - b 6), i.e. without the 
female sitting on them. Likewise a hair falls out of its own accord 
(αυτόματη, Hist.An. VII, xi, 587 b 26), i.e. without being pulled. 
Again, crickets are said to become pregnant of their own accord 
(αυτόματοι, Hist.An. X, vi, 637 b 18), i.e. without the intervention of 
the male. Water in springs and rivers flows of its own accord 
(αυτόματα, Meteor. II, i, 353 b 28). The term αυτόματο? in these 
passages means no more than "of its own accord" and does not refer 
to spontaneous generation.56 
The meaning of αυτόματος is no different when used to refer to 
spontaneous generation. Animals are said to be generated 
spontaneously (αυτόματα -γίνεσθαι, Hist.An. V, i, 539 a 22; V, xv, 
547 b 18-19, 548 a 10-11; V, xix, 551 a 1; De Gen.An. II, i, 732 b 12; 
Prob. X, 65, 898 b 5), i.e. to come about without the intervention or 
causality of seed.57 Parallel phrases are: spontaneous generation 
(yéveoLÇ αυτόματο?, De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 762 a 9), to be 
spontaneously generated (την yéveavv αΰτομάτην εχαν, De An. II, 
iv, 415 a 27-28), from a spontaneous formation (από συστάσεω? 
αυτόματη? [text: Louis], De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 761 b 26), to be 
generated spontaneously (αύτομάτω? γίνεσθαι, Part.An. I, i, 640 a 
27; De Gen.An. II, vi, 743 a 35), to take shape spontaneously 
(συνίστασθαι. αύτομάτω?, De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 761 b 24 [text: Louis]), 
the generation of...spontaneously generated animals (ή yéveois...r¿>v 
The term αυτόματο? does not have its origin merely in preSocratic philosophy, 
as shown by its use in Lysias, κατ' Άνδοκ. 25. Cf. JOUANNA, De l'Art...253 n.5: 
"το αυτόματοι' désigne ce qui se produit de soi-même, sans aucune intervention 
extérieure." 
56
 The expression τα αυτόματα των θαυμάτωΐ' (literally "the wonders <that 
move> of their own accord" refers to automatic puppets in De Gen.An. II, i, 734 b 9-
10, Met. A(I), ii, 983 a 14, sim. De Gen.An. II, ν, 741 b 7-9 ei' TOÎÇ αυτόματοι? 
θαύμασι, De Motu An. 7, 701 b 2 τα αυτόματα. Cf. further FARQUHARSON, De Motu 
Ли...-note ad 701 b 2. 
5 7
 HULL, The conflict...247 claims that the reason for calling such generation 
spontaneous is "that like is not producing like" This, however, is not the fundamental 
reason, as explained. 
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αυτομάτων-, De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 763 a 24-25). We may note the άπαξ 
λεγόμενου in Aristotle: "other [sc. plants are formed] as if nature had 
acted of its own accord" (τα δ' ώσπερ αϋτοματιζούσης της φυσβως, 
De Gen.An. I, i, 715 b 27). 
For Aristotle, if something is said to have occurred of its own 
accord, the implication is that it belongs to the area ofthat which is 
for a purpose and occurred by chance. Hence a horse that came 
αυτόματος (literally: of its own accord) came "by chance", because it 
was saved by doing so (Phys. II, vi, 197 b 15)58, and a tripod, if it fell 
in such a way that one could sit on it, is also said to have fallen 
αυτόματος, i.e. by chance (197 b 16-17). 
The term το αυτόματοι', literally "that which takes place of its 
own accord", is a derivative of the adjective αυτόματος and means 
"chance" (cf. ch.l (ii) and (xv)). Hence the expression από 
ταύτομάτου γίγνεσθαι (De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 762 b 18; HistAn. V, i, 
539 b 7; Part.An. I, i, 640 a 28-29 (referring to health); Met. Z(VII), 
vii, 1032 a 29) means at the same time to be generated "by chance" 
and "spontaneously" (the literal translation from the Latin). The 
notion of spontaneous generation (generation without seeds) is that of 
chance generation. 
(ii) The causes of spontaneous generation 
For Aristotle it was obvious that spontaneously generated 
organisms are living and therefore have soul, which is their formal, 
final and efficient cause.59 The first problem requiring to be solved 
was, therefore, the origin of this soul or formal cause, since it could 
CHARITON, Phys. /-//...translates: "We say that the horse came automatically, in 
that it was saved because it came..." But in English we would certainly not say that a 
horse came "automatically" We would, however, say that it came "by chance" 
5 9
 It is incorrect to hold, as does HULL, The conflict...246 that "in the case of 
spontaneously generated organisms, their formal, final and efficient causes do not 
coincide" Once they exist they are part of nature. The only difference between them 
and non-spontaneously generated living beings is that they are unable to reproduce 
offspring alike to themselves and hence are not generated by a parent like to 
themselves. 
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not by definition be transmitted in the natural way, namely by seed. 
The second problem was that of the specification of the material 
cause. 
The solution to the former problem provided by Aristotle in De 
Gen.An. is hylozoist. He writes that spontaneously generated "animals 
and plants are formed in the earth and water, because in earth water is 
present, and in water pneuma is present, and in all pneuma soul-heat 
(θ€ρμότητα ψυχικής) is present, so that in a way all things are full of 
soul"60 Thus Thaies was right.61 Aristotle concludes that the soul in 
spontaneously generated organisms must be derived from the 
principle of soul present in their matter. 
Aristotle views the principle of soul (762 a 25-26, 762 b 17), 
which manifests itself as soul-heat (762 a 20) in pneuma, as some­
thing that is omnipresent. The soul of living beings is a "part of soul 
principle" (TO της ψυχικής αρχής).62 
The manner in which soul-principle (soul in general) is determined 
to be the form of spontaneously generated organisms is as follows: 
The liquids containing corporeal matter, e.g. sea-water, become 
heated and form a frothy bubble which encloses pneuma containing 
soul-principle, i.e. soul in general. The form of the (kind of) organism 
to be generated is conditioned by the frothy bubble or envelope that 
encloses the soul-principle, or more precisely by the contents of the 
frothy bubble.63 The frothy bubble or envelope corresponds to the 
uterus in the female animal. The variables in the composition of the 
6 0
 De Gen An III, xi, 762 a 18-21 Anstotle appears to be giving an explanation of 
the origin of all spontaneously generated organisms. But whether frothy bubbles or a 
parallel procedure occur in all cases, e g in that of the growth of mistletoe from 
putrescent matter (De Gen An 1, i, 715 b 25-30) is not stated. 
6 1
 Cf. De An I, v, 411 a 7-11 
6 2
 De Gen An. II, in, 737 a 8-9. Cf Hist An V, xxxii, 557 b 11-12, where Aristotle 
mentions "whatever materials have life" in the context of spontaneous generation. 
Louis, Histoire des Animaux, .ad loc does not render the meaning of the passage. 
6 3
 το συνιστάμενοι' èv τη περιλήψει, 762 a 25 That this is the correct 
interpretation of the meaning (whatever about the grammar) is shown by the fact that 
the frothy bubble is not living, but only its contents, as Aristotle states in regard to 
testaceans (cf two paragraphs infra). 
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contents of the envelope are brought about by the place where the 
bubble occurs and the material (body) enclosed in the bubble.64 
Thus the place where the bubble occurs and the contents of the 
bubble determine the kind of organism that soul enclosed in the 
bubble will be able to develop.65 Undetermined soul (or soul-
principle) is viewed as being determined and made into a specific 
formal cause by means of characteristics of the material cause.66 The 
material cause and the formal cause must both be those required to 
produce organisms of the spontaneously generated species in ques­
tion, just as in sexual generation the female or material cause must be 
that appropriate to the male or formal cause in order to produce 
offspring.67 
In the case of testaceans the frothy bubble becomes the shell, 
which Aristotle appears to consider not to be living and to be ana­
logous to bones and horns, while the contents of the frothy bubble 
become the living organism inside the shell.68 
64
 De GenAn. Ill, xi, 762 a 21-27. 
6 5
 De GenAn. Ill, xi, 762 b 12-18. 
6 6
 De GenAn. Ill, xi, 762 b 16-17: το δ' έναπολαμβανόμενοί' ή άποκρινόμεΐΌΐ' ci' 
τω πνεύματι. τη? ψυχική? αρχής...GOTTHELF, Teleology and spontaneous 
generation...MT-9 does not see that it is unthinkable that Aristotle should not have 
taken the view that soul in general (what he calls 'undifferentiated vital heat') must be 
determined and made into a specific formal cause by the frothy bubble, since no living 
organism can be animated by 'soul in general' and spontaneous organisms once 
generated are part of nature. The frothy bubble both limits and specifies soul in 
general as well as the material cause of the spontaneous living organism (the earthy 
water in the place in question). 
6 7
 Cf. De GenAn. II, ν, 741 b 7-9: '"As the parts of the animal to be formed are 
present potentially in the matter, once the principle of movement has been supplied, 
one thing follows on after another without interruption, just as it does in the wondrous 
automatic puppets." Cf. on this passage LENNOX, Teleology...223-4. The material 
cause (in the female) contains potentially the full programme of the form. On the 
wondrous automatic puppets cf. also supra n.56. 
6 8
 De GenAn. Ill, xi, 762 a 27-32. GOTTHELF, Teleology and spontaneous 
generation... Ml thinks that Aristotle does not refer to the contents of the shell, which 
he most certainly does. 
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This soul or specific formal cause, like all souls, then acts through 
pneuma or more precisely the substance in the pneuma.69 Pneuma is 
hot air and contains soul-heat. The substance in it corresponds on 
earth to ether in the superlunary area, while semen is a compound of 
pneuma and water.70 The reason for the introduction by Aristotle of 
pneuma and the substance in it appears to be not only the frothy 
appearance of semen, but above all the need he feels to provide an 
intermediary vehicle between the immaterial soul and the material (in 
the female). 
In spontaneous generation the heat of the sun (or of the season) 
plays a role analogous to that played by the heat provided by the 
animal in natural generation. There are two stages. Firstly, the heat of 
the sun causes the formation of the formal cause by heating the water, 
thereby causing the frothy bubble that limits and determines the soul-
principle (formal cause) in it. In natural generation the heat of the 
animal is transmitted as part of the soul to the pneuma in the seed. 
Secondly, the heat of the sun supplies the heat required to bring forth 
spontaneously generated organisms from the frothy bubble, in the 
same way as the heat in the animal is required to bring forth 
offspring.71 
Without the heat of the sun as efficient cause there can be no 
formal cause of spontaneous generation. Heat does not have this 
function in natural generation. After the formation of the formal cause 
of spontaneous generation (the determination of soul-principle), heat 
is also an efficient cause, but then only a mere condition and 
instrument of generation, as in natural generation.72 Heat and cold 
6 9
 De Gen An HI, χι, 762 b 16-18, II, in, 736 b 37 Cf BALME, Development of 
biology 101 The account in MATTHEN, The Four Causes.. 165-6 omits a number of 
elements in the process 
7 0
 De Gen An II, n, 735 b 37 - 736 a 1 For an account of pneuma cf PECK, De 
Gen An.. .582-9, BALME, De Partibus Ammalmm 1. 160-5. 
7 1
 De Gen An II, vi, 743 a 26-36, II, in, 737 a 3-5, III, xi, 762 Ы2-16 
7 2
 De Gen An II, in, 737 a 3, II, îv, 740 b 25 - 741 a 3 Cf Phys II, n, 194 b 13 
άνθρωπος γαρ αι<θρωποΐ' yevvâ και ήλιος The heat embodied in the sun is the causa 
assistens of all generation Cf also Met Λ(ΧΙΙ), ν, 1071 a 13-16 
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may produce qualities, but cannot produce the logos. Thus the heat 
of the sun is to be viewed as a concomitant efficient cause of the 
production of spontaneously generated organisms from the frothy 
bubble. 
In Met. Z(VTI), ix Aristotle states that the cause of spontaneous 
generation is matter which initiates for itself that motion which seed 
initiates.74 This statement is highly problematic75 if taken at its face 
value for the following reasons. Firstly, matter, if it initiates motion, 
is merely another word for a seed. Taken at its face value such a 
theory would be a deus ex machina. Secondly, a theory of matter 
initiating motion would have materialist implications, since it would 
imply the absence of soul.76 However, even regardless of these 
difficulties it is evident that this single succinct statement cannot be 
taken as a full explanation of spontaneous generation. 
The correct exegesis of the passage requires it to be taken in the 
context of the chapter of which it is a part. In this chapter Aristotle 
firstly discusses the conditions under which chance substitutes for art 
(1034 a 9-32) and then those under which it substitutes for nature 
(1034 a 33 - b 7). The working of art, to which man has privileged 
access, is examined before the parallel working of nature. 
7 3
 De Gen An II, ι, 734 b 31-36 The logos is produced by the κινησι? from the 
male parent who is in actuality what the material is potentially 
74
 Met Z(VH), ix, 1034 b 4-6 
7 5
 Рьск, De Gen An 585 even calls it -'startling" He attempts to "palliate" it 
7 6
 GOTTHELF, Aristotle's conception 241 writes that spontaneously generated 
organisms come to be of material necessity and not for the sake of anything He 
defends the same view in Teleology and spontaneous generation 189, 191 HULL, 
The conflict 247 makes the same claim This is not true of De Gen An Even if the 
statement in Met Ζ were taken in isolation, which would be incorrect, one would then 
have to say that Aristotle attempted to supply the formal cause by means of the 
material cause. GUTHRIE, A History VI, 236 claims that matter here is its own 
efficient cause, as if there could be an efficient cause without a formal cause The 
question of the possible materialist implications in the account in Hist An V-VI and 
the chronology of these books is dealt with in BALME, Development of biology 100-
2, but requires more extensive treatment beyond the scope of this volume Balme 
holds Hist An to be later than De Gen An, while Louis, La generation spontanée 
300 holds Hist An V-VII to be one of Aristotle's earliest works CAPELLE, Die 
Urzeugung 155 also considers De Gen An to be a much later work than Hist An 
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At the start of Ζ ix Aristotle raises the question why some things 
are generated both by art and by chance (άττο ταύτομάτου), such as 
health77, and others not, such as a house. His answer is that we must 
examine the matter which is the starting-point of the process (ή 
άρχουσα της· γενέσεως) in the production (èv τω тгаіеі ) and 
generation of artificial things. The matter which Aristotle is speaking 
of here is matter in the sense of the immediate materials required to 
produce what is wanted (the final cause). The producer of art 
discovers this matter by a process of thinking (νόησις). The 
subsequent κά'ησι? which leads to the achievement of the final cause 
is called production (ποίησις·)78. Aristotle takes the example of health, 
where the doctor will continue reasoning until he discovers what he 
can use immediately to start producing health and comes to the 
conclusion that he needs heat. Heat, then, is viewed by Aristotle as 
the matter of health, as stones are of a house. 
In some cases the matter is such that it can initiate its own motion, 
and in other cases it is not.79 In the case of stones, even though they 
can initiate movement towards their proper place, they cannot initiate 
the movement to build a house.80 But in other cases the objects 
normally produced by art can also be produced without art, (i) either 
because the motion can be initiated by those things which do not 
indeed possess the art, but can themselves be moved either by other 
things which do not possess the art, or (ii) by the motion from the part 
of the product which preexists in them.81 
In APo II, xi. 95 a 5-6 (passage discussed supra Ch.3(a)) he gives the examples 
of health and safety (σωτηρία). 
7 8
 Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 32 - 1032 b 10. 
7 9
 Met. Z(VH), ix, 1034 a 13-14. 
8 0
 There is clearly a lacuna (in the text or in thought) in 1034 a 14, as stones (1034 
a 16) are examples of matter that cannot initiate its own motion (towards the final 
cause). The thought is that stones can initiate one kind of motion, but not that 
required for the achievement of the final cause. 
81
 Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 a 18-21. Aristotle emphasizes that the matter is part of the 
final cause aimed at, e.g. heat is a part of health and stones part of a house: Met. 
Z(VII), vii, 1032 b 26-31; Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 a 12-13, 26-30. This passage is 
interpreted correctly by FREDE and PATZIG, Metaphys.Z...\54: "Die Worte [sc. 1034 a 
20-21] gehen auch insofern über das zuvor Gesagte hinaus, als sie zwei Weisen 
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The notion of matter initiating motion for itself therefore includes 
(i) the case where the matter that is said to initiate the movement for 
itself is itself moved by another cause that does not possess the art, 
e.g. the heat that initiates the movement towards health may itself be 
caused either by the sun or by a person who does not possess the art 
of médecine82, and (ii) the case where the part of the product which 
preexists it brings it about, e.g. the heat which is part of health causes 
health. 
It follows, therefore, that Aristotle understands the notion of 
matter initiating motion itself in a much broader sense than its 
immediate sense suggests, since matter is said to initiate motion itself 
provided that the universale ante rem is absent, even when it has 
received the motion from another source that does not possess the art 
normally required to attain the goal. 
Aristotle did not repeat what he means by matter initiating motion 
when he came to deal with chance in nature and gave a highly laconic 
account of spontaneous generation in 1034 b 4-6. When his under-
standing of matter initiating motion is applied to 1034 b 4-683 it 
follows that the fact that the matter of spontaneous generation is said 
to initiate motion itself is in no way contradicted by the efficient 
causality of the sun in De Gen. An., as has been claimed84, since matter 
can still be said to initiate motion even when it receives its motion 
from the sun, given that the sun does not possess τέχνη. Secondly, the 
matter that initiates motion in Met. Ζ is not incompatible with the 
unterscheiden, auf die das, was das Produkt hervorbringt, sich in der erforderlichen 
Weise bewegen kann, nämlich entweder unter Einwirkung eines anderen, welches 
ebenfalls nicht über die Kunst verfugt, oder unter Einwirkung eines Teils seiner 
selbst, welches gleichzeitig bereits ein Teil der entstehenden Sache selbst ist. Es hieß 
ja schon zu Beginn, daß die Materie des Produkts einen Teil des Produkts bereits 
enthalte; und dieser kann, unter den entsprechenden Bedingungen, die Ursache dafür 
sein, daß die Materie aus sich selbst heraus das Entstehen eines Produkts verursacht, 
welches in der Regel nur durch die Einwirkung einer Kunst verursacht wird." 
*
2
 Cf. Met. A(I), i, 981 a 3-12. 
83
 BOSTOCK, Metaphysics Ζ and Η..Λ36 notes aptly that the theory of matter 
initiating motion in the area of art might well have been written with spontaneous 
generation in mind. 
^BOSTOCK, Metaphysics Ζ and Η..Λ39. 
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hylozoist matter containing the soul-principle (soul m general) that 
initiates motion inside the frothy bubble in De Gen An. and is part of 
the final product (spontaneously generated organisms).85 The theory 
of Met. Ζ and of De Gen.An also fits in well with Aristotle's 
statement in Phys I, ix that matter desires form, which might be taken 
to imply a hylozoist view of matter.86 Likewise, Aristotle's statement 
in Phys II, vi that the cause of spontaneous generation is internal87 is 
perfectly compatible with the theory of matter initiating motion (when 
the sun shines). 
It may be concluded, therefore, that the theory of matter initiating 
that motion which seed initiates is to be understood in the context of 
the chapter as a whole and as parallel to the theory of matter initiating 
the motion that is normally initiated by the producer of art. When 
understood in context, there is no incompatibility between Met Ζ 
1034 b 4-6 and De Gen.An. 
It is to be noted that the offspring of the products of spontaneous 
generation is said always to be imperfect (i.e. unlike its parents).88 
This occurrence is unnatural and presumably monstrous. However, 
this does not mean that spontaneously generated organisms are not 
part of nature. It is incorrect to hold that "the only way individuals 
can partake in the eternal and divine is by like producing like"89 This 
8 5
 Cf supra ρ 148 
8 6
 Phys I, ix, 192 a 16-23 Cf Conclusion (c)(n) and nn 24-30 
8 7
 Phys II, vi, 197 b 36 Aristotle is referring here to monsters and spontaneous 
generation Ross, Aristotle s Physics 524 thinks Aristotle is referring here only to 
spontaneous generation, because, as was seen above (§(b)), he wrongly excludes 
monsters from the area of chance CHARLTON, Phys 1-11 110-1 followed by LENNOX, 
Teleology 234 and GOTTHELF, Teleology and spontaneous generation. 191 η 23 
thinks that Aristotle is referring only to monsters (the cause of which they take to be 
defective seed, the theory of Phys II, vin, which is internal) without considering that 
the cause of spontaneous generation in Met Ζ (matter that initiates motion) is also 
internal LENNOX, ibid, writes that the cause of "spontaneous biological de­
velopment" is external - but this is not true of the matter that initiates for itself that 
motion which seed initiates 
8 8
 Cf De Gen An I, xvi, 721 a 5-9,1, xvin, 723 b 3-9, II, ι, 732 b 11-14, Hist An 
V, i, 539 b 7-14, V, xxxi, 556 b 21-24, De An II, iv, 415 a 26-28 
8 9
 HULL, The conflict 246-7 LENNOX, Teleology 235 argues that spontaneously 
generated organisms lacked the identity between the process of reproducing the form 
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assertion is based on a metaphysical error. Every individual strives in 
the first place for the achievement of the perfection of its form, which 
is a participation in the divine (imitation of the Unmoved Mover) and 
only in the second place for the eternity of the Unmoved Mover. It is 
only upon recognition of the unattainability of the second aim that it 
reproduces in order to attain eternity in the species. Reproduction is 
thus not the first aim of living beings. Hence reproductive failure in 
spontaneously generated organisms does not mean that they are not 
natural or do not partake in the eternal and divine.90 
For this reason Hull's criticism of the influence of Aristotle's 
biology on his metaphysics is unfounded.91 Aristotle was entitled to 
base his fundamental metaphysical insight, i.e. that the term 
'substance' means in the first place a living being92, on his biology 
without having to reject it due to the existence of spontaneous 
generation, since spontaneous generation merely constitutes a break in 
the chain of reproduction, and the fact that about one fifth of the 
animals mentioned by Aristotle are produced exclusively by 
spontaneous generation93 is therefore not significant. All substances 
seek the full perfection of their form and therefore belong to nature, 
whether they are naturally generated or produced by spontaneous 
generation. 
Finally, spontaneous generation is to be fitted into Aristotle's 
account of chance as follows. Spontaneous generation is an unusual 
outcome of the sun (the efficient cause) shining on the earth due to its 
coincidence with the right place. This situation is exactly parallel to 
that of a man being cured by chance instead of by the doctor because 
warm weather or a man lacking skill cures him, whereas the doctor 
(1 e the form in potency) and the end product (presumably the form in act) But this 
cannot be correct He also argues incorrectly that the end of biological development is 
reproduction of a form and that spontaneously produced organisms are the exception, 
because he holds that they are not for the sake of such an end This view is based on a 
metaphysical error, as explained 
90
 HULL, The conflict 248-9 is also far from the mark when he suggests that 
spontaneously generated organisms possibly do not belong to species. 
91
 HULL, The conflict 246 On this influence cf infra Conclusion (cXuXS). 
92
 Met Z(VII), vu, 1032 a 18-19 
93
 This estimate is to be found in HULL, The conflict. .246 
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would have prescribed heat with a view to health. Usually a formal 
cause is required to achieve an end, e.g. a doctor would have set out 
from health as a formal cause in order to decide on the efficient cause 
to be applied to the patient, namely heat. But there is no specific 
formal cause of spontaneous generation that makes the sun shine, just 
as the man who recovered his debt went to the market-place without 
the intention (formal cause) of recovering the debt (his decision to go 
to the market-place - the efficient cause - was taken with a view to 
achieving a different formal cause). The outcome in each case 
(spontaneous animals, health, recovery of the debt) belongs to the 
area of that which would be done for a purpose, but was not. The 
efficient cause brings about what would have been the final cause, but 
was not. The difficulty involved in the absence of seeds will be 
examined further in section (d)(ii) of this chapter. 
In this section it was seen, accordingly, that Aristotle, setting out 
from a hylozoist standpoint, derives the soul in spontaneously 
generated organisms from the soul-principle present in their matter. 
The manner in which soul-principle is determined to be the forms of 
spontaneously generated organisms was examined in detail. The heat 
of the sun was seen to be the efficient cause of the formal cause of 
these spontaneously generated organisms. The problem of the mean­
ing of matter initiating motion in Met. Ζ ix was elucidated. It was seen 
that the theory of matter initiating that motion which seed initiates is 
to be understood in the context of the chapter as a whole and as 
parallel to the theory of matter initiating the motion that is normally 
initiated by the producer of art. It was seen that spontaneously 
generated organisms, once generated, are part of nature. Finally, it 
was seen how spontaneous generation is to be fitted into Aristotle's 
theory of chance. In the next section the question of evolution in 
Aristotle's theory of spontaneous generation will be dealt with. 
(Hi) The evolution of the theory of spontaneous generation 
There is considerable evidence to show that Aristotle originally 
held that some animals are generated both by means of semen and by 
spontaneous generation, a theory that is sometimes referred to as that 
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of random spontaneous generation, and that he later reduced the 
theory of spontaneous generation to a quasi-science in De Gen.An.94. 
The evidence is found in Met. Ζ and Prob. Random spontaneous 
generation also fits in much better with the classification of 
spontaneous generation under ταύτόματον in Phys. 
In Met. Ζ vii, in his discussion of generation, Aristotle writes: "Of 
these [sc. ποίησες] some are generated άπο ταύτομάτου καί. από 
τύχης in much the same way as things generated in nature. For 
sometimes there too the same things come into being both from seed 
and without seed"95 Balme takes this passage to mean that individuals 
of the same kind are sometimes generated with seed and sometimes 
spontaneously.96 
The passage is theoretically open to other interpretations, which 
should be mentioned. Firstly, the word evia could be taken to mean 
"some kinds or subspecies"97 Aristotle's meaning would then be that 
some subspecies e.g. offish (Hist.An. VI, xv, 569 a 10-26), of plants 
(De Gen.An. I, i, 715 b 25-27) and of insects (Hist.An. V, i, 539 a 22-
24 with De Gen.An. II, i, 732 b 10-14) are generated by seeds, 
whereas others are generated without seed. 
Secondly, Aristotle might be speaking of plants. This is the 
interpretation of Alexander.98 
A third suggestion has been made in order to explain the clash 
between the passage quoted from Met. Ζ and the regular spontaneous 
generation of De Gen.An.: "This clash could be partly avoided by 
supposing he is speaking of different phenomena in the two places, 
i.e. in GA of the regular generation of certain species of animals 
This thesis was put forward by BALME, Development of biology...96-100. Cf. 
also BoSTOCK, Metaphysics Ζ and H... 139 and GOTTHELF, Teleology and spontaneous 
generation.. .182. 
9 5
 Met Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 28-32: τούτων δέ τι ve? γίγνονται καί άπο 
ταύτομάτου καί άπο τύχη? παραπλήσιων ώσπερ éi' τοίς άπο φύσεως· γιγνομέΐ'οις· 
ειαα γαρ κακά ταύτα και έκ σπέρματος- γίγΐ'εται καί άνευ σπέρματος. This 
passage is also discussed supra Ch.3(b)(i). 
9 6
 BALME, Development of 'biology...96; likewise JUDSON, Chance... 74 n.2. 
9 7
 Cf.e.g. De Gen An I, xviii, 726 a 6. 
" ALEXANDER, In Met 488, 36-37. γίΐ'οιται γαρ βοτάΐ'αι καί ёк σπέρματος και 
di/ευ σπέρματος. Likewise ib. 501,4. 
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without seed, and here of the irregular and unusual generation without 
seed, of animals that are standardly generated from seed"99 This 
suggestion, however, involves the supposition that Aristotle would 
not have mentioned in De Gen.An. "the irregular and unusual 
generation without seed, of animals that are standardly generated 
from seed." Such a hypothesis is likely only on the supposition that 
Aristotle had originally believed in random spontaneous generation 
and abandoned it by the time of writing De Gen.An. 
That the latter hypothesis is correct, i.e. that the passage from Met. 
Ζ is to be interpreted as referring to random spontaneous generation is 
shown by the following passage from Prob.: 
Why are some animals produced not only from each other, but also 
spontaneously, whereas some are only produced from each other, such as 
man and horses? Is there no other cause except that in some the time of 
gestation is short, so that the season of birth is not protracted and can 
occur during the change of seasons, but of the latter class the birth is much 
protracted, since they are born after a year or ten months; so that they 
must necessarily be bom from the intercourse of animals or not at all?100 
From this passage it follows that Aristotle originally believed that 
some animals could be generated both from semen and by spon­
taneous generation, i.e. he held a theory of random spontaneous 
generation, which is the theory referred to in the passage from Met. Ζ 
quoted above.101 
The theory of random spontaneous generation has been taken to be 
reflected in the passage Met. Ζ 1034 b 4-6 dealt with above.102 In this 
passage Aristotle attributes spontaneous generation to matter that 
9 9
 BOSTOCK, Metaphysics Ζ and H... 139 ad Met. 1034 a 33 - b 7. 
1 0 0
 Prob. X, 65, 898 b 4-11 (read ή μή γίι^σθαι in 898 b 10). 
101
 This is the interpretation of Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics ...II, 183, who does 
not, however, see that no animals are generated both from themselves and by 
spontaneous generation in De Gen.An. Louis, La génération spontanée...304 claims 
that Aristotle admits in Hist.An. that flies formed in dung can be reproduced both 
from larvae (Hist.An. V, xix, 552 a 20-29) and by spontaneous generation, i.e. a 
theory of random spontaneous generation. 
102
 supra section (ii). BOSTOCK, Metaphysics Ζ and #...139 understands the 
passage as supporting the random spontaneous generation in Met. Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 
28-32. 
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initiates for itself that motion which seed initiates. However, it was 
seen in the last section that this theory, if taken at its face value, is 
problematic and can hardly be the full story. The passage is too brief 
to be interpreted as necessarily implying a theory of random 
spontaneous generation and must be understood in the light of Met. 
Z(VH), ix, 1034 a 9-32, as seen in the last section. 
The theory of random spontaneous generation was also held by 
Theophrastus.103 This theory, as found in Theophrastus, necessarily 
must be a theory earlier than the regularising of spontaneous 
generation found in De Gen.An. and Hist.An., a strong tendency 
towards which is found in Theophrastus.10'' It would, therefore, seem 
that Balme may be right in situating Theophrastus' views on 
spontaneity between Met. Ζ and De Gen.Ân..m 
At the time of writing De Gen.An. Aristotle held that spontaneous 
generation applies to all members of those classes of living beings 
that are said to be spontaneously generated, with the possible 
exception of snails. However, a reminiscence of the earlier theory of 
random spontaneous generation may be seen in Aristotle's account of 
the generation of testacea. 
At the start of his discussion of testaceans Aristotle states (a) that 
they "seem in a way to be generated from semen and in a way not 
from semen, (b) and in a way to be spontaneously generated and in a 
way from themselves, (c) or some by one method and some by the 
103
 C.P. I, i, 2. 
104
 Cf. BALME, Development ofbiology..A02-4. 
105
 It has been seen, furthermore, that Aristotle's view of spontaneity in Met. Ζ had 
materialist implications due to the absence of a (substitute) formal cause, even if 
Aristotle had no materialist intention. Theophrastus also does not mention the αρχή 
ψυχική of De GenAn., but attributes spontaneous generation to a material cause 
(moisture, air, earth, corruption) and to the heat of the sun as efficient cause. The 
evidence has been well drawn up by BALME, Development of biology...\02-A. 
Theophrastus also does not mention the theory of matter initiating motion (that of 
Met. Z), but his views are not incompatible with it. The same materialist implication is 
found, therefore, in Theophrastus' view of spontaneous generation and in Met. Z. 
Aristotle excludes this materialist implication in De Gen.An.. 
1 0 6
 De GenAn. Ill, xi, 761 a 16-19. 
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In the discussion Aristotle writes in regard to whelks and purpuras 
and those testaceans that are said to produce "honeycombs" that they 
emit quantities of slimy fluid emanating "as it were from some 
seminal substance" (οίον άπο σπερματική? φύσεως·, 761 b 32). Now 
he denies that this "seminal substance" is real semen and says we 
must consider it to correspond to sideshoots in plants.107 This 
discussion corresponds, then, to (a) in the introduction to testaceans. 
In the passage 761 b 23-26 Aristotle states that "some testaceans 
are generated spontaneously, others by emitting a δύναμις-
(=παραβλαστάνει), but these also often occur from a spontaneous 
formation (σύστασις)." This statement corresponds to (b) in the 
introduction. 
Finally, Aristotle states that "all testaceans that neither produce 
sideshoots (τταραβλαστάνει) nor make "honeycombs" (κηριάζει) 
reproduce by spontaneous generation" (762 a 8-9). This statement 
corresponds to (c) in the introduction. 
The conclusion therefore is that Aristotle does not believe that any 
testaceans reproduce by means of real semen (although the case of 
snails remains an open question, 762 a 32-35, cf. De GenAn. I, xiv, 
720 b 6-8 and Hist.An. V, xv, 546 b 17 ως ε ίπαν), but rather that 
those that "honeycomb" are to be assimilated to those that produce 
sideshoots. Aristotle allows that some testaceans arise only by 
spontaneous generation (follows from (c)), whereas others reproduce 
both by producing sideshoots (or honeycombs) and by spontaneous 
generation (follows from (b)). 
It has been pointed out that there is a discrepancy between 761 b 
23 - 762 a 8, where Aristotle allows that certain testaceans can be 
reproduced both by spontaneous generation and in another way, and 
763 a 25 - 763 b 16, where Aristotle states that all testaceans are 
formed spontaneously.108 There is no easy solution to this contra­
diction. One possibility is that 763 a 25 - 763 b 16 is a note that was 
Hence BALME, Development of biology...99 rightly rejects the examples given 
by Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics.. II, 183 as examples of living beings produced both 
έκ σπέρματος andan' αυτομάτου. 
1 0 8
 PECK, De Gen An. ..364, BYL, Recherches.. 270. 
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appended to the book at a later stage, since Aristotle states in 763 a 
24-25 that he has more or less concluded the discussion. However, it 
might also be taken from 763 a 7-8 that Aristotle held that all 
testaceans are generated spontaneously. Furthermore, Aristotle seems 
to imply in De Gen.An. I, xxiii, 731 b 12-13 that (all) testaceans are 
generated spontaneously. This is also the doctrine of Hist.An. V, xv, 
547 b 18-19. In Hist.An. V, xv, 546 b 22 Aristotle even denies that 
purpuras come into being from honeycombs. It is possible, but not 
proven, that 761 b 23 - 762 a 8 may be an earlier view later 
abandoned by Aristotle. The most helpful remark in regard to this 
problem seems to be that of Aristotle himself in regard to testacea: "in 
regard to all of these the facts are obscure" (τούτων 8è πβρί μέν 
πάντων άδηλον, 720 b 6-7). 
We may now return to Aristotle's introductory statement that 
testaceans seem "in a way to be generated from semen and in a way 
not" Aristotle was keen to maintain that testaceans are neither animals 
nor plants, but halfway between them and hence that there was at least 
a resemblance to semen in their manner of reproduction. It is possible, 
therefore, that the fact that Aristotle takes the trouble to explain that 
the "seminal substance" is not really semen may contain a 
reminiscence of the theory of random spontaneous generation which 
he refers to in Met. Ζ 1032 a 30-32. 
It may be concluded, then, that Aristotle originally believed that 
some animals could be generated both by semen and by spontaneous 
generation, i.e. random spontaneous generation. This theory 
harmonizes much better with the classification of spontaneous 
generation under ταύτόματον in Phys. . 1 0 9 It is supported by evidence 
from Met. Ζ and Prob, and is a theory that was held at some point 
(presumably before De Gen.An. was written) by Theophrastus. 
BALME, Development of biology. ..96 claims that Aristotle held that spontaneous 
generation occurs randomly in Phys. However, the passages relied on by Balme for 
support relate to Aristotle's account of chance as such and not to spontaneous 
generation in particular. It remains an open question, of course, to what extent 
Aristotle ever held that "random" spontaneous generation was genuinely random. 
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At a later stage, in De Gen.An., Aristotle no longer believed in 
random spontaneous generation. From his account of testacea in De 
Gen.An. it follows that they are all generated by spontaneous 
generation, with the possible exception of snails. There is, however, 
in the account a possible reminiscence of the earlier theory of random 
spontaneous generation. 
(d) The parallel between chance events and chance substances 
In this section the question will be raised to what extent chance 
events and chance substances are parallel to one another, i.e. to what 
extent the explanation of the former is compatible with that of the 
latter. 
A first difficulty in classifying chance substances under 
ταύτόματον was seen in Ch.I §(xvii) to be due to the fact that the 
cause of monsters and spontaneous generation is said in Phys. II, vi to 
be internal, whereas the cause of everything due to ταύτόματον 
(exclusive of τύχη) is external. Further difficulties will now be 
examined. 
(i) The unusualness of monsters and spontaneous generation 
It has been seen that chance substances, i.e. monsters and 
spontaneous generation occur counter to nature, since they do not 
occur always or for the most part, but unusually.110 However, it has 
been denied that spontaneous generation is unusual in De Gen.An., 
since "an almost clear distinction is drawn between those animals 
which are always spontaneously generated and the remainder which 
never are"
1
" But what Aristotle means is that the vast majority of 
animals are not generated spontaneously. Hence spontaneous 
generation occurs contrary to the norm of nature. That this is the 
supra section (b) and n. 11. 
' " BALME, Development of biology...91. TORSTRIK, JJept Τύχης..Α65 had already 
objected that spontaneous generation occurs regularly in the case of some animals and 
plants. The same objection is raised by HULL, The conflict...247. 
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correct interpretation is proven by the following statements in De 
Gen. An.: 
For monstrosity belongs to the class of things contrary to nature, but not 
against nature in its entirety, but nature taken as what holds for the most 
part. 
In the case of animals that usually bear only one offspring, 
Aristotle considers the production of twins to be monstrous: 
Hence such cases seem rather to be monstrous, because they occur 
contrary to the general rule and to what is usual.' '3 
Thus what occurs contrary to the usual in nature is monstrous. It is 
possible, in the case of the female, for nature not to achieve its end in 
a way that is usual. In this case Aristotle speaks of a natural 
deformity (αναπηρία φυσική).114 
It may, however, happen that that which occurs in the minority of 
cases also occurs regularly. In this case Aristotle states that it occurs 
contrary "to this particular order" (i.e. contrary to nature), but never 
in a merely random fashion (αεί μη τυχόντως)."5 He then writes: "it 
seems less of a monstrosity because even that which is contrary to 
nature is, in a way, in accordance with nature, namely when the 
formal nature has not gained control over the material nature""6 
People do not even call things of this kind monstrosities, e.g. in the 
case of the smoky vine."7 
Here Aristotle admits that generation contrary to nature does not 
occur randomly and appears "less of a monstrosity" (ήττον είναι 
оокеі τέρας), but "in a way in accordance with nature", because of its 
regularity, which is a regularity contrary to the regularity of most 
natural generation. 
1 1 2
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 770 b 9-11. 
1 1 3
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 772 a 36-37. Cf. De Gen.An. IV, in, 767 b 5-6: someone 
who does not resemble his parents is in a way a monstrosity. 
ш
 De Gen.An. IV, vi, 775 a 15-16, cf. De Gen.An. IV, iii, 767 b 8-9. 
1 1 5
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 770 b 14-15. 
1 1 6
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 770 b 15-17. 
1 1 7
 De Gen.An. IV, iv, 770 b 17-24. 
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The question arises, then, as to whether the regularity with which 
chance substances are generated falls under science or not. The 
question is certainly legitimate because Aristotle allows for the 
existence of a science ofthat which is unusual, but absolutely regular, 
e.g. honey-water is beneficial in case of fever except at the new 
moon."
8
 The answer to the question must, however, be negative. 
Aristotle maintains that monstrosities are contrary to nature and does 
not go further than to say that their frequent occurrence only means 
that they appear "less of a monstrosity" and "in a way in accordance 
with nature"119 
The reason why there is no science of monsters and spontaneous 
generation is that their occurrence is not fully regular and is 
unpredictable. It is true that monsters do not occur randomly,120 that 
only certain types of monsters are possible121 and that the reasons for 
their occurrence can be determined..122 It is also true that Aristotle 
gives a complex account of the occurrence of spontaneous generation. 
Species depend on the place and kind of material enclosed.123 
However, Balme goes too far when he claims that Aristotle in De 
Gen.An. "brings the proximate causes of spontaneity to scientific 
account"124 The fact remains that the occurrence of spontaneous 
generation and likewise of monsters is not fully regular and is 
unpredictable. 
Looked at from the point of view of the products of spontaneous 
generation, it is true that in De Gen.An. spontaneous generation 
applies to all members of the classes of living beings that are said to 
1 1 8
 Met. E(VI), ii, 1027 a 20-26, cf. supra Ch.4 (xi). 
1 1 9
 Cf. also Rhet. I, x, 13, 1369 b 2-5, discussed supra Ch.3(a), where Aristotle 
writes: "in regard to those things [sc. which occur] contrary to nature (παρά φύσιι>), 
there is no need to investigate minutely whether they occur in accordance with a 
certain nature or some other cause" Aristotle does not explain what this "nature" or 
other cause that causes things that occur contrary to nature might be. 
1 2 0
 supra n. 112 and 113. 
1 2 1
 De Gen.An. IV, iii, 769 b 10-25 and De Gen.An. IV, iii-iv in extenso. 
1 2 2
 Cf. supra §(b). 
1 2 3
 De Gen.An. Ill, xi, 762 a 18 - 762 b 18. Cf. BALME, Development of 
biology...9%-9\ DURING, Aristoteles...550. 
1 2 4
 BALME, Development o/'biology. ..98. 
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be spontaneously generated and does not apply to any other living 
beings, except for the questionable case of snails.1 5 This degree of 
regularity and of explicability is, however, counterbalanced by the 
unpredictability of the place and materials which make soul-principle 
form one type of spontaneous organism or another.126 
It may be concluded that Aristotle may well have believed in 
random spontaneous generation at the time of writing Phys. Whether 
he regarded spontaneous generation as occurring totally randomly in 
the same way as chance, is, of course, an open question. But he 
classed it under ταύτόματοί'.127 At the end of his career, in De 
Gen.An., however, he denies that monsters occur randomly and might 
well have done the same for spontaneous generation, given the 
detailed examination of its occurrence which he gives. The need to 
supply a specific formal cause by means of accidents in the matter 
might have been a reason for still holding that spontaneous generation 
is random in a sense. However, the situation is that Aristotle has not 
reduced the occurrence of monsters and spontaneous generation to a 
science, while at the same time they no longer fit in with the 
randomness of chance (if indeed they ever really did fit in). Indeed 
regularity of occurrence (as of spontaneous generation in De Gen.An. 
and Hist.Au.) is precisely the argument that Aristotle used to refute 
the non-teleological accounts of biological development given by 
Empedocles and Democritus. 
(ii) The unusual category and the efficient cause 
It is clear from Aristotle's account of monsters and spontaneous 
generation that he wishes to establish a parallel between chance 
events and chance substances, but that the parallel is not entirely 
satisfactory. In the first place monsters are due to the coincidence of a 
per se or substantial base (Nature's aim) with an unusual category. 
125
 Cf. this chapter (c)(ii). 
1 2 6
 This idea seems to be that expressed by LENNOX, Teleology ... 236 when he 
writes that "the core of incidental causation of processes described as by chance is 
that the result is not responsible for the process leading to it." 
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Aristotle would undoubtedly have to resort to the category of the right 
place to explain monsters. The cause expressed in De GenAn., 
however, as seen above, is either the joint action of more than one 
semen, or the lack of heat in the male principle, or the quantity of 
material presented to the male or its coldness (or perhaps a 
combination of these factors). It is therefore quite clearly very 
difficult to reduce these possible causes of monsters to the category of 
the right place. The problem arises in particular if the cause is viewed 
as being in the male principle for the following reason. Nature's aim 
and the seed are closely related, since the seed converts Nature's aim 
into the efficient cause that leads to a monster. The formal and final 
causes produce an efficient cause that acts on the matter. It is 
therefore unsatisfactory to consider the inadequate male principle as 
part of the unusual category required for a chance event. 
In the case of spontaneous generation the first difficulty is the 
absence of seeds. The absence of the seed means that the vehicle is 
absent which normally is required to transform the formal and final 
causes into an efficient cause that acts upon the matter.128 The 
absence of the formal cause {universale ante rem) is unproblematic 
where the outcome is a product normally produced by art, e.g. health. 
Thus health can be produced by chance by a blind efficient cause, e.g. 
an unskilled person or the sun shining, which causes the matter of 
health (i.e. heat) to initiate the motion leading to health. However, 
where the outcome is a substance, the formal cause must be supplied 
from something that existed in advance. Aristotle accordingly con­
cludes that the efficient cause (the sun) causes the water to heat and 
form a frothy bubble, thereby enclosing or determining the latent 
αρχή ψυχική in the matter and converting it into a specific formal 
cause. The mechanism of spontaneous generation is to be taken as 
parallel, then, to the mechanism by which a man recovers his health 
by chance, with the difference that in the case of spontaneous gene-
1 2 7
 Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-37. 
1 2 8
 For the seed as formal and efficient cause cf. Met. Z(VII), ix, 1034 a 33 - 1034 
b 6: το μεν γαρ σπέρμα...εχει γαρ δυνάμει το εΐδος.,.τήν κίνησιν ην το σπέρμα 
κινεί... 
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ration the formal cause has to be found in the matter or in some way 
added to it. It is this situation that is problematic. 
Once the formal cause has been brought about, however, it is also 
difficult to maintain that an unusual category intervenes to produce an 
unexpected or unusual result. One would have to maintain that it is 
the unpredictability of the place and the materials which make soul-
principle form one type of spontaneous organism or another that is an 
unusual category of the right place. 
(e) Conclusion 
In this chapter the various causes at work in chance events and 
chance substances were examined, as also was their complex 
interaction. A full account was given of the origin and constitution of 
monsters and spontaneously generated organisms. It is hoped that this 
account will be viewed as vastly more satisfactory than former 
accounts. 
It was seen, furthermore, that there is considerable evidence to 
show a marked evolution between Phys. and Met., on the one hand, 
and De Gen.An., on the other hand, in regard to Aristotle's theory of 
chance substances. This evolution is seen in regard to the cause of 
monsters and the development from random to regular spontaneous 
generation. 
It was seen that Aristotle considered chance events and chance 
substances to be parallel. Chance events occur where the formal 
cause, when converted into an efficient cause, concurs with an 
unusual category and a result is produced that was not a final cause, 
but could have been. In the case of chance in the area of nature there 
is an antecedent formal cause in the case of monsters, but not in the 
case of spontaneous generation. 
Difficulties in the theory are the fact that monsters and 
spontaneous generation are not as unusual or as spontaneous as 
chance events. The unusual category in the case of monsters and both 
the manner of production of the formal cause as well as the unusual 
category in the case of spontaneous generation also do not fit in well 
with the theory. 
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This investigation concludes the study of the theory and 
application of the theory of chance in Aristotle's work in the area of 
nature. In Part II of this volume we turn to the ethical works. 
PART TWO 
CHANCE IN THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 
In Part I of this volume the doctrine of chance in Aristotle's 
physical works was examined. In Part II the function of chance in the 
ethical works will be treated. It will be seen that in ЕЕ and MM 
Aristotle develops a doctrine of chance that goes much further than 
that of Phys. II, iv-v. In Chapter 6 chance will be examined as the 
source of external prosperity, which is a condition of happiness. In 
Chapter 7 Aristotle's analysis of good fortune by chance will be 
investigated, and his theory of intuition elucidated. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CHANCE AS THE SOURCE OF EXTERNAL PROSPERITY 
The present chapter on chance as the source of external prosperity 
will be divided into two parts. In part (a) the necessity of possessing 
external prosperity - and hence the inevitability of exposing happiness 
to the vagaries of chance - will be examined. An answer will be 
sought to the question of the extent to which this requirement makes 
happiness dependent upon chance. It will be seen that in solving the 
problem Aristotle introduces a fundamental distinction between a 
source and a condition of happiness. The nature and amount of the 
external prosperity necessary for happiness will be examined. In part 
(b) it will be seen that happiness is also dependent on chance from 
another point of view. For Aristotle happiness, the perfect realisation 
of human potential, requires a man to be perfectly happy throughout 
life and also requires a man to live a 'complete life' (βίος τέλειος·). 
The meaning of the happiness in question and the duration of a 
'complete life' and the extent to which the qualitative and quantitative 
requirements for happiness depend upon chance will accordingly be 
examined. 
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(a) The necessity of external prosperity 
Happiness for Aristotle is not a matter of chance,1 but depends on 
the effort of the individual to be virtuous. Virtue is the source of 
happiness. There are two kinds of virtue, contemplation (virtue of the 
theoretical part of the soul) and moral virtue (virtue of the practical 
part of the soul), and the former is the source of greater happiness 
than the latter.21 have argued elsewhere that moral virtue is part of the 
"contemplative life", firstly because moral virtue is required to 
achieve the discipline needed in order to contemplate as much as 
possible, and secondly because contemplation, through the influence 
of the final cause, attracts the individual to act virtuously. The ideal 
man cannot contemplate at all times or isolate himself totally and will 
act according to moral virtue in his dealings with other human beings, 
and hence achieve second-rate happiness whenever he is not 
achieving the supreme happiness found in contemplation. This 
complex topic will not be entered into here.3 
For Aristotle, however, the degree of happiness4 attained by any 
individual also depends on the circumstances under which he lives. If 
a man suffers grave misfortunes he will never be supremely happy, no 
matter how virtuous he is, since favourable circumstances (referred to 
as external prosperity) are necessary for supreme happiness. 
It is for this reason that chance plays a role in human happiness, 
since circumstances or external prosperity are not under human 
1
 NE 1, ¡χ, 5-6, 1099 b 20-25; Pol. VII. i, 1323 b 21-29. 
2
 According to Aristotle the source of happiness for man is "activity (ενέργεια) of 
the soul according to virtue, and if there are several virtues, according to the best and 
most perfect" (NE I, vii, 15, 1098 a 16-18). Cf. also NE I, ix, 7, 1099 b 26; I, x, 9, 
1100 b 8-10; I, x, 11, 1100 b 19-20. For the content of contemplation and moral 
virtue cf. my book Gott und θεωρία..., chapter 2 and my article Das betrachtende 
Leben...esp. p.35. 
3
 Cf. my book Gott und θεωρία..., chapter 2; my articles La contemplation 
(θεωρία) humaine selon Aristote...and Das betrachtende Leben... 
4
 On degrees of happiness in Aristotle cf. my article El sentido de la felicidad de la 
vida perfecta (bios teleios) en la Etica de Aristóteles...and infra this chapter (b)(i). 
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control, but are the outcome of chance. Although external prosperity 
is not a source of happiness, since an unvirtuous man can be 
wretchedly unhappy while surrounded by riches and every worldly 
advantage, it is a condition of supreme happiness.6 
A source of happiness differs from a condition of happiness in that 
it is an activity which when performed necessarily produces happiness 
in the individual, whereas the presence of a condition of happiness 
does not produce happiness in the individual, but enables the source 
to produce happiness. Aristotle himself points out the importance of 
the distinction between a source and a condition of happiness. He 
writes that the cause of disputes in regard to the nature of happiness 
lies in the fact that people regard things that are indispensable 
conditions of being happy as actual parts (i.e. sources) of happiness.7 
Aristotle states explicitly that the source of happiness is goods of 
the soul, not external goods.8 Those men who suppose that external 
goods are the source of happiness are like those who assign the cause 
of a brilliant performance on the harp to the instrument rather than to 
the skill of the player.9 
It is important to emphasize that external prosperity, which is a 
condition of happiness, is not a part of happiness, since only the 
sources of happiness are parts of happiness. This is clear from 
Aristotle's definition of happiness as an activity (е еруеіа),]0 i.e. as 
5
 NE I, x, 12, 1100 b 22; NE I, viii, 17, 1099 b 6-8; Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 21-29; ЕЕ 
VI(=W£VII),xiii,4, 1153b 21-22; MM II, viii, 1, 1206 b 30-34. 
6
 Л^ £ГІ, viii, 15, 1099 a 31-32; МММ, viii, 1, 1206b30-34. 
7
 ЕЕ I, ii, 5, 1214 b 24-27. Cf. MM I, i, 4-5, 1182 a 7-9 and Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 26-
29, where the distinction between sources and conditions is clear. It is remarkable that 
in Rhet. I, v, 4, 1360 b 19-23 Aristotle calls the goods which he lists "parts" (μέρη) of 
happiness, a view which he so clearly denounces in NE and ЕЕ. BURNET, The 
Ethics...45 calls it a popular usage. 
8
 NE I, viii, 2, 1098 b 14-16; I, viii, 3, 1098 b 18-20 (the τέλο? is happiness); NE 
I, ix, 7, 1099 b 25-28; NE I, x, 9, 1100 b 7-11 (το ευ here means happiness); ЕЕ I, iii, 
5-6, 1215 a 12-19; MM I, iv, 1-2, 1184 b 26-28. For the distinction between sources 
and conditions of happiness cf. Λ/ΑΠ, i, 4-5,1182 a 7-9. 
9
 Pol. VII, xiii, 1332 a 25-27. 
10
 NE I, vii, 15, 1098 a 16-18; NE I, viii, 2-3, 1098 b 15-19; A'S I, viii, 8, 1098 b 
30-31; NE I, viii, 14, 1099 a 29-31; JV£ I, ix, 7, 1099 b 26; NE I, x, 2, 1100 a 14; NE 
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resulting from activity, as is clear from the passages now to be 
discussed. 
Aristotle concludes as follows his argument about amusements: 
"For happiness does not lie in such pursuits [sc. amusements], but in 
virtuous activities (èv TOÛÇ κατ' άρετην ένεργειαι.?)..."11 It is clear 
from Aristotle's turn of phrase in this passage that happiness is not 
itself an activity, but is to be found in activity. Again, he holds that 
activities in accordance with excellence (αρετή) are the causes of 
happiness.1" Thus happiness is not an activity, but the result of 
activity. But as external prosperity is not an activity, happiness is 
neither identical with external prosperity nor produced by it. External 
prosperity is therefore not a part of happiness, although it is a 
condition required for happiness.13 
I, x, 9, 1100 b 10, NE I, xui, 1, 1102 a 5-6, NE 1, xni, 6, 1102 a 17, NE IX, ix, 5, 
1169 b 29, NEX, vi, 2, 1176 b 1-5. NEX, vu, 1, 1177 a 12-18, NE X, vu, 8, 1177 b 
26-31, £ £ I, in, 5-6, 1215 a 12-19, ЕЕ II, ι, 7-9, 1219 a 27-39, Pol VII, vni, 1328 a 
37-38, Met Θ(ΙΧ), vi, 8, 1048 b 26-28 
11
 Mi X, vi, 8, 1177 a 9-10 
12
 NE I, x, 9, 1100 b 9-10 κιιριαι δ' eioii' αϊ κατ' αρ€την έΐΈργειαι. της 
€ύδαιμοιαα?, NE Ι, χ, 13, 1100 b 33-34 
13
 COOPER, Aristotle on the goods of fortune 173-4 and passim and IRWIN, 
Permanent happiness 95, 101 have not grasped the fact that a condition of or 
instrument required to achieve happiness is not regarded by Aristotle as a constituent 
of eudaimoma An instrument used by a source of happiness is not a part of happiness 
or included in it Only a source of happiness is considered to be a constituent of 
happiness 
Cooper holds that external prosperity is included in Aristotle's "definition" of 
happiness in NE and that it is hardly referred to and then only as a condition of 
happiness in ЕЕ and MM, and that his interpretation of NE was the view of Cicero 
and Anus Didymus Hence he claims (ibid 174-6) that Cicero and Anus Didymus 
must have been referring to NE and not ЕЕ or MM in their accounts of Aristotle's 
view of happiness As shown in this section, external prosperity is a condition, not a 
source (and hence not a constituent) of happiness in all of Aristotle's ethical writings 
Furthermore, it seems clear that Cooper has overpressed the passage he quotes form 
Cicero Cicero, De Fin II, vi, 19 writes "Multi enim et magni philosophi haec ultima 
bonorum luneta fecerunt, ut Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prospentate 
coniunxit " Cooper, ibid, claims that this passage shows that Aristotle regarded 
external prosperity as a source of happiness KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect 
Life 118-9 has objected that Cicero's passage is more naturally read as 'the good 
fortune of having a complete life' This does not seem to be a sufficient reply to 
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Chance is accordingly related to happiness in that it is the cause of 
external prosperity, which is a condition of supreme happiness. The 
necessity of this external prosperity for supreme happiness will be set 
out in what follows The nature and amount of the external prosperity 
required will be examined afterwards. 
The necessity of external prosperity for happiness, by which he 
means supreme happiness, is stated explicitly by Aristotle.14 The lack 
of certain external advantages damages supreme happiness.15 No-one 
calls a man perfectly happy if he meets with misfortunes like those of 
Cooper, since Cooper's translation seems correct "Aristotle combined the exercise of 
virtue with prosperity over a complete lifetime " I prefer therefore to repl> to Cooper 
that it is not possible to read so much into Cicero's statement, since it is both possible 
and likely that Cicero was giving a compressed view of happiness without 
distinguishing sources and conditions of happiness Kenny, ibid , holds rightly that 
the passage provides not the slightest evidence that Cicero is referring to NE rather 
than ЕЕ or MM, since Aristotle regards external goods as a necessary instrument for 
the exercise of virtue in both ЕЕ and MM 
As for Arms Didymus, the emendation containing the term χορηγεω (ар Stobaeus 
II, 51 12 Wachsmuth). which might indicate that his source was NE I, is to be 
rejected Cf MORAUX, Der Anstotelismus I, 353 n 117 and the literature he refers to 
and more recently COOPER, ibid 185 and ANNAS, The morality of happiness 379 
There is therefore no adequate basis for Cooper's thesis that the "practice of assigning 
priority on the central questions of philosophical theory to the Nicomachean Ethics 
over the other treatises was standard already by the beginning of the first century ВС 
at latest " In all probability Aristotle's three ethical works were in circulation and of 
equal authority NE may have been drawn upon more for the discussion of external 
goods with the Stoics, as Aristotle made more of a problem out of external goods in 
NE Cf also infra Ch 9 
14
 NE I, vin, 15, 1099 a 31-33, I, vin, 17, 1099 b 6-7, NE I, ix, 7, 1099 b 26-28, 
NEI, χ, 15, 1101 a 14-15, NEX, vin, 9, 1178 b 33-35, NE X, vin, 11, 1179 a 9-12, 
Pol VII, xiii, 1331 b 39 - 1332 a 1, ЕЕ VI (= NE VII), хш, 2, 1153 b 17-19, ЕЕ VIII, 
m, 16, 1249 b 16-19, MM II, vin, 1, 1206 b 33-34, MM II, vin, 12, 1207 b 16-18 
GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque . II, 69 and DURING, Aristoteles. 16 are 
convinced that the metaphor in χορηγεω and its derivatives was still felt in Aristotle's 
time, but RACKHAM, NE 42-3 and ERIKSEN, BIOS Theoretikos 103 are convinced of 
the contrary The derivatives are also found in NE X, vu, 4, 1177 a 30, NE X, vin, 4, 
1178 a 24, Pol. VII, ι, 1323 b 41, Pol VII, ìv, 1325 b 38, Pol I, vi, 1255 a 14, Pol 
IV, ι, 1288 b 40, Pol IV, и, 1289 a 33, Pol IV, χι, 1295 a 28 
15
 NE I, vin, 16, 1099 b 2 Cf GAUTHIER, La Morale 65 who says of man's need 
for external prosperity "Bien sûr, d'en être prive, c'est sur son bonheur une 
meurtrissure " 
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Priam ' 5 Great and repeated pieces of good fortune make life more 
blissful, as they embellish life, and the use of them is noble and good, 
whereas the reverse crushes and blights blissfulness both by causing 
pain and hindering many activities.17 Thus the sources of happiness 
when accompanied by the conditions necessary for supreme happiness 
produce greater happiness than the sources alone. 
Accordingly, it is clear that Aristotle considers a certain measure 
of external prosperity to be necessary for supreme happiness. 
However, he reduces as much as possible the importance of external 
prosperity, while still considering it indispensable. He minimises its 
importance by viewing it not as a source, but only as a condition of 
happiness.18 He refers to it as a necessary adjunct required in 
addition19 to the sources of happiness. The great-souled man will be 
neither too happy at good fortune nor too grieved by bad luck.20 
External prosperity is made up of a considerable number of goods, 
some of which are necessary for different reasons than others. Also 
the amount of external prosperity necessary for perfect happiness is 
limited. The nature and amount of the external prosperity necessary 
for happiness will now be examined. 
In Aristotle a variety of classifications of goods is found: a twofold 
division into internal and external goods; a threefold division into 
,6/V£I, ix, 11, 1100 a 5-9, W£ I, x, 14,1101 a6-8 
11
 NEI, χ, 12, 1100 b 25-30 
18
 BURNET, The Ethics 5 writes- "It is, of course, quite clear that Happiness, like 
everything else in this world, is dependent on certain material conditions, but that is 
no reason for including those conditions in its definition. It is true that a tragedy, 
however fine it may be, cannot be produced at all without a chorus and costumes and 
scenery, but these things are no part of the tragedy itself, they are the province of the 
choregos and not of the poet " Cf GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque. II, 74-5; 
STEWART, ¿V£ I, 135-6, DURING, Aristoteles . 16 Cf also NE Ι, χι, 4, 1101 a 31-33 
where Aristotle uses the image of a tragedy to represent life. 
,9JV£I,viii, 5-6, 1098b22-26,1, vin, 15, 1099 a31-32,1, vin, 17, 1099b6-7,££ 
VI (=NE VII), xni, 2-4, 1153 b 17-21 Aristotle uses the verbs προσδέομαι and 
συμπάραλαμβάνω to indicate that external prosperity, although necessary, is only a 
supplementary adjunct required in addition Cf GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à 
Nicomaque II, 68 ad 1099 a 15, BURNET, The Ethics 44, STEWART, NE I, 122-3. In 
MM II, vni, 12, 1207 b 18 ευτυχία is held to beaui'epyoç τη ευδαιμοιαα 
20NEW, m, 18, 1124a 15-16 
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goods of the soul, goods of the body and external goods; a fourfold 
division into goods of the soul, goods of the body, external goods and 
goods of fortune.21 Aristotle's various classifications of goods seem to 
indicate, not an evolution in his thought in regard to the classification 
of goods, but rather a certain flexibility in the classification of goods. 
In the present argument external prosperity is used for the sake of 
convenience in the sense in which it includes goods of the body and 
goods of fortune, i.e. in the sense in which it includes all goods except 
goods of the soul.22 
External prosperity is subdivided in NE into two categories of 
goods, some of which are indispensable conditions (υπάρχεις 
άναγκαΐον) of happiness and others of which are of the nature of 
auxiliaries (σύνεργα) and useful instrumentally (όργανικώ?).2"1 Some 
of the goods which in NE are held to be auxiliaries and instrumentally 
useful to happiness are friends, wealth and political power; some of 
the goods, which are simply "indispensable" to happiness, i.e. the lack 
of which spoils supreme happiness, are good birth, satisfactory 
children and personal beauty.24 It is clear that this list only contains 
examples (οίον, 1099 b 2) - three of each kind - and is far from 
exhaustive. Even honour, the greatest of the external goods,25 is not 
21
 In Protrep. В 21 DURING; Rhet. I, v, 3-4, 1360 b 14-29; NE I, viii, 2, 1098 b 12-
15 goods of the soul and of the body are internal goods. In ЕЕ VI (=NE VII), xiii, 2, 
1153 b 17-18; Pol. VII, i, 2, 1323 a 24-27; MM I, iii, 1, 1184 bl-4; II, iii, 14, 1200 a 
12-14 and MM II, vi, 21, 1202 a 30-32 goods of the body are not external goods, but 
are not necessarily to be taken as internal goods either. Finally, in NE I, viii, 15-16, 
1099 a 31 -b 6; ЕЕ II, i, 1, 1218 b 32; Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 27 and Protrep. В 2 DURING 
goods of the body are part of external goods. The goods of fortune are added in ЕЕ VI 
(=NE VII), xiii, 2, 1153 Ы 7-19 and Rhet. I, v, 4, 1360 b 19-29. 
2 2
 This is the use found in NE I, viii, 15-16, 1099a31 - b 6; ЕЕ II, i, 1, 1218 b 32; 
Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 27. 
2 3
 NE I, ix, 7, 1099 b 26-28. External goods are also called an instrument 
(όργανον) in Pol. I, viii, 1256 b 35; Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 7-8; cf. also NE I, x, 12, 1100 
b 27 (χρήσις). 
2 4
 NE I, viii, 15-16, 1099 b 1-3. Cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque...]!, 
70-1. 
25
 NE IV, iii, 10, 1123 b 17-21. It should be noted that Aristotle also says that 
friends are the greatest of external goods (NE IX, ix, 2, 1169 b 10). GAUTHIER-JoLiF, 
LEthique à Nicomaque ...II, 278-9 (followed by KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect 
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on the list. It is, however, to be found listed among external goods on 
the longer list in Rhet.26 In ЕЕ Aristotle also gives an abbreviated list 
of natural goods (των φύσει αγαθών), and mentions that there are 
other goods (των άλλων αγαθών).27 In MM he also gives a few 
examples of the different kinds of goods.28 In Rhet. II, xii he lists three 
external goods - noble birth, wealth and power - which he refers to as 
being τύχη.2 9 Eriksen considers it "remarkable that scholë is not 
counted as an external good"30 But he has not noticed that Aristotle 
does not give an exhaustive list of external goods. It is in fact implied 
in Pol. VII that σχολή is an external good.31 Possibly the availability 
of σχολή is regarded by Aristotle as a necessary concomitant of 
wealth and so not worth mentioning separately on his lists. Some of 
the other external goods that are instrumentally useful to moral virtue 
are strength and opportunity (εξουσία),32 health, food and other 
requisites.33 
There is not too much difficulty in seeing the usefulness of the 
external goods that Aristotle qualifies as auxiliaries and 
instrumentally useful, e.g. friends, wealth and political power.34 
Friends are useful instrumentally both for contemplation and for 
Life...40 n.32) attempt to explain this anomaly by claiming that Aristotle is referring 
to a popular opinion (δοκεΐ) about useful friends, and not to his own view about 
"true" friends, whom they claim are "interior goods" But the reference to friends in 
NE I, viii, 15. 1099 b 1-2 shows that useful friends are meant and are thought of as 
instruments. Thus useful friends are external goods (Rhet. I, v, 4, 1360 b 27; ЕЕ VIII, 
iii, 16, 1249 b 18) and are necessary to the perfectly happy man. Possibly the best 
solution to the anomaly is to understand μέγιστοι» (1169 b 10) as meaning "very 
great" and not "the greatest" 
2 6
 Rhet. I, v, 3-4, 1360 b 14-29. 
2 7
 £ £ VIII, iii, 16,1249 b 16-18. 
2SMMl, iii, 1, 1184 b 1-4. 
2 9
 Rhet. II, xii, 1388 b 36 -1389 a 2. 
3 0
 ERIKSEN, Bios Theoretikos..A49. 
3)
 Pol. VII, xv, 1334 a 33-34. 
3 2
Λ£Χ, viii, 4, 1178 a 32-33. 
"NEX, viii, 9, 1178b 33-35. 
3 4
 NE I, viii, 15, 1099 a 32 - 1099 b 2. 
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moral virtue.35 However, it should be observed that wealth and 
political power are not useful for contemplation, but only for moral 
virtue. The liberal man and the magnificent man will need wealth to 
perform liberal and magnificent actions and the just man to discharge 
his obligations.36 But Aristotle does not say that wealth and political 
power are useful only for secondary happiness (the happiness arising 
from moral virtue) - they are indispensable for happiness without 
qualification, i.e. perfect happiness. Thus there is evidence that moral 
virtue is included to a certain extent in the life of contemplation. 
If one takes the external goods that are held in NE to be 
"indispensable conditions" (ύπάρχειν αναγκαίοι', 1099 b 27) of 
happiness, and yet are not listed by Aristotle as "instrumentally use­
ful" (i.e. to contemplation and moral virtue), one may well wonder 
why they are "indispensable" Since Aristotle deliberately does not list 
them as "instrumentally useful" to contemplation or moral virtue,37 
they should be unnecessary, since happiness does not have its source 
in external goods. 
In order to try to solve this problem it has been argued that the 
"indispensable conditions" of happiness which Aristotle does not list 
as instrumentally useful in NE, are nonetheless instrumentally 
useful.38 It has also been argued that the non-instrumental 
3 5
 NE VIH, i, 1, 1155 a 6-9; NE IX, ix, 2, 1169 b 8-16; NE IX, ix, 5, 1170 a 2-3; 
NE X, vii, 4, 1177 a 34. Cf. my book Gott und θεωρία..Λ 17 and my article Das 
betrachtende Leben...34. 
3 6
 ΛΈIV, i i, 1, 1122 a 18-23; 7V£X, vüi, 4, 1178a28-30. 
37
 Cf. LÉONARD, Le Bonheur...51-2: "On ne peut aucunement prétendre que la 
noblesse de race, une heureuse progéniture, la beauté soient des instruments de la 
vertu pratique..." 
38
 Early in the twentieth century ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen...II, 2, 855 
held that external prosperity without distinction is instrumental for the attainment of 
moral virtue. More recently, COOPER, Aristotle on the goods of'fortune... 183 has put 
forward the view that: "Having good children...can easily be seen to contribute to the 
exercise of the virtues...One central context for the exercise of the virtues is in the 
raising of children..." Cf. ibid. 189: "The failure to have good children only affects his 
[sc. the ideal man's] happiness insofar as it prevents the subsequent activities he 
might have engaged in together with them." This is a modem attitude certainly not 
shared by Aristotle, who would not have seen the activity of educating of children as 
an indispensable condition of a philosopher's happiness. His remark on the first page 
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"indispensable conditions", while not directly useful as instruments 
for virtuous activity, are nonetheless instrumentally useful for the 
achievement of political power, which is in turn instrumentally useful 
for the exercise of virtue.39 
These attempts to solve the problem cannot convince because the 
simple fact is that Aristotle deliberately did not include certain 
"indispensable conditions" of happiness on his list of external goods 
that are "instrumentally useful" (sc. to contemplation and moral 
virtue). It is impossible to get away from this fact. In order to discover 
why these goods are considered indispensable, it is doubtless best to 
follow Aristotle's train of thought. It is clear, firstly, that Aristotle 
was inspired to place these goods, e.g. good birth, satisfactory 
children, personal beauty into his ideal of perfect happiness because 
traditional concepts of happiness included them.40 The views of the 
many and the wise are Aristotle's point of departure in NE. If the 
general view is that someone lacking these goods cannot be perfectly 
happy, then there is good reason to think that the perfect life must 
require them. Aristotle is interested in the perfect life and hence holds 
that happiness lacks nothing.41 His view is finally made clear when he 
of the Physics is very significant in this regard: "Children at first call all men father 
and all women mother, and only later come to distinguish them" (Phys. I, i, 184 b 12-
14). This kind of situation could only arise where neither father nor mother look after 
their children. For Aristotle's negative views on children cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, 
L'Ethique Nicomaque...\\, 75-6. 
3 9
 KRAUT, Aristotle on the human good...254-5 rightly rejects Cooper's view that 
in NE all of the external goods were intended by Aristotle to be used as an instrument 
for the promotion of virtuous activity. But he then holds the similar view that they 
were held by Aristotle to be indispensable because they are nonetheless useful (i.e. 
instrumental) in promoting one's power or social status. 
4 0
 For the list of goods included in the classical Greek ideal of happiness cf. Plat. 
Ap. 30 a-b; Gorg. 467 e 4, 477 с 1; Meno 78 с 5 - d 6; 87 d 2 - 89 a 2; Euthyd. 279 a 
7 - b 5; Ale. I, 104 a 2 - с 1, 131 b - c; Resp. 491 с 2-3, 591 b 5-7, 618 с 6 - e 4; 
Phileb. 48 e 1 - 10; Leg. 631 b 6 - d 6, 661 a 4 - с 5, 697 a 6 - b 6, 726 a 2 - 728 a 3, 
743 e 2-6; 870 a 8 - b 6; Ep. VII, 335 b; VIII, 355 b 2-6; Epin. 979 с 4-5; Isoc. Evag. 
22-23, 70-72; Arist. Rhet. I, v, 1360 b 19-29. 
4 1
 NE I, vii, 7, 1097 b 15-16; NE IX, ix, 3, 1169 b 19-20: NE IX, ix, 9, 1170 b 17-
18; NE X, vi, 2, 1176 b 5; NE X, vii, 7, 1177 b 25-26; ЕЕ VI (=NE Vil), xiii, 2, 1153 
b 16-17; MMl, ii, 9, 1184 a 27-29. 
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states in NE that great and repeated pieces of good fortune 
(ευτυχήματα) make life more blessed because they embellish 
(συνεπικοσμεΐΐ') life and also [presumably in regard to the 
instrumentally useful goods] because the use of them is beautiful 
(καλή) and virtuous.42 However philosophically unsatisfactory, it 
would appear, therefore, that Aristotle considered e.g. good birth, 
satisfactory children, personal beauty in NE to be indispensable 
conditions for happiness for purely aesthetic reasons, because they 
embellish (σννεπικοσμεϊν) life.43 Wicked children44 spoil one's life, 
not because one cannot act virtuously towards them (which one 
certainly can), and not because they prevent us achieving political 
power, but from an aesthetic point of view, because they spoil the 
setting or surroundings of the perfect life.45 
When we turn to ЕЕ and MM we do not find the subdivision of 
external prosperity into those goods that are indispensable conditions 
(ύπάρχειν άναγκαΐον) of happiness and those that are auxiliaries 
(συνεργό) and instrumentally useful (όργαΐΊκώς), as found in NE. In 
ЕЕ and MM all external prosperity is considered to be instrumentally 
useful for virtue.46 Thus in ЕЕ VI (=NE VII) Aristotle states clearly 
that all external goods - those of the body, external goods and the gifts 
of fortune - are required for happiness in order that the activities (that 
are sources of happiness) may not be impeded through lack of them.47 
"NEI, x, 12, 1100 b 26-28. 
4 3
 Cf. IRWIN, Permanent happiness...97 who speaks of them as "intrinsic (i.e. not 
purely instrumental) goods." For an excellent refutation of the instrumental theory cf. 
ANNAS, The morality of happiness...380. 
4 4
 NE I, viii, 16, 1099 b 5: πάγκακοι παίδες. 
4 5
 The role of aesthetics in Aristotle's philosophy (and indeed in Greek philosophy 
as a whole) has been largely neglected. The most outstanding example in Aristotle is 
the theory that circular motion is more perfect than rectilinear. Outstanding examples 
in other philosophers are Parmenides' aesthetic reason for holding that the universe 
must be limited and Pythagoras' aesthetic reason for holding that there must be ten 
heavenly bodies and hence an anti-earth. 
4 6
 The same view is found in Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 40 - 1324 a 2 and Protrep. В 8 
(DURING). External goods are for the sake of the soul: Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 18-21; cf. 
Pol. I, iv, 1253 b 31-32. 
4 7
 ЕЕ VI (=NE VII), xiii, 2,1153 b 17-19. 
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In ЕЕ good birth (a merely "indispensable" condition of happiness in 
NE) is listed alongside wealth and power48 (which are auxiliaries and 
instrumentalIy useful in NE), and hence it might appear that in ЕЕ 
Aristotle has dropped the distinction between "indispensable 
conditions" and "auxiliaries" of happiness. At the conclusion of ЕЕ 
Aristotle states that one must choose the amount of goods of the body, 
wealth, friends and the other goods that will most produce the 
contemplation of God,49 which is the source of happiness. Friends 
were seen (in discussing NE) to be useful both for contemplation and 
moral virtue.50 Some goods of the body were also seen (in discussing 
NE) to be useful for both contemplation and moral virtue 51 But one 
does not use other goods of the body - beauty, stature, fitness for 
athletic contests52 - directly for contemplation or moral virtue. 
However, as Aristotle holds goods of the body in ЕЕ to be 
instrumentally useful for contemplation, his view in ЕЕ must be to 
consider these goods of the body as useful to making friends or 
gaining wealth or political power and thus as indirectly useful 
instrumentally to contemplation or moral virtue.53 Finally, wealth is 
4 8
 E£ VIII, in,9, 1249 a 10 
" ' Е Е Vili, in, 16, 1249 b 16-19 Cf GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique a Nicomaque II, 
884 ad 1178 b 4-5 Cf GlGON, Zwei Interpretationen 215 "Der Text sagt ποιήσει 
[1249 b 17], wobei es sich von selbst versteht, daß dieses Wort nicht gepreßt werden 
darf Die richtige Auswahl der außeren Güter wird die θεωρία natürlich nicht 
erzeugen, wohl aber sie ermöglichen ποιείι· ist nicht mehr als der Gegenbegriff zu 
κωλυειν (b 20) Sowohl der Überfluß wie auch der Mangel an den φύσει αγαθά 
können die θεωρία stören und verhindern " 
50
 Cf supra η 35 
51
 NE X, vin, 9, 1178 b 33 -1179 a l 
52Rhet I,v,4, 1360 b 22 
5 3
 Cf VANIER, Le Bonheur 169, who turns beauty into a good that is useful 
instrumentally He writes "la beauté rend plus faciles les relations d'amitiés, un 
homme qui est trop laid a voir aura difficilement des amis" Again ibid 172 he writes 
"la beauté elle-même n'est-elle pas un moyen par rapport à l'amitié9" 
Likewise, in regard to good birth he writes (ibid 174) "L'instrumentalité de la 
noblesse de race est encore plus frappante quand on sait la place qu' Aristote donne a 
l'éducation et au 'bon naturel' provenant de l'heredite dans l'acquisition de la vertu" 
Cf NUSSBAUM, The fragility of goodness 328 STEWART, NE I, 130 even goes so far 
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necessary for moral virtue, not for contemplation. Aristotle therefore 
must mean that one should choose the amount of wealth which will 
best promote moral virtue, which in turn will promote contemplation. 
In MM Aristotle holds political power (αρχή), wealth, health 
(ισχύ?) and beauty to be potentialities (δυνάμει?), by which he 
means instruments for virtuous or unvirtuous use.54 In NE he had held 
that beauty was merely "indispensable" to happiness, but not 
instrumentally useful. Again, in MM Aristotle holds that good birth, 
one of the non-instrumental indispensable conditions of happiness in 
NE, is an auxiliary (συνεργός·) of happiness, i.e. instrumentally 
useful.55 
The conclusion may therefore be drawn that Aristotle presents a 
much more coherent vision of external goods in ЕЕ and MM, since he 
regards them all as instruments useful directly or indirectly for the 
exercise of moral virtue and contemplation. The problem raised by 
indispensable conditions of happiness that are considered not to be 
instrumentally useful for virtue, as found in NE, is absent both in ЕЕ 
and in MM. 
Aristotle applies his doctrine of the mean not only to moral virtue, 
but also to external prosperity. The amount of external goods 
necessary for perfect happiness is neither too great nor too small, but 
a medium amount, the right amount.56 Those who possess a medium 
amount of goods are more willing to obey reason. For a person who is 
excessively beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite -
excessively poor or weak or of very low class - it is difficult to follow 
the rule of reason.57 Too many external goods are harmful or at least 
as to claim that eirvéveia is "on a higher level than the 'instruments' or 'ornaments' 
of €ύδαιμοιάα." 
5 4
 Λ/Λ/1, ii, 2-3, 1183 b 27-35. 
55
 MM 11, viii, 5, 1207 a24 and MMII, viii, 12, 1207 b 18. 
5 6
 Pol. IV, xi, 1295 b 3-5; Pol. I, viii, 1256 b 31-37; ЕЕ VI (= NE VII), xiii, 4, 
1153 b 21-24. For another argument in favour of moderate wealth cf. Pol. IV, xi, 
1295 b 13-21. Poverty leads to crime: cf. Pol. II, vi, 1265 b 12; Pol. II, vii, 1266 b 38 
- 1267 a 1; Pol. II, ix, 1270 b 10; Pol. IV, viii, 1293 b 38-39. The passages referred to 
in this note and in the remainder of the notes in this section have been overlooked by 
IRWIN, Permanent happiness...98-9 and ANNAS, The morality of happiness...3S\-4. 
51
 Pol. IV, xi, 1295 b 5-9. 
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of no value to their possessor58 One should not have too many 
friends,59 nor too much wealth,60 nor too many bodily goods. ' 
All types of goods are necessary for perfect happiness.62 But there 
is a fundamental difference between goods of the soul and external 
goods. Goods of the soul are the goods which are most properly called 
goods and are most good6 1 One cannot have too many goods of the 
soul M External goods, on the other hand, are for the sake of the 
soul 6<i One must have neither too many nor too few of them, and the 
right amount is the amount that promotes the activities of the soul, i.e. 
contemplation and moral virtue.66 
There is only one external good, namely wealth, about which 
Aristotle gives more details as to how much quantitatively the ideal 
man should possess. For contemplation external goods are in general 
a hindrance,67 although collaborators are an external good which 
enables one to contemplate better.68 The ideal man will, of course, 
need the necessities of life.69 Furthermore, the ideal man, inasmuch as 
he is a man and lives with a number of people, also chooses to 
perform morally virtuous actions, and for this purpose he needs 
external goods.70 There is a seeming conflict in NE between the 
5 8
 Pol Vii, i,1323b 7-10 
5 9
 Pol IV, xi, 1295 b 14-15 
60
 Pol IV, xi, 1295 b 14, NE X, vin, 6, 1178 b 4-5 
6 1
 ЕЕ VI (=NE VII), xiv, 2, 1154 a 15-16 
6 2
 Pol VII, ι, 1323 a 26-27, ЕЕ VI (-NE VII), xiii, 2, 1153 b 17-19, Rhet I, ν, 4, 
1360 b 19-29 
"NEI, ш, 2, 1098 b 12-15, MM I, in, 1, 1184b 4-5 The activity of the soul is 
the soul's good (NE I, ix, 7, 1099 b 26-28) The activity of the soul must be a good, 
since Aristotle speaks of the other goods 
6 4
 Pol VII, ι, 1323 b \0-U, ЕЕ VI (NE VII), xiv, 2, 1154 a 13-14 
6 5
 Cf supra η 46 
6 6
 Cf supra η 47 and 49 
6 7
 NE X, vin, 6,1178b 3-5 
6 8
 NE X, vii, 4, 1177 a 34 When Aristotle states m NE X, vin, 6, 1178 b 3-5 that 
external goods (των τοιούτων 1178 b 3) are so to speak a hindrance to contemplation 
he is doubtless thinking only of wealth, since the collaborators or friends who help 
one contemplate better are also external goods Cf my book Gott und ешріа 116-7 
69
У £ Х , ш,4, 1178 a 25-26 
7 0
 NE X, ш, 6, 1178b 5-6 
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amount of external goods which the ideal man will need and find 
beneficial for his contemplation and the amount for the morally 
virtuous actions he will perform. The requirements in external goods 
for contemplation and moral virtue differ widely.71 The liberal man 
needs wealth to be liberal and the just man to return services.72 
Aristotle seeks to reconcile the differing requirements. He reaches a 
compromise solution by minimising the amount of external goods 
necessary for moral virtue.73 He concludes that the ideal man will not 
require many or great possessions - moderate resources suffice.74 -
The politician, on the other hand, who is not Aristotle's ideal man, 
and leads only the life of second-rate happiness, the life of moral 
virtue only, needs a great deal of external goods (πολλών δεΐται) and 
the more so, the greater and more noble are his actions, such as 
liberality and justice.75 
In ЕЕ it appears that Aristotle is concerned only with the 
contemplative life (which includes moral virtue) and not with the life 
of moral virtue only (the life of secondary happiness, as it is called in 
NE). Hence in ЕЕ the amount of external goods needed by the ideal 
man is defined as the amount that will best promote the contemplation 
of God.76 
It may be noted, in addition, that chance as the 'explanation' of 
external prosperity can be divided into chance in the area of art and 
chance in the area of nature.77 A man can be wealthy, have friends and 
political power by chance, although he would normally acquire them 
7,JV£X, viii,4, 1178 a 28. 
12
 NE X,\iii, 4, 1178 a 28-30. 
ъ
 Neither self-sufficiency (a requirement of perfect happiness) nor moral virtue 
require an excessive amount of external goods; it is possible to perform noble deeds 
without being ruler of land and sea (a hyperbolic expression); one can practice moral 
virtue with moderate resources (NE X, viii, 9-10,1179 a 3-6). 
14NEX, viii, 9-10, 1179 a 1-9. 
7 5
 NE X, viii, 4-5, 1178 a 28 - 1178 b 3. It should be noted, however, that Aristotle 
attaches more value to the intention of the person who performs an action than to the 
mere achievement (NE IV, i, 19, 1120 b 7-10). 
7 6
 £ £ VIII, Hi, 16, 1249 b 16-21. 
7 7
 Cf. Rhet. I, ν dealt with in Ch.3(a) and n.5. 
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by art. If he is of noble birth and beautiful, this is due to chance in the 
area of nature. 
Aristotle, accordingly, unlike Antisthenes, the Stoics, Christianity 
and Plotinus, maintains that the most perfect life is dependent for its 
existence to some extent on the availability of favourable external 
circumstances. External prosperity (i.e. all goods except goods of the 
soul) is, however, not a source, but an indispensable condition of 
happiness. In NE Aristotle regards some external goods as necessary 
conditions for happiness, although they are not instrumentally useful 
for virtue or contemplation. However, in ЕЕ and MM he holds that all 
external goods are either directly or indirectly instrumental ly useful 
for moral virtue and contemplation. The amount of external goods 
indispensable for happiness is neither too great nor too small, but the 
right amount, i.e. the amount which will best promote moral virtue 
and contemplation. The source of external prosperity, which is a 
condition of supreme happiness in all of Aristotle's ethical works, is 
chance (τύχη). This is, accordingly, the first way in which chance 
plays a significant role in Aristotle's Ethics. 
It is undoubtedly true that Aristotle seeks to do justice both to the 
view that happiness must be something dependent on human action 
and available to all who seek it in the right way, which leads to the 
conclusion that its source is virtue, and the popular perception that a 
certain amount of external prosperity is necessary for happiness, 
which leaves this requirement for happiness in the hands of chance.78 
The only way to make happiness dependent exclusively on man is to 
adopt the Stoic view that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness and 
that a man can be happy (at least have a good conscience) even on the 
rack. The fact that Aristotle did not wish to adopt this radical view, 
but sought to integrate the requirement of external prosperity into his 
view of happiness, means that there is inevitably a tension within this 
ANNAS, The morality of happiness. ..384 concludes that "Aristotle needs, but has 
not thought through a satisfactory account of just how the external goods do figure in 
the happy life." This judgement seems unfair to Aristotle, as he unquestionably did 
think through the problem of the external goods, but opted for a balanced solution 
rather than the radical view of Antisthenes (and later of the Stoa). 
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view. One can only regard his view as unsatisfactory or a failure, 
however, if one adopts a more radical (and in Aristotle's eyes less-
balanced) view. 
It may be noted, finally, that a requirement of chance in Phys. II, 
¡v-vi is that the event should be unusual. But chance in the ethical 
works is said to be responsible for all external goods79 and not just 
unusual cases (such as the man whose brothers were all ugly, while he 
was handsome).80 Hence 'chance' in the ethical works, the 
'explanation' of external goods, does not fit into the metaphysical 
explanation of chance in Phys. II, iv-vi. It means 'the haphazard', 
'that for which there is no explanation', i.e. simply the way things are. 
It is the material cause. The fact that Aristotle does not deal with 
chance in this sense in Phys. II, iv-vi will be examined in the 
Conclusion. 
(b) Good fortune throughout a complete life (βίος τέλβιος) is 
necessary for perfect happiness 
In his ethical works Aristotle emphasizes that the happiness which 
he is seeking is complete or perfect happiness, by which he means a 
happiness that lacks nothing. He is seeking the means to attain a 
terrestrial paradise. In this aim he is, of course, very strongly under 
the influence of the model furnished by Plato's philosopher-king, who 
also had the most perfect possible life on earth. 
The possibility of such a life depends, of course, on good fortune, 
since the "perfect life" requires every kind of external prosperity 
throughout life, and such prosperity depends on chance. 
Aristotle finds himself in conflict with his theory that happiness 
depends essentially on man's own efforts and is not the outcome of 
chance. In TVE he proceeds, therefore, to work out in a long dialectical 
passage the relative place of chance and of personal effort in attaining 
happiness, i.e. perfect happiness on earth. In ЕЕ and MM he involves 
cf. supra n.5. 
Cf. Rhet. I, ν dealt with in Ch. 3(a). 
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himself in fewer complications and gives a more straightforward 
answer to the problem. 
In the following account it will be shown (i) that Aristotle 
recognizes the existence of various degrees of happiness; (ii) that the 
happiness sought by Aristotle in his ethical works is perfect happi-
ness; (¡ii) that perfect happiness is conceived by Aristotle as lasting 
throughout life; (iv) that perfect happiness is considered to require a 
"complete life" (βίο? τέλειος·); (ν) that perfect happiness at a given 
moment is to be distinguished from the perfect happiness of a 
"complete life" Finally, (vi) given the material conditions required for 
perfect happiness and the additional requirement of a "complete life", 
the role of chance will be seen to be considerable in attaining this 
ideal. 
(i) Aristotle recognizes the existence of various degrees of 
happiness 
Exegetes of NE are familiar with the fact that the life of moral 
virtue is happy only in a secondary way,81 in comparison with the 
contemplative life. The idea that different degrees of happiness are 
mentioned in NE is therefore not new. However, this fact is not often 
mentioned, doubtless because Aristotle's references to different 
degrees of happiness are more implicit than explicit. It must be shown 
that throughout the Ethics Aristotle is aware of the common human 
experience that there are different degrees of happiness. 
Aristotle writes that the life according to the intellect (νους·) is the 
happiest for man.82 He states that the activity of the better is superior 
and happier.83 Those with a greater capacity for contemplation are 
happier.84 The wise man (σοφός·) is most beloved by the gods and is 
81
 NE X, viii, 1, 1178 a 9: Δευτέρων δ' ό [sc. βίος] κατά την ά'λλην άρετήν [sc. 
ευδαίμων]. 
*
2
ΝΕΧ, vii, 9, 1178 a 5-8. 
η
ΝΕΧ, vi, 7, 1177 a 3-6. 
8 4
 NE Χ, viii, 8, 1178b 28-30. 
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therefore most happy.85 Great and repeated successes will render life 
more blissful.86 Virtuous and supremely happy men have the most 
blissful life.87 The happiest men will least need a friend.88 In each of 
the passages mentioned in this paragraph the comparative or super­
lative89 implies that Aristotle is conscious of different degrees of 
happiness. 
Aristotle frequently mentions "perfect happiness",90 implying 
thereby the existence of happiness which is less than perfect. Again in 
NE Aristotle sets out to examine human happiness,91 thereby implying 
that there are other kinds of happiness. In ЕЕ he explicitly states that 
there may well be another happiness than that of man, namely that of 
a better being than man, such as a god.92 
It is clear, therefore, that in the Ethics Aristotle recognizes 
different degrees of happiness.93 It will be seen that it is of great 
importance, among these degrees of happiness, to distinguish perfect 
happiness from the lesser grades of happiness. 
8 5
 NE X, viii, 13, 1179 a 29-32 The implications of this dialectical passage cannot 
be dealt with in detail here Cf ERIKSEN, BIOS Theoretikos 172 "Aristotle's use of 
the superlative very often denotes the highest degree possible where no completion is 
ever found And so it is used here in syngenestatos (79 a 26), theophilestatos (79 a 24, 
30), and eudaimonestaton (79 a 31) The superlative here rather underlines the 
relativity and incompleteness of the predicates." 
uNEl,x, 12, 1100b 25-26. 
8 7
 NE IX, ix, 9, 1170 a 27-28 
8 8
 E£ VII, xii, 2, 1244 b 10-11 
9
 εΰδαιμονικωτέρα, εύδαιμονέστατος·, μάλλον εύδαιμοΐ'είν, μαλιστ' ευδαίμων, 
μακαριωτερον, μακαριωτάτη 
9 0
 NE Χ, vu, 1, 1177 a 17, NE Χ, vu, 7, 1177 b 24, NE X, viii, 7, 1178 b 7. ή 
τελεία ευδαιμονία, ЕЕ VI (=NE VII), xiii, 2, 1153 b 16-17" ή δ' ευδαιμονία των 
τελείων; NE I, xii, 7, 1102 a 1. εστίν ή ευδαιμονία των τιμίων και τέλειων. 
"ΛΈΙ,χι ι ι , 5, 1102 a 14-15 
η
ΕΕ\, vii, 2, 1217 a 22-24. 
9 3
 Cf HARDIE, Aristotle's Ethical Theory.. .345, who speaks of "the grading of the 
forms of happiness open to men." Likewise ERIKSEN, BIOS Theoretikos . 49 speaks of 
"the grades of happiness." 
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(ii) The happiness sought in the ethical works is perfect happiness 
It has been seen in the last section that Aristotle is aware of the 
existence of different degrees of happiness for man. However, he 
usually only refers to these different degrees of happiness implicitly. 
This is due to the fact that he is mainly interested in perfect happi­
ness, which for him is real happiness. The lesser degrees of happiness 
are not fully happiness. Hence Aristotle refers to perfect happiness 
simply as 'happiness'. 
Usually when Aristotle speaks of happiness (ευδαιμονία) he 
means the highest level of happiness. Hence he states that happiness 
is the absolutely final end of human life.94 Happiness is the most 
desirable of all things,95 honoured and perfect,96 self-sufficient,97 the 
best, noblest and pleasantest of all things.98 It is an activity of the soul 
in accordance with perfect excellence (αρετή)99 and must occupy a 
complete lifetime.100 Happiness lacks nothing101 and nothing pertain­
ing to happiness can be imperfect.102 Thus only perfect happiness is 
happiness in the proper sense of the word. 
NE I, x, 15, 1101 a 18-19: τηι< εϋδαιμοΐ'ίαΐ' δέ τέλος και τέλαοί' тС еце 
πάιτη πάιτως. Cf. NE 1, vii, 3-5, 1097 a 28 - 1097 b 1; NE 1, vii, 8, 1097 b 20-21; 
NE X, vi, 1, 1176 a 31-32. Cf. LÉONARD, Le Bonheur..2d: "Par ailleurs, fin et bien 
sont synonymes; il y a donc, en même temps qu'une fin dernière, un bien suprême 
unique vers lequel tend l'homme." Likewise Plat. 5ymp.205a identified happiness and 
the final end in life. 
95
ЛГ£І, іі, 8, 1097 b 16. 
96
 NE I, xii, 7, 1102 a 1; ЕЕ II, i, 7, 1219 a 28; ЕЕ II, i, 9, 1219 a 35-6; ЕЕ VI 
(=NE VII), xiii, 2, 1153 b 16-17. Cf. Pol. Ill, viii, 1281 a 1-2. 
9 7
 NE I, vii, 6-8, 1097 b 6-20; NE X, vi, 2, 1176 b 5-6. 
n
 NE Ivìiì, 14, 1099 a 24-5. 
"JVEI.xiii, 1, 1102 a 5-6; cf. ΛΈΙ, χ, 15, 1101 a 14-16; ЕЕ II, i, 9, 1219a34-35, 
38-39; ЕЕ II, i, 7, 1219 а 27-28. 
100
 NEI, vii, 16, 1098 а 18-20; NE I, ix, 10,1100 a 4-5; NE Ι, χ, 15, 1101 a 14-16; 
ΝΕΧ,νύ, 7,1177 b 25. 
101
 NE X, vi, 2, 1176 b 5; NE I, vii, 7, 1097 b 15-16; NE IX, ix, 3, 1169 b 19-20; 
NE IX, ix, 10, 1170 b 17-18; MM I, ii, 9,1184 a 27-29. 
, 0 2
 NE X, vii, 7, 1177 b 25-26; £ £ VI (=Λ^£ VII), xiii, 2, 1153b 16-17. Cf. NEX, 
v, 11, 1176 a 27. 
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Aristotle does not state on every occasion that he speaks of 
happiness whether he means perfect happiness or a lesser grade of 
happiness. But the context, as often in Aristotle, indicates the 
meaning. It is incorrect to claim that Aristotle is inconsistent in not 
always stating whether he is referring to perfect happiness or a lesser 
degree of happiness.103 Aristotle is not inconsistent, even if he could 
have been more explicit. 
The happiness sought by Aristotle in the ethical works is happiness 
in the highest degree. It will be seen, however, in the next section that 
perfect happiness for Aristotle is not merely the highest degree of 
happiness, but also requires a certain duration of existence. 
(Hi) Perfect happiness must last throughout life 
In this section it will be argued that in Aristotle's ethical works the 
duration of time necessary for a life of perfect happiness is not 
synonymous with the duration implied in the phrase "a complete life" 
(βίο? теХеюс). The duration of perfect happiness will be examined in 
this section and the phrase βίο? теХеюс in the next. 
In NE Aristotle states that happiness is an end and altogether 
complete in every way.104 Happiness is perfect.105 Happiness lacks 
nothing.106 Nothing pertaining to happiness can be imperfect.107 
Aristotle concludes his discussion of the duration of perfect happiness 
Cf. ERIKSEN, Bios Theoretikos...49: "For happiness is not only exclusively 
desirable for its own sake; it is what is most desirable of all things. Nothing can be 
done to increase it if it is there (cf. EN 1097 b 17 ff.). This is, as it seems, 
contradictory to the grades of happiness which are presented elsewhere, when 
Aristotle mentions 'supreme' happiness, happiness 'in a secondary sense', or 
distinguishes happiness from blessedness (makaria), as in the judgement about Priam 
(EN 1101a 6ff., 1176 a 25). For if happiness is complete, without any defects, can 
there be, then, many forms of happiness or grades of happiness?" 
MNEl,\, 15, 1101 a 18-19. 
1 0 5
 NE I, xii, 7, 1102 a 1; ЕЕ VI (=NE VII), xiii, 2, 1153 b 16-17; cf. ЕЕ II, i, 9, 
1219 a 35-36. 
1 0 6
 NE X, vi, 2, 1176 b 5: ouôevôç γαρ ενδεή? ή ευδαιμονία. 
1 0 7
 NE Χ, vii, 7, 1177 b 25-26: ούδεν γαρ άτελέ? έστι των τ % εύδαιμοιία?. Cf. 
£•£11,1,7,1219 a 28. 
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by stating that a man, in order to be called happy, must act according 
to perfect virtue and be sufficiently equipped with external goods 
during a complete lifetime and must die in the same way (και 
τελευτήσοί'τα κατά λόγον).108 From these statements it appears that 
happiness, in order to be perfect, must last throughout life until death. 
However, Aristotle considers in NE that a man may be called 
happy who at some stage in his life lost happiness and then regained 
it. But such a case is very exceptional, firstly, because a man must 
suffer severe and frequent disasters to lose happiness.109 Secondly, 
Aristotle does not believe that there exists any internal cause which 
can take away perfect happiness from a man. If, due to severe and 
frequent disasters, a man loses perfect happiness, he does not lose his 
capacity for contemplation and moral virtue.110 Hence he loses only 
perfect happiness (the highest degree of happiness), but does not 
become wretched (άθλιος).111 If it is possible for him to regain perfect 
happiness it will take a long and complete period of time during 
which he will gain great distinctions.112 It is necessary only to restore 
NE 1, χ, 15, 1101 a 14-17 (the authenticity of this passage will be shown infra 
§(iv)); NE I, x, 4, 1100 a 23; NE 1, ix, 11, 1100 a 9. For the importance of a good 
death after a good life cf. DE WACHTER, De Aristotelische Ethiek...282-4. 
1 0 9
 ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ...\% claims incorrectly that every man suffers severe 
misfortunes. He gives as an example the death of parents, spouse, friends. But 
Aristotle would certainly consider these events as ordinary misfortunes (των 
τυχόιτων ατυχημάτων, NE Ι, χ, 14, 1101 a 10), which do not deprive a man of 
happiness and are clearly different in kind from such overwhelming misfortunes as 
those of Priam. If such frequent misfortunes as the death of friends (all the more 
frequent in Aristotle's time) deprived a man of happiness, then happiness would no 
longer possess the degree of stability which Aristotle attributes to it (NE I, x, 7, 1100 
b 2-3). It is true that Aristotle states in NE I, viii, 16, 1099 b 5-6 that a man who has 
had good children and friends and lost them by death is not considered happy, at least 
in the popular opinion. (In NE I, viii Aristotle is testing the compatibility of his 
definition of happiness with popular opinion - cf. NE I, viii, 1, 1098 b 9-12). But, as 
will be seen, Aristotle pursues the dialectical argument regarding external prosperity 
in NE I, χ and the conclusions given there are the final answers to the problems 
raised. 
1 1 0
 NE I, x, 13, 1100 b 34-35: ουδέποτε γαρ πράξει τα μισητά και τα φαύλα. 
" ' Λ ΐ Ι , χ , 13,1100 b 34. 
"
2
Λ Έ Ι , χ , 14,1101 a 11-13. 
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the external prosperity which he has lost, not to restore his virtuous 
activity.113 Thirdly, if a man does lose perfect happiness there is then 
some doubt (еітсер, 1101 a 12) whether he can actually regain it. But, 
as stated, if it is possible for him to regain perfect happiness it will 
take a long and complete period of time.114 Thus Aristotle points out 
that it is very difficult for a man to lose perfect happiness and that, if 
he does lose it, it is very difficult for him to regain it. Therefore, a 
man who loses perfect happiness and regains it is very exceptional. 
Even if a man does lose perfect happiness and then regains it, it is 
still necessary for him to die happily in order to have had a perfectly 
happy life."5 Also, a long and complete period of time must elapse 
between his great and frequent misfortunes and the time when he may 
again be said to have had a happy life.116 The period of great and 
frequent misfortunes must be blotted out by great distinctions."7 
Looking back at the life of such a man, the period of great and 
frequent disasters would appear as negligible due to the compensation 
of great distinctions over a long period. 
113
 This view is defended correctly by IRWIN, Permanent happiness 100 
GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque II, 84 ad 1101 a 12-13 claim incorrectly 
"Ce temps 'achevé, c'est le temps que mettra le bonheur à mûrir à nouveau, l'activité 
vertueuse à s'épanouir " NUSSBAUM, The fragility of goodness 337 also claims that 
the long period required to restore a man's happiness shows that it is a question of 
restoring his moral capacity, since "a purely external impediment to good action could 
be set right immediately by the restoration of good fortune " However, Aristotle is 
talking about the restoration of the possibility of saying that a man has had a perfectly 
happy life The period of great and frequent misfortunes must be blotted out by great 
distinctions (NE I, χ. 14, 1101 a 11-13) Thus it is not sufficient for a hitherto happy 
king to be restored to the throne after he has been overthrown and suffered other 
severe disasters, but he must return to the security enjoyed before his deposition, 
which takes a long time Nussbaum (ibid 338-9) uses the typical defects of the 
average old person listed in Rhet II, xni and the effect of fortune on character in Rhet 
II, xv-xvii as an argument to show that peoples' characters are vulnerable She 
describes this situation well for ordinary people, but it does not hold for Aristotle's 
ideal man who is invulnerable to ordinary reversals 
""ΛΈΙ,χ, 14, 1101 a 12-13 
1 1 5
 One cannot call a man happy who leads a perfectly happy life and then suffers 
the misfortunes of Priam at the end -ΝΕΙ,ιχ, 11, 1100 a 8-9 
"
6 J V £ I , X , 14, 1101 a 12-13 
ulNEl,x, 14, 1101 a 13 
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Hence it is true that in NE happiness, in order to be perfect, must 
last throughout life until death."8 In the case of the exceptional man 
who loses perfect happiness and then regains it, the period of lack of 
perfect happiness is blotted out by the subsequent long period of great 
distinctions, so that looking at his whole life, one can still say that his 
whole life until death was happy. 
The doctrine of ЕЕ in regard to the duration of perfect happiness is 
the same as that of NE: happiness must last throughout life until 
death. Aristotle states that happiness is perfect."9 It is a perfect 
good.120 None of the three periods of life '2 1 is happy because it is not 
complete and a whole.122 In ЕЕ Aristotle does not mention the 
possibility of losing happiness and of regaining it. 
In MM Aristotle explicitly states the same doctrine: happiness is a 
complete good and end (τέλειον αγαθόν και τέλος).123 It cannot be 
realized in an incomplete period of time, but only in one that is 
complete (èv χρόνω теХеіш), and such a period means as long as a 
man lives (όσον άνθρωπος βιοί).124 
Accordingly, it has been seen that in NE, ЕЕ and MM happiness, 
in order to be perfect, must last throughout life until death. In the next 
section it will be seen, however, that it is first necessary for a man to 
live for a certain number of years before he can be said to be perfectly 
happy. 
Cf. S. MANSION, Les positions maîtresses...84: "...il ne reste donc que la vie 
dans laquelle l'âme agit par la raison ou en conformité avec elle qui soit propre à 
l'homme. Une telle activité portée à son maximum de perfection et maintenue durant 
toute la vie, tel est le bien véritablement humain." 
119
 ЕЕ II, i,9, 1219 a35-36. 
, 2 0E£II , i, 7, 1219 a 28. 
m
 Cf. Rhet. II, 12-14. 
, 2 2 ££II , i,9, 1219 a 36-39; ЕЕ II, i, 10, 1219 b 5-8. 
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 MMl, iv, 5, 1185 a 1-2; М Ш , ii, 7, 1184 a 12-14. 
mMMl, iv, 5, 1185 a 4-6. 
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(iv) Perfect happiness requires a "complete life " (βίος réÀetoç) 
In NE the phrase "a complete life" (βίος τέλειος) occurs three 
times in Book I, and the parallel phrase τέλειον μήκος βίου occurs 
once in NE Χ.125 
Aristotle examines the meaning of the word τέλειος in Met. Д( ), 
xvi. There he points out that τέλειος means (i) "complete" or "whole" 
(i.e. has a quantitative meaning); (ii) "perfect" (i.e. has a qualitative 
meaning); (iii) has various transferred meanings. The context of all of 
the four passages of NE referred to in the last paragraph makes it clear 
that βίος τέλειος bears a quantitative (i.e. temporal) rather than a 
qualitative significance. On this point virtually all commentators are 
agreed.126 The point on which they disagree concerns the length of 
time necessary for a βίος τέλειος. 
Two views have been put forward by the important commentators 
concerning the length of time necessary for a βίος τέλειος. 
According to the first view, held by large numbers of commentators, a 
βίος τέλειος is the whole of man's life during which he must be 
happy.127 Arleth put forward the second view concerning the duration 
of a βίος τέλειος, which he defined as "eine zur vollständigen 
125
 NE I, vii, 16, 1098 a 18-20; NEI, ix, 10, 1100 a4-5; NEI, x, 15, 1101 a 14-16; 
NEX, vii, 7, 1177b25. 
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 ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ...13-14 mentions, however, some nineteenth-century 
interpretations of ßioc теХеіос as "the state" or as "man's purpose" These 
interpretations are not worth discussing. ERIKSEN, Bios Theoretikos...95, GRANT, The 
Ethics...\, 451, 468 and DIRLMEIER, Eudemische Ethik...226 admit the temporal 
meaning of βίος· τέλειο?, but hold that the phrase also bears a qualitative meaning. Of 
course, it is clear that quantity is not an ultimate value, but is for the sake of quality, 
i.e. a certain length of life is necessary in order for life to be perfect. However, this 
conclusion cannot be drawn from the four passages of NE, listed in the last note, and 
there is evidence only of a temporal meaning of ßioc теХеіос in these passages. 
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 Cf. BURNET, The Ethics...37; GRANT, The Ethics...\, 251; RAMSAUER, NE 37; 
EUSTR., In EtkNic. 71, 21-23; VERBEKE, L'Idéal ...85; THOMAS AQUINAS, In EtkNic. 
Lib.I, Lectio X, 129. 
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Entwicklung gelangte Lebensform im Unterschiede von der erst im 
Werden begriffenen."128 
It seems clear from 1101a 14-17 that βίος τέλειος is not the same 
in meaning as the whole of man's life. But the contrary appears to 
follow from 1100 a 4-9, i.e. it appears that βίο? τέλειος does mean 
the whole of life, as the misfortunes of Priam who suffered disaster in 
old age are mentioned as a reason for the necessity of a complete life 
(βίος· τέλειος) for perfect happiness, and Aristotle then asks whether 
we are to call no man happy as long as he is alive (1100 a 10-11). The 
problem is how to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the 
two passages. The solution proposed by those exegetes who support 
the first view is to reject or alter the text of 1101 a 16-19. The 
solution proposed by Arleth and Gauthier, who support the second 
view, is not only to reject 1101 a 16-19, but also to change the 
meaning of 1100 a 4-9 by reading it in the light of NE I, x. It will be 
argued below that neither of these views is satisfactory, and that the 
problem can best be solved by taking into account Aristotle's 
dialectical method in NE, which does not necessitate attributing only 
one meaning to βίος τέλειος. If this solution is adopted, the need to 
question the authenticity of 1101 a 16-19 disappears. 
The natural meaning of βίος τέλειος, as Gauthier points out,129 
would be that of a complete life of happiness until death, such a life 
presumably lasting until old age. This is clearly the meaning of βίος 
τέλειος in 1100 a 4-9, as has been pointed out.130 If NE I, χ did not 
exist, there would be no hesitation in saying that such was in all cases 
the meaning of βίος τέλειος. The problem is, then, to understand the 
argument of NE I, x. 
For Aristotle the problem in holding that a man cannot be happy 
unless he has lived a complete lifetime is that one cannot say of a man 
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 ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕ/ΟΣ...20, followed by GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nico-
maque...\\, 59-60 and SOUILHE and CRUCHON, NE I-II ...ad loc. A variant of this view 
is also defended by IRWIN, Permanent happiness...106. 
129
 GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque...\\, 59. 
130
 Aristotle also uses the phrase άπα? ßioc to designate the whole of life in NE X, 
vi, 6, 1176 b 29-30. 
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that he is happy when he is alive, but only when he is dead.131 This 
causes a problem for the Stagirite, because he has defined happiness 
as an activity or realisation (ενέργεια),132 and secondly (if one refuses 
to call a dead man happy) because the happiness of a man (in the 
sense of external circumstances affecting his reputation)133 can change 
even after death. Hence Aristotle concludes that calling a man happy 
when he is dead means calling him happy because he has been so in 
the past.134 But it is strange not to be able to call a man happy at the 
time when he actually is happy.135 Aristotle's problem here is of his 
own making. It will be seen in the next section that he uses the word 
"happiness" equivocally, meaning (a) perfect happiness at a given 
time and (b) perfect happiness throughout life (including old age) 
until death. His problem is that he wishes to predicate (b) of the man 
who possesses (a). His solution (the doctrine of the βίος теХеюс) will 
be seen to be a compromise between (a) and (b). 
Aristotle proceeds to examine the possibility of being able to call a 
man happy at a time when he is still alive and happy. But in this 
connection he is faced with the problem posed by external prosperity. 
Unlike Antisthenes and the Stoics, Aristotle chose to make happiness 
dependent not only on virtue, but also to a certain extent on external 
prosperity. If happiness were dependent only on virtue, then a man 
who achieved perfect virtue could be said to be perfectly happy, both 
now and for the future, since in Aristotle's view no circumstances can 
take away a man's capacity for virtuous activity.136 But since Aristotle 
makes happiness dependent to a certain extent on external prosperity, 
it is always possible for a man to have happiness taken away from 
him, since one cannot predict the future,137 and any man may suffer 
m
 ΝΕΙ,χ, 1-2, 1100a 10-14. 
, 3 2
ΛΈΙ,χ,2 , 1100 a 13-14. 
133
 Cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque...\\, 78. 
™NEl, x,7,1100 a 32-34. 
m
 ΝΕΙ,χ, 7, 1100 a 34-35. 
m
 ΝΕΙ,χ, 10. 1100Ы2-14;І,х, 13, 1100 b 34 -1101 a 6. 
l37JV£I,x, 15,1101 a 18. 
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greatly at the end of his life, as shown by the classical example of 
Priam.138 
Aristotle solves the problem raised by the vicissitudes of fortune 
by minimising the importance of external prosperity. While perfect 
happiness does require external prosperity and great and repeated 
successes make life more blissful and the contrary harm it,139 yet the 
essence of happiness is not dependent on external prosperity, but on 
activities in accordance with virtue.140 The perfectly happy man will 
not easily lose his perfect happiness, but only if he suffers severe and 
frequent disasters.141 Even in adversity nobility shines through.142 The 
perfectly happy man can never become miserable: he can only lack 
supreme happiness, and that only if he encounters the misfortunes of 
Priam.143 In this way the Stagirite minimises the danger to perfect 
happiness from the vicissitudes of fortune which affect external 
prosperity.144 
Having thus minimised the danger to happiness from the 
vicissitudes of fortune, Aristotle returns to the question of whether it 
is possible to call a man happy at a time when he is still alive and 
happy. He answers the problem as follows: 
What therefore prevents us calling that man happy who acts in accordance 
with perfect virtue and is sufficiently furnished with external goods, not 
just for any length of time, but during a complete lifetime? Or must it be 
added that he will also continue to live in this way and die in like manner? 
(Since the future is hidden from us and we posit happiness as an end and 
something altogether and in every way complete.) If this is so, we shall 
call those of the living who possess and who will continue to possess the 
things mentioned to be supremely happy, supremely happy on the human 
scale, however .I45 
mNEl, ix, II, 1100 a 6-8. 
mNEl,x,\2,1100b 25-29. 
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 NE 1, χ, 9-13, 1100 b 7 - 1101 a 6. 
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 NEI, χ, 14, 1101 a 7-11. 
l42NEl,x, 12, 1100 b 30-31. 
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'NE\,\, 14, 1101 a 6-8. 
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 Likewise in NE I, xi Aristotle also minimises the effects of external prosperity 
on the dead. 
usNEl,x, 15-16,1101 a 14-21. 
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In this passage Aristotle is not talking about when a man is 
perfectly happy - as Arleth points out,146 it would be absurd to say that 
a man is happy now, provided that he continues to be so in the future. 
- He is here talking about when a man may be said to be perfectly 
happy.147 
It has been seen that perfect happiness must last throughout life 
until death (and such a life must presumably last until old age). But 
Aristotle has granted in 1100 a 34-35 (от' εστίν ευδαίμων) that a 
man who leads a life of perfect happiness until death is in fact happy 
during that life. The problem is, therefore, at what stage he may be 
called happy. 
The answer to that problem is that a man may be called happy 
when he acts in accordance with perfect virtue, is sufficiently 
furnished with external goods, has lived a complete lifetime (βίο? 
τέλειο?) and is destined to die in like manner.148 When viewed in this 
way, there is no problem in understanding the passage - which must 
therefore be accepted as authentic - except for the fact that βίο? 
τέλειο? has a different meaning to that found in 1100 a 4-9. Here the 
phrase βίο? τέλειο? means a complete life before a man's death (as 
he must continue to live the perfect life, οϋτω βιωσόμενον), whereas 
in 1100 a 4-9 it means the whole of life up to and including death. 
The change in meaning of βίο? τέλειο? between these two 
passages results from a normal form of Aristotle's dialectic. There are 
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 ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ.Λ6. 
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 Cf. VERBEKE, L'Idéal...85-86: "Il ne faut donc pas attendre la fin de sa vie pour 
dire de quelqu'un qu'il a atteint l'idéal de la perfection humaine, bien que cet idéal 
implique que l'activité contemplative soit poursuivie jusqu'au dernier jour de 
l'existence terrestre." It is because they failed to see this point that numerous editors 
and commentators rejected NE I, χ, 15, 1101 a 16-21 in part or as a whole, or 
transposed some words in the passage. Cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à 
Nicomaque...\\, 84 for a list of some of these authors. 
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 Of course the future is unknown. But since the only thing that can rob the 
perfectly happy man of his happiness is a series of major disasters, which is a rare 
occurrence, and since even then there is a possibility of a man restoring his prosperity, 
one may call a man happy now while he actually is happy. The final condition of 
continuing to live this way and dying in like manner is thus virtually made into a 
foregone conclusion once one has achieved a ßioc теХеіо?. 
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many parallel examples in NE of such unannounced changes in 
meaning in passages. For example, in NE X, viii, 7, 1178 b 7-23 
Aristotle starts out his argument from the plurality of the popular gods 
and concludes it with the Unmoved Mover.149 Aristotle starts out from 
the terms of the many or the wise and concludes with his own view. 
Thus the last meaning of βίο? τέλειος· in NE Ι, χ, 15, 1101 a 16 is the 
one which Aristotle really believes in. It remains to be seen how long 
a period Aristotle considered necessary for the βίος теХеюс referred 
to in 1101 a 16. 
In 1101 a 14-17 it is clear that a "complete life" is not the whole of 
a man's life. Yet in order to be perfectly happy a man must fulfil all 
the conditions necessary for such perfect happiness - his activity must 
accord with perfect virtue and he must possess sufficient external 
goods for the period included under the "complete life", as stated in 
1101 a 14-17. - The "complete life" must, therefore, be at least as long 
as the length of time required to act perfectly virtuously and to 
acquire the amount of external goods needed for perfect happiness.150 
It is therefore necessary to inquire what length of time is required in 
order to act perfectly virtuously and to obtain sufficient external 
goods. 
There are a number of indications of the length of time necessary 
to achieve perfect virtue, which is to be taken to include both 
intellectual and moral virtue. Firstly, children cannot be happy,151 
because they cannot act virtuously. Aristotle holds that youths also 
cannot be happy because they are still engaged in the task of learning 
to be virtuous.152 Furthermore, a man reaches his mental prime around 
Cf. my book Gott und ешріа...\%. 
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 Cf. ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕ/ΟΣ...20: "Allerdings wird der im βίο? теХеіос 
Begriffene so lange nicht den Namen eines Glückseligen verdienen, als die zur 
Ausbildung der tugendhaften Lebensweise erforderliche Zeit noch nicht abgelaufen 
ist, denn alles Vorhergehende gehört nicht zu dem vollendeten Sein, sondern zum 
Werden der Lebensform." 
^ NEI, ix, 10, 1100 a 1-3; ЕЕII, i, 10, 1219 b 5. 
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 NE\, "i, 5-7, 1095 a2-l 1; ЕЕ V (=NEVÌ), viii, 5, 1142 a 11-16; cf. JVEII, i, 1, 
1103 a 15-17; Л/£ II, i, 3, 1103 a 25. 
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the age of forty-nine or fifty.153 But given that contemplation is 
mental, it is hardly possible to hold that a man would have led the 
ideal life if he died before his mental prime.154 Again, it has been 
shown that the contemplation which is the source of perfect happiness 
for man consists in studying all the sciences with a unifying aim, 
namely that of raising the intellect to God as much as possible.155 But 
it is not possible to have studied all the sciences before reaching an 
advanced age, as seen, for example, in the programme of studies of 
Plato's philosopher-king.156 Thus there is substantial evidence that a 
man could not achieve perfect virtue, which includes intellectual as 
well as moral virtue, until about the age of fifty. 
In order to achieve perfect happiness, a man also requires a certain 
number of external goods. The length of time needed to acquire one 
of these goods also provides an indication of the age before which a 
man may not be held to have achieved perfect happiness. The 
possession in question is that of satisfactory children, without which 
Aristotle considers that a man cannot be happy.157 Aristotle 
recommends that a man should marry aged thirty-seven, when he is at 
his physical prime.158 Such a man, in order to possess a number of 
153
 Rhet II, xiv, 4, 1390 b 11, Pol VII, xiv, 11, 1335 b 32-35 
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 It may be noted that fifty is also the age at which Plato's philosopher-king 
achieved the ftillness of his training Resp 540 a 
155
 Cf. my article La contemplation ( ешріа) húmame selon Ansióte 
156
 Of course in Aristotle's time, unlike today, it was possible to achieve a 
considerable mastery of most sciences It is apparent from Aristotle's own works that 
he had a profound knowledge of virtually all sciences Cf also Hippias' claim to 
polymathy in Plat Hipp Min 368 b - d and Gorgias' claim in Plat Gorg 447 с -448 
a. On this claim cf MARROU, Histoire de l'Education. 92 Cf. STEWART, NE. II, 448 
ad NE X, vu, 7, 1177 b 25 the phrase μήκο? βίου теХею means "that the life of the 
ευδαίμων must have a reasonable duration, that it must be long enough for him to do 
his life's work in " 
157
 Λ Ϊ Ι , vin, 16,1099 b 2-3 
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 Pol VII, xvi, 1335 a 29 In Rhet II, xiv, 4, 1390 b 10 the body is said to be at 
its peak from thirty to thirty-five and possibly one should read "thirty-seven or a little 
before" in 1335 a 29 
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satisfactory children, would need to live to be more than forty or to be 
nearly fifty.159 
Thus there are a number of indications which show that the 
fulfilment of two of the conditions necessary to call a man perfectly 
happy, namely his practice of perfect virtue, both intellectual and 
moral, and his possession of all indispensable external goods, require 
that such a man must live until about the age of fifty.160 The third 
condition is that he must fulfil these conditions during a "complete 
life" Once a man has fulfilled these conditions during a βίο? τέλειο?, 
and provided that he will continue to live this way and die likewise, 
he may be called perfectly happy while he is still alive.161 Thus the 
evidence points to the age of fifty as that at which a man may be said 
Aristotle also states that if a man suffers not ordinary misfortunes, but great 
and frequent misfortunes he can lose perfect happiness (NE I, x, 14, 1101 a 9-11). In 
such a case, if he can regain his happiness at all, he can do so only after a long and 
complete period (év ττολλω τ ι υ και τελείω [sc. χρόνιο]) during which he achieves 
great and fine distinctions (NE I, x, 14, 1101 a l 1-13). Thus χρόνος τέλειος is the 
length of time necessary to restore a man's external prosperity after frequent severe 
misfortunes. However, it is not an indication of the length of time necessary to be 
equipped sufficiently with external goods, in the case of the usual man, who does not 
suffer great and frequent misfortunes. 
Gauthier and Arleth interpret χρόνος τέλειος (NE I, x, 14, 1101 a 12-13) as 
meaning the same as βίος τέλειος elsewhere (GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à 
Nicomaque...\\, 84 ad 1101 a 12-13; ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ..ΛΊ). But their 
interpretation is unjustified, since βίος τέλειος means the length of time during which 
a man must act according to perfect virtue and must be adequately equipped with 
external goods in order to be called perfectly happy (NE I, x, 15-16, 1101 a 14-21). 
It has been seen that Gauthier also believed incorrectly that during the χρόνος 
τέλειος (NE Ι, χ, 14, 1101 a 12-13) a man would regain his virtuous activity (supra 
n.33). Thus he believed that a man could achieve perfect virtue more than once in a 
lifetime (GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque..\\, 84 ad 1101 a 12-13; likewise 
ARLETH, ΒΙΟΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ...17). Hence, according to Gauthier, a βίος τέλειος, which 
he holds to be the length of time necessary to achieve perfect happiness, must be 
sufficiently short to fit into a lifetime at least twice. The deficiency of this view is due, 
of course, to the fact that it is based on the two incorrect suppositions mentioned 
above. 
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 In Plat. Leg. II, 653 a a man can also only be τέλειος at the approach of old 
age. 
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 NE I, x, 15-16, 1101 a 14-21. 
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to have had a complete life (βίος τέλειος). " As always in Aristotle's 
dialectical arguments, it is the final view expressed which is the true 
conclusion. Hence when Aristotle later uses the phrase μήκος βίου 
τέλειον
163
 in NE X to describe the minimum length of life necessary 
for perfect happiness, the phrase should be understood as meaning a 
life up to about the age of fifty. 
It has been seen, therefore, that in NE Aristotle reconciles by 
means of dialectic (i) the fact that a man's whole life must be happy 
in order for one to say that he has had a completely happy life, and (ii) 
the fact that a man who is going to have a completely happy life may 
at a certain stage be said, while he is still alive, to have achieved a 
perfectly happy life. 
The phrase βίος τέλειος is not found in ЕЕ. In ЕЕ Aristotle does 
not discuss the problem of calling a man happy during his lifetime. 
Unlike in NE he accepts the obvious meaning of Solon's saying164 not 
to call a man happy while he is still alive. The phrase £ωή τελεία 
found in ЕЕ II, i, 9-10, 1219 a 34-1219 b 8 means the whole of life, 
since Aristotle contrasts the whole with a part. Thus in ЕЕ the happy 
life must last throughout youth, maturity and old age, that is, 
throughout the whole of life.165 
In MM Aristotle also does not discuss the possibility of calling a 
man happy during his lifetime. Since happiness is a complete good 
and end (τέλειον αγαθόν και τέλος) it must dwell in a complete 
being (ëv τελείφ). Hence it cannot dwell in a child (for no child is 
Cf. also DIRLMEIER, Eudemische Ethik...226, who points out that a ßioc 
τέλειος must last as long as nature has appointed for man to live: "ein im 30. Jahr 
endendes Leben ist nicht an das naturgegebene Telos des Alters gelangt." 
, 6 3WEX,vii,7, 1177b 25. 
164
 ЕЕ IL i, 10, 1219 b 6: διό και το Σόλωνος έχει καλώ?... Cf. BURNET, The 
Ethics...51. 
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 Cf. VERBEKE, L'Idéal...92 on ЕЕ: "La perfection humaine consistera dans 
l'activité d'une âme vertueuse (ψυχή? αγαθής ενέργεια) durant le cours entier de 
l'existence humaine (ζωής τελείας ενέργεια κατ' άρετήν τελείαν)." Cf. also 
VANIER, Le Bonheur...224, n.I. Cf. also ЕЕ V (= NE VI), vili, 6, 1142 a 15-16: a 
young man cannot possess φρόνησις, since the experience required is possible only 
after a quantity of time (πλήθος χρόνου). 
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happy), but only in a man, since he is complete (τέλειος).166 But it is 
not sufficient for a man merely to reach adulthood in order to achieve 
happiness. Happiness is also not to be found in an incomplete period 
of time (εν χρόνω ατελεΐ), but only in a complete period (εν τελείω). 
A complete period of time will be as long as a man lives (όσον 
άνθρωπος βίοι).167 This phrase όσον άνθρωπος βιοί must be taken to 
mean not merely the whole of life until death, but also a full lifetime, 
as is clear from the context. It follows that to lead the ideal life a man 
must not merely live happily throughout life until death, but must also 
live a minimum length of time, which extends beyond childhood and 
adulthood to a full life span. 
Thus it has been seen that in NE, ЕЕ and MM happiness, to be 
perfect, must not only last throughout life until death, but requires a 
lifespan of a minimum duration, which is that of a 'complete life' 
(βίος τέλειος). It will be seen, however, that the man who leads a 
perfectly happy life may also be said to be perfectly happy on a single 
day. 
(v) Perfect happiness on one day and in a complete lifetime 
Aristotle states that one cannot be perfectly happy on one day or 
for a short period of time, but only in a complete life (βίος 
τέλειος).168 In this claim there might at first appear to be an 
inconsistency in his theory of happiness. A man cannot continue 
contemplating for long (unlike God) and must sleep. Yet no man is 
happy when asleep.169 Thus every happy man ceases to be happy 
every day when he goes asleep. Besides, Aristotle admits that even 
when he is awake a man needs a change from the activity of 
contemplation.170 This change consists in amusements,171 and a man is 
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 MM I, iv, 5, 1185 a 1-4. 
, 6 7MMI,iv,5, 1185 a 4-6. 
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not happy when amusing himself. It would appear contradictory, 
therefore, to maintain that no short period of happiness is really 
happy. 
But it has been seen that Aristotle admits that the man who leads a 
completely happy life is actually happy while he is still alive.173 Thus 
one must distinguish the happiness of the perfectly happy man on one 
day from happiness in the sense of a completely happy life.174 The 
man who leads a complete life of perfect happiness must necessarily 
be perfectly happy on each of the single days of his life.175 Aristotle 
therefore does not mean that a man cannot be perfectly happy on a 
single day. When he writes that a person is not happy for one day 
only, he means that a single day is too short a criterion to judge the 
permanence of happiness required for the complete happy life. 
Thus three aspects of happiness in the Ethics have been 
distinguished: (a) the lesser grades of happiness, (b) perfect happiness 
at a given time or on a given day, and (c) perfect happiness which is 
continuous over a complete lifetime. The last-mentioned is the object 
sought in the Ethics, since it has been seen that the happiness sought 
by Aristotle in the Ethics is qualitatively happiness of the highest 
degree and quantitatively happiness for the greatest possible duration. 
(vi) Chance, external prosperity and happiness 
The qualitative and quantitative aspects of happiness in Aristotle's 
ethical works have been examined above. It was seen that Aristotle 
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 NE X, vi, 6, 1176 b 33-34. Cf. my article La contemplation (θεωρία) humaine 
selon Aristote... 402. 
ìnNEX, vi, 8, 1177 a 9-10. 
mNEl,x,7, 1100 a 34-35-
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 Cf. VANIER, Le Bonheur...231. 
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 Cf. Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), vii, 1072 b 24-25, which shows that perfect happiness can 
exist for a short time. Furthermore, Aristotle states in ЕЕ I, viii, 11, 1218 a 12-13 that 
"a thing that is white for many days is no more white than a thing that is white for one 
day..." Hence happiness is not happier by lasting for a long rather than a short period. 
Cf. DIRLMEIER, Eudemische Ethik...204: "Nach Ar. ist die Wesenheit eines Dings, das 
immanente τί ην eívaí, ein άΐδιοί', d.h. der Zeit, genauer dem Werden und Vergehen 
entzogen." 
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distinguished various degrees of happiness and that the happiness 
sought in the ethical works is perfect happiness. It was shown that for 
Aristotle perfect happiness means a perfectly happy life and that 
perfect happiness accordingly must last throughout life. The problem 
of the meaning of a 'complete life' (βίος τέλειο?) was investigated, 
and it was seen that the phrase 'a complete life' means a life that must 
last at least until the age of about 50. Hence it cannot be said of a man 
who died before the age of 50 that he has lived a perfectly happy life. 
Aristotle holds in NE that it can be said of a man who has reached the 
age of 50 and who is perfectly happy that he has lived a perfectly 
happy life, provided he continues to be perfectly happy until death. 
Finally, a man who lives a perfectly happy life is perfectly happy on 
every day of his life. However, one day is a criterion too short to 
judge of the permanency of his happiness. 
Aristotle uses the term "happiness" in an equivocal manner to refer 
to the lower degrees of happiness, to perfect happiness at a given 
moment and to a perfectly happy life. Happiness taken in the sense of 
happiness at a given moment may be called psychological happiness, 
and it is happiness in the sense in which it is most frequently used 
nowadays. It is a transitory feeling of happiness. However, this 
meaning of happiness is not the usual meaning of happiness found in 
Aristotle's ethical works. Although Aristotle places the essence of 
happiness in contemplation and moral virtue, which are goods of the 
soul and sources of psychological happiness, he is strongly influenced 
by the external or material conditions of happiness, which Plato and 
Greek tradition had identified or closely associated with happiness. 
Thus the "happiness" or ευδαιμονία he seeks in the ethical works 
means the full and perfect development of man. In order to attain this 
complete development or "happiness" a man must possess not merely 
intellectual and moral excellence, but must live to be a completely 
developed man in possession of certain external goods. Thus 
Aristotle's notion of ευδαιμονία seems well paralleled by his physical 
theory, according to which a living being or substance can only be 
said to have achieved its goal if it attains its full realisation 
(εντελέχεια). Hence happiness for Aristotle is not merely 
psychological happiness, although psychological happiness is 
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undoubtedly the most important part of happiness. It is clear that 
Aristotle attempted to free himself from the problem of the role 
played by external goods in "happiness" and was more successful in 
ЕЕ and MM than in NE, where he is seen struggling with difficulties 
at length. Although he did not allow them the status of sources, but 
only that of conditions of happiness, and although in NE he minimised 
by dialectic their influence on the stability of happiness, nonetheless 
the influence of tradition since Homer and particularly of his master 
Plato exercised such an influence that Aristotle did not hesitate to 
give a material and aesthetic structure to the psychological sources of 
happiness. This is most evident from his requirement of a particular 
duration of life (namely a life up to about the age of 50) before he is 
willing to speak of such a life as happy, regardless of how virtuous an 
individual might be in a short life. 
Aristotle attempts to combine what we call psychological 
happiness with his own notion of "the complete life". He places the 
essence of happiness in contemplation and moral virtue, although 
these are the sources of psychological happiness and not at all of the 
additional requirements needed for the "complete life". The "com­
plete life" consists of additional requirements of a material nature 
added on to the psychological sources of happiness for the sake of 
aesthetic perfection and physical full realisation. It involves a long 
series of external goods, all of which are necessary for the perfection 
of the perfectly happy life and all of which must last throughout life 
until death. The source of these external goods is chance. Hence the 
role played by chance in providing the material structure for the 
perfectly happy life is fundamental. The hesitation of some 
commentators to translate the term ευδαιμονία by "happiness" is also 
comprehensible in the light of this situation. 
The conflict in which Aristotle finds himself is inevitable for any 
philosopher who seeks permanence of happiness during life. To reject 
"external goods" or to fail to require a "complete life" is foolish. Yet 
at no time can the individual rely that he will not lose these external 
goods. Aristotle decided to retain external goods of many kinds as 
conditions (not sources) of happiness, and hence ties happiness (to a 
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certain extent) to the vagaries of chance (meaning here the haphazard, 
as seen at the end of the last section). 
In this chapter, accordingly, the role played by chance in regard to 
the conditions of happiness was examined. In the next chapter it will 
be seen that chance can also influence the sources of happiness. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CHANCE AND INTUITION 
In the last chapter it was seen that external prosperity, which is a 
requirement of happiness, is dependent upon chance. The extent to 
which Aristotle makes happiness dependent upon external prosperity, 
and accordingly upon chance, was examined. It was seen that external 
prosperity plays a subordinate role in the achievement of happiness, 
since external prosperity is not a source of happiness, but a mere 
condition required by the sources of happiness. In this chapter it will 
be seen, however, that Aristotle in ЕЕ and MM also considers whether 
chance plays a role in enabling the sources of happiness to lead to 
successful outcomes (external prosperity) to a greater or lesser extent. 
The reason for the investigation is the same as in the last chapter, 
namely because of popular opinion, which is the basis of his 
philosophy. According to popular opinion some people achieve 
happiness ('are fortunate') by nature, meaning 'by chance' (see 
below). In this chapter ЕЕ VIII, ii will be examined first, followed by 
MM II, viii. In ЕЕ it will be seen that Aristotle distinguishes two 
cases. Firstly, there are those who desire the right thing in the right 
way at the right time (1247 b 24) and this leads to 'more continuous 
good fortune' (1248 b 6-7), i.e. fairly regular unforeseen success. 
(The good nature required for this depends to a certain extent on 
(prior) external prosperity, as seen in chapter 6). Secondly, there are 
those who act contrary to their impulse and yet succeed again and 
again, as a dice-player sometimes succeeds in throwing a series of 
sixes, although he cannot always do so. It will be seen that Aristotle 
also attributes this kind of nonpermanent success to chance, i.e. 
chance can also play a role in the achievement of successful outcomes 
- external prosperity and the addition to happiness it provides - based 
on (i.e. accidental to) the exercise of the sources of happiness (the 
virtues) contrary to impulse. In MM it will be seen that Aristotle also 
investigates two kinds of good fortune, namely the first kind 
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mentioned in ЕЕ and secondly the 'haphazard' or chance in the sense 
of the material cause. 
In the following account ЕЕ is taken to be posterior to NE, 
although no conclusions are based upon this chronology.' The 
numerous arguments for dating ЕЕ late and NE as a youthful work 
cannot be dealt with here. MM is also taken to be an authentic work, 
although a definitive study devoted to refuting the arguments against 
its authenticity has still to appear." The argument in this chapter will 
be seen to favour the chronology NE - ЕЕ - MM. 
(a) The doctrine of τύχη in ЕЕ Vili, ii 
The most important discussion of chance outside Phys. II, iv-vi is 
that in ЕЕ Vili, ii. Historically, this chapter has been the most 
influential in ЕЕ, as it was translated into Latin together with MM 
VIII, ii and circulated in the Middle Ages as a separate treatise with 
the title De Bona Fortuna, which achieved great popularity. In ЕЕ 
VIII, ii the only term used for chance is τύχη. But then the discussion 
is limited to luck, i.e. chance in the area of human beings. 
1
 A.KENNY has shown in The Aristotelian Ethics...and Aristotle on the Perfect 
Life..Λ13-142 that the Common Books (ЕЕ IV-VI = NE V-VII) are stylistically much 
closer to ЕЕ than NE and hence established that the Common Books in all likelihood 
were originally composed as part of ЕЕ. It follows that ЕЕ is the later work, since it is 
out of the question that Aristotle, if he had taken over the Common Books from ЕЕ at 
the time of writing NE. would have included a second treatment of pleasure in NE. 
COOPER, Aristotle on the goods offortune...181 has not grasped this point and speaks 
without any justification of a revised version of the Common Books. It can only be 
concluded that an editor at some point inserted ЕЕ IV-VI into NE, where they did not 
belong, and hence left us with a Nicomachean Ethics containing two treatises on 
pleasure. This is the most obvious argument for the posteriority of ЕЕ. Careful 
comparison of the method and doctrine of ЕЕ can also show that ЕЕ must be the later 
work. Cf. my review of KENNY, The Aristotelian Ethics...in Revue Philosophique de 
Louvain. Cf. also GoSLrNG and TAYLOR, The Greeks on Pleasure...193. For the 
posteriority of ££ to NE cf. ALLAN, Quasi-mathematical method...and MONAN, Moral 
knowledge... 
2
 On the authenticity of MM cf. DIRLMEIER, Magna Moralia...and COOPER, The 
Magna Moralia...lts authenticity is also defended by NUSSBAUM, The fragility of 
goodness...493 and KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect Life... 114-5. 
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The chapter provides important additions to Aristotle's doctrine of 
chance and hence deserves separate treatment. The chapter is also of 
interest because the doctrine of τύχη is explained continually in 
reference to the contrasting concepts of φύσις and νους. The 
argumentation of the chapter is highly tortuous and requires to be set 
out clearly. The chapter might reflect Aristotle's train of thought in 
solving the problems raised or is possibly the annotation by a student 
of what Aristotle dictated in a lecture. 
The aim of the ethical works is to investigate the way to achieve 
happiness. Aristotle introduces a discussion of good fortune 
(€ύτυχία) in ЕЕ VIII, ii because in the language of the time the 
fortunate (the ευτυχείς) were said to be happy (εΰ πράττειν or to 
possess εύπραγία).3 The question arises, then, as to the source of 
(continual) good fortune. Is it nature (φύσις), i.e. nature in the sense 
of the material cause, as is commonly held?4 
The commonly held view is that some are fortunate by nature, just 
as some are blue-eyed and some are black-eyed by nature.5 The phrase 
'by nature' means here 'by chance', i.e. nature is understood here as 
the preSocratic 'nature' or Aristotle's material cause, i.e. just the way 
things are, the inexplicable. These people are held to be fortunate by 
nature, since they are manifestly not fortunate due to their intelligence 
or skill (due to φρόνησις, επιστήμη, τέχνη), but in spite of being 
foolish (άφρων).6 
Having ruled out intellect (voûç) as the source of continual good 
fortune (since such fortunate persons succeed in spite of being 
foolish), Aristotle inquires whether a supernatural force might not be 
the source in question. Since he is convinced that that which is most 
divine in man and hence is attributable to the Divinity is goodness and 
intellect and that the Divinity therefore could not prefer a foolish man 
3
 Phys. II, vi, 197b5;W£I, viii, 4, 1098 b 20-22; NE I, via, 17, 1099 b 7-8; cf. ЕЕ 
V (=NE VI), ii, 4, 1139 a 32-35; ЕЕ Vl(=NE VII), xiii, 4, 1153 b 21-23. Cf. WOODS, 
££...176. Cf. Rhet. I, v, 3, 1360 b 14; Plat. Euthyd. 281 b 2, 279 d - 280 b. 
4££VIII , ii,2-3, 1247 a 2-3, 9. 
5££VIII , ii, 3, 1247 a 11. 
6
 £ £ VIII, ii, 4-6, 1247 a 13-23. Cf. Plat. Meno 99 с 7-9. 
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to an intelligent one,7 he replies that it would be illogical to suppose 
that protection by supernatural force (a god or daimon) was the reason 
why some foolish people had continual good fortune. 
The only three possible sources of good fortune, says Aristotle, are 
nature, intellect and divine providence. Having eliminated intellect 
and divine providence, there remains only nature.8 
Having shown that only nature can be the source of continual good 
fortune for the foolish (or unintelligent), Aristotle proceeds to point 
out that there is a contradiction in saying that anyone could have 
continual "good fortune" by "nature"9 Nature - as understood by 
Aristotle - is the source ofthat which happens always or usually in the 
same way, whereas fortune is the opposite.10 Therefore, if a man has 
continual good fortune, it is not really good fortune that he has, but a 
good nature. The argumentation here seems likely to be posterior to 
Phys. II, v, 196 b 10-15, since Aristotle uses this fundamental 
definition of τύχη to examine the problem of the source of continual 
good luck. 
Continuing the logical train of thought whereby if the person who 
has continual good fortune is concluded not really to have good 
fortune, but a good nature, Aristotle asks the obvious question that 
must occur in the reader's mind, namely whether one can speak of 
fortune as a reality at all. His reply is that one cannot abolish fortune 
as a concept, since this would involve infidelity to common linguistic 
usage, which is the foundation of his whole philosophy. If everyone 
speaks of good luck as a reality, then it must be a reality of a kind." 
Aristotle points out briefly that chance is not a substantial reality (a 
φύσις), but a cause in the mind of the person who seeks to explain the 
unexpected. However, he does not wish here to enter into the problem 
of the fact that chance (τύχη) is at the same time non-substantial and 
7Cf. NEX, viii, 13, 1179a23-32;MMII, viii, 1207a6-12. 
8
 £ £ Vili, ii, 7, 1247 a 29-31. 
9 £ £ V I H , ii, 8-9, 1247a31 - 1247 b 1. 
, 0 ££VIII, i i ,8 , 1247a31-33. 
1
 ' £ £ Vili, ii, 10, 1247 b 4-5: ei S' όλως εξαιρετέοι· και ουδέν από τύχη? φατέον 
γίν€σ0αι. 
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yet to be regarded as a cause.12 This is manifestly a matter which he 
has already solved in his own mind, and hence it would hardly be 
credible to hold that he had not already written Phys. II, iv-v at the 
time he wrote this passage of ЕЕ. 
In 1247 b 9-18 Aristotle now raises an objection to what he has 
just established (namely that continual good fortune does not really 
mean good fortune, but a good nature). He objects that there would 
appear to be nothing to prevent a lucky dice-thrower from continually 
throwing a six. In this case the good luck proceeds from indeterminate 
and indefinite antecedents (1247 b 12) and hence one cannot learn to 
have this kind of good luck by experience. What prevents someone 
having this kind of good luck continually? This good luck would then 
have nothing whatever to do with having a good character (or nature) 
(ούχ o n τοιοσδί, 1247 b 16-17),13 i.e. there does appear to be such a 
thing as continual good luck which is not the same thing as having a 
good nature. This is Aristotle's objection to his previous conclusion. 
In 1247 b 18-28 Aristotle adds to his previous argument (1247 a 3-
31) whereby the person who has continual good fortune does not in 
reality have good fortune, but a good nature. He points out that there 
are two kinds of impulse (όρμαί) in the soul, those from reasoning 
(λογισμός") and those from irrational appetition (ορεξις· άλογο?). He 
holds the latter to be prior (πρότεραι) in the temporal sense, since e.g. 
children have irrational appetition before they have rational appetition 
(sc. of the good).14 If the impulse caused by desire for what is pleasant 
([βο.όρμή] δι' έπιθυμίαν ήδέος) exists by nature (φύσει), then 
(irrational) appetition (ope^iç)(the irrational appetition mentioned 
above) is also by nature, and at any rate all things (παν) proceed by 
nature towards the good (and hence also irrational appetition).15 And 
1 2
 £ £ VIII, ¡i, 10, 1247 b 8-9. 
13
 Reading of Jackson, Dirlmeier, Décarie, Woods, Walzer-Mingay. 
14
 For a fuller account of this doctrine cf. MM II, vii, 30-31, 1206 b 17-29. 
15
 Cf. NE I, i, 1, 1094 a 1-3. In Dirlmeier's translation (Eudemische Ethik...100), 
followed by KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect Life...164, the apodosis does not follow 
from the protasis. The same remark holds for Woods' apodosis (££...41). Aristotle is 
seeking to show that the irrational impulses and appetition are by nature and hence 
must strive for the good. From 1247 b 34 it is clear that ορμή and ope ξι? must be 
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there exist people with a good nature (ευφυείς), who without the aid 
of reason (άνευ λόγου) have an impulse in the direction of the natural 
order of things (όρμώσιν <η> ή φύσις ττέφυκε) and desire the right 
thing in the right way at the right time. These people will succeed 
even though they are foolish and irrational (i.e not philosophers or 
highly intelligent) Such people are undoubtedly fortunate (ευτυχείς·), 
and hence are so by nature (φύσει). 
In the next section (1247 b 28 - 1248 a 2) Aristotle starts by raising 
the question whether, on the basis of what has preceded, it is not 
necessary to distinguish more than one meaning of good fortune 
(ευτυχία). He then raises the distinction he has already made in 1247 
b 18-28 and 1247 b 9-18. This is a distinction between things that are 
done from impulse (and as a result of choice)16 and things not done 
from impulse and choice, but the contrary, i.e. pure chance.17 People 
are said to have had good fortune (εύτυχήσαι), if they succeed in 
spite of reasoning badly. But they have good fortune of the contrary 
type (i.e. pure chance), if they desired a different or lesser good than 
they obtained.18 In the former case their impulse (ορμή) and appetition 
distinguished I suggest, with KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect Life 153, not 
bracketing [και ή] in 1247 b 20 and retaining παι with Susemihl and Kenny In other 
words, Bekker's text of 1247 b 20-21 should be retained, as proposed by 
ν FRAGSTEIN, Studien 370-1 and DECARIE, ЕЕ 212 n 30 
1 6
 τα μέΐ' γαρ πράττεται diro της- ορμή? και προελομενωΐ' πράξαι, 1247 b 29-30 
This is the good fortune discussed in 1247 b 18-28 
17
 As discussed in 1247 b 9-18 
18
 This is Dirlmeier's interpretation, which, in spite of the following difficulties, 
seems correct In ЕЕ 1247 b 32-33 Aristotle refers to another or lesser good than 
expected, in MM 1207 b 8-10 to the cause of escaping ill or receiving something good 
unexpectedly There cannot be any doubt that the cases referred to in MM are due to 
pure chance, and they are stated to be without όρμη (1207 b 8) The cases in ЕЕ are 
stated to be contrary to ορμή (1247 b 30) and are obviously due to pure chance, since 
they involve όρμη, albeit a όρμη aimed at a different or lesser good Nonetheless, the 
context is such that one cannot doubt that the meaning is the same both in ЕЕ and 
MM, although MM expresses the content much better than ЕЕ Woods, ЕЕ 181 is 
thus undoubtedly wrong in claiming that b 32-33 refers to a separate class of cases 
falling under "natural'" good fortune 
KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect Life 67 understands a 'different' or a "lesser' 
good to mean what we usually call an evil However, it does not seem necessary to 
restrict a 'different' or a 'lesser' good in this way 
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(öpe£ic) was right, and hence their good fortune was due to nature 
and occurred in spite of foolish reasoning. (Of course one can also 
have misfortune if one trusts one's irrational impulse and appetition, 
1247 b 37-38)19. Aristotle then returns to pure chance in 1247 b 38 -
1248 a 1 : he asks how in the other cases (those of pure chance) there 
can be good fortune in accordance with good natural endowment of 
inclination and desire. The answer is, of course, that there cannot. He 
concludes that there are therefore several (in fact only two) kinds of 
good fortune.20 
In the next section (1248 a 2-15) Aristotle sums up what he has 
hitherto stated. He mentions that some people are (sc. continually) 
fortunate contrary to all the teachings of science and correct 
reasoning, and he states that the cause of such good fortune must be 
different [sc. from reasoning](1248 a 2-5). Aristotle intends to give an 
answer to the question whether all good fortune can be reduced to 
some other cause (namely nature). He proceeds to cut down the area 
attributable to pure good fortune by inquiring whether it is or is not 
good fortune when a man succeeds without reasoning, but thanks to 
the right desire at the right time. He concludes that such good fortune 
is not really good fortune, but only apparently so (since there is an 
underlying natural cause). His general conclusion is, then, that good 
19
 KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect Life...69 holds that in 1247 b 38 Aristotle has in 
mind "bad reasoning on the basis of good desire." But he must have in mind good 
ορμή, not bad reasoning, due to bad desire (επιθυμία, which corresponds to ôpeÇiç). 
In other words, the person with a good ορμή (by nature) cannot rely that he will 
succeed in spite of bad reasoning, if the bad reasoning is dragged down by bad desire 
which leads to faulty action. 
2 0
 The text is uncertain, but the meaning is beyond doubt. The best elucidation of 
the text is that of V.FRAGSTEIN, Studien...371-3. However, despite his careful solution 
of the textual problems, his detailed subdivision of the argumentation (which is 
essentially that of Dirlmeier) remains far from certain. Firstly, his explanation of τύχη 
διττή (1248 a 1) as meaning that τύχη and ευτυχία are divided into bad luck (failure 
in spite of a good ορμή) and good luck (success thanks to a good ορμή, but in spite of 
bad reasoning) cannot claim any degree of certainty. Secondly, bad luck (failure in 
spite of a good ορμή) is not a subdivision of good fortune (πλείοιι? αϊ εύτυχίαι, 1248 
a 2). There can be only two kinds of good fortune, that which in fact is more a good 
nature than good fortune and pure good fortune (contrary to all expectation and 
explanation). 
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fortune is not entirely reducible to nature, but that good fortune is not 
always pure good fortune either, but frequently relies on nature. He 
concludes that such good fortune as has a basis m nature (δια φύσι,ν, 
1248 a 14) is not entirely reducible to nature, and that it would be 
wrong to conclude that there is no such thing as pure good fortune 
(with no basis in nature).21 
In the next section (1248 a 15-29) Aristotle enters in greater depth 
into the question of what is attributable to fortune and what to nature. 
In the last section he concluded that forming a desire for the right 
thing at the right time was due in part to nature and not due to pure 
good fortune. In this section he inquires whether that part not due to 
nature is due to good fortune. He argues that if this is the case then 
fortune will be the cause even of thought and deliberation, since there 
is no infinite regress possible in thought and deliberation But in 
Aristotle's eyes it is absurd to attribute things of such value as thought 
and deliberation to fortune. He concludes that it is not fortune, but 
God (the Unmoved Mover) who is the source of thought, deliberation 
and desiring the right thing at the right time. He writes: 
Or is there a starting-point with none other outside it, and is this starting-
point due to its being of such a nature able to produce such a result? The 
object of search is this - what is the starting-point of movement in the 
soul? The answer is clear in the same way as in the universe, so also there 
[sc in the soul], God moves everything. For in a manner the divine 
element in us moves everything The starting-point of reasoning is not 
reasoning, but something superior. What, then, could be superior even to 
knowledge and intellect, but God?22 
2 1 1 e the case of the lucky dice-thrower who continually throws a 6. 1247 b 9-18 
2 2
 ЕЕ VIII, и. 20-22, 1248 a 22-29 Text О C T or Susemih! with the following 
variations In 1248 a 23-24 read αύτη oc δια το τοιαύτη ye είναι τοιούτο δύνεται 
ποια ν, , and in 1248 a 25-26 δήλον δη ώσπερ έν τω όλω еос, και πάν екеі κινεί 
These are Solomon's emendations, largely taken over from JACKSON, Eudemian 
Ethics 197 
The various translations of the passage are all in substantial agreement (SOLOMON, 
Ethica Eudemia ., JACKSON, Eudemian Ethics 196-7, DlRLMElER, Eudemische 
Ethik .102, CHROUST, Aristotle's Religious Convictions 93-4, n 9, VERDENIUS, 
Human Reason and God 288, n 6, 291, n 16. RAOCHAM, ЕЕ 467, WOODS, ЕЕ 43, 
KENNY, Aristotle on the Perfect Life. 165) The textual emendations thus appear 
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From Met it is clear that God moves the universe as a final cause. 
But Aristotle states in the above passage: "...in the same way as in the 
universe, so also there [sc. in the soul], God moves everything '" Thus 
God moves man's soul as a final cause."' 
It follows, therefore, that forming a desire for the right thing at the 
right time is due in part to nature and in part to the final causality of 
God."4 It is noteworthy that Aristotle had rejected divine providence, 
i.e. an efficient causality on the part of a divinity as the source of 
continual good fortune (1247 a 23-31). Such efficient causality of 
what is called good fortune is, of course, quite different to Aristotle's 
solution proposed here, namely that nature and the final causality of 
the Unmoved Mover combine to produce what appears to be continual 
good fortune. 
In the next section (1248 a 29 - 1248 b 3) Aristotle elaborates on 
those who are fortunate, though irrational, and compares them with 
those who are rational. 
Because of this [sc. final causality by God], as I stated previously (b 
πάλαι eXeyoi'). those are called fortunate (βύτυχβΐ?) who are successful 
when they follow their impulses, although they lack reason, and it is no 
use for them to deliberate. For they have a principle that is superior to 
relatively unimportant Cf GIGON. Zwei Interpretationen 210. who writes of this 
passage it is "die entscheidende Aussage., über deren Sinn kein Zweifel sein kann, 
auch wenn der Text leider gerade an dieser Stelle hoffnunglos verstummelt ist Wie 
im All. so ist auch in der Seele Gott diese αρχή κινήσεως Und zwar wirkt Gott 
unmittelbar auf das (teîor in uns und dieses wiederum setzt gewissermaßen πάντα. 
also vor allem das richtige Begehren, in Bewegung Denn Gott allein erfüllt die oben 
gestellte Bedingung, eine αρχή zu sein, die selbst nicht wieder Begehren. Denken und 
Planen ist. sondern etwas anderes *' Cf also Η von Arnim, Eudemische Ethik und 
Metaphysik 19 
Woods. ЕЕ 43. translates еос by "a god'' However, the reference here is to the 
Unmoved Mover, mover of the universe DURING. Aristoteles 452 translates "the 
God" and speaks of "the God"' of the cosmos and "the God" in us for a refutation of 
this interpretation cf m\ article The Love of God 132 
23
 Cf AUBENQUE. La Prudence 72-3. KENNY. Aristotle on the Perfect Lije 80 
The interpretation of this passage b> THOMAS AQUINAS, in which he claims that God 
is the first efficient cause of movement in the soul, is unhistoncal {SCG HI. 89. 2651. 
ST MI. qu 9, art 4) 
2A
 Cf von FRAGSTLIN. Studien 380 quoted mjra η 34 
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intelligence and deliberation - others have reason (λόγον), but do not have 
this [sc. the effect of the final causality of God] - and [sc. they 
have](divine) inspiration,25 but cannot do this [sc. think rationally]. For, 
though unreasoning, they succeed and their insight [alternatively: And of 
these (τούτων)26 the insight of the virtuous and the wise27] is swift, and it 
is necessary not to consider insight (divination) on the basis of reason to 
be the only type,28 but some are able to obtain insight (use divination) 
through experience and others through practice29 in using observation 
(σκοπείν). And these forms of obtaining insight (divination)^0 use God. 
And this (procedure) discerns well both the future and the present, and 
25
 In 1248 a 33 read και έι<θουσιασμόν (closing the bracket after έχουσι) with 
Susemihl. Dirlmeier. τούτο δ' ού δύΐ'αιται (1248 a 33-34) is already difficult because 
it repeats τούτο δ' ούκ εχουσι (1248 a 33). Hence it is preferable to make τοΰτο δ' où 
δύναιται a counterpart to και ενθουσιασμοί' (i.e. to read και έιΌουσιασμόν, τούτο δ' 
ou δύνανται). Furthermore, it is incorrect to exclude rational persons from 
ενθουσιασμός, as does the text of the OCT, since the principle (άρχή)^. of μαιτική) 
can function with λόγο?, even if it functions better without it ( 1248 a 40 -1248 b 1 ). 
2 6
 The attempt by v. FRAGSTEIN, Studien...376 to make άλογοι refer to the rational 
whose reason at times fails is unconvincing. 
2 7
 My preferred solution to the problem raised by φρονίμων καΐ σοφών (1248 a 35) 
is to eliminate these words entirely, i.e. to hold that they got into the text erroneously. 
The text then becomes perfectly comprehensible and the sense is almost certainly 
what Aristotle intended. However, if one must retain φρονίμων και σοφών, it then 
seems best to take τούτων in isolation, "of all these people", i.e. both the rational and 
the irrational. This avoids two difficulties. Firstly, if one takes τούτων with φροιάμων 
και σοφών, then Aristotle is referring to the irrational as prudent and wise when led 
by the final causality of God, which seems unlikely. V.FRAGSTEIN, Studien...377 
retains τούτων, but understands άλογοι (1248 a 34) as referring to the rational, which 
cannot convince. Secondly, one avoids the possible but unnecessary change of 
τούτων into των, as proposed by Dirlmeier. 
2 8
 Read μόιτμ' (1248 a 36) with Dirlmeier and v. Fragstein. 
2 9
 It is quite incorrect to suppose that those who use divination on the basis of 
experience and practice in observation are the rational. This difficulty was seen by v. 
Fragstein, who did not, however, conclude that he must alter his interpretation. 
Aristotle is, of course, speaking of the irrational. 
3 0
 αύται must refer to the irrational, since it is the irrational who use [the final 
causality of] God. Neither Dirlmeier nor v. Fragstein succeed in their attempts to 
make αύται refer to "the former", and it must refer to '4he latter", who are therefore 
the irrational. Cf. DECARIE, ££...216 n.53: "La mantique utilise directement Dieu, 
sans l'intermédiare de la raison et de l'intellect." 
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this is the way (οϋτως)"1 they see, whose reason is disengaged. Hence the 
impulsive32 have dreams that are true. For it seems that the principle is 
stronger when reason is disengaged, just as the blind remember better, 
being released from having their faculty of memory engaged with the 
objects of sight.33 
The meaning of this badly corrupted passage is clear in its 
essentials. The passage concerns those who are irrational and appear 
to have what is called continual good fortune, which, when 
investigated, proves to be nothing other than the final causality of the 
Unmoved Mover. This is the basis of their divination and its success. 
In the concluding section (1248 b 3-7) Aristotle sums up the 
results of his investigation.34 There are two kinds of good fortune 
(ευτυχία), one of them divine (Gda). The latter type is found in the 
case of the man whose good fortune is due to acting impulsively 
under a kind of intuition of goodness or God, i.e. under the final 
causality of God. Although Aristotle does not say so in this summary, 
he must also here be referring to the person with a good nature, 3 
whose impulse is right (1248 a 15-29 and 1247 b 33-38). This type of 
good fortune is more continuous, since it is based on a good nature 
and the final causality of God (it is this that enables it to happen 
31
 Reading όντως (1248 a 39) with Jackson, Dirlmeier, von Fragstein and Kenny. 
3 2
 μελαγχολικοί - cf. ЕЕ VI (=NE VII), 1150 b 25, 1152 a 19, 28; 1154 b 11. Not 
"those of a melancholic temperament"! 
3 3
 Cf. Plat. Meno 99 a 1 - 100 b 4. 
3 4
 My conclusion here is also that of V.FRAGSTEIN, Studien...3&0: "beim eigent­
lichen Glückspilz, ευτυχής, spielt die Physis eine gewisse Rolle, sie ist aber nicht die 
eine, letzte Ursache seiner Eutychie. Die Tyche is zwar gelegentlich Ursache von 
Glückszufällen, nicht aber von bestandigem Glück. Dies ist, so lehrt der Schluß, Werk 
der Gottheit: eine Theodizee." Cf. also DIRLMEIER. Endemische Ethik..A92: "Die 
göttliche Eutychie ist gerade jene, die auf die Natur-Impulse einwirkt. Diese be-
kommen dadurch ihre αρχή. Die zweite Eutychie ist die die eigentlich nur τύχη zu 
nennen wäre. Weiterhin darf man hier nicht also nicht fragen, warum Gott in solchen 
Seelen nicht tätig wird. Klar aber ist, daß da wo Gott wirkt, Konstanz ist. Die andere 
Eutychie ist ein αβέβαιοι', ή γαρ τύχη αβέβαιο? (Phys 197 a 30)." The investigation 
by VERBEKE, Happiness and Chance.„250 falls short in its account of this doctrine. 
3 5
 The importance of good birth - one of the external goods indispensable to 
happiness - is reflected in this doctrine. Cf. AUBENQUE, La Prudence...73. 
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regularly). The other type of good fortune is that of the person who 
acts against his impulse, i.e. pure luck, like the person who repeatedly 
throws a six at dice (1247 b 9-18). Such good fortune, being pure 
chance, is by definition not permanent. 
It is to be understood that Aristotle in this chapter is speaking of 
the role of chance in acquiring external prosperity that is an 
unexpected by-product of the exercise of the moral virtues. That this 
'good fortune' is a by-product of the exercise of the virtues is clear 
from the fact that he refers to desiring the right thing, in the right way 
at the right time (1247 b 24). The exercise of the moral virtues is a 
source of happiness. Where a man succeeds in regularly doing the 
right thing in the right way at the right time, in spite of reasoning 
badly, this cannot be due to chance, and can be attributable only to 
having a good nature and to the final causality of God. The good 
fortune, i.e. the external prosperity or success (κατορθοΰσιν, 1247 b 
27), he achieves as an unforeseeable by-product of this regular 
virtuous activity will be fairly frequent (literally 'more continuous'). 
This is 'divine' good fortune (1248 b 4). Where a man succeeds 
strikingly often (yet not so often as in the first case) and contrary to 
expectation (by acting virtuously, yet contrary to his impulse), his 
good fortune is attributable to pure chance, since there is nothing in 
his exercise of virtue that would lead one to suppose that any by­
product of his activity should lead to external prosperity. Having 
sought a different or lesser good than he obtained (1247 b 32-33), he 
achieves a higher good due to a combination of moral virtue (the 
source) and the addition of pure luck, the unexpected accident. 
It may be concluded that the doctrine of ЕЕ Vili, ii represents a 
major development over that of Phys. II, v, 197 a 30-32. There 
Aristotle wrote: "Again, the view that good fortune (βύτυχία) is 
something unstable is correct; for chance is unstable, as nothing that 
VERBEKE, Happiness and Chance...256 points out that chance, i.e. pure chance, 
could not be the origin of man's ethical behaviour. While this is true, it must be said 
that the nature with which a man is born is due to pure chance. Verbeke also does not 
see that Aristotle in ЕЕ VIH, ii introduces the notion of a kind of chance that is not 
pure luck. 
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occurs by chance can be either invariable or usual." Here in ЕЕ VIII, 
ii Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of good fortune and speaks of a 
'more continuous' type of good fortune (ή μεν συνεχή? ευτυχία 
μάλλον, 1248 b 6-7), which is incompatible with the unstable good 
fortune referred to in Phys. II, v, as well as unstable "pure" luck (αΰτη 
δε ού συνεχής, 1248 b 7), i.e. the luck of the dice-player (1247 b 9-
18), which corresponds with the view of unstable good fortune 
expressed in Phys. II, v. 
However, in Phys. II, vi, which was seen in Ch.II to be a later 
addition to Phys. II, iv-v, Aristotle refers to ευτυχία as being almost 
the same as ευδαιμονία, i.e. as being stable, and as being the outcome 
of good action (εύτφαξία, 197 b 2-5). Here he must be referring to the 
more stable ευτυχία which he identified in ЕЕ VIII, ii and not to the 
unstable ευτυχία he spoke of in Phys. II, v. It follows, therefore, that 
the doctrine of ευτυχία in ЕЕ VIII, ii is posterior to that of Phys. II, ν 
and that the doctrine of ευτυχία in Phys. II, vi is based on that of ЕЕ 
ІП, ii. 
It is to be noted that in Phys. II, vi, 197 b 32-33 Aristotle denies as 
evident that one could have τύχη by nature (φύσει). The manner in 
which Aristotle denies as evident a matter which he discusses at 
length in ЕЕ VIII, ii, before coming to a conclusion, would appear to 
indicate that Phys. II, vi was posterior to ЕЕ VIII, ii. On the other 
hand, the unqualified statement in Phys. Π, ν that good fortune is 
inconstant and not always or for the most part37 seems to show that 
Aristotle had quite certainly not yet raised the question of continual 
good fortune as found in ЕЕ VIH, ii and MM II, viii. 
The doctrine of ευτυχία based on ορμή, which is "more 
continuous" and almost the same thing as happiness, is not found in 
NE, presumably because it had not yet been developed. It will now be 
seen that it is worked out more clearly and concisely in MM, where 
Aristotle also holds it to be the proper (κυρίως) meaning of good 
fortune. 
37
 Phys. II, v, 197 a 30-32: ετι άβέβαιον ή ευτυχία ευλόγως- ή γαρ τύχη 
αβέβαιο?· ούτε γαρ dei ούθ" ώς επί το ττολύ oîor τ ' εΐι>αι των άπό τύχη? ούθεν. 
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(b) The doctrine of good fortune (ευτυχία) in MM II, viii 
The topic to be examined in MM II, viii is ευτυχία, which is 
examined because of its relationship to ευδαιμονία.38 Aristotle first 
raises the difficulty of the area to which τύχη is to be attributed. The 
problem is the following. 
Chance (τύχη) cannot pertain to nature (φύσις) because the 
products of nature occur always or usually in the same way, whereas 
the results of chance occur without order (ατάκτως) and randomly 
(ώς ετυχεν). But chance also cannot be an intelligent perception 
(νους)39 or right reasoning (λόγος ορθός), since these also imply order 
(το τεταγμένον) and invariability (το άεί ωσαύτως), unlike chance.40 
Furthermore, chance cannot be a kind of divine providence 
(επιμέλεια τις θεών). "For we consider God (τον θεόν), being master 
of good things and evil, to apportion them according to desert, 
whereas chance (τύχη) and the results of chance (τα άπό της τύχης) 
occur in very truth randomly (ώς αν τύχη). If we attribute this area to 
God (τω θεώ), we shall make him either an incompetent judge or an 
unjust one; and this is not fitting for God (τω θεώ)."41 
Having raised the problem, Aristotle then solves it as follows: 
Apart from nature (φύσις), intelligence (νους) and God (ό θεός), 
there is no other area to which chance (τύχη) can be ascribed. If we 
proceed by process of elimination, we can eliminate νους and the 
connected areas of λόγος and επιστήμη, as these appear entirely 
foreign to chance. We can also eliminate providence (επιμέλεια) and 
the connected concept of benevolence (εύνοια) on the part of God 
(παρά του θεού) as being good fortune (ευτυχία), since these also 
befall the wicked (τοις φαυλοις), and it is unlikely that God (τον 
θεόν) takes care (έπιμελεισθαι) of the wicked. By process of 
elimination, therefore, that which is closest to good fortune (ευτυχία) 
is nature (φύσις).42 
3 8
 MM II, viii, 1, 1206 b 30-36. 
3 9
 On the meanings of roûç cf. my book Gott und θεωρία...53-63. 
4 0
 MM II, viii, 2, 1206 b 36 -1207 a 5. 
4 1
 MM II, viii, 3, 1207 a 6-12. 
4 2
 MM II, viii, 4-5, 1207 a 12-18. 
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Now good fortune (ευτυχία) and chance (τύχη) are used to refer 
to events beyond our control. Hence no-one says that a man who 
possesses moral virtue is fortunate (ευτυχή), since everyone is free to 
possess moral virtue or not. We speak more properly (оікеютеро ) of 
someone who is of noble birth (ευγενή) or in general who has goods 
over which he has no control as being fortunate (ευτυχή).43 
However, the possession of goods over which one has no control is 
not the proper meaning (κυρίως) of good fortune (ευτυχία). There are 
more senses than one (πολλαχώς·) in which we term a man fortunate 
(ευτυχή?)· "For we also call a man fortunate (ευτυχή), who succeeds 
in doing something good beyond his calculation, and the man who 
reasonably should have suffered loss, when he makes a gain."44 This 
second type of good fortune is thus an outcome of human action and 
hence is different from the good fortune by which one obtains 
external goods such as good birth, beauty etc. However, this second 
type of good fortune is also different from moral virtue, since moral 
virtue refers to the manner of performing an action and is within our 
control, whereas good fortune in the sense of an unexpected outcome 
of a human action is not within our control. This second type of good 
fortune is more properly called good fortune in Aristotle's view. This 
is no doubt because it fits into Aristotle's metaphysical account of 
chance in Phys. II, iv-vi, whereas chance as an 'explanation' of the 
totally inexplicable, e.g. why one man is born noble and beautiful and 
another the opposite, does not. 
Aristotle then apparently generalizes about the two types of good 
fortune: "Good fortune, is, then, when one obtains some good which 
reason would not expect or when one does not suffer an evil which 
one would expect. It is, however, in the good we receive that good 
fortune is more appropriately (οίκειότερον) and more clearly 
recognized. To receive something good would appear to be essentially 
(καθ' αυτό) a piece of luck, whereas to escape an evil is a piece of 
4 3
 A/M II, viii, 5, 1207 a 18-26. 
44
 MM II, viii, 6, 1207 a 26-30. 
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luck accidentally (κατά συμβεβηκό?).' This passage will be dealt 
with below in regard to its metaphysical content. 
Aristotle then returns to the second type of good fortune, which he 
considers to be the proper meaning of the term. He declares it to be an 
"irrational nature" (άλογο? φύσις). The fortunate man is he who has 
an unreasoning (άνευ λόγου) impulse (όρμήν) towards good things 
(τάγαθά) and obtains them. The source of this irrational impulse is 
nature (φύσΐ-ç). For in our souls there is by nature (τη φύσει) 
something by which we are impelled (όρμώΐ'ευ) irrationally (άλόγως) 
towards that which is good for us (προ? α àv ей εχωμερ). If one asks 
someone thus favoured why he acts as he does, he cannot explain. His 
case is like that of men inspired (TOLÇ ένθουσιά£ουσιν). For men 
inspired (οι ένθουσιά£οντε?) have an unreasoning impulse (avev 
λόγου όρμήν) towards some particular act.46 
In this passage Aristotle's account of the second type of good 
fortune is sufficient to make it certain that he is referring to the case 
already discussed in relation to ЕЕ of the man whose good fortune is 
due to acting impulsively under a kind of intuition of goodness47 or 
4 5
 MM II, viii, 7, 1207 a 30-35. 
4 6
 MM II, viii, 8-9, 1207 a 35- 1207 b 5. Cf. MM II, iii, 2, 1199 a 10-13 and MM I, 
xxxiv, 26, 1198 a 15-18. 
4 7
 MM II, viii, 8, 1207 a 38 - 1207 b 1. The only outstanding difference between 
the two accounts is the absence of the explicitation of τάγαθά (1207 a 37). In ЕЕ 
Aristotle explains that such good fortune depends on the final causality of God. There 
can be no doubt that τάγαθά {MM 1207 a 37) and à àv eu Ιχωμεν (MM 1207 b 1) 
are also final causes. Given MM II, viii is a great deal more concise than ЕЕ VIII, ii, 
there is no reason to suppose that the absence of an explicitation of the final causality 
referred to in MM means that Aristotle's doctrine in question is any different in MM 
and ЕЕ. Some commentators come to an excessively hasty conclusion on this point, 
e.g. DlRLMElER, Magna Moralia..A2\. H. von ARNIM, Die drei aristotelischen 
Ethiken...30-31 does not see that Aristotle is referring in both ЕЕ and MM to the same 
type of good fortune. His method is clearly open to criticism: instead of presuming 
that the two kinds of good fortune in two ethical works by the same author are 
fundamentally the same unless proven to be incompatible, he is determined - for the 
sake of his theory of the development of Aristotle's thought - to exploit all small 
differences to prove incompatibility. In fact the absence of an explicit reference to 
God in the brief passage 1207 a 35 - 1207 b 5 is no proof of a radical change in 
CHAPTER SEVEN 223 
God, i.e. under the final causality of God. This is the man with a good 
nature whose impulse is right (1248 a 15-29, 1247 b 33-38, 1248 a 29-
1248 b 3). Both in ЕЕ and MM this kind of good fortune depends on 
an irrational impulse deriving from a good nature and directed by 
final causality. In both ЕЕ and MM Aristotle compares such a man to 
those inspired. In ЕЕ Aristotle comes to the conclusion that such good 
fortune is more continuous than what he there calls pure good fortune, 
since it is not accidental, but has a cause, namely a good nature and 
the final causality of God. 
Aristotle then returns to the first kind of good fortune.48 He states 
that we do not have a fitting and proper name for it, but often call it a 
cause (when we say: something happened by chance)49. But he holds 
that the term 'cause' is different from what we are referring to. A 
cause and its consequence are two different things, he states. I.e. that 
which is an outcome (consequence) of fortune is not caused in the 
strong sense by fortune. The first kind of good fortune is different 
from an impulse (άνευ ορμής·) which attains good things. We speak of 
escaping an ill or again of obtaining an unexpected good as occurring 
by fortune, i.e. we speak of fortune in terms of a cause. Such good 
fortune as this is different from the second type and appears to arise 
from the vicissitudes of circumstances (è κ των πραγμάτων της 
μεταπτώσεως). Aristotle calls this accidental good fortune (κατά 
συμβεβηκος ευτυχία).50 The significance of this expression will be 
discussed below, as will also the significance of Aristotle's denial that 
chance is a cause. 
Aristotle concludes by stating that if the first type of good fortune 
(cause of noble birth and external goods beyond our control) is also 
good fortune and an auxiliary (συνεργός)(ϊ.β. a necessary condition) 
for happiness, nonetheless the second type is more properly good 
fortune (ευτυχία οϊκειότερα), the type namely which is the basis 
Aristotle's doctrine in ЕЕ. It is quite simply due to the conciseness of MM when 
compared to the extensive account in ЕЕ. 
4 8
 DIRLMEIER, Magna Moralia...420 sees this point correctly. 
4 9
 Cf. ЕЕ Vili, ii, 9-10, 1247 b 2-8. 
5 0
 MM II, viii, 10-11, 1207 b 5-13. 
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(αρχή) of the impulse (της· ορμής) that leads to the attainment of 
good things (των αγαθών).51 
Such is Aristotle's account of ευτυχία in MM. It will now be seen 
that a number of conclusions can be drawn from this account. 
Aristotle's denial that the first kind of good fortune (cause of noble 
birth and similar external goods) is a cause (1207 b 5-12) must 
undoubtedly be understood as a reference to the fact that chance in 
this sense neither is nor has a per se cause. It is the haphazard, the 
way things are, and has no explanation. In Phys. II, v, 197 a 5-6 and 
197 a 32-35 Aristotle defines chance as an accidental cause, and it is 
not credible that in this passage of MM Aristotle had not yet arrived 
at the view that chance was an accidental cause, since Aristotle 
always held this view (cf. Top. Ill, i, 116 b 1-7, Rhet. I, x, 12-13, 1369 
a 32 - b 5), and since he proceeds in this passage to state that the first 
kind of good fortune is accidental good fortune (κατά συμβεβηκος 
ευτυχία, 1207 b 13). It seems, rather, that Aristotle is more concerned 
here with showing that good fortune based on ορμή, which has a per 
se cause, namely the ορμή (comparable to a decision, which is also a 
per se cause, as seen in Ch.I), is more properly good fortune because 
it corresponds to his metaphysical account of chance in Phys. II, iv-vi. 
It is an accident (the accidental acquisition of an unusual good) that 
inheres in a per se cause with a purpose (the ορμή). Due to the 
meeting of the per se cause with the unusual meaningful accident, the 
event becomes significant and is referred to as a 'chance' event (in 
casu: good fortune).52 
It is to be noted that Aristotle applies his metaphysics to the two 
kinds of chance dealt with in the chapter: 
5 1
 МШІ, viii, 11-12, 1207 b 13-18. 
5 2
 DlRLMElER, Magna Moralia..A1\ thinks that MM marks an advance on Top., 
because Top. refers to τύχη as a cause (Top. Ill, i, 116 b 1-7), whereas MM denies 
that pure good fortune is a cause. But in fact Aristotle not merely in Top. and Phys. , 
but also elsewhere in MM (I, ii, 3, 1183 b 32-34) holds that chance is a cause: not, 
however, a substantial cause, but an accidental cause. When he denies that chance is a 
cause in MM 1207 b 5-10 he is referring to the fact that chance is not a per se or 
substantial cause and is not concerned with examining accidental causality at this 
point. 
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...for example [sc. we speak of] the 'cause' of our escaping evil, or again 
of our receiving something good when we do not expect it. This kind of 
good luck differs from the other kind, and appears to arise from the 
vicissitudes of circumstance; it is good fortune only accidentally (κατά 
συμβεβηκό?). If, then, this latter sort is also 'good fortune', nonetheless as 
regards happiness the other kind is good fortune in a more proper sense, 
namely where the source (αρχή) of the impulse (τη? ορμή?) that leads to 
the attainment of good things is in the man himself53 
In this passage Aristotle says we speak of the 'cause' of escaping 
an ill or receiving a good unexpectedly. By this he undoubtedly means 
that we say: it happened by luck, i.e. luck is spoken of as being a 
cause. "This kind of good luck" (type I) refers to that which arises 
from the vicissitudes of circumstances (έκ των πραγμάτων TTJÇ μετα­
πτώσεων). It is distinguished by Aristotle from "the other kind" The 
other kind (type II) is one of the two kinds which Aristotle arrives at 
also in ЕЕ VIII, ii. It is the case of the man whose good fortune is the 
unexpected outcome of acting impulsively under a kind of intuition of 
goodness or God, i.e. under the final causality of God. Such a person 
has a good nature and his impulse is right. His 'good fortune' is more 
continuous, since it is accidental to the best possible per se cause, 
namely a good nature and the final causality of God. The other type of 
good fortune (type I), which depends on the vicissitudes of 
circumstances, does not have a per se cause, even though we speak of 
things occurring by luck. Aristotle then declares that type I is good 
fortune only "accidentally" (κατά συμβεβηκός·), whereas type II is 
good fortune in a more proper sense. It is to be noted, of course, that 
type II depends on type I, since the good nature which is the basis of 
the good impulse is given by pure chance. 
In MM II, vii i Aristotle declares: "Good fortune is, then, when one 
obtains some good which reason would not expect or when one does 
not suffer an evil which one would expect. It is, however, in the good 
we receive that good fortune is more appropriately (οϊκειότεροί') and 
more clearly recognized. To receive something good would appear to 
"МЛ/И, viii, 10-11, 1207 b 9-16. 
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be essentially (καθ' αυτό) a piece of luck, whereas to escape an evil is 
a piece of luck accidentally (κατά συμβεβηκό?)."54 
In this passage Aristotle goes further than in any other passage on 
chance. Elsewhere he points out that chance itself is an accident. But 
here he makes a further distinction based on his metaphysics between 
obtaining good fortune and avoiding misfortune. The declaration that 
good luck is essentially luck and the avoidance of bad luck 
accidentally luck seems to lack justification, since all luck is 
accidental. In this passage one sees Aristotle's tendency to reduce 
everything in the universe to the status of substance and accident, 
including the content of the mind. It may be noted that it also appears 
quite untrue to say that someone who avoids a great misfortune 
considers himself less fortunate than someone who achieves an 
unexpected good. 
Aristotle holds that the attainment of an unexpected good is 
essentially (καθ' αυτό) good luck and the lucky avoidance of an evil 
an accidental (κατά συμβεβηκό?) piece of luck (1207 a 30-35). 
However, in 1207 b 9-18 he takes these two kinds of luck, which both 
fall under type I (i.e. which arise from the vicissitudes of 
circumstances), and declares that both are good luck only accidentally 
(κατά συμβεβηκός). Both are declared to be accidental because both 
must yield the title of real (more proper) good luck (Ευτυχία 
οίκειοτέρα, 1207 b 15) to type II, which has a per se cause. It can, 
then, hardly be doubted that this progressive metaphysical 
categorization of every aspect of his thought stems from Aristotle 
himself. 
The unusual occurrence of first and second person verb forms in 
MM II, viii, 1207 b 2-3 may be taken to indicate that this chapter was 
noted down by a student in a lecture given by Aristotle. When 
Aristotle gave an example, he most likely did so in a personal (1st and 
2nd person) form. MM in its totality may consist of lecture-notes 
taken by a student towards the end of Aristotle's career. 
It is striking that Aristotle only in ЕЕ and MM examines good 
fortune based on ορμή deriving from a good nature and directed by 
5<
 MM II, viii, 7, 1207 a 30-35. 
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final causality. In ЕЕ the length and tortuousness of the argument may 
be an indication that Aristotle was working out the doctrine. In MM 
the doctrine is established, and Aristotle declares that good fortune 
based on ορμή is the proper meaning of good fortune (1207 b 13-18). 
Given the accounts of chance in early works (e.g. Rhet. I, v, 17, 1361 
b 39 - 1362 a 12; Rhet. I, x, 12-13, 1369 a 32 - b 5), it is not credible 
that Aristotle would not have mentioned chance based on ορμή - the 
proper meaning of good fortune (!) - if he had already discovered this 
doctrine. It is therefore quite incredible that the doctrine of ευτυχία in 
ЕЕ and MM is to be dated early and equally that Aristotle abandoned 
the doctrine of chance based on ορμή in later works, as the champions 
of an early date for MM and ЕЕ are obliged to hold. 
Both in ЕЕ and MM Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of ευτυχία. 
However, only one of these two kinds is found in both works. In ЕЕ 
he distinguishes the case of those who have pure good fortune from 
that of those who have good fortune as a by-product of actions 
resultant from a good nature that acts under the final causality of God. 
Those who have pure good fortune are like the successful dice-player 
and succeed in spite of acting against their impulse. In MM Aristotle 
does not mention those who in ЕЕ are said to have pure good fortune. 
He refers, on the one hand (as in ЕЕ), to the good fortune of those 
who have a good nature and act under the final causality of God (as 
seen above, his terms are such that this cannot be doubted). The other 
kind of good fortune he refers to is good fortune in the sense of the 
"source" or "explanation" of noble birth and other similar external 
goods. This is the only passage in all of his works in which Aristotle 
shows awareness that these two kinds of chance must be 
distinguished. In NE and ЕЕ Aristotle refers to external prosperity as 
attributable to chance without showing any awareness that he is using 
chance in the sense of the material cause, i.e. in a manner incompat­
ible with his metaphysical account in Phys. II, iv-vi. In Phys. II, iv-vi 
he gives an account of chance in which he claims that chance is an 
accidental cause, that there is a per se cause of all chance events and 
that chance events are unusual, i.e. he gives an account incompatible 
with the attribution of such external prosperity as noble birth and 
beauty to chance. Only in MM does Aristotle distinguish chance in 
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the sense of the material cause (i.e. in a non-explanatory sense) from 
chance in the metaphysical sense described in Phys. II, iv-vi (where 
good fortune is an unusual accident that coincides with a per se cause, 
namely the ορμή). 
It has been seen, therefore, that the doctrine of good fortune based 
on ορμή is found only in ЕЕ and MM and that only in MM does 
Aristotle distinguish chance in the sense of the material cause from 
chance in the metaphysical sense (doctrine of Phys. II, iv-vi). In NE 
(except NE X, ix - cf. infra chapter 9) he does not mention the 
metaphysical doctrine of chance at all and uses chance only in the 
sense of the material cause. In ЕЕ he uses chance in both senses, but 
does not distinguish them. Only in MM does he use chance in both 
senses and distinguish them. He then categorizes chance in the sense 
of the material cause as chance by accident and chance in the 
metaphysical sense as chance in the more proper sense. This evidence 
taken in isolation is an indicator (to be weighed against all possible 
contrary evidence) that the chronology of the ethical works is NE - ЕЕ 
- MM . " 
The 'more proper' or metaphysical sense of chance in MM was 
also seen to be recognizably the doctrine of 'more continuous' good 
fortune in ЕЕ, which is incompatible with the doctrine that good 
fortune is unstable in Phys. II, v, 197 a 30-32. It was seen in section 
(a) of this chapter how Aristotle developed the doctrine of 'more 
continuous' good fortune in ЕЕ and refers to it in Phys. II, vi and MM. 
Only in MM, finally, does Aristotle refer to the "more continuous" 
good fortune based on ορμή as the proper (κυρίως) meaning of good 
fortune and contrast it with good fortune in the sense of the material 
It is to be noted that H. von ARNIM, Die drei aristotelischen Ethiken...30-37, 
Endemische Ethik und Metaphysik... 17-25 is determined that MM is earlier than ЕЕ 
and ЕЕ earlier than NE. A refutation of his arguments is beyond the scope of this 
work. 
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cause, which he refers to as accidental good fortune. This evidence -
as far as it goes - indicates the following chronology: NE, Phys. II, iv-
v, ЕЕ, Phys. II, vi, MM. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CHANCE IN THE LISTS OF SOURCES OF HAPPINESS IN 
NE ANO ЕЕ 
Both in NE and ЕЕ (but not in MM) Aristotle lists the possible 
sources of happiness before examining them. It is worthwhile 
examining the place accorded to chance on these lists. 
In NE I, ix Aristotle raises the question of the sources of happi­
ness: he inquires whether happiness is (a) something that can be learnt 
(μαθητόν) or (b) something that can be acquired by habituation or 
some other kind of practice (έθιστον ή άλλως πως· άσκητόν) or (с) 
whether it comes to man thanks to some divine allotment (κατά τίνα 
θείαν μοίραν), or (d) by chance (δια τύχην).1 
Of these four possibilities Aristotle refers the first to another 
discussion (not found in NE). He argues in favour of (b) and (c). Then 
he denies (d) as follows: "To hand over the greatest and finest of 
things to chance (τύχη) would be excessively incongruous"2 By the 
latter statement it is to be understood that chance is not the main 
source of happiness, not that chance plays no role in happiness in NE, 
since this would not be true. Chance plays a role in determining 
external goods which are a condition, although not a source of 
happiness. It is to be noted that the theory of intuition found in ЕЕ 
and MM, which comes under τύχη (ευτυχία), is not developed in NE, 
although it is referred to in NE X, ix.3 
In ЕЕ I, i, 4 Aristotle raises the same question regarding the 
sources of happiness: 
...whether all who achieve the designation 'happy' are so (i) by nature 
(φύσει), as they are tall or short and differ in skin-colour, or (ii) through 
1
 NEI, ix, 1, 1099 b 9-11. On the term θεία μοίρα cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à 
Nicomaque...\\, 72. The term occurs in Plat. Meno 99 e, 100 b; cf. 70 a. On еіа 
μοίρα in Plato cf. DES PLACES, Pindare et Platon... 149-155. 
2 t f£] , ix ,6, 1099 b 24-25. 
3
 For NE X, ix cf infra Ch.9. 
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learning (δια μαθήσεως), which would imply that there is a science of 
happiness), or (iii) through some kind of practice (διά τίνος ασκήσεως). 
(For people gain many characteristics neither by nature nor through 
learning, but by habituation (έθισθεΐσιν), bad characteristics by being 
habituated in a bad manner and good characteristics by being habituated 
well). Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but in one of the 
following two ways: either (iv) by the inspiration of some demonic being, 
like those frenzied, as in the case of those possessed by a nymph or a god, 
or (v) due to chance (δια την τύχην) (for many people identify happiness 
with good fortune).4 
Of the five possibilities mentioned here (ii) and (iii) correspond to 
(a) and (b) and (v) to (d) in NE. The first possibility, (i) φύσις, 
probably corresponds to (c) in NE, namely θεία μοίρα. Divine allot­
ment should be taken to mean the ordering of the world according to 
the regularities of φύσις, which are caused by the final causality of 
the Unmoved Mover.5 Aristotle refers θεία μοίρα in NE to another 
discussion, meaning physics and metaphysics. Finally, possibility (iv) 
in ЕЕ has no counterpart in NE. 
In ЕЕ, as in NE, Aristotle rejects the theory that chance could be 
the determining factor in securing happiness. He also gives the same 
reason as in NE: 
For if living well lies in chance events or natural events, it would be 
beyond the hopes of many men, for then its possession cannot be secured 
by effort, nor does it depend on men themselves, nor is it a matter of their 
conduct.6 
As in NE, however, it is not to be understood that chance plays no 
role in happiness. Aristotle even states that virtually (σχεδόν) all 
occurrences of happiness fall under the five principles (αρχάς) he 
mentions in 1214 a 15-25,7 i.e. happiness falls under φύσις, έπίπνοια 
"££I,i,4-5,1214 a 15-25. 
5
 Aristotle does not accept that happiness is sent by the gods (NE I, ix, 3, 1099 b 
15), but yet holds that there is a sense in which happiness can be regarded as coming 
by a θεία μοίρα - since otherwise he would not refer the matter to another discussion, 
but would simply deny it. -
6 £ £ I , iii, 5, 1215 a 12-15. 
7 £ £ I , i,6, 1214a26-28. 
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δαιμονίου and τύχη, as well as the two main means of acquiring 
happiness: μάθησις and ασκησις·. 
Chance is related to happiness in two ways. Firstly, the possession 
or lack of external goods is the outcome of chance, and since external 
goods are a condition of happiness, chance determines the condition 
of happiness. 
Secondly, in ЕЕ VIII, ii Aristotle elaborates the theory that the 
person with a good nature, whose impulse is right, and who acts 
impulsively under a kind of intuition of goodness or God, has divine 
(θεία) and "more continuous" good fortune (ευτυχία).8 This good 
fortune (ευτυχία) which is a source of external prosperity is to be 
classified under chance (τύχη). It would appear, then, that the sources 
of such external prosperity as is required for happiness are those 
classified in ЕЕ I under (i) nature and (iv) inspiration (i.e. intuition of 
goodness), as well as (v) chance or good fortune (ευτυχία).9 Thus the 
inclusion of possibilities (iv) together with (v) as sources of happiness 
in ЕЕ appears to refer to the theory of intuition elaborated in ЕЕ VIII, 
ii. 
It is to be noted that no list of sources of happiness occurs in MM. 
From the above account of chance in the lists of the sources of 
happiness in NE and ЕЕ it follows that the sources given appear to 
correspond to the theories developed in both works, although 
Aristotle could have been a great deal more explicit. The term θεία 
μοίρα found in NE, but not in ЕЕ, is part of Aristotle's Platonic 
heritage. 
8
 Cf. supra Ch.7(a). 
9
 Cf. GAUTHIER-JOLIF, L'Ethique à Nicomaque..\l, 73. 
CHAPTER NINE 
DIFFERENCES IN THE ROLE OF CHANCE IN NE, ЕЕ 
AND MM 
(a) The doctrine of external goods 
Since chance is the source of external goods, an account of chance 
in the Ethics would not be complete without a comparison of the 
doctrine of external goods in NE, ЕЕ and MM. 
In NE, ЕЕ and MM Aristotle emphasizes that external goods are 
not the source, but an indispensable condition of happiness.1 In NE, 
however, there is a much more extensive account of external goods 
than in ЕЕ and MM (NE I, viii, 15-17; I, ix, 10-11; I, x, as compared 
with ЕЕ I, ii and only a few phrases in MM). Due to the more 
extensive account in NE there is more emphasis on the material aspect 
of the perfection of the ideal life in NE than in ЕЕ and MM. In 
particular the distinction made in NE between external goods that are 
instrumentally useful for happiness and those that are simply 
indispensable conditions of happiness2 is absent in ЕЕ and MM. In ЕЕ 
good birth (a merely "indispensable" condition of happiness in NE) is 
listed alongside wealth and power3 (which are auxiliaries and 
instrumentally useful in NE), and hence it might appear that Aristotle 
in ЕЕ has dropped the distinction between "indispensable conditions" 
and "auxiliaries" of happiness. In MM, furthermore, good birth, which 
is held to be the outcome of good fortune,4 is classified as an auxiliary 
of happiness (συνεργός· ττ\ ευδαιμονία),5 i.e. belongs to the same 
category as the goods held in NE to be instrumentally useful. Thus the 
1
 NEI, ix,7, 1099b 26-28; £ £ I , ii, 2-5, 1214 Ы2-27; MMII, viii, 12, 1207 b 16-
18. 
2
ΛΈΙ, ix, 7, 1099 b 26-28. 
3 ££VIII . iii,9, 1249 a 10. 
4
 MM II, viii, 5, 1207 a 24. 
5
 MM II, viii, 12, 1207 b 18. 
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distinction made in NE between external goods that are instrumentally 
useful for happiness and those that are simply indispensable 
conditions of happiness appears to have been abandoned in ЕЕ as well 
as in MM. The greater emphasis in NE on the material perfection 
required for perfect happiness and the greater attention in NE on 
categorizing this external prosperity is doubtless due to the greater 
Platonic influence on NE than on ЕЕ and MM.6 
The fundamental doctrine of external goods appears, however, to 
be the same in NE, ЕЕ and MM. The amount of external goods needed 
by the ideal man in ЕЕ is determined by the amount that will best 
promote contemplation of God,7 and the implication is that this is a 
moderate amount of external goods. According to NE one must have 
neither too many nor too few external goods, and the right amount is 
the amount that promotes the activities of the soul, i.e. contemplation 
and moral virtue. A distinction is made in NE between the greater 
amount of external goods needed for the life of moral virtue than for 
the contemplative life,9 and this distinction is not found in ЕЕ, as 
Aristotle is concerned in ЕЕ only with the life of perfect happiness. 
The amount of external goods required for perfect happiness is not 
stated in MM, but there are no reasons for thinking it to be different 
from NE and ЕЕ. 
In NE, ЕЕ and MM it is held that the ideal life means a life of 
happiness throughout life until death and requires that man should 
live until old age. In MM and ЕЕ, however, Aristotle does not involve 
himself with the tortuous problem of whether one can call a life happy 
where a man at some point lost happiness due to severe and frequent 
disasters and then recovered his reputation over a long and complete 
period of time. In ЕЕ and MM he also does not discuss the problem 
of calling a man happy during his lifetime, but accepts the obvious 
meaning of Solon's saying not to call a man happy while he is still 
alive. 
6
 Cf. Ch. 5 n. 40 supra. 
7££VIII , i i i , 16, 1249 b 16-21. 
SNEX, viii, 9-10, 1178b33-1179a9. 
9NEX, viii, 4, 1178 a 23-34. 
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Thus, whereas there is a clear difference in emphasis between the 
account of external goods in NE as compared to ЕЕ and MM, the 
fundamental doctrine in all accounts is the same. The account in NE is 
strongly influenced by Aristotle's Platonic heritage, and the problem 
he attempts to solve dialectically in NE I, χ is of Platonic and 
traditional making. The absence of this discussion in ЕЕ and MM 
may be taken together with other evidence as an indication of 
progress away from Aristotle's Platonic heritage. 
(b) Chance and intuition 
The most fundamental difference in the role played by chance in 
NE as compared to ЕЕ and MM is the absence in NE and presence in 
ЕЕ (VIII, ii) and MM (II, viii) of a complex theory of intuition, which 
is used to explain why some people are apparently happy by chance. 
While non-continuous success in action, which is contributory to 
happiness, may be the outcome of pure chance, continuous success is 
held in ЕЕ to be the outcome of a kind of intuition of goodness or 
God. It was seen that there is no reference in MM to the theory of 
non-continuous success due to chance and that MM contains the same 
doctrine as ЕЕ in regard to the intuition of goodness or God, only 
more clearly and concisely expressed. 
The kernel of this theory may be recognized in two sentences in 
NE X, ix (a chapter that appears to have been added to the rest of NE 
at a later date). There Aristotle refers to the kind of nature that 
inclines towards good action as resulting from divine causes for those 
who are truly fortunate.10 It would appear that he is referring to the 
kind of nature that is open to God's final causality and acts virtuously 
by an irrational impulse. Thus, while the theory of intuition found in 
ЕЕ and MM is not developed in NE, it seems that it is nonetheless 
implicitly present in NE X, ix. 
It has been seen, therefore, that chance plays a major role in 
determining whether a man will achieve happiness or not. Chance is 
master of the external goods which Aristotle considers to be an 
NEX, ix,6, 1179b 20-23. 
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indispensable condition of happiness. Chance is also master of the 
quality of the nature with which each individual is born and hence 
determines whether our nature will be open to the final causality of 
God. Only if we are bom with a nature open to this final causality, 
will we act well and achieve the contemplation of God. Finally, 
chance is also master of the external prosperity accidentally resultant 
from virtuous activity and required for perfect happiness. 
CONCLUSION 
- Let the wise be warned against too great 
readiness at explanation: it multiplies the 
sources of mistake, lengthening the sum for 
reckoners sure to go wrong. 
- George Eliot, Middlemarch, Book 5, Ch.45 
The present volume is the first full account of chance in Aristotle. 
The partial analyses of chance in Physics II, iv-vi that have appeared 
heretofore have been seen to be highly deficient. No previous 
treatment of chance has brought together the concept of chance in the 
physical and ethical works of Aristotle. As chance is a topic of 
importance in physics, biology, metaphysics and ethics, and dealt with 
in many other contexts also, the present study has been extremely 
wide-ranging and has necessitated the study of most of Aristotle's 
works. From the analysis a number of conclusions follow. These will 
be divided into (a) textual conclusions and (b) doctrinal conclusions 
concerning Aristotle's theory of chance, i.e. exegetical conclusions. 
Finally, in part (c) conclusions will be drawn about Aristotle's 
concept of chance in relation to the contemporary philosophical 
discussions on (i) teleology, (ii) determinism and free choice, (iii) the 
origin of life, and (iv) the order in the universe, evolution and 
quantum theory. 
(a) Textual conclusions 
Jaeger's Aristoteles...published in 1923 was the start of a series of 
enthusiastic attempts at establishing a chronology of Aristotle's 
works. However, enthusiasm for the task waned in some quarters for 
many years after some notable failures,1 when it became clear that it 
1
 The reception accorded to NOLTE, Het godsbegrip... meant that his work must be 
seen as such. However, the material he gathered could undoubtedly constitute the 
basis for a valuable study. 
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would be very difficult to establish this chronology, as many of 
Aristotle's works are composed of books dating from different 
periods, and many parts of books also date from different periods. 
However, the task has never ceased to attract many exegetes and 
needs to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, in order to improve 
the quality of the exegesis of Aristotle's work. Realistically, however, 
it seems unlikely that any single exegete at the present time could 
succeed in a lifetime in establishing a full and accurate chronology 
acceptable to the scientific world. Accordingly, all partial con­
tributions towards the establishment of a definitive chronology must 
be considered as of value. Any exegetical work that does not take 
account of the status quaestionis of the chronology of Aristotle's 
works must at this stage appear seriously defective. Hence con­
siderable attention has been devoted to the chronological question in 
this volume and this has led to a number of conclusions. 
In the present volume an attempt has been made to show the 
meaning of τύχη and ταΰτόματον for Aristotle. The investigation 
required a detailed study of Phys. II, iv-vi, from which it appears that 
Phys. II, iv-v constitute Aristotle's original treatment of chance in the 
Physics, and that II, vi was added on at a later stage when II, iv-v were 
partially revised. 
Given that Phys. II, vi is to be dated later than Phys. II, iv-v, all of 
the major texts in Aristotle's works relating to τύχη and ταύτόματον 
were examined, and it was seen that there is some likelihood that 
Phys. II, vi is to be dated to the same period as Met. Z(VII), vii-ix and 
Met. Л(ХИ), iii, i.e. towards the end of Aristotle's career, but before 
De An. and De Gen.An. 
It is therefore incorrect to hold in an undifferentiated manner, as 
did Jaeger, that Phys. II is to be dated early in Aristotle's career.2 
On the basis of a detailed study in Ch. 5 it was seen that there is 
considerable evidence to show a marked evolution between Phys. and 
2
 JAEGER, Aristoteles...Ъ\ 1: "Damit ist unwiderleglich erwiesen, daß nicht nur das 
zweite Buch der Physik...,sondern eine vollständige Reihe von Untersuchungen, die 
unter dem Gattungsbegriff φυσικά zusammengefaßt wurden, bereits um 347 be-
standen hat." 
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Met., on the one hand, and De Gen. An., on the other hand, in regard 
to Aristotle's theory of chance substances. This evolution is seen in 
regard to the cause of monsters and the development from random to 
spontaneous generation. 
It was seen also that it is highly unlikely that ЕЕ VIH, ii and MM 
II, viii are early writings of Aristotle, since Aristotle does not, as he 
otherwise would, refer to the theory of chance contained in them in 
other early accounts of chance (e.g. Rhet. I, v, 17, 1361 b 39 - 1362 a 
12; Rhet. I, x, 12-13, 1369 a 32 - b 5). Furthermore, the account of 
chance in MM II, viii was seen to mark a development in meta­
physical thought over ЕЕ VIH, ii. This metaphysical advance is one of 
the indications that Aristotle himself was the author. This evidence 
provides a partial refutation of the theory that ЕЕ and MM are early 
works and that Aristotle abandoned the theory of chance in ЕЕ VIH, ii 
and MM II, viii when he wrote NE. On the contrary, the likelihood is 
that at the time he wrote NE Aristotle had not yet developed the 
theory of chance found in ЕЕ VIII,ii and MM II, viii. We have, 
accordingly, evidence here (to be taken with the other evidence) that 
the correct chronological order of Aristotle's ethical works is NE, ЕЕ 
and MM. 
It must be supposed that ЕЕ (VIII,ii) antedates Phys. II, vi (197 b 
32-33), as Aristotle denies in the latter passage as evident that one 
could have τύχη by nature (φύσει), whereas he discusses the question 
at length in ЕЕ VIII, ii before coming to a conclusion. On the other 
hand, the unqualified statement in Phys. II, ν that good fortune is 
inconstant and not always or for the most part (197 a 30-32) shows 
that Aristotle had not yet raised the question of continual good fortune 
as found in ЕЕ VIII, ii and MM II, viii. 
It was seen in the discussion of MM II, viii how Aristotle pursued 
the gradual application of his metaphysical theory even to the extent 
of stating that receiving good luck is essentially (καθ' αυτό) a piece of 
luck, whereas to escape an evil is a piece of luck accidentally (κατά 
συμβεβηκο?). The persistent application of his metaphysics to the end 
of his life is best known from Aristotle's application of the 
hylemorphic theory to man in the De Anima. In De An. Aristotle 
reduces the Platonic substantial soul, in which he had believed for 
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most of his life, to the status of the form of the body, which is equated 
with matter. This theory marks an important stage in Aristotle's 
evolution away from Platonism. 
Finally, it was seen that only in MM does Aristotle observe the 
fact that chance, the source of external goods in all his ethical works, 
is incompatible with the account of chance given in Phys. II, iv-vi, 
since it is not unusual and does not have a per se cause and is not 
accidental to a per se cause. Only in MM does Aristotle recognize the 
existence of the term chance in the sense oí not being a cause, i.e. as 
not genuinely providing an explanation of external goods, i.e. as the 
material cause of the preSocratics or 'the way things are'. Only in 
MM does Aristotle recognize this meaning of 'chance', although he 
uses it in NE and ЕЕ, and only in MM does Aristotle contrast this 
meaning of chance with that found in Phys. II, iv-vi, which he holds to 
be the proper meaning of chance. There are, accordingly, solid 
grounds for holding that Aristotle's theory of chance is found in its 
most advanced form in MM. 
In Ch.4 §viii it was also seen that Aristotle had not yet developed 
the theory of hypothetical necessity at the time of writing APo II, xi. 
In this chapter Aristotle states that there are two kinds of ανάγκη, one 
being the material cause and the other being force (βία), and he even 
denies the theory of hypothetical necessity by denying that that which 
comes about for a purpose comes about by necessity. It would appear 
from the text that hypothetical necessity had been recently discovered 
by him at the time of writing PartAn. I, i, 642 a 1-13. 
From a careful analysis of the text of Phys. II, iv-vi it was seen that 
there are a number of incompatibilities between chapters II, iv-v and 
II, vi. It follows that the text of these three chapters, if their final form 
is to be attributed to Aristotle, must constitute rough notes and have 
been revised in haste. If the text in its present form is to be attributed 
to Aristotle, it is striking that its inferior presentation contrasts 
sharply with the profundity of the thought contained therein. The most 
obvious solution to this anomaly is to suppose that Aristotle dictated 
his lectures in such a way that every word could be written down and 
that the extant works of Aristotle are the lecture-notes taken down by 
students. It need then only be supposed that after Aristotle's death 
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different sets of notes were collated,- and rather imperfectly collated -
out of respect for the text of the master.3 It is in fact difficult to avoid 
this conclusion, as one can hardly suppose that Aristotle himself 
would have revised his own text in such a manifestly unsatisfactory 
manner. It may be said, then, that the discovery that Phys. II, vi was 
collated to Phys. II, iv-v after Aristotle's death casts new light on the 
editorial activity of Andronicus of Rhodes (or such other editor as 
may have been responsible for the present text). 
From the present study, accordingly, it has proved possible to 
attain an insight into the structure of Phys. II, to discover with some 
degree of likelihood when Phys. II, vi was written, to trace the 
evolution of Aristotle's theories on chance substances from Phys. and 
Met. to De Gen.An., to obtain evidence for the authenticity of MM 
and the relative chronology of the ethical works and to cast light on 
the time of discovery of hypothetical necessity and on the method of 
composition or origin of Aristotle's works. 
Finally, the elucidation of the fact that τύχη in Phys. II, iv-v and in 
other works frequently means 'chance' and not 'luck', the analysis in 
Ch. 3(b)(i), which shows that the phrase ταύτόματον και τύχη 
merely means 'chance', and the objections raised in Ch. 1 §ii to many 
current translations of τύχη and ταύτόματον must mean that the 
currently most widely used translations of Aristotle will require 
revision. 
(b) Doctrinal conclusions 
Aristotle's account of chance events is metaphysical and 
epistemologica! in nature. Chance is not a substance or aperse cause, 
since it does not exist in the strong sense. For every event, including 
chance events, there is a per se cause, which is either nature (фиочс) 
3
 Cf. ToRSTRiK, IJept Ti^s·...469-470, who holds that the text of Phys. II, iv-vi is 
one of the most corrupt in the whole Aristotelian corpus and that an editor brought 
together two separate versions of Aristotle's thought. 
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or intellect (voûç).4 Both are per se and efficient causes. However, 
Aristotle points out that substances and events cannot be explained 
only by means oí per se causes, since there are innumerable acci-
dental causes of every substance and event. For example, the cause of 
the statue is the sculptor, but equally the cause is Polyclitus.5 The 
cause of the death of the cat was the car. But equally the cause of the 
death of the cat was the fact that it crossed the road at the time the car 
was passing. There are innumerable accidental causes of every 
substance and event. While they are true causes, the kind of 
explanation sought by an enquirer usually means that it is unnecessary 
to mention accidental causes at all. Only in some cases is it thought 
necessary to mention a few of the accidental causes. In providing an 
explanation for a chance event, however, Aristotle points out that it is 
necessary to name both the per se cause and the significant accidental 
cause. In the case of a chance event it is the significant accidental 
cause that is viewed as the most important part of the explanation, 
because it is seen as of immediate relevance to man's goal in life. 
Thus the man recovered money from his debtor by chance because he 
decided to go to the market-place (per se cause), but above all 
because his debtor happened to be there (accidental cause). 
4
 Phys. II, vi, 198 a 1-10. Thus Aristotle supports the view of those who say that 
for everything that occurs by chance there is an αίτιον ώρισμένοι· (196 a 2) - a term 
which may be understood as a per se or "substantial" cause. ROSS, Aristotle's 
Physics..A\ writes: "Aristotle recognizes the existence of chance, not as a cause or a 
type of cause, nor as a breach in necessary causation, but as a type of sequence whose 
general character is that an action or movement, by virtue of some concomitant that 
happens to accompany it, exceptionally produces a result which, though it was not 
aimed at, is of a kind that might naturally have been aimed at." Ross here writes too 
hastily that chance is not a cause - it would be correct, however, to maintain that 
chance is not a substantial or existing cause. It cannot be accepted that Aristotle is not 
up to date, as held by CRAEMER-RUEGENBERG, Die Naturphilosophie...53, who holds 
that the theory of substance makes Aristotle's thought "very limited" and prevents 
him from understanding causal chains. In fact per se causes and the accidents οι per 
se causes are of fundamental importance in the analysis of the procedures of human 
thought. 
5
 Phys. II, iii, 195 a 32-35. 
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Thus Aristotle defines chance as an accidental cause. It is not the 
per se cause of a chance event, since it is an accident. But it is the 
cause of an event being seen as relevant to man's purpose in life. 
Thus the chance meeting with one's debtor and consequent recovery 
of money is relevant to the achievement of happiness. Aristotle views 
chance as a cause. His identification of chance as a cause fits in well 
with his dialectic. In Greek (as in English) one speaks of an event 
occurring 'by chance', as if chance were an agent. When it is said, 
e.g. by Democritus, that the order in the universe is due to chance, the 
term 'chance' is undoubtedly felt to be a substitute for an efficient 
cause and to serve as an explanation. In Aristotle's time the notion of 
chance as an agent was also no doubt stronger due to traditional 
views. By applying his dialectic to the view of the many and the wise 
that chance is an efficient cause, or a substitute for an efficient cause, 
Aristotle distils the truth, which is that chance is indeed a cause, but 
an accidental cause. 
The recognition by Aristotle that per se causes alone are not 
sufficient to provide a total explanation for events, but that the 
innumerable accidents also provide an explanation, may be said to be 
of extreme importance. While the accidental causes of events are 
usually entirely or largely neglected, as seen above, the accidental 
cause in the case of a chance event is the cause of primordial 
significance. Thus Aristotle explains chance in an entirely satisfactory 
manner in terms of his hylemorphic theory. In spite of its importance, 
however, Aristotle's application of his hylemorphic theory to chance 
has in no previous investigation been studied at all adequately.7 
Aristotle's next achievement consists in his recognition of the fact 
that chance always refers to a teleological context, as seen in Ch. 1 
§§(v) and (vi). This achievement will be dealt with more fully in 
section (c) of this Conclusion. The teleological context is clear from 
the fact that chance is accidental to nature (substances) and intellect 
6
 Necessity ('Ανάγκη) was also referred to as a kind of personal power by e.g. 
Empedocles, Parmenides and other poets and religious teachers. Cf. GUTHRIE, A 
History...ll, 163. 
7
 JUDSON, Chance. ..98-9, however, points out the importance of the topic. 
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(decisions), both of which are per se causes and orientated towards an 
end. 
Aristotle recognizes that only unusual occurrences are said to 
come about by chance (Ch. 1 §iii). His division of events into those 
that occur always or usually, and those that occur unusually, is of 
inestimable importance. Quite apart from other far-reaching con-
sequences, there would be no (unusual) accidents or chance, if the 
division of events into those that come about unusually and those that 
come about always or usually were not an essential dichotomy in 
thought. 
Aristotle's recognition of the fact that only very few events are 
meaningful to human beings is also of fundamental importance (Ch. 1 
§v). The number of meaningless events is unlimited. People generally 
do not recognize this fact, because they pay no attention to meaning-
less events, such as the coincidence of regaining one's health and 
having one's hair cut, or washing oneself while a solar eclipse is 
taking place. 
One of Aristotle's most profound observations is that intelligibility 
and purpose go together (Ch.l §v). If there is no potential connection 
of purpose between two occurrences, it is absurd, i.e. meaningless to 
connect them. Thus one would declare the individual who said that he 
had washed himself in vain because the sun did not go into eclipse to 
be not merely ridiculous, but mad. Such an individual would risk 
being locked up because he was not obeying and was endangering a 
fundamental law of human nature, which is to seek to understand 
events, i.e. to interpret them in such a way as to make it possible to 
promote the achievement of one's goal in life. All thought is 
orientated towards man's purpose in life, and whatever occurrences 
cannot be interpreted as relevant to this purpose are meaningless. 
Aristotle concludes, then, rightly that chance is a term applied to 
events that are both (i) unusual and (ii) meaningful (i.e. that appear 
relevant to man's purpose or goal in life). 
In the further elaboration of chance, Aristotle sets out from his 
fundamental observation that only substances and human decisions 
have a purpose (are teleological in nature)(Ch.l §viii). Accidents, 
therefore, do not have a purpose nor could they have a purpose, since 
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they are nothing in themselves. Chance, being an accident, does not 
have a purpose in its own right. It is the per se cause that is the cause 
in its own right of an event that is viewed as due to chance. However, 
chance, i.e. the unusual, striking or meaningful accident that concurs 
with the per se cause, may be called an accidental cause. It is due to 
the continual human search for means to goals that the human in­
tellect picks out the significant unusual accident that offers a means to 
a goal and calls it 'chance'. 
One of Aristotle's major achievements is the foundation he gives 
for the fact that chance events are inherently unpredictable (Ch. 1 §x). 
Science is only ofthat which occurs always or for the most part. Since 
only unusual occurrences are said to come about by chance, the 
occurrence of chance events can therefore not be reduced to a science. 
Science is an instrument for predicting the future (in order to enable 
man to achieve goals). But prediction of the future, inasmuch as the 
future will involve the unusual, would imply the reduction of the 
unusual to a science, which is a contradiction in terms. The unusual is 
by definition unexpected. Since not all meaningful occurrences can be 
subsumed under what usually happens, it follows, therefore, that the 
future cannot be predicted. Since the occurrence of chance events 
cannot be reduced to a science, chance events must necessarily occur 
unexpectedly and are intrinsically unpredictable. 
These may be said to be the most important elements in Aristotle's 
analysis of chance events, which has hitherto never been understood 
or explicitated in a manner that was even remotely satisfactory. 
If we tum now to the ethical works, we find that Aristotle refers to 
chance as the 'source' or 'explanation' of external prosperity 
(literally: the 'master' (των ектос αγαθών, ων ή τύχη εστί κυρία, 
1206 b 34)), as seen in Chapter 6. In this sense it means no more than 
'the haphazard'. It is simply the way things are. In another words, it is 
the material cause of the preSocratics. This meaning of chance is not 
mentioned in Phys. II, iv-vi and is incompatible with the metaphysical 
explanation of chance given there. There is no per se cause of chance 
as the cause of noble birth, beauty etc. Nor is chance in this sense an 
accidental cause or unusual. Thus one of the senses of chance in the 
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ethical works is not referred to in Phys. II, iv-vi. This fact has never 
been observed before. 
It appears, therefore, that there is to be found in Aristotle's works 
what I may refer to as a 'hard' and a 'soft' meaning of chance. The 
'soft' meaning of chance is the metaphysical explanation found in 
Phys. II, iv-vi. The 'hard' meaning is that of the material cause, the 
purely inexplicable, for which no metaphysical account is available. 
More will be said of this distinction below in dealing with Aristotle's 
rejection of Democritus' view that the order in the universe is 
attributable to chance. 
It is important to note that Aristotle apparently was neither aware 
in NE and ЕЕ that his use of chance in the hard sense was 
incompatible with his account of chance in Phys. II, iv-vi nor in Phys. 
II, iv-vi that his metaphysical explanation of chance was not 
applicable to the hard sense (chance as source of external prosperity) 
as found in the ethical works. It would appear that in NE and ЕЕ he 
used 'chance' as source of external prosperity in a prephilosophical 
sense. He did not question the popular use of the term 'chance' as an 
'explanation' for the inexplicable, i.e. why one person is born noble, 
beautiful and intelligent and another is bom poor, ugly and stupid. He 
adopted the popular use of 'chance' as a substitute for the material 
cause. 
In ЕЕ VIII, ii Aristotle is seen discovering a second meaning of 
chance in relation to external prosperity (cf. Chapter 7(a)). There he 
attributes to good fortune (chance) the external prosperity or success 
that results unexpectedly as a by-product of morally virtuous action 
based on a good ορμή and directed by the final causality of God. This 
type of chance (good fortune) fits in with the account given in Phys. 
Π, iv-v. Thus the per se cause of such chance external prosperity is 
the ορμή and the unusual accident is the successful outcome. 
In MM, finally, Aristotle accepts that there are two meanings of 
chance. Firstly, there is the hard meaning of chance (chance in the 
sense of the material cause) and, secondly, there is the soft meaning 
of chance (chance as source of external prosperity that is a by-product 
of virtuous action). Only in MM does he recognize both of these 
meanings of chance and only in MM does he contrast them. Of the 
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two, he holds that the soft meaning is the more proper and that the 
hard meaning is chance only accidentally. 
Thus only in MM does Aristotle show awareness that the hard 
meaning of chance is incompatible with the soft meaning. In ЕЕ and 
in MM, but not in NE, he gives a second account of chance (good 
fortune) as the source of external prosperity that is compatible with 
the theory of Phys. II, iv-vi (the soft meaning). In MM, finally, he 
declares this second account to be the 'more proper' account and the 
hard meaning of chance to be chance accidentally. It is clear, 
therefore, that Aristotle (if the chronology I have argued for is 
correct) was displeased at the existence of the hard sense of chance, 
when he became aware of it (in MM), and reduced its status to that of 
an 'accidental' sense of chance, while at the same time he developed a 
second theory of chance as source of external prosperity (in ЕЕ and 
MM) which is compatible with the soft or metaphysical theory. 
Undoubtedly the doctrine of MM represents an attempt to coordinate 
the hard and the soft meanings of chance and to downgrade the hard 
meaning as much as possible. 
It was seen, then, that Aristotle in MM acknowledges the 
existence of the hard meaning of chance used in both NE and ЕЕ, in 
which works he is seemingly not aware of its incompatibility with the 
soft meaning. The next step in understanding the hard meaning would 
consist in asking the question why people seek an answer to the 
inexplicable and give the answer 'chance' rather than 'there is no 
answer'. This question is not raised by Aristotle. 
In the present volume an attempt has been made for the first time 
to trace the development of the theory of chance in Aristotle's ethical 
works. This led to the discovery of the existence of the hard meaning 
of chance and its incompatibility with the soft meaning. It is clear, 
then, that in no previous study was it understood that Aristotle 
distinguishes between them only in MM and that MM provides his 
metaphysically most advanced treatment of chance. 
Turning then, finally, to Aristotle's analysis of chance substances, 
it may be said that his analysis presents difficulties due to the fact that 
he tries to see them as parallel to chance events. 
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In Chapter 5(d) it was seen that monsters and spontaneous 
generation, which are chance substances, can only with difficulty be 
fitted into the explanation of chance events given in Phys. II, iv-vi. 
Difficulties are that monsters and spontaneous generation are not as 
unusual or as spontaneous as chance events. The unusual category in 
the case of monsters and both the manner of production of the formal 
cause as well as the unusual category in the case of spontaneous 
generation also do not fit in well with the theory of a chance event. 
In no previous study have chance substances been studied qua 
chance substances. Aristotle's theory of chance substances has, 
furthermore, in the past been lamentably misunderstood. Finally, no 
attempt had hitherto been made to compare Aristotle's theory of 
chance substances with his theory of chance events, although 
Aristotle seeks to draw a parallel between them. 
In conclusion, it may be said, then, that Aristotle's study of chance 
is extremely wide-ranging. Chance is a metaphysical concept of the 
first order and plays a role in the analysis of causes, events and 
contingency. It plays a major role in the fields of ethics and biology, 
but also plays a role in many other areas, e.g. in the writing of plays in 
Poet., as seen in chapter 3. Aristotle's greatest contribution to the 
study of chance unquestionably lies in his account of chance events. 
On the basis of the investigation undertaken in this volume it may 
safely be asserted that his analysis of chance events has at no point in 
the history of philosophy been remotely equalled. The depth of his 
analysis is such that it has hitherto not even been adequately 
understood. 
The present volume could have been concluded here. However, I 
attach value to showing that Aristotle's analysis of chance events and 
chance substances is not merely of historical interest, but, on the 
contrary, highly relevant to some of the most disputed and important 
contemporary philosophical discussions, as will now be seen. 
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(с) Aristotle's concept of chance and contemporary philosophical 
discussions 
It is clear that the topics to be dealt with in this section can only be 
treated extremely briefly. No attempt will be made to do full justice to 
the topics in question, since a separate volume would be required for 
each. The aim is simply to show, within the space of a few pages, the 
importance of Aristotle's views for the topics in question. 
(i) The teleologica! context of Aristotle's theory of chance 
It is not the purpose of this section to give an account of teleology, 
but merely to argue that Aristotle's situation of the concept of chance 
in a teleological context is one of his most important contributions to 
the analysis of the concept. 
It was seen in Chapter 1 §x how Aristotle points out that the 
number of accidents pertaining to any substance is indefinite. Most 
purposeless events or coincidences are never even observed by man, 
since they are irrelevant, i.e. lacking in meaning, because human 
beings are interested only in what contributes to their aim in life. 
Thus, it was seen how Aristotle cites the coincidence of someone 
regaining his health and having his hair cut, or again the coincidence 
of someone washing himself when a solar eclipse is taking place. 
There is no connection between these events, as the second event 
cannot assist the accomplishment of the first, and hence one cannot 
say that the second event in each case occurred by chance. 
It was seen also (Chapter 1 §v) that man at all times interprets 
everything he comes into contact with in terms of its function within 
the perspective of his aim in life.8 This aim, as Aristotle points out in 
his ethical works, is ευδαιμονία, a term which means not merely 
happiness, but the full flowering (full realisation, in metaphysical 
terms) or perfection of man. Whatever does not or cannot serve this 
8
 Cf. JUDSON, Chance...92: "Our aim of understanding the world about us - of 
making sense of the operations of nature and the strategies of rational agents -
requires us to distinguish pieces of behaviour which are reliably connected with those 
operations and strategies from those which, even if they appear to be, are not." 
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purpose is never examined by man, as it would not be rational to do 
so. A rational investigation is one which contributes to man's aim of 
existence in the best possible condition. This remark applies also to 
science, which being a subordinate part of human activity, is never 
disinterested. All scientific aims and hypotheses are ideological,10 i.e. 
a subordinate part of man's striving to exist in the best possible 
condition. 
Chance, then, is the term applied to an unusual accident which 
human beings or other per se causes encounter in their pursuit of 
goals. It is a term that indicates that the accident in question is 
meaningful, i.e. contributes to (or takes from) the achievement of the 
goal of the per se cause. Without the goal of the per se cause, i.e. 
without a teleological context, there could never be such a notion as 
chance. This discovery by Aristotle is of fundamental importance. 
The notion of chance accordingly implies the existence of goal-
orientated per se causes. In fact all per se causes are goal-orientated, 
since the only per se causes are substances and human decisions, and 
the latter are always taken for a purpose. It may be added that 
Aristotle indicates in certain passages that the notion of substance is 
best applied to living beings. In Phys. II, i he limits the concept of 
natural substance to animals, plants and the four sublunar elements." 
The four sublunar elements may be viewed as possessing soul, as will 
be seen in the next section.12 Again, in Met. Z(VII), vii Aristotle states 
that human beings and plants are what correspond best to the concept 
of a substance (ουσία).13 If the term 'substance' applies properly or 
9
 Reproduction is not the primary aim of living beings. Cf. supra Ch. 5(c)(ii) p. 154 
and n.89. MONOD, Le hasard...!! also claims incorrectly that reproduction is the 
"projet téléonomique essentiel" of living beings. 
10
 Cf. DEBROCK, Enkele beschouwingen..A66: "In tegenstelling echter met wat 
Kant beweerde, vereist het technisch denken een doelgerichte instelling, en wel in die 
zin, dat zonder doelgerichtheid geen wetenschappelijk denken mogelijk zou zijn." Cf. 
CHARLES, Teleological causation... 122: "...what it is to be a rational agent is to be one 
who given that G is a goal, does Al...An (if they lead to G) in favourable conditions." 
11
 Phys II, i, 192 b 8-11. Cf. also Mei Д( ), iv, 1015 a 13-15. 
1 2
 Cf. De Gen An. Ill, xi, 762 a 18-21 discussed supra ρ 181 n.60). 
13
 Met Z(VII), vii, 1032 a 18-19. On the meaning of substance cf. further my 
article Substance, Nature and Time... 
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best only to living beings, and if the only other per se causes are 
human decisions (the source of concepts and artefacts), then it is not 
difficult to see that all per se causes are goal-orientated and that 
chance therefore must be an accident of a goal-orientated per se 
и cause. 
Aristotle's view of chance may now be compared with those of 
Bertrand Russell and J.S. Mill, as outlined in the Introduction to this 
volume. The major difference between their views is that Aristotle 
situates chance in a teleological context, whereas Russell and Mill did 
not. 
Russell's definition of a chance event as one, the cause of which is 
unknown (cf. Introduction) is lacking, because to define a chance 
event this way is merely to renounce the search for the cause of the 
event (as when we deliberately renounce the search for the causes of a 
coin falling heads or tails to determine which side will start a game 
and leave the outcome to chance).'5 
J.S. Mill held a chance event to be the outcome of the concurrence 
of two independent causal chains (cf. Introduction). However, the 
concurrence of two (or indeed an indefinite number of) independent 
causal chains is lacking as a definition of a chance event, because it 
fails to take into account the underlying search for goals which makes 
man attribute to chance and indeed notice only a very limited number 
of causal chains.16 
The teleological context presupposed by chance is not the only 
aspect of Aristotle's theory of chance that has been attacked or 
rejected. Ross attacks Aristotle's distinction between the usual and 
the exceptional: "The defects of Aristotle's treatment of chance are 
evident. The distinction between the usual and the exceptional is 
14
 If the only per se causes are substances and human decisions, and if the term 
substance is limited properly to animate beings, then apart from animate beings the 
sublunar world of Aristotle may be compared to Sartre's Being, since it is subject to 
determination by human beings. 
15
 This use of chance is that of Democritus - cf. infra (c)(iv). 
1 6
 For further criticism of Mill's interpretation cf. NAGEL, The Structure of 
Science. ..326-9. 
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unsatisfactory..."17 However, Ross' criticism appears to be invalid. 
All human calculations are based on the usual. However, the 
indeterminate numbers of accidents relating to all per se causes are 
almost all unusual. We never notice most of them, because they are 
irrelevant to our goals in life. But wherever an accident strikes us and 
is picked out by us, this is because it is relevant to our goals, and it is 
this that we call 'chance'. Such an accident is exceptional. We do not 
refer to the usual as occurring by 'chance', since that which occurs 
usually can be calculated, whereas a chance event cannot. The 
concept of chance is, therefore, dependent on Aristotle's distinction 
between the usual and the exceptional. It is also dependent on the 
teleological context of man's pursuit of goals, since all exceptional 
occurrences referred to as 'chance' events are the outcome of the 
coincidence of an unexpected accident with a per se cause that is 
seeking to achieve a goal. 
It may be concluded, then, that any attempt to understand chance 
outside the teleological context of man's search to achieve his goal of 
continued existence in the best possible condition, must be deficient. 
This is undoubtedly one of Aristotle's most important contributions to 
the analysis of the concept.18 
(ii) Aristotle's rejection of determinism 
Once again, it is not the purpose of this section to give a complete 
account of any topic, but to give a brief account situating the results 
of this volume and showing their significance for the discussion of 
freedom and determinism. 
Determinism may be divided into (a) determinism due to final 
causality, and (b) determinism due to efficient causality. This intro-
17
 Ross, Aristotle...77. Ross, ¡bid., claims incorrectly that Aristotle "treats the 
existence of the exceptional as due to the capacity of matter for receiving more than 
one determination." His remark is relevant at most to the mere material cause of the 
existence of monsters and spontaneously generated living beings. 
18
 Cf. NAGEL, The Structure ofScience...325, who gives as the first meaning of 
chance an account borrowed from Aristotle. 
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ductory section will deal mainly with Aristot le 's rejection of deter-
minism due to final causality in the sublunar area. 
Determinism may be defined as the theory that all events occur 
necessarily, i.e. the theory that the past could not have been different 
and that, given a certain past, the future is already determined. Its 
corollary is that all past and future events could be known if one 
could put all facts about the universe into a sufficiently powerful 
computer or an intellect such as Leibniz 's God.1 9 Given this defi-
Cf. PEIRCE, Collected Papers...6.37. SORABJI, Necessity, cause and blame...ix 
defines determinism as "the view that whatever happens has all along been necessary, 
that is, fixed or inevitable." A. MANSION. Introduction...328-9, defends a determinist 
point of view except that he admits human free choice (i.e. his position is that referred 
to by William James as 'soft determinism'): "Pour que la causalité du hasard pût être 
ramenée au même schéma que celle des causes naturelles, il faudrait - et ce serait 
d'ailleurs une condition suffisante - que chaque être de l'univers y eût sa place 
naturelle fixée dans l'ensemble non seulement de façon générale, comme c'est le cas 
pour les éléments, mais jusqu'à sa détermination individuelle, comme c'est le cas 
pour les astres. Du coup il n'y aurait plus de différence entre la nature et le hasard; ou 
plutôt...il n'y aurait plus dans le monde de hasard du tout. Et, par voie de 
conséquence, la science, telle que la conçoit Aristote, serait à même d'énoncer les lois 
qui dominent la production de tous les êtres individuels et de chaque événement 
d'ordre naturel...Etant condamnés à ignorer les dispositions actuelles de tous les corps 
de l'univers qui peuvent influer par leur action sur tel événement, nous regardons 
celui-ci comme contingent, en tant qu'il est strictement imprévisible. S'il ne répond 
pas aux prévisions plus ou moins probables que nous fondons sur la connaissance que 
nous avons des causes propres et normales de phénomènes de telle ou telle sorte, nous 
le mettons de ce chef au nombre des faits accidentels. Les faits normaux, tout comme 
les faits exceptionnels, sont représentés à ce titre comme faits contingents, les uns et 
les autres. Chacun d'eux aurait pu, en effet, ne pas arriver: le fait normal, parce 
qu'une cause accidentelle et imprévisible aurait pu y faire obstacle; le fait 
exceptionnel, de même, puisque les causes accidentelles et tout aussi imprévisibles 
auxquelles il est dû, auraient pu ne pas jouer. En tout ceci il y a, en outre, dans l'esprit 
d'Aristote, une certaine confusion [!] entre la nécessité logique et la nécessité réelle. 
Ses exposés trahissent une tendance à les rapprocher à l'excès, de manière à 
transformer en contingence l'incertitude inévitable à laquelle nous sommes 
condamnés, quant à la détermination des détails de la réalité." Ib. 330-1: '"D'autre 
part, quand dans une de ces séries l'ordre est rompu par la production d'un être ou 
Гаррагапсе d'un phénomène, l'un et l'autre dissemblables à ceux qui forment les 
termes d'une série normale, il n'y a pas là une exception au déterminisme; car une 
telle interruption est due,...à l'action du hasard en tant qu'il s'identifie à la nécessité 
brute. On conclura donc que, malgré les apparences (!), le système péripatéticien est 
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nition, it is certain that Aristotle rejected determinism. To quote just 
one well-known passage, he writes in De Int.: "Whatever is, is and 
whatever is not, is not, necessarily; however, that every being should 
be and every non-being should not be, is by no means necessary"20 
His standpoint, based on the results of earlier chapters, will now be 
set out in detail. It will be seen, firstly, that Aristotle rejects 
determinism based on final causality in the sublunar area. His 
rejection of determinism based on efficient causality will then be the 
subject of the next three subsections. 
In the superlunary area, the heavenly bodies exist by absolute 
necessity, i.e. the necessity belonging to eternal things, as seen in Ch. 
4 (ii).21 They also move by absolute necessity, not only because the 
ether of which they are made encounters no opposition in its natural 
movement, but also because the final causality of the Unmoved 
Mover encounters no opposition in the superlunary area. Absolute 
necessity of movement means absolute predictability. However, 
Aristotle holds that there are strict limitations to the action of this 
final causality in the sublunar area. 
In the sublunar area the final causality of the Unmoved Mover 
operates directly with absolute necessity only on becoming as a 
whole, i.e. on species (in the extended sense of types of becoming).22 
The final causality of the Unmoved Mover also operates indirectly 
with absolute necessity on becoming as a whole, because the sun and 
déterministe en ce qui concerne le monde physique, parce qu'il met dans l'ensemble 
des causes productrices d'un effet une influence à la fois nécessaire et nécessitante, 
influence qui doit aboutir à cet effet et à cet effet seulement." 
20
 De Int. ix, 19 a 23-25. Cf. 19 a 7-22. SORABJI, Necessity, cause and blame...2\-
22 incorrectly holds that this passage asserts the necessity of the present and the past. 
In fact the first part of the passage is no more than a reiteration of Parmenides' logic. 
Cf. S. MANSION, Le jugement d'existence...7>\l\ KNEALE and K.NEALE, The 
development oflogic...92-3. 
21
 On comets and other sublunar and subethereal phenomena cf. SOLMSEN, 
Aristotle's system...399, 411-2. 
22
 No doubt the notion of a necessary phenomenon composed exclusively of 
contingent parts is untenable. It is unnecessary to enter into further detail, however, as 
the theory of necessary types of becoming is untenable anyway. Cf. VERBERE, 
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the moon which move by absolute necessity due to the final causality 
of the Unmoved Mover (as well as the efficient causality of the 
heavenly bodies) in turn cause the cycle of becoming by efficient 
causality, as seen supra Ch. 4 §ii and ix. 
The final causality of the Unmoved Mover also operates on all 
living beings in the sublunar area, but without producing absolutely 
necessary results.23 It would operate with absolute necessity, i.e. 
everything in Nature would happen always, and not merely usually, 
except that it is frequently prevented from doing so, as seen in Ch. 4 
§7. 
The final causality of the Unmoved Mover also acts on inanimate 
beings, e.g. stones, in the sense that rectilinear movement is 
interpreted by Aristotle as being an imitation of circular movement, as 
seen supra Ch. 4 §ii and ix. This final causality also does not produce 
absolutely necessary results in the case of the individual. 
Finally, Aristotle also writes that matter desires form, thereby 
implying that the final causality of the Unmoved Mover also acts on 
matter.24 There are two objections to this view, which require to be 
answered. Firstly, the manner in which the Unmoved Mover can 
exercise final causality on matter may be considered obscure, since it 
is not endowed with specific soul. Hence it has been claimed that 
Aristotle's statement that matter desires form is metaphorical.25 
However, this claim is incorrect, since it has been seen that Aristotle 
adopts a hylozoist standpoint.26 Given that he understands matter to 
contain 'soul principle' (soul in general), there is no reason not to take 
the statement that matter desires form at face value.27 Secondly, it is 
Nécessité de la génération . 205 MoNOD, Le hasard. 54-5 defends a point of view 
very similar to that of Aristotle without being aware of its unsoundness 
23
 Reproduction is the manner in which the individual living being seeks the 
eternity of the Unmoved Mover Cf De An II, iv, 415 b 3-7; De Gen An II, ι, 731 b 
24-732 a l . 
2 4
 Phys I, ix, 192 a 20-23 
2 5
 Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics...I, cxxxvii Cf. SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and 
Blame. ..164 
2 6
 Cf. supra Ch. 5 (cXn) ρ 159 and notes 60-62 
2 7
 This is the interpretation of MOVÍA, L'Anima.. 298. The origin of the notion is 
Platonic In favour of this interpretation it may further be pointed out that Aristotle 
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questionable to what extent one can speak of matter as being 
'something' at all (or a 'substance' in Aristotle's terms),28 i.e. the 
problem is that if matter is not a substance, there is nothing for the 
final causality of the Unmoved Mover to exercise its final causality 
upon. However, Aristotle holds that matter is a reality and a quasi-
substance.-9 As it is a reality, there is no reason why matter should not 
be attracted by final causality. This attraction of matter by final 
causality also makes it possible to explain the movement of inanimate 
elements by means of final causality. Given that soul is required for 
attraction by final causality, there is no way that the movement of 
types of becoming (e.g. air changing into water) or the movement of 
the elements (e.g. the rectilinear movement of a stone) can be 
interpreted as movement by final causality, unless it is the 'soul 
principle' (soul in general) in their matter that makes these otherwise 
inanimate realities move in imitation of circular movement.30 
views movement as a kind of life in all natural beings (Phys. VIII, i, 250 b 14). HAPP, 
Hyle...72 n.311, 294, 538 n.82, and 771 has no hesitation in speaking of the desire of 
matter for form (the desire of that which is lacking, such as the female and ugliness, 
for that which is not lacking, such as the male and beauty). Cf. also CHARLTON, Phys. 
l-ll ...92, who writes that Aristotle "thinks that the material of a thing can be a source 
of change because it has an active tendency to change independent of any external 
cause." Aristotle also emphasizes the unity of movement and order in the universe 
(Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), χ, 1075 a 16-25, Gertet Corr. II, x, 336 b 12.) Cf. THEILER, Ein ver­
gessenes Aristoteleszeugnis...130: "Nicht ausgesprochen ist, daß auch alle evvXa είδη 
göttliche Bestimmtheit in der durch den Umlauf der Planetensphären angeregten 
Weltveränderung erstreben." 
28
 Cf. supra Conclusion (c)(i) p.250 and nn.l 1-13. 
29
 Phys. I, ix, 192 a 6: έγγύ? και ούσίαΐ' πω?. 
3 0
 Cf. HAPP, #y/e...774-5: "Die Hyle ist also nicht negativ-indifferent das 'Nicht­
Haben' der Form, sondern 'Formverlangen' und somit - da nach Möglichkeit je eine 
höhere Form erstrebt wird - das Vollkommenheitsstreben des Unvollkommenen; am 
schönsten hat dies Aristoteles phys. α 9, 192 a 3-25 formuliert. Die sprachliche Form 
der Negation, mit welcher das Wesen der Hyle bezeichnet wird (άμορφοι', άπειρον, 
ατελές usw.), ist also zugleich Ausdruck der Sehnsucht zum Vollkommenem. Deut­
lich sichtbar ist dieses Streben, wie schon öfter gesagt, im Kreislauf der Elemente und 
in der endlosen Kette von Werden und Vergehen, womit das sublunare Sein die 
Ätherbewegung nachahmt. Träger des 'Verlangens' und damit die eigentliche 'Trieb-
feder' dieses riesenhaften kyklischen Prozesses ist die Hyle. Da man diesen Kreislauf 
'Geschichte' nennen kann, ist also die Hyle der Faktor des Geschichtlichen im 
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These objections having being dealt with, it may now also be said 
that the final causality exercised on matter by the Unmoved Mover 
does not produce absolutely necessary results, since this attraction is 
often prevented from achieving regular results. 
To sum up, it may be said, therefore, that in the sublunar area the 
final causality exercised by the Unmoved Mover is frequently 
prevented from achieving the effect it would otherwise have on living 
beings, inanimate beings and matter. Determinism due to final 
causality is, therefore, not to be found in the sublunar area. 
It will now be seen that Aristotle also rejects determinism due to 
efficient causes in the sublunar area because of three realities, namely 
(i) human free choice, (ii) unusual accidents, (iii) chance. 
(a) Human free choice 
It is not the purpose of this section to give a detailed account of 
Aristotle's interpretation of free choice, but rather to situate free 
choice in the teleologica! context that became clear from the 
examination of chance and to show that the indeterminist inter­
pretation of freedom, or freedom reduced to chance, is vastly less 
satisfactory than Aristotle's view. 
It was seen in Ch.I §10 that one of the causes of the 
unpredictability of the future is freedom of choice. It is true that 
human beings are subject to the final causality exercised by their 
good. Rationality is, then, the law dictating that human beings must 
act in function of a good. The better one is, the less freedom one has, 
since one will act constantly as required by the good.31 However, 
human beings are not all so good that they act constantly as required 
by the highest good and furthermore often have to calculate what is 
the right course of action (or 'the good') in a given situation. Thus in 
Aristotle's example in Met. E(VI), iii, the man who eats pungent food 
will get thirsty and must go to the well. The only rational thing to do, 
aristotelischen Sein. Dieses Vollkommenheitsstreben der Hyle ist...die aristotelische 
Umwandlung des platonischen Motivs von der όμοίωσις· θεώ..." Cf. also BAEUMKER, 
Das Problem der Materie...263. 
31
 Met. Λ(ΧΙΙ), χ, 1075 a 19-20. 
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if one is thirsty, is to go to the well (in Aristotle's example). However, 
Aristotle points out that the choice of pungent food was free (i.e. 
based on a personal analysis of the good and the means to the good). 
Thus a free choice (or other contingent event) precedes a series of 
rational (logical) or necessary causes. Aristotle is concerned in the 
chapter in question with the accidental or contingent origin of a series 
of causes that is viewed as necessary from a given point onwards, 
because logically required by a final cause. 
For Aristotle humans beings are not the servants of science (the 
analysis of reality with a view to ascertaining the means to happi-
ness), because they determine for themselves their own good (as it 
appears to them) and the means to achieve this good. This is the 
meaning of free choice. Only after the good and the means to the good 
have been determined - freely determined - is man obliged to take 
these means, because that is what is rational and is what we mean by 
the rational thing to do (as opposed to acting in an irrational or mad 
way).32 
Free choice is therefore to be situated in the teleological context of 
man's striving for the good. Man is free to calculate for himself the 
means to his good as seen by himself. Only his own interpretation of 
the good and his personal calculation of the means to achieve it have 
any claim on him. It will now be seen that this interpretation of 
freedom is vastly superior to the interpretation of freedom as 
attributable to chance, i.e. the indeterminist view. 
The indeterminist view is represented by Epicurus and William 
James. As pointed out in the Introduction, C.S.Peirce was aware of 
the affinity between his position and that of Epicurus. 
32
 FINE, Aristotle on determinism...577 writes: "When Aristotle says that voluntary 
actions have an internal origin and are up to us, he does not imply a break in causal 
necessitation at any point." Fine's Stoicising interpretation of Aristotle (cf. ibid. 578) 
is incorrect. Human action is not necessitated (or 'caused' in the sense of 'causally 
necessitated'). The selection of a course of action by a human being is made on the 
basis of a judgement of what contributes to a good, the good being more or less 
objectively good, the judgement being more or less accurate, and the moral strength to 
take a decision being stronger or weaker. Only the perceived good has the power to 
impose itself on man and it does not necessitate the choice of means to this end. 
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In the case of Epicurus one may note, firstly, that the explanation 
of our world and others like it and of human free choice by means of 
arbitrarily swerving atoms is, of course, naive in the light of modern 
knowledge.33 But even in the light of the knowledge available in his 
own time Epicurus cannot escape the criticism that to make free 
choice dependent on the clmamen is to make it ¿rational and 
arbitrary, and hence to destroy freedom, not save it, as has been 
pointed out.34 Possibly Epicurus wished to account for the un-
predictability of the actions of the individual and of the development 
of human society. But this cannot be done by assuming the existence 
of arbitrarily (i.e. orationally) swerving atoms. 
William James also held that (his notion of) chance or 
indeterminism in nature is a condition for human free choice 
Although he did not equate human choice with random occurrences,35 
the fact that he did not do so leaves his position ambiguous3 and not 
It may be noted that Epicurus, apart from his famous theory of the clmamen, 
also uses chance in a number of other contexts in a seemingly non-philosophical 
context (i e in the sense in which chance is used by the man in the street to refer to 
the unexpected) For a list of passages cf BAILEY, The Greek Atomists 305 
34
 Cf FURLEY, Two studies 232-3, LONG, Hellenistic philosophy 56-61 (LONG, 
ibid 60, is undoubtedly right in holding against FURLEY, ibid 232-3, that every free 
act involves a swerve), SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame 18 Cf GlGERENZER, 
The empire of chance 282 "Decisions or actions that are arbitrary, accidental and 
completely inexplicable, as opposed to actions determined by identifiable motives or 
reasons, are hardly a convincing instantiation of human freedom " 
35
 Cf BIRD, William James 152-3 "James' intention is surely to say that the 
future can be affected by our choices, and that possible futures of that sort may be 
superior to other possible futures to which our choices make no contribution For the 
determinist strictly such talk of alternative possible futures is excluded This is why 
James's unclanty over the term 'chance' is not m the end a serious hazard to his 
argument He argues essentially for the minimal indeterminist position, that is one 
which allows for non-determinate futures, in the belief that this at least makes 
possible a human choice affecting those outcomes He is not required to equate 
human choice with mere random occurrences, but only to hold that the denial of 
determinism allows for the possibility of human choice " 
36
 Cf BIRD, William James 149-150 "It is all the more surprising, therefore, that 
he [sc James] deliberately uses the term 'chance' to mark the feature which 
determinism denies and indeterminism requires To speak of a 'chance' or 'random' 
event in the physical sphere might conflict with a determinist belief that every 
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more satisfactory than that of Epicurus. The same criticism holds for 
C.S. Peirce's postulate of tychism or absolute chance as a prerequisite 
of human free choice.37 
The unsatisfactory nature of the indeterm in ist interpretation of 
freedom will not be dealt with further here, since the aim here is 
merely to point out that the introduction of chance to explain human 
freedom is unsatisfactory. Aristotle did not use chance to explain free 
physical event is governed by law. But there is no reason to equate such chance events 
with what we ordinarily call 'free', 'voluntary' actions. This yields a fundamental 
ambiguity in James's discussion which he partially admits. For indeterminism might 
be formulated in at least two ways, either as 
(3) Some events have, or can be given only, a probability of occurrence which 
equals the probability of their non-occurrence. 
oras 
(4) Some events are governed by voluntary human choice. 
(3) expresses an indeterminism which might be confined to the physical realm, 
while (4) canvasses such a doctrine restricted to the realm of human action. (3) and 
(4) are not even extensionally equivalent. The class of equi-probable events under (3) 
is not identical with the class of events governed by human choice under (4). Some of 
the former, a penny's falling heads or tails uppermost, are not matters of choice, and 
most of the latter are not equi-probable. 
James never explicitly resolves this confusion in his discussion. He uses the term 
'chance' sometimes to mean 'random probability', and sometimes to mean only the 
'hope' of some desirable outcome, sometimes in accordance with (3) and sometimes 
in accordance with (4). He never considers the difficulty in his argument that 
'random' or 'erratic', or 'unpredictable' behaviour on the part of some person, which 
might satisfy (3), is often a sign not of a free agent but of someone in the grip of some 
pathological condition which inhibits voluntary choice. He further underlines these 
difficulties by his use of the term 'novelty' and by saying such things as that the 
words that an author writes are 'novelties' in the sense that they surprise him. 
Nevertheless James acknowledges the awkwardness in this terminology. He is 
throughout very defensive about his term 'chance', and says at one point: 
"Well, I admit there may be just a dash of perversity in its choice. The spectacle of 
the mere word-grabbing game played by the soft deterministe has perhaps driven me 
too violently the other way." [TWB 179] 
37
 Cf. PEIRCE, Collected Papers...6.61: "On the other hand, by supposing the rigid 
exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little - be it but by a strictly 
infinitesimal amount - we gain room to insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into 
the place where it is needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, 
it is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence; and in so doing we resolve 
the problem of the connection of soul and body." 
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choice. On the contrary, he saw that a chance event was accidental to 
a free choice (or other per se cause). 
In this section it was seen that Aristotle's view of free choice 
belongs in a teleological framework. It was seen that his interpretation 
of free choice is vastly more satisfactory than the introduction by the 
indeterminists of chance to explain free choice. It is also clear that 
free choice contradicts the determinist standpoint. Aristotle's 
treatment of free choice will therefore not be dealt with in greater 
detail here. It will now be seen that Aristotle holds that all events in 
the sublunar physical world are also contingent and that there is 
therefore a further reason why Aristotle rejected determinism. 
(β) Unusual accidents 
The aim of this section is not to deal with accidents in detail, but 
merely to show that unusual accidents are incompatible with the 
determinist standpoint and hence that free choice is not the only form 
of contingency in the world. 
The fundamental cause of all movement in the universe is the final 
causality of the Unmoved Mover. But this final causality causes those 
objects on which it acts to cause many other movements by efficient 
causality (βία). Such movements by efficient causality are, therefore, 
accidents of the working of the final causality of the Unmoved Mover. 
When an animal in search of its food kicks a stone, the movement of 
the stone is an accident (caused by βία) of the movement of the 
animal, which moves by final causality (attracted by food). 
It was seen in Ch.4 (x) that Aristotle holds that a variable accident 
of a purposeful development (natural substance) does not itself have a 
purpose. An animal has an eye by hypothetical necessity, but the fact 
that the eye in question is blue or another colour is not for a purpose. 
An accident, not having an existence of its own, cannot have a 
purpose (of its own). 
Whatever is not for a purpose cannot be foretold and is not subject 
to scientific knowledge. Thus, whereas it can be foretold that an 
animal will search for food (by analysis of its logos), it cannot be 
foretold from scientific analysis that on the way to its food it will kick 
262 CONCLUSION 
a stone, since the kicking of the stone is accidental to the movement 
by final causality. 
In his description of the battle of Waterloo, which to a large extent 
is an analysis of chance, Victor Hugo holds that Napoleon would have 
emerged the victor, if it had not (by chance) rained during the night 
before the battle Faced with this kind of statement, one can only 
reply, as would Aristotle, that countless factors might have altered the 
outcome of the battle.19 The countless accidents which are not for a 
purpose are not subject to scientific analysis. 
Aristotle holds that only that which occurs always or usually can 
be reduced to a science and predicted. Science has been developed as 
an instrument to aid man in his search for happiness. Science is 
purpose-orientated. Hence, whatever does not serve a purpose, such as 
the colour of an animal's eye or a stone kicked by an animal (in 
relation to the logos of the animal) falls outside the domain of science 
and cannot be predicted. Of course, one might decide to make a 
Les Misérables, Deuxième partie, Livre premier, III, Le 18 juin 1815 "S'il 
n'avait pas plu dans la nuit du 17 au 18 juin 1815, l'avenir de était changé Quelques 
gouttes d'eau de plus ou de moins ont fait pencher Napoleon Pour que Waterloo fût 
la fin d'Austerlitz, la Providence n'a eu besoin que d'un peu de pluie, et un nuage 
traversant le ciel à contresens de la saison a suffi pour l'écroulement d'un monde " 
Similarly Bertrand RUSSELL, Reply to criticisms 738-9 states that the best example he 
knows of a chance event which had large consequences was the German decision in 
1917 to allow Lenin to go to Russia The theoretician of war, General Carl von 
Clausewitz, claims that the chance failure of the Prussian general York to meet up 
with the French general Macdonald at the end of the 1812 campaign in Russia led to 
his conversion to the Russian side, which in turn swayed Prussia to the allied side, 
which led to the fall of Napoleon and thus changed the whole history of Europe In 
The Campaign of 1812 in Russia 251 he comments on this event as follows 
"Although we are not inclined to attribute the phenomena of this world each to an 
individual cause, but rather to consider them ever as results of many co-operating 
forces, so that the failure of a single member never produces a total alteration of the 
entire frame, we must still admit, that great results have often arisen from apparently 
trifling causes, and that a cause standing by itself, and therefore the more exposed to 
chances, has had very universal effects " This account of a chance event is close both 
to Epicurus' clinamen and to the notion of chance as the material cause, ι e the totally 
inexplicable 
3 9
 Cf A MANSION, Introduction "ill, who refers to "l'action imprevisible des 
causes accidentelles " 
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scientific study of animals kicking stones. But here again the 
accidents of the events under study, e.g. when a given stone kicked by 
an animal will roll down a mountainside and kill someone, are scien-
tifically unpredictable. 
It is true that the domain of science is continually being extended 
and that it is man's aim to reduce all events to a science, i.e. to see all 
occurrences in relation to his purpose in life, namely survival in the 
best possible condition. However, on Aristotle's principles such an 
aim can never be fully achieved, since there can be no science of the 
accidental (the unusual accident). In harmony with this view Aristotle 
also holds that variable accidents do not have a purpose, as stated 
above. 
One of man's preoccupations, however, is the prediction of the 
future, since future occurrences are relevant to his aim of survival in 
the best possible condition. The only way man can predict the future 
is by means of science. He examines per se causes and their effects. 
Each per se cause, when it acts, also brings about countless accidents. 
Man can attempt to reduce the most important of these accidents to 
per se causes and to a science as well. But the prediction of the future 
is impossible because there are innumerable accidents of every per se 
cause that acts. Therefore the future can never be predicted. 
Aristotle's standpoint can be illustrated by a more extensive 
example than he provides himself. Lightning struck a house and 
caused an old woman living in the house to have a heart-attack and 
die. Her death caused her dog to miss his meal, and his hunger caused 
him to steal meat in a butcher's shop. The theft caused the butcher to 
run after the dog into the road. The appearance of the butcher in the 
roadway caused a car to swerve and knock over the stand of a fruit-
seller. Now it is true that this sequence of events would not have 
occurred if lightning had not struck the house of the old woman. 
Furthermore, the chain of events is logical and the explanation in each 
case adequate. Yet not one of the events that occurred could have 
been known scientifically or predicted in advance either by man or by 
the most highly perfected computer, because in each case the 
sequence of events consists of an unusual accident (side-effect) of a 
per se cause. 
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Of fundamental importance is the fact, then, that Aristotle defends 
the view that events that cannot be known scientifically are 
contingent, i.e. not necessary.40 Thus Aristotle's standpoint is not just 
that of William James' soft determinist, i.e. that human free choice 
provides an exception in an otherwise determined world. This 
remarkable standpoint, which is that of thinkers as diverse as Thomas 
Aquinas and Hume, is a priori very far-fetched. Why should only 
humans not be determined in an otherwise determined world? 
Aristotle rejects both "hard" determinism and the notion that only 
human free choice forms an exception in a determined world. He 
defends the view that every event not subject to science, i.e. that 
inherently cannot be predicted by science, is contingent. However, no 
event can be made the object of scientific thought with its entire 
wealth of accidents, but only if the accidents are peeled away or 
neglected. Events can only be predicted by science if accidents can be 
neglected. Events as such, i.e. with their wealth of accidents, are 
accordingly unpredictable and therefore contingent. Thus all events 
are contingent, and not merely human free choices. Unusual 
accidents, of which an indefinite number inhere in every per se cause, 
mean, therefore, that the future is inherently unpredictable and is 
contingent, i.e. unusual accidents show that the determinist standpoint 
is incorrect. 
De Int. ix, 19 a 35 - 19 b 4. The choice of explanation of an event post factum 
depends on human free choice, since, as the Stoics pointed out, every substance in the 
universe contributes to every event in a way. It would be thought highly unsatis­
factory to claim that the fruit-seller's stand was knocked over because an old woman's 
house was struck by lightning, because people usually want simple explanations for 
every event. One might also account for the butcher's action in a wide variety of 
different ways, e.g. by saying that he was in debt and could not afford the loss of a 
piece of meat, or by saying that he hated dogs. Every event is explicable by an 
unlimited number of "causes" Explanations by means of causes are therefore also 
contingent. Cf. also supra n. 32. Cf. EVERSON, L'explication..ЛЬ: "...les explications 
sont déterminées par notre intérêt..." 
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(γ) Chance 
Finally, Aristotle also rejects determinism based on efficient 
causality because of the reality of chance. Chance events are by 
definition unforeseeable, because they are not accessible to science, 
which applies only to that which occurs always or usually, whereas 
that which is determined is (at least theoretically) foreseeable and 
subject to being known by science. 
The determinist, as Aristotle pointed out, has to maintain that there 
is no such thing as chance, i.e. to reduce that which we call chance to 
necessity or the analysis of necessity knowable by science. But 
Aristotle maintains that chance, i.e. events which people attribute to 
chance, refers to events that cannot be reduced to necessity and thus 
are inaccessible to the analysis of necessity or the usual which we call 
science. Aristotle points out that the number of accidents or relations 
of a substance is unlimited. Almost all of the accidents of a substance 
are unusual and hence cannot be part of scientific knowledge as seen 
in Ch. 4 §xi. 
All human activity (including scientific thought) is carried out for 
the sake of happiness (or better: our full perfection), the goal of life. 
Whenever an unusual event (a substance meeting with an accident) 
occurs that strikes the mind - that is in search of means to its goal - as 
being related to happiness (in contrast to the indefinite number of 
events not related to happiness), humans refer to such an event as a 
chance occurrence. But such events are not subject to scientific 
knowledge, because they are unusual, and hence are not determined. 
As stated in the last section, Aristotle relates necessity 
(determinism) to scientific knowledge. That which is determined is 
knowable (and theoretically foreseeable). That which is essentially 
unforeseeable is not predetermined. 
It may be noted that chance is closely related to free choice, 
because something is said to occur by chance when it is perceived to 
be related to man's purpose in life, which is the end in function of 
which free choices are made. For example, a man decides that it is 
conducive to his happiness to dig a hole to plant a tree. However, 
while digging the hole he discovers buried treasure by chance/luck 
and devotes his energy to prising open the treasure-chest and counting 
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the gold coins rather than to planting the tree. This is because the 
discovery of treasure, upon reflection, constitutes in his eyes a short­
cut to the happiness which he had originally decided to seek by 
planting a tree. At all times human beings are adapting their course 
towards their goal. The event (the discovery of treasure) is therefore 
viewed as a 'lucky' chance event because of its choiceworthiness 
(being an object of free choice). 
Thus it follows that the two reasons for rejecting determinism 
dealt with in sections (i) and (ii), namely free choice and unusual 
accidents, are each in their own way presupposed by the term 
'chance'. There could be no chance if there was no free choice, and 
there could be no chance, if there were no unusual accidents. 
(δ) Conclusion 
It has been seen, therefore, that for Aristotle determinism due to 
final causality is not to be found in the sublunar area and that three 
realities are incompatible with determinism by efficient causes in the 
sublunar area, namely (i) human free choice, (ii) unusual accidents, 
and (iii) chance. These three realities are closely related. Every 
examination of the causes of an event is due to a free choice. An 
alteration in the course of events or in the goals being pursued occurs 
when a chance event occurs, i.e. when someone sees a shortcut on the 
road to happiness by pursuing a different logical chain of thought. 
Finally, there will inevitably be countless accidents of any series of 
causes examined, the ramifications of which are not subject to 
scientific investigation. 
For Aristotle, as seen above, free choice is not the only exception 
to determinism, but so too are unusual accidents and then, of course, 
chance, which depends on both. Since they are not subject to science, 
they are contingent. Thus Aristotle concentrates on the world as it is 
known by human beings, and holds that only that which is subject to 
being known scientifically is determined and only that which is 
determined can be known scientifically. Future sublunar events 
cannot be known scientifically to the extent that they involve free 
choice, unusual accidents and chance and to this extent in Aristotle's 
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eyes are contingent. Thus for Aristotle the question of determinism 
and of contingency depends on epistemological considerations. 
Aristotle opposes Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and 
Democritus and doubtless other preSocratics by clearly limiting the 
role of necessity in the sublunar world both in the area of free choice 
and in the physical world. However, it should be noted that these 
preSocratics cannot be classified (in James' terms) as "hard" 
determinists, as is clear from their ethical theories. No ancient 
philosopher (including Zeno of Citium) can be classified as a genuine 
hard determinist.41 
It has been held that "an event is necessary, given its cause" " But 
it is rather the case that innumerable events are unpredictable and that 
no event can be predicted with certainty, and thus they are not 
necessary. As Aristotle points out, there is a per se cause for every 
event that occurs. But there are also innumerable accidents that 
determine every event. The accidents are almost all unpredictable. 
Science, therefore, is only possible to the extent that the accidental 
causes can be excluded (from a prediction of the future). Events are 
contingent because per se causes alone are not sufficient to explain 
them. However, when they have occurred, they can always be 
explained by the appropriate causes, which are chosen on the basis of 
their plausibility. 
41
 On the hard determinist view in Antiquity cf. SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and 
ВІате.ЛТ. 
4 2
 FINE, Aristotle on determinism...569. The same view is put forward by A. 
MANSION, Introduction...325: "dans l'ordre naturel, dans la mesure où en sont exclues 
les interventions dues à l'action humaine, le déterminisme causal règne en maître, 
sans aucune limitation." Mansion is here confused by the unlimited explicability of 
events post factum, and appears not to realize that Aristotle emphasizes their 
unpredictability in advance. Mansion wrongly holds that Aristotle must have held the 
same view as Avicenna! 
43
 Cf. MONOD, Le hasard...55: "En disant que les êtres vivants, en tant que classe, 
sont non prévisibles à partir des premiers principes, je n'entends nullement suggérer 
qu'ils ne sont pas explicables selon ces principes...La biosphère est à mes yeux 
imprévisible au même titre...que la configuration particulière d'atomes qui constituent 
ce caillou queje tiens dans ma main." Cf. SORABJI, Necessity, cause and Ыате...УІ: 
"What is important is that, in the...sphere of human conduct, there should be actions 
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The final causality of the Prime Mover does not necessitate the 
events that occur in the sublunar world, but merely the general 
orientation of the sublunary world (repetition of kinds of events). 
Aristotle establishes a teleological framework or general orientation 
for sublunar activity, but holds that the detail is filled in by events that 
are not determined. Hence his philosophy of history is cyclical or 
repetitive as regards species or kinds of events, but rectilinear as 
regards individuals.44 Because events involving free choices, unusual 
accidents and coincidences occur continually and constitute the 
starting-point of that which can result in an unpredictable outcome, 
final causes are unable to achieve the absolute determination which 
they would otherwise achieve.45 
It is remarkable that there is a tendency to interpret Aristotle as 
both a metaphysical and an epistemological determinist, although in 
reality he is neither. Ross, for example, whose work has been admired 
for several generations, writes: "And on the whole the treatment of 
chance in the Physics does not imply the existence of contingency. 
Every event is represented as following determinately from causes of 
its own. A goes to the market for sufficient reasons; so does B. But 
from A's point of view B's being there (though not his own being 
there) is a chance event, since it flows from causes of which A knows 
which are explicable without being necessitated." In the case of human beings one 
should not identify the explanation of an action with a cause, as does SORABJI, ibid., 
238, since the fundamental cause is free choice and the action is otherwise not 
specifically human. 
4 4
 Gen. et Corr. II, xi, 338 b 6-10. Ross, Aristotle...81 claims that the cyclical 
series of events is metaphorical, but there are no grounds for thinking that this is the 
case. 
4 5
 Cf. FREDE, The limits of determinism...220: "That Aristotle in Meta. E3 
'escapes' determinism by introducing accidental (and therefore 'uncaused') causes 
seems to me undeniable. But I do not think this implies that Aristotle would otherwise 
have to consent to a system of mechanical, Democritean necessities. What would be 
established is not the hegemony of necessitating efficient causes but rather the 
totalitarian regime of the τέλος." 
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nothing. Chance is simply a name for the unforeseen meeting of two 
chains of rigorous causation."46 
For Ross the unforeseeable is necessary, because it can be 
explained logically with hindsight. For Aristotle, however, the 
unforeseeable is contingent, because the possibility of explanation (by 
means of causes) post factum does not imply necessity in advance. 
When a man decides to go to the market to attend a theatre 
performance, he may end up spending the day recovering a debt, 
because he happens to meet his debtor before reaching the theatre4 8 
There is no chain of rigorous causation leading to the event, as Ross 
claims.49 There is only a possibility of rational explanation after the 
event. 
4 6
 Ross, Aristotle 77-8 Cf ibid Aristotle's Physics 516 ad 196 b 10-17 
"Aristotle is not claiming that there is any breach of necessity involved in such cases 
[sc chance events] " Cf CHARLES, Aristotle s philosophy of action 47 η 40 "Indeed 
Aristotle introduces such cases [sc of chance events] to show that where there is 
apparently chance, there is in fact necessitation Thus it is only qua seeker of W, that 
S's meeting Τ is not determined If all that is required for the determinist thesis is that 
there is some description of the relevant processes under which the effect is 
determined, such cases are compatible with determinism " Cf GIGERENZER, The 
empire of chance 280 "The remarkable force and persistence of metaphysical and 
epistemologica! determinism in an era of probabilistic methods and theories owes 
much to the traditional philosophical concept of knowledge in a strict sense, as it is 
found, say, in Aristotle someone can be said to possess knowledge only if it is 
established that the thing known could not possibly be otherwise " 
4 7
 Cf De Int ιχ, 19 a 7 - 19 b 4 and Ch 1 (xi) Thus SORABJl, Necessity, cause and 
blame 32 writes correctly " if some of our decisions are not necessitated, it by no 
means follows that they are uncaused and inexplicable " Cf ibid xi " a cause is one 
of four kinds of explanation " Ibid 40 "Aristotle's so-called four causes are best 
thought of as four modes of explanation " 
4 8
 Cf Gen et Corr II, xi, 337 a 34 - 337 b 7, where Aristotle introduces a 
distinction between το εσται (that which necessarily will be) and το μελλβι (text 
JOACHiM)(that which is about to happen, but need not happen) He gives the example 
of a man who may not go for a walk, although he is now about to do so 
49Against his will Ross is obliged to admit that Aristotle believed in contingency 
"There is, however, a third element in Aristotle's notion of accident which seems to 
imply objective contingency, and not merely contingency relative to the present 
imperfection of our knowledge In the history of the world there are actually fresh 
starts which are not the determinate result of anything that has preceded In De Int 9 
Aristotle argues that the law of excluded middle is not true of judgements about the 
270 CONCLUSION 
Aristotle understood that man, in striving to stay alive (to be, to 
exist) and in striving for happiness (his best state), reorientates 
himself as he thinks best after every event (e.g he recovers a debt 
although he had planned to go to the theatre) While man's ultimate 
goal remains the same, the path he will take to reach it is contingent 
and unpredictable, because chosen freely, i.e. on the basis of personal 
evaluation, and because unforeseeable events (coincidences) 
continually influence the choiceworthiness of our course of action 
Aristotle holds the profound view that science is only of that 
which man notes to occur always or for the most part. There can 
accordingly never be a science of the coincidental, since the 
coincidental is the exception to the rule and therefore can never be 
predicted. Aristotle's view may be reformulated as follows. Science is 
an instrument useful to man for the achievement of his aim in life, and 
its usefulness is as an instrument of prediction. The reason for 
explaining coincidences with hindsight is the attempt to reduce them 
to a science in order to attempt (in vain) to render other coincidences 
predictable in the future. As prediction of the future is a major 
concern for man in ensuring his survival, it is most uncomfortable for 
man to have to face the fact that the future is inherently unpredictable. 
future there is an αρχή - a genuine fresh starting-point for future events - in human 
deliberation and action In De Gen el Corr 11, 11 room seems to be left for a 
contingency not only in respect of human free will, but generally in respect of the 
details of terrestrial history" {Aristotle s Metaphysics I, lxxxi) However, Ross has 
clearly been influenced by J S Mill and Bertrand Russell and has difficulty in 
accepting that Aristotle thinks differently In Aristotle 80-1 he discusses De Int ix, 
Met E, in and Gen et Corr II, xi On De Int ix he comments "Aristotle is not an 
absolute determinist " On Gen et Corr II, xi he remarks "This evidently leaves 
much detail in the history of the world (even apart from free will) the prey of 
contingency Yet it is doubtful whether that is Aristotle's real thought"1 Again he 
writes {Aristotle 201) "Aristotle seems to believe in an objective contingency which 
is not a mere euphemism for our ignorance of the future He had no clear conception 
of a universal law of causation" Again he writes ibid 188 "Aristotle frequently 
distinguishes between the necessary and the contingent element in the universe It is 
not always clear whether he means that there are events which are objectively 
undetermined, or is distinguishing between necessity which we can trace and that 
which eludes us, but apparently he believes that in human action, at all events, there is 
an actual contingency " ' 
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That which is unpredictable could no doubt be viewed as necessary if 
it were predictable, i.e. if its causes could be grasped in advance. 
It may be said, then, that Aristotle not only was not a determinist, 
but that he provided an epistemological and metaphysical explanation 
for the inadequacy of determinism. He showed not only that human 
free choices are not the only exception in an otherwise determined 
world, but that all events on earth are in the final analysis contingent, 
since they can all be traced back to a contingent starting-point. This 
contingent starting-point can be a free choice or an unusual accident 
or chance, which can be based on both. Science is only possible to the 
extent that accidental causes can be excluded from predictions. The 
scope of science is, therefore, very limited. Science is dependent on 
the reduction of events to per se causes. However, per se causes are 
not sufficient to account for events. Events are, therefore, contingent. 
This remarkable and profound viewpoint, for which the study of 
Aristotle's concept of chance was essential, has hitherto not been 
understood. Its value for the contemporary debate on freedom and 
determinism is also beyond doubt. 
(Hi) Chance and the origin of life 
Once again, the purpose of this section is not to study a topic in its 
own right, but to point out the extraordinary extent to which 
Aristotle's views are up-to-date. In this section the relevance of 
Aristotle's theory of spontaneous generation to the most widespread 
scientific view of the origin of life will be seen. 
Aristotle set out in metaphysics from the immutability of Plato's 
Forms, which he incarnated into the forms in nature and hence 
considered to be immutable. Hence also he concluded that the world 
is eternal. Therefore, he was not open to one of the consequences of 
the notion of spontaneous generation he inherited, namely that all life 
had an origin. However, Aristotle, given his dialectical method, was 
also not willing to reject entirely the centuries-old uncontradicted 
tradition of credence in spontaneous generation as the origin of all 
life, even though it was incompatible with his Platonic principle of 
eternal forms. Instead, he accepted spontaneous generation as 
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exceptional, as part of the expression of chance in nature. It was seen 
that he appears to have held a theory of random spontaneous 
generation in his early works. 
When Aristotle, by the time of writing De Gen.An., had 
established the considerable regularity with which "spontaneously 
generated" organisms occur, he did not, however, decide to assimilate 
the generation of these organisms to natural generation. The reason 
may partly have been the invisibility of seeds, which accounted to a 
large extent for the origin of the theory. Hence he continued to view 
"spontaneously generated" organisms as exceptional, i.e. counter to 
expectation and to nature. But if Democritus could deduce the 
existence of atoms without technical instruments,50 obviously 
Aristotle could have deduced the existence of invisible seeds.51 The 
most obvious reason why he did not do so or incorporate spontaneous 
generation into his theory of the natural, was that one of the funda­
mental principles of his philosophical method was that the opinions of 
the many and the wise could not be entirely mistaken.52 Another 
reason may be the conviction from his early days that chance finds 
expression in exceptional circumstances in nature.53 
HULL, The conflict...250 n.6 observes correctly: "In general, Aristotle's lack of 
instruments has been considerably overworked as an excuse for the factual errors 
which permeate his writings." Lack of instruments is given as a reason by e.g. 
CAPELLE, Die Urzeugung..A14; GUTHRIE, Λ History...Vl, 236; GOMPERZ, Griechische 
Denker...m, 140. 
51
 THEOPHRASTUS, C.P. I, 5, 1-5 has a critical approach to the acceptance of 
spontaneous generation and is aware of the fact that some kinds of "spontaneous" 
generation may be due to invisible seeds. But he does not for a moment consider 
extending the theory of invisible seeds to all kinds of spontaneous generation, perhaps 
under the burden of tradition. On the burden of this tradition cf. BYL, 
Recherches...211'. For a detailed account of Theophrastus* standpoint cf. CAPELLE, 
Die Urzeugung...160-180, esp. 172-3. CAPELLE ibid, rightly emphasizes the important 
passage C.P. Ill, xxii, 3: πανταχού γαρ ή фдаіс ζωογονεί μιξαμένη πως· τη 
ύγρότητι το θερμον καθάττερ ϋλην ουσαν την ύγρότητα τω θερμω προς· τήν σηψιν. 
5 2
 Cf. my book Gott und θ€ωρία..Α5-19 and my article Dialectic, Language and 
Reality... 
5 3
 That Aristotle's principles were the reason he did not reject spontaneous 
generation may appear from the following observation of LOUIS, La génération 
spontanée...304-5: "...il s'en est sans doute fallu de peu qu' Alistóte n'abondonnât 
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Aristotle's attitude is reflected in his passing reference to the 
possibility that men and quadrupeds (i.e. all life on earth) might have 
had an origin, i.e. been caused spontaneously,54 a theory which he 
discountenanced, since the primary fact in his eyes was the regular 
reproduction of a man by a man. Spontaneous generation was to be 
regarded as the exception and sidelined, likewise also the possibility 
that all life had had a spontaneous origin. 
Aristotle was the foremost proponent and the great systematizer of 
the ancient theory of spontaneous generation. Due to his influence the 
theory came to be associated mainly with his name. Aristotle's theory 
of spontaneous generation - or equivocal generation, as it was called 
in the Middle Ages and in modern times - held sway, like his 
geocentric theory for over two thousand years and was only refuted 
species by species between the seventeenth and the nineteenth 
centuries. It took the efforts of many leading biologists to finally 
defeat the theory as providing an explanation for the generation of any 
given species existing at the present time.55 However, at almost the 
same time that the theory had been largely laid to rest in this form by 
Pasteur in the 1860's in favour of the old aphorism omne vivum ex 
vivo, it was made more popular than ever before in a new form by the 
success of Darwin's theories, namely as an explanation of the origin 
of life on earth. (It may be noted, however, that Darwin himself did 
not speculate on the origin of life). It is highly paradoxical that 
biologists devoted immense efforts to showing that no combination of 
favourable materials and circumstances would lead to the spontaneous 
development of living beings and that when they had succeeded 
species by species, mechanicists and dialectical materialists 
l'hypothèse de la génération spontanée. Ses remarques sur la façon dont certains 
animaux nés spontanément peuvent eux-mêmes se reproduire, montrent bien qu'il 
aurait pu aller jusqu'à renoncer à une doctrine qui ne lui était plus strictement 
nécessaire pour expliquer la formation des animaux qu'il observait." 
54
 De Gen.An. III, xi, 762 b 28-30. 
55
 Cf. FARLEY, The spontaneous generation controversy... For a brief account of 
the first modem denial of all spontaneous generation by W. HARVEY (1578-1659) to 
its general acceptance thanks to L. PASTEUR (1822-1895) cf. also CAPELLE, Die 
Urzeugung. ..177-9. 
274 CONCLUSION 
postulateci spontaneous generation under the new title of abiogenesis 
as the source of all life on earth. 
The outcome is, therefore, that Aristotle's theory of chance sub-
stances, as formulated in his theory of spontaneous generation, may 
be said to be essentially the theory defended by most contemporary 
scientists. His theory of spontaneous generation may, therefore, be 
said to be at the very heart of the contemporary debate on the origin 
of life. 
(iv) Chance, the order in the universe, evolution and quantum 
theory 
As seen in Ch. 1 §xviii and Ch. 4 §b, Aristotle rejected chance as 
the explanation of the order in the universe. He maintains the 
principle that that which occurs absolutely regularly occurs by 
necessity and therefore does not occur by chance, since that which 
occurs by chance cannot occur with absolute regularity. From this 
standpoint Aristotle concludes to a cause (in casu final causality by 
the Unmoved Mover). For Democritus the simple fact is that there is 
astonishing and very unusual order in the universe, which due to its 
psychological unexpectedness must be accounted for by a term, but 
for which he can find no explanation to hand, and so uses the empty 
term 'chance'. The dispute between Aristotle and Democritus - the 
adherents of a cause and those who reject a cause - continues to the 
present day with the adherents of both parties considering the 
conclusion of the other to be unacceptable. 
It has been seen, however, that Aristotle himself uses 'chance' in a 
prephilosophical sense meaning 'no cause' in his ethical works, where 
the term serves as an 'explanation' for the unequal division of 
external goods, such as noble birth and beauty, among people. The 
prephilosophical sense is the material cause, the mere fact that some 
things are as they are. In §(b) above I have referred to this use of 
'chance' as the 'hard' meaning. The question is, therefore, what right 
Aristotle has to object when Democritus attributes the order in the 
universe to 'chance' in the same 'hard' sense, i.e. when Democritus 
claims that there is no explanation at all for the order in the universe. 
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Aristotle's answer is, however, that the order in the universe presents 
extraordinary regularity, whereas there is no such regularity in the 
distribution of the external goods required for happiness. 
Aristotle's position may also be elaborated as follows. When one 
says that any event in the world came about by chance, one means 
that due to some cause it came about contrary to expectation 
Therefore, to hold that the order in the universe came about by chance 
(with Democritus, who first made this assertion) is to say that due to 
some cause this order came about contrary to expectation. One does 
not expect so much order in that which occurs by chance, and hence 
one feels the need of an explanation. But to say that the order in the 
universe came about by chance is precisely to feel the need of an 
adequate explanation, i.e. to assert implicitly the existence of a per se 
cause, and at the same time to deny it (since chance is not an existing 
thing) or to renounce the search for the cause (as in tossing a coin). 
Thus to say that the order in the universe came about by chance is 
implicitly to contradict oneself.56 It is in fact to imply that there must 
be a per se cause of the order in the universe (presumably also a cause 
adequate to the task) and then not to investigate or rather to deny this 
cause. This is the reason for Aristotle's objection when Democritus 
holds that everything in the world occurs by necessity (due to an 
efficient cause), but that the world itself (i.e. the order in the world) 
came about by chance (the mere material cause). Aristotle's objection 
holds in exactly the same way for the contemporary 'attribution' of 
the order in the universe to chance, given that contemporary 
scientists, in their search for an explanation, admit that this order 
could not have emerged from pure chaos on the law of probabilities in 
the space of 15 or 20 billion years, the approximate age of the 
Cf WIELAND, Die aristotelische Physik 261 "Wenn also Anaxagoras, 
Empedokles und die Atomisten, mit denen Aristoteles in diesem Zusammenhang 
vornehmlich zu tun hat, die Zweckursache nicht kennen, so sind sie gezwungen, den 
Zufall zu Hilfe zu nehmen, da sie aus ihren eigenen Voraussetzungen allein die 
Ordnung in der Erscheinungsweit zu erklaren nicht imstande sind Wer aber von 
Zufall spricht - das ist das Ergebnis aus Phys В 4-6 -, denkt selbst bereits 
unausdruckhch in teleologischen Begriffen Daher versteht auch derjenige die Natur 
noch implizit teleologisch, für den sie explizit nur ein Spiel des Zufalls ist " 
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universe according to many scientists, or indeed in many times that 
number of years. To attribute to 'chance' that for which a cause is 
sought, is to raise a question and provide an empty answer. Empty 
answers are usually considered unsatisfactory and a justification of 
such a procedure must therefore be required. 
Likewise, to maintain that life started by chance or is the outcome 
of chance (as held by Empedocles) or to maintain that there is no 
cause of the phenomenon of evolution as such (at least no per se 
cause), is not merely to deny an explanation, but is also to feel the 
need of an explanation.58 It is to deny (or renounce the search for) a 
cause to something remarkable which has occurred contrary to 
expectation and apparently with the goal or end of being (survival). 
But to deny a cause to that which inherently postulates a per se cause 
is once again implicitly to contradict oneself. It is in fact to imply that 
there must be a cause of life and of evolution and not to investigate, or 
rather to deny this cause. Aristotle argued on this basis against 
Empedocles that that which occurs by chance cannot occur regularly, 
but must have a per se cause.59 
In the explanation of the origin of life contemporary mechanicists 
and materialists resort to the concept of "chemical evolution"60 No 
reason in terms of a final cause is given as to why complex protein 
macromolecules should "evolve" continuously for millions of years to 
develop into the first living beings. But the attribution of a mere 
material cause (i.e. no cause at all) in reality provides no explanation. 
The naturalist argument for the origin of life in terms of random 
events in this chemical "evolution" is weakened because of the 
extremely improbable or quasi-impossible occurrence of protolife 
substances from a statistical point of view considering the age of the 
7
 Cf. BlRX, Interpreting evolution...275. 
58
 A. MANSION, Introduction...297, doubtless through a lapsus memoriae holds 
that Aristotle describes evolution as accidental (Phys. II, viii, 198 b 29-32). But of 
course Aristotle, as Mansion must also have seen, only set out this hypothesis in order 
to strongly deny it and refute it (Phys. II. viii, 198 b 32 - 199 a 8). 
59
 Phys. II, viii, 198 b 29 - 199 a 8. It may be noted that Darwin, like Empedocles, 
also admitted no per se cause of evolution. 
60
 BlRX, Interpreting evolution...29. 
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earth. Hence e.g. Birx, who defends the materialist and mechanicist 
view, writes that the naturalist view is no more than speculation.61 
Monod - to take another example - holds that chance, i.e. a chance 
combination of elements (by which he means a random combination, 
i.e. an unpredictable rather than a merely unknown combination) led 
to the teleonomy and order and evolution of living beings.62 This has 
already been stated to be highly unlikely. In addition Monod does not 
refer to or account for the fact that life did not arise from chaos (the 
original state of Plato's world), but from the considerable order in the 
universe that was a prerequisite for life to arise, which thereby 
heightens the unlikelihood. 
It may be said, then, that Aristotle's argument against Empedocles 
has lost nothing of its cogency. It is also precisely the criticism that is 
today frequently levelled by the scientific and philosophical world 
against Darwinian evolutionary biology.63 Thus it is entirely up-to-
date. 
It has been seen, accordingly, that Aristotle's interpretation of 
chance constitutes to the present day a fundamental objection to the 
attribution to chance of the order in the universe, the origin of life and 
61
 BlRX, Interpreting evolution..33. Cf. also AYALA, Teleologica! explanations...5: 
"...the combination of genetic units which carries the hereditary information 
responsible for the formation of the vertebrate eye could never have been produced by 
a random process like mutation. Not even if we allow for the three billion years plus 
during which life has existed on earth." 
62
 Cf. MONOD, Le hasard...WQ-2 esp. 112: "Hasard capté, conservé, reproduit par 
la machinerie de l'invariance et ainsi converti en ordre, règle, nécessité." Monod's use 
of language is unphilosophical. But it is clear that he is unwittingly postulating ърег 
se cause of order. What else could convert 'chance' into order? 
6 3
 Cf. SHANAHAN, Chance as an explanatory factor..2A9: "One of the most 
persistent criticisms of Darwinian evolutionary biology is that it relies for its 
explanations on the notion of 'chance'. Critics hold that appeals to 'chance' in 
evolutionary biology demonstrate the explanatory poverty of this science, because 
'chance' is simply a way of referring to events that are unexplainable. To appeal to 
'chance' is, on this view, not to offer an explanation, but rather to deny that any 
explanation is possible. In the words of Huston Smith, 'the word 'chance' denotes an 
occurrence that is inexplicable. A theory that claims to explain while standing with 
one foot...in an explanatory void is in trouble.'" See the list of critics given by 
Shanahan ibid. 
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the phenomenon of evolution as such. Finally, it will now be seen that 
the term 'chance' is also used to give a rational appearance to (i.e. as 
an explanation for) that which is defined as indeterminate. The 
relevance of Aristotle's interpretation of chance to this view will also 
be seen. 
Quantum mechanics has given rise to the question whether certain 
singular subatomic events are not inherently unpredictable (i.e. in-
volve chance) and whether the principle of universal determinism has 
not been proven false on the subatomic level. To this question it has 
been replied e.g. by Nagel that the physical universe operates 
according to highly complex laws, many of which are unknown to 
us.64 The phenomena that do not correspond to known laws may be 
merely phenomena, the laws of which have not yet been discovered. 
A theory of uncertainty in biology somewhat similar to 
Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty has also been put forward.65 
Mutations are said to occur "randomly" or "spontaneously", not in the 
sense that they occur causelessly, but in the sense that they cannot be 
accounted for in terms of the adaptive requirements of organisms.66 
Here too the objection consists in the fact that unpredictable outcomes 
may be the result of the action of unknown forces, as held e.g. by 
Lamarck67 and partially by Darwin.68 
64
 NAGEL, The structure of science...332-5. 
65
 Cf. AYALA, The mechanisms of evolution..Ai: "In this way evolutionary 
adaptation involves a mixture of variation and selection, of chance and necess-
ity...Darwin's theory implies that natural populations are made up of a more or less 
common genetic type with a few rare variants. In recent years this assumption has 
been contradicted by evidence that natural populations possess an enormous reservoir 
of genetic variation, suggesting that the role of chance in the evolutionary process is 
subtler than Darwin supposed." 
66
 Cf. AYALA. The mechanisms ofevolution...51 : "The forces that give rise to gene 
mutations operate at random in the sense that genetic mutations occur without 
reference to their future adaptiveness in the environment. In other words, a mutant 
individual is no more likely to appear in an environment in which it would be favored 
than in one in which it would be selected against." 
67
 Cf. LAMARCK, Histoire naturelle...I, 268-270. Cf. also SHANAHAN, Chance as an 
explanatory factor. ..252: "On Lamarck's view, 'chance' is an epistemological notion 
denoting ignorance of causes. As such, 'chance' has no objective reality. It is merely a 
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Aristotle's analysis of chance may be held to be relevant in this 
debate also. Aristotle postulates that there must be a per se cause of 
every chance event. This is not to postulate the determinacy or the 
predictability of a chance event.69 But it is to postulate the existence 
of a final cause, since all per se causes are orientated towards a goal. 
Thus the per se cause of a man getting his money back is his decision 
to go to the market-place. The fact that he would meet his debtor and 
get his money back was unpredictable. But he would not have got his 
money back if he had not decided to go to the market-place with 
another goal in view. No event can be inherently unpredictable except 
in the context of a final cause, because unusual accidents adhere only 
in substances and per se causes, all of which are orientated towards a 
goal.70 
If, therefore, certain subatomic events or events in the area of 
evolution are held to be due to chance in the sense of being inherently 
unpredictable, Aristotle would conclude that there not only must be a 
per se cause of the events, but that the chance outcomes are only 
possible in the context of final causality. Otherwise it is inappropriate 
to speak of a 'chance' outcome. It is, then, precisely such a context of 
final causality (the aim of survival) that Darwin appears to postulate 
for evolution when he writes: 
"[The action of selection] absolutely depends on what we in our 
ignorance call spontaneous or accidental variability. Let an architect 
shorthand way of saying that we simply do not know what the causes are in a specific 
case, although there certainly are (a set of sufficient) causes for any occurrence." 
68
 Cf. SHANAHAN, Chance as an explanatory factor..259. 
69
 Thus SHANAHAN, Chance as an explanatory factor. ..267 writes: "'Some concepts 
of chance - e.g. Lamarck's notion of 'chance' as ignorance of causes - do in fact serve 
no explanatory function [sc. in evolutionary biology!. Other concepts of chance, e.g. 
as accident, as historical contingency, and as random genetic drift, do serve important 
explanatory functions when situated in their theoretical contexts." What Shanahan is 
saying here is precisely what Aristotle holds. Chance cannot serve as a substitute for a 
per se cause (as Lamarck held). But chance has a significance as indicating the 
unpredictability of an outcome due to accidents. The theoretical context requires a 
final cause (the aim of survival) and presupposes per se causes. 
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be compelled to build an edifice with uncut stones, fallen from a 
precipice. The shape of each fragment may be called accidental Yet 
the shape of each has been determined by ..events and circumstances, 
all of which depend on natural laws, but there is no relation between 
these laws and the purpose for which each fragment is used by the 
builder. In the same manner the variations of each creature are 
determined by fixed and immutable laws; but these bear no relation to 
the living structure which is slowly built up through the power of 
selection " 7 1 
This quotation from Darwin reflects Aristotle's thought precisely. 
The per se cause which selects with a view to survival is like the 
architect who builds with a view to constructing an edifice.72 But the 
outcome will reflect chance to the extent that the per se cause comes 
into contact with materials that are haphazard and can lead to an 
Essentially this latter position may also be held to be that of С S Peirce Peirce's 
tychism is not really a horizontal principle of îndelerminism (or irrationality), but 
rather the expression of the operation of his agapism (final causality) 
71
 DARWIN, The variation of animals I, 395 Cf also AYALA, Teleologica! 
explanations 2 "Darwin accepted the facts of adaptation, and then provided a 
natural explanation for the facts One of his greatest accomplishments was to bring the 
teleological aspects of nature into the realm of science He substituted a scientific 
teleology for a theological one " Cf AYALA, ibid 10 "Natural selection can be said to 
be a teleological process m two ways Firstly, natural selection is a mechanistic end-
directed process which results m increased reproductive efficiency Reproductive 
fitness can, then, be said to be the end result or goal of natural selection Secondly, 
natural selection is teleological in the sense that it produces and maintains end-
directed organs and processes, when the function or end-state served by the organ or 
process contributes to the reproductive fitness of the organisms " Cf AYALA, ibid 11 
"The overall process of evolution can be said to be teleological in the sense of being 
directed towards the production of DNA codes of information which improve the 
reproductive fitness of a population in the environments where it lives The process of 
evolution can also be said to be teleological in that it has the potentiality of producing 
end-directed DNA codes of information, and has in fact resulted in Ideologically 
oriented structures, patterns of behaviour, and self-regulating mechanisms " Cf 
AYALA ibid 11 "The end-directedness of living organisms and their features may be 
said to be'internal'teleology " 
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 Cf AYALA, Teleological explanations 15 "His [Aristotle's] error was not that 
he used teleological explanations in biology, but that he extended the concept of 
teleology to the nonliving world " 
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unpredictable result. It may be said, then, that Aristotle's analysis of 
chance appears to be as relevant as ever in the field of biology and 
provides basic parameters of thought for the analysis of events 
thought to be indeterminate. 
(v) Conclusion 
The purpose of section (c) of this Conclusion was not to deal with 
any topic in detail, but rather to show that Aristotle's theory of chance 
is not merely of historical interest, but highly relevant to many areas 
of concern to the contemporary philosopher. As this section is no 
more than an appendix to the main study of Aristotle's doctrine, the 
areas to which Aristotle's thought is of relevance could only be 
sketched. The aim was to provide a brief overview, based on the 
results of this volume, of areas of application for Aristotle's theory of 
chance, each of which would require a separate volume, if one were 
to treat them in detail. 
This section could have been omitted from this volume, but has 
been included because of the importance of showing that Aristotle's 
analysis is of value to the solution of contemporary problems. 
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DE EVOLUTIE VAN HET BEGRIP TOEVAL IN DE 
FYSISCHE EN ETHISCHE WERKEN VAN ARISTOTELES 
EEN COMMENTAAR OP PHYS. II, IV-VI 
SAMENVATTING 
De doelstelling van dit werk bestaat er in de eerste plaats in het 
begrip toeval bij Aristoteles toe te lichten. Het begrip is van filosofisch 
belang, omdat het door veel denkers aangehaald wordt om de orde in 
het heelal, de oorsprong van het leven, de menselijke vrijheid en het 
geluk te verklaren. Daarnaast speelt het begrip een belangrijke rol in de 
fysica, de fysiologie, de verklaring van de natuur, de genetica en de 
evolutionaire biologie. Toeval is tenslotte iets waarmee iedereen 
geconfronteerd wordt en waarmee men moet leren omgaan. Toeval 
speelt ook een belangrijke rol in veel literaire werken. 
In de geschiedenis van de filosofie werd toeval op verschillende 
manieren verklaard. Toeval is een leeg en misleidend begrip volgens 
Francis Bacon. Volgens Heraclitus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, 
Democritus en de Stoa is toeval een begrip dat niet leeg is, maar hun 
determinisme ook niet tegenspreekt. Een toevallige gebeurtenis is 
volgens Bertrand Russell een gebeurtenis met een onbekende oorzaak. 
Ook J.S. Mill benadrukt het onbekende aspect van de oorzaken van een 
toevallige gebeurtenis. Volgens Epicurus zijn toevallige gebeurtenissen 
helemaal niet veroorzaakt. Ook CS. Peirce en W. James verdedigen een 
enigszins gelijkaardig standpunt. Tenslotte is er dan ook nog het 
standpunt van Aristoteles. 
Aristoteles heeft drie moeilijke en diepgaande hoofdstukken in Phys. 
Π over toeval geschreven en behandelt het begrip in bijna al zijn 
werken. Hierover is echter tot heden nog geen monografie verschenen. 
Anderzijds blijkt de actualiteit van het thema uit het feit dat 
uitzonderlijk veel Aristotelesspecialisten tot de discussie bijgedragen 
hebben. In dit volume wordt het thema uitputtend onderzocht. 
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Binnen de werken van Aristoteles is het begrip van fundamenteel 
belang, wil men zijn theorie van de natuur, zijn metafysica, het begrip 
wetenschap, zijn opvatting over de voorwaarden van het geluk en over 
het bereiken van geluk door intuïtie verstaan. Aristoteles is de eerste 
auteur die het begrip toeval onderzocht heeft en, zo wordt in dit volume 
geargumenteerd, de enige auteur die de diepgaande implicaties van het 
begrip werkelijk gevat heeft. 
In Deel I van dit volume wordt het begrip toeval in de context van de 
natuur en in Deel II in de context van de ethiek onderzocht. Hoofdstuk I 
gaat uit van de basistekst, namelijk Phys. II, iv-vi. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt deze tekst systematisch verklaard. Dit hoofdstuk en het volgende 
vormen een commentaar op de tekst van Aristoteles. Hierin legt 
Aristoteles het begrip toeval uit in termen van zijn eigen metafysica. De 
drie hoofdstukken van Phys. Π doen, vanwege hun structuur en inhoud, 
de vraag rijzen of de interpretatie van het begrip toeval door Aristoteles 
geen evolutie gekend heeft. Deze vraag wordt onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 
II. De conclusie wordt getrokken dat Phys. II, iv-v een geheel vormen en 
tot een vroeger stadium in de ontwikkeling van Aristoteles' denken 
behoren dan Phys. Π, vi. Dit laatste hoofdstuk lijkt achteraf door een 
editor toegevoegd te zijn. Op basis van dit inzicht wordt in Hoofdstuk 
ΠΙ de vraag onderzocht of het niet mogelijk is Phys. Π, vi te dateren. Dit 
hoofdstuk biedt tevens de gelegenheid alle belangrijke passages in de 
werken van Aristoteles waarin hij toeval behandelt te onderzoeken. De 
vergelijking van deze passages maakt het mogelijk de exegese ervan in 
een aantal belangrijke opzichten te verbeteren. Verschillende van deze 
passages behoren tot de moeilijkste uit het gehele corpus van 
Aristoteles' werken. Er wordt een poging ondernomen om de 
duisterheid van een reeks passages op te helderen. Aristoteles is de 
eerste denker voor wie toeval het tegenovergestelde is van 
noodzakelijkheid, zoals blijkt uit Hoofdstuk Г . In dit hoofdstuk wordt 
het begrip noodzakelijkheid uitvoerig behandeld. De betekenis van 
absolute noodzakelijkheid, hypothetische noodzakelijkheid en dwang 
wordt verklaard. Vervolgens wordt een poging ondernomen om de 
draagwijdte van Aristoteles' kritiek op zijn voorgangers te vatten. Voor 
deze laatsten sloten toeval en noodzakelijkheid elkaar niet wederzijds 
uit. Het onderzoek biedt de sleutel tot de vraag in welke mate 
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Aristoteles een determinist was. Het doel van Hoofdstuk V bestaat erin 
de verschillende soorten oorzaken te onderzoeken die een rol spelen in 
toevallige gebeurtenissen en toevallige substanties. Toevallige 
gebeurtenissen worden eerst onder de loep genomen. De twee soorten 
toevallige substanties zijn respectievelijk monsters en spontaan 
gegenereerde organismen. Deze gevallen worden grondig onderzocht. 
Daama wordt de vraag gesteld of de oorzaken die een rol spelen bij 
toevallige gebeurtenissen als parallel en compatibel beschouwd mogen 
worden met de oorzken die een rol spelen bij toevallige substanties. 
In Deel II van dit werk wordt de rol van toeval in de ethische werken 
van Aristoteles onderzocht. In Hoofdstuk VI deel (a) wordt de 
noodzakelijkheid van uiterlijke welvaart voor het geluk en het daaruit 
ontstaande risico voor het geluk verklaard. De vraag wordt gesteld in 
welke mate het geluk afhangt van toeval. Daarbij is het door Aristoteles 
ingevoerde onderscheid tussen een bron van en een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde voor geluk van fundamenteel belang. Er wordt gepoogd om 
vast te stellen welke soort en hoeveel uiterlijke welvaart hiervoor nodig 
is. In deel (b) blijkt dat het geluk ook vanuit een ander standpunt van 
toeval afhangt. Volgens Aristoteles is het voor 'het gelukkige leven' 
nodig volkomen gelukkig te zijn gedurende heel het leven en moet men 
daarenboven ook over een 'volledig leven' (bios teleios) beschikken. De 
betekenis van het hiermee bedoelde geluk en van de duur van een 
'volledig leven' wordt onderzocht evenals in welke mate de kwalitatieve 
en kwantitatieve vereisten van het geluk van toeval afhankelijk zijn. 
In twee werken (ЕЕ en MM) speelt toeval niet alleen een rol bij 
uiterlijke welvaart, maar stelt ook de bronnen van het geluk in staat hun 
doel in mindere of meerdere mate te bereiken. Dit blijkt uit Hoofdstuk 
VII. Aristoteles onderscheidt twee gevallen. In ЕЕ onderscheidt hij ten 
eerste het geval van diegenen die het geluk hebben op de juiste manier 
en op het juiste ogenblik naar het juiste doel te verlangen. Dit leidt tot 
tamelijk duurzaam geluk. Ten tweede zijn er diegenen die tegen hun 
instinct handelen en toch herhaaldelijk succes boeken, zoals het een 
dobbelaar soms lukt een reeks van zessen te gooien. Het laatste geval 
hangt af van zuiver geluk, terwijl het eerste geval eerder met een goede 
natuur te maken heeft. In MM vinden we ook een onderscheid tussen 
twee gevallen: het geluk van diegenen die een goede natuur hebben (het 
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tweede geval in ЕЕ) en geluk in de zin van diegenen die uiterlijke 
welvaart bezitten. 
In de twee korte Hoofdstukken Ш en IX worden respectievelijk de 
verschillen onderzocht tussen toeval in de lijsten van bronnen van het 
geluk in NE en ЕЕ en de verschillen in de rol van toeval in NE, ЕЕ en 
MM. 
In de Conclusie worden in de eerste plaats besluiten getrokken rond 
de datering van de werken van Aristoteles. Ten tweede wordt een 
poging gedaan om de hoofdstellingen van Aristoteles rond toeval op te 
sommen. Hieruit zouden de diepte en de juistheid van zijn inzichten 
moeten blijken. In een derde deel van de Conclusie wordt tenslotte 
gepoogd de waarde en de relevantie van Aristoteles' interpretatie van 
toeval voor onze tijd duidelijk te maken. De teleologische context die 
het begrip toeval veronderstelt wordt onderstreept. Er wordt een poging 
gedaan om aan te tonen dat Aristoteles niet alleen geen determinist was, 
zoals veel denkers beweerd hebben, maar dat hij alle gebeurtenissen in 
de ondermaanse wereld als contingent ziet, waarbij er vanzelfsprekend 
ruimte is voor menselijke vrijheid. Er wordt gewezen op de actualiteit 
van de theorie van spontane generatie in het huidige debat over de 
oorsprong van het leven. Gepoogd wordt aan te tonen dat Aristoteles' 
kritiek van toeval als verklaring van de orde in het heelal fundamenteel 
is en dat dezelfde kritiek eveneens geldt voor toeval als onderdeel van 
moderne evolutietheorieën en van toeval in de kwantummechanica. 
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